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	ABSTRACT 
Politics by Other Means: 
Economic Expertise, Power, and Global Development Finance Reform 
Jigar D. Bhatt 
 
This dissertation investigates how economic expertise influences development 
governance by examining how state economists establish methods for decision-making in global 
development finance.  It contributes to debates over expert power by taking a science studies 
approach to address two problems in existing theories and accounts of experts.  First, social 
reformers, heterodox planning theorists, and development critics from both the left and the right 
treat rationality and politics asymmetrically.  When experts fail, politics has triumphed.  When 
experts succeed, the credit goes to rationality, not politics.  Second, within this asymmetrical 
approach, investigations and explanations of expert power neglect a principal conduit of expert 
influence: their methods.  This dissertation turns the focus to economists’ efforts to establish 
their methods as governing rationales and the effects these methods engender.  Doing so allows 
us to approach particular forms of state rationality such as neoliberalism or managerialism not as 
processes of depoliticization, of intellectual rationality prevailing over political interests and 
values, but as explicit political accomplishments with both the power to bring about political 
effects and the susceptibility to being challenged.   
State economists’ efforts to establish three paradigmatic development economic methods 
in particular—governance indicators, growth diagnostics, and randomized controlled trials—and 
these methods’ effects on power relations, decision-making, and the distribution of resources 
were assessed using an embedded case study design of their use for decision-making in 
	administering a new development finance fund, the United States Millennium Challenge 
Account.  A mixed methods approach using interviews, documents, and various datasets found 
that economists could not realize the power of their intellectual rationality without exercising 
power thought to be the reserve of politicos.  Economists had to employ various strategies of 
power both to gain autonomy from bureaucratic authorities and overcome opposition from expert 
groups holding alternative rationalities.  This involved enrolling bystanders and opponents in 
their entrepreneurial efforts to establish methods.  The more opposition economists faced, the 
more power they had to exercise and allies they had to enroll.  Once enrollment was successful, 
economists’ status was elevated and their methods became indispensable to particular decision-
making processes.  These new ways of making decisions introduced different biases that elevated 
economists’ concerns, objectives, and ways of knowing.  They also impacted the distribution of 
development finance in ways that exacerbated inequality in at least the short to medium term. 
This dissertation’s focus on economists’ political work and methods has implications for 
planning practice because it opens up new political possibilities.  Rather than treating state 
expertise and public participation as antagonistic, zero-sum confrontations, planners can pursue 
democratic values by both “opening up the state” and “getting inside” methods.  If orthodox 
economists had to overcome opposition from groups of opposing experts with competing 
rationalities then other experts can likewise use political strategies to establish their methods as 
governing rationales.  Even in situations where this is not possible or desirable, understanding 
methods’ political effects can instigate reflective practice and possible change. 
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Chapter 1: A Science Studies Approach to Expertise in the State 
Introduction 
On April 9, 2014 the Center for Global Development (CGD), a leading development 
think tank in Washington, DC, hosted a debate at CGD headquarters and online on William 
Easterly’s book, The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the 
Poor, published that same year (Easterly, 2014).  Easterly, a well-known development 
economist, debated Owen Barder, a CGD Vice President and Senior Fellow, who was described 
as a development “thinker and doer”, on the following resolution: “On balance, development 
experts, with their technocratic approach and their indifference to the abuse of political power 
and of people’s rights, have harmed rather than helped the interests of poor people” (CGD, 
2014).  The audience was asked to vote on whether they agreed or disagreed with the resolution 
before and after the debate.  After one and a half hours of discussion, only two percent of 
viewers changed their minds (CGD, 2014).  
Easterly’s hyperbole, the way experts and politics are framed in the resolution, and that 
so few viewers were moved by the discussion are indicative of an impoverished debate over the 
role and influence of experts, particularly economists, in global development.  This dissertation 
aims to provide a partial corrective to how the role of experts and their influence in planning, 
policy, and development are framed and discussed.   
This chapter introduces the dissertation by describing why experts and politics are treated 
as distinct in the planning and development literature.  It then presents the dissertation’s purpose 
and the research questions driving its empirical work.  The research design and methodology 
supporting the execution of this empirical work is described next.  The chapter then provides a 
background to the case being investigated by situating it within broader trends in global 
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development finance and development economics.  Afterwards it explains the study’s conceptual 
framework and contributions to research and practice.  The chapter concludes with an overview 
of the remaining chapters in the dissertation. 
Background to the Research Problem 
This dissertation examines a paradox.  Critical theorists from both the left and the right 
critique the power of experts in planning and administration.  Meanwhile, social reformers 
bemoan that state experts are routinely ignored or dismissed by decision-makers.  And, experts 
themselves decry their lack of influence.  Why, then, if critics believe experts are so powerful, do 
they seem inconsequential by others?  This dissertation addresses this paradox by asking whether 
state experts are powerful, and if so, how, by investigating a key conduit through which expert 
influence is channeled: the methods that link knowledge with action.  My specific focus is on 
economic methods for decision-making in global development finance.    
Two major intellectual limitations have contributed to the paradox.  The first is social 
reformers’ linear rational model (Baum, 1980; Weiss, 1979).  The second is neo-marxist and 
postdevelopmental theorists’ arguments that state expertise generates a depoliticized “post-
political” condition (Beveridge & Koch, 2017; Sachs, 1992).  These groups treat rationality and 
power asymmetrically.  According to these scholars, when experts fail, politics has triumphed.  
But when experts succeed, credit goes to rationality, not politics.  As a result, rationality is 
believed to be incompatible with interests and displaces power. 
The source of this asymmetry is these scholars’ implicit acceptance of the “doctrine of 
objective knowledge”, which believes that experts’ power is based on the superiority of their 
intellectual rationality.  John Friedmann presented this doctrine elegantly in his article “The 
Epistemology of Social Practice” using Karl Popper’s philosophy of science (Friedmann, 1978).  
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Friedmann argues that the legitimizing claims of technocracy—or “rule by know-how”—rest 
with its unique epistemology, which, drawing on the name of a famous work by Popper, 
Friedmann calls “objective knowledge”.  He described these claims as follows: 
Ultimate reality is singular and integral, and its varied manifestations are capable of being 
known objectively…But the ability to make such assertions differs among people 
according to their training and vocation.  Those whose mastery of the techniques for 
acquiring objective knowledge is superior, or who have superior access to such 
knowledge, are also justified in making decisions and committing resources for those 
whose knowledge is restricted and inferior (Friedmann, 1978: 76).   
 
Friedmann (1978) argues that technocrats “transpose the abstract properties” of 
knowledge in one “world”—the world of objective thought, which is an autonomous space 
occupied by thinkers where knowledge production unfolds—to control events in another 
world—the world of physical states and historical events, which is a managed space occupied by 
non-professional doers who must obey thinkers’ commands (Friedmann, 1978).  This is the 
model social reformers and critical theorists are drawing on in their respective promotion or 
denouncement of technocracy.  Each group believes in technocracy’s ability to control events in 
the physical, or “real” world by, for example, constraining politics.  Social reformers welcome 
technocrats’ ability to limit “inefficient” partisan interests and quell dangerous populist passions 
(Centeno & Silva, 2016; Tugwell, 1954).  Critical theorists, on both the left and the right, decry 
technocrats’ ability to suppress political voice and local knowledge: the left is principally 
concerned with the threat to cultural and indigenous practices and the right with individual 
preferences and market prices (Easterly, 2007; Escobar, 2011).   
Even within this asymmetrical treatment of rationality and politics, the accounts of expert 
influence are partial.  A principal property of objective knowledge—the scientific method—has 
been neglected as a source of experts’ power (Hirschman & Berman, 2014).  Friedmann (1978) 
outlines several key properties of objective knowledge.  Objective knowledge is universally valid 
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and ahistorical.  The “truth value” of any proposition stakes out a claim that is independent of 
both time and place.  Objective knowledge is expressed in language that is codified and abstract.  
Access to it is restricted because the special language in which objective knowledge is expressed 
has to be learned through several years of arduous training narrowly available to a technocratic 
elite.  Objective knowledge is both cumulative and progressive. It is developed and refined on 
the basis of the rules of scientific method that include standards of truth, content, and validity.  
This property of intellectual rationality is more akin to praxis than thought (Oakeshott, 1991).  
This is why Popper said that scientists were like workers who added to the growth of objective 
knowledge like masons working on a cathedral (Popper, 1972).   
Studies of experts are dominated by the first two properties of objective knowledge: 
universally valid knowledge, or ideas, and codified language, or discourse.  By contrast, the third 
property of intellectual rationality, the practice of scientific method, has received far less 
attention in studies of state and development experts.  The study of the power of expert ideas is 
in its infancy but growing.  Scholars have turned to ideational explanations for political and 
policy change out of dissatisfaction with dominant approaches in political science such as 
interest group, rational choice, and historical institutionalist explanations (Mehta, 2013).  These 
scholars focus on the ability of ideas to shape individual interests and organizational objectives 
(Beland & Cox, 2010).  Meanwhile, studies of expert discourse are well-established and 
discourse analysis is the preferred medium of postmodernist scholars such as 
postdevelopmentalists and postcolonialists (Crush, 2012; Watts, 1993).   
Certain influential philosophers have inspired planning and development scholars to 
focus on expert discourse. The work of Jacques Derrida stimulated works analyzing experts’ 
language and critiquing state rationality (Harper & Stein, 1995).  Foucault spurred a whole 
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program on governmentality studies that focused on “discursive regimes” and the power of 
expert discourse to create truth and shape subjects (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991).  
Governmentality studies has been very fruitful for understanding state expertise as 
a governmental program, such as conditional cash transfers (Ruckert, 2009), and power as a set 
of social relations that draws on state power but can extend far beyond the state’s boundaries 
(Ilcan & Phillips, 2010; Li, 2007).  Studies of governmentality were one of the first and most 
important contemporary attempts to understand the nexus of knowledge, power, and the work of 
experts.  While these studies help to understand how, for example, expert discourse and 
techniques can be used to monitor populations and define normalcy and deviance, the program 
nonetheless falls short of explaining the role of experts and whether their effects had anything to 
do with knowledge construction inside state organizations.  This neglect of state experts and their 
practices is largely because Foucault had a tendency to dismiss the role of the expert agent and 
the role of the bureaucracy in power relations (Clegg, 1994; Fraser, 1981; Jessop, 2001).   
Research Problem and Purpose 
The problem this dissertation addresses is that social reformers and development critics 
fail to describe particular forms of state rationality as political accomplishments and therefore 
contingent, contestable, and changeable.  Furthermore, they understate methods as a key conduit 
of expert power.  With respect to this study’s focus on methods, it is not a problem that 
intellectual rationality has been identified as a source of expert power.  Rather, the issue is that 
the focus has been on expert discourse, and to a lesser extent, expert ideas, and those have been 
treated as the sources of expert power.  This power is presumed to be based on experts’ identity 
and relationship with objective knowledge and presented as invariable.  As a result, we are left 
looking at expert power “through a glass darkly” (Moynihan, 2009).   
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My argument is that one of the central functions of expert methods is to translate broad 
policy objectives into programmatic and administrative reality and therefore merits close 
investigation and scrutiny.  In order to understand state experts’ power we must closely look at 
some of the work they do most often—analysis for decision-making.  We can achieve a fuller 
and clearer understanding of expert power and its political effects by researching how experts 
stabilize methods that do work on their behalf.1  I am not suggesting that methods do not 
encapsulate ideas and discourses. They do.  Governance indicators, for example, cannot exist 
without new institutional economics and the rhetoric of good governance.  Hirschman and 
Berman (2014) refer to this combination of discourse, ideas, and methods as “cognitive 
infrastructure”, which includes experts’ “styles of reasoning”—their orienting concepts, ways of 
thinking, and assumptions—in addition to their methodological approaches.  However, existing 
investigations often stop after explaining how ideas and discourse affect organizations and 
institutions (e.g., Fukuda-Parr & Hulme, 2011).  How ideas and discourse shape experts’ 
methods, which I refer to as “governing rationales”, and the effects these methods have on 
organizations should also be examined.  This focus on methods can shed light on the “last mile” 
of expert influence.  
With respect to the broader question of whether state experts are powerful, this 
dissertation specifically asks how certain economic methods, or planning and policy devices 
(Hirschman and Berman, 2014), get adopted by organizations as governing rationales and in turn 
affect organizational power relations, decision-making, and the distribution of resources. It is 
important to study how experts’ methods get established and the effects they have because 
                                                
1 I use the term stabilized throughout this dissertation because institutionalized gives a false sense of permanency.  I 
thank Elizabeth Popp Berman for this observation.  
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orthodox economics, and perhaps other current dominant rationalities, are assumed to be 
structurally given and inevitable (Swyngedouw, 2014).  However, if they are viewed as political 
as any other project, then they are contingent and contestable. Furthermore, unlike 
governmentality studies where scholars have limited their focus to expertise’s effects on 
normalization and subject formation, I examine the more pedestrian issues of methods’ effects on 
bureaucratic power relations, decision-making, and the eventual distribution of organizational 
resources.  These issues are equally important but considerably more neglected among 
Foucauldian-inspired scholars examining the relationship between expertise and power (e.g., 
Gupta, 1998).  
 I employ a science studies approach to answer questions of how state experts establish 
their methods as policy devices and what effects those methods have.  I support this broader 
conceptual approach with modern and postmodern perspectives on power, a diverse genre of 
sociological literature on quantification processes in organizations, and a practice ontology that 
focuses on governance strategies that include factors such as actors, techniques, and power rather 
than on experts’ discourse or ideas alone (Best, 2014).   
A science studies approach is advantageous for several reasons. First, applying science 
studies—usually reserved for studying scientists, engineers, or other knowledge workers in 
laboratories—to state organizations can help us better understand the unique entrepreneurial 
efforts and political strategies of knowledge-based state experts. Second, science studies treats 
knowledge production as political work that faces resistance (Latour, 1988).  Finally, science 
studies suggests that methods “black-box” social science ideas and discourse (MacKenzie, 
2005).  
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 To study experts’ methodological projects or particular forms of state instrumental 
rationality, I employ a value-rational or phronetic research approach.  A value rational approach 
allows me to keep the focus on experts’ power and “micro-practices”, such as methods 
(Flyvbjerg, 2004).  I ground the investigation of how state experts stabilize their methods and the 
effects those methods have within an embedded case study of a United States (US) global 
development finance agency and use a mix of qualitative and quantitative evidence drawn from 
interviews, documents, and datasets.  The embedded case study concentrates on three economic 
methods used to make decisions in the US Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a new global 
development finance program, and the agency tasked with its implementation, the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC).  These methods—governance indicators, growth diagnostics, and 
randomized controlled trials (RCT)—are the dominant techniques used for allocating 
development finance, designing country development programs, and evaluating development 
projects, respectively. 
Research Design and Context 
Research Design. Jacqueline Best’s (2014) excellent overview of contemporary global 
development finance describes the major strategies that development finance agencies use in the 
field.  She describes four “governing strategies”—country ownership, governance standards, risk 
mitigation, and results measurement—that have come to define the field in the so-called Post-
Washington Consensus era.  Whereas Best (2014) analyzes these strategies and practices across 
the breadth of the field by looking at multiple institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund, multilateral development banks (MDB), and bilateral aid agencies, my dissertation focuses 
on a specific organization and looks in-depth at specific methods that support some of these 
governing strategies.  I chose an embedded case-study research design for its ability to isolate, as 
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reasonably as possible, economic methods’ effects; permit enough contextual detail to allow 
naturalistic generalization; and enable a mixed methods research approach.  Moreover, while 
both Best (2014) and this dissertation focus on a very important aspect of global development—
development finance policymaking—I examine this “meso” level process through the lens of 
governance indicators and also look at more “micro” level development processes such as 
national development planning (growth diagnostics) and local project evaluation (RCTs).  This 
vertical embedded case study design examines the development process from start to finish 
through the lens of a single agency and is rare among studies of development expertise. 
Both the case of the MCA-MCC and these three development economic methods were 
selected because of their paradigmatic qualities in the global development finance field.  
Governance indicators represent one way for development agencies to operationalize their focus 
on client countries’ institutions to increase “aid effectiveness”.  Growth diagnostics help 
demonstrate these development agencies’ commitment to country ownership, which 
acknowledges countries’ unique economic, political, and social circumstances during 
development planning.  RCTs can contribute to institutions’ results agendas that aim to put the 
field on sound methodological footing and demonstrate success to its critics. 
Research Context. The Millennium Challenge Account is a dedicated development fund 
as part of the United States International Affairs budget under the category of Bilateral Economic 
Assistance.  The MCC is both a bilateral aid and global development finance agency.  It occupies 
a space between fields: the field of US foreign assistance and its related organizations such as the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the field of global 
development finance and its related organizations such as the World Bank.  The MCA-MCC was 
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chosen as a case study because it represents a paradigmatic case of changes in global 
development finance governance during a period of momentous change.   
The MCA was announced in March 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico at the first-ever United 
Nations Conference on Financing for Development.  Over fifty Heads of State and two hundred 
Ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Development and Trade attended.  They produced the 
Monterrey Consensus, a resolution stating that developing countries should take a greater 
leadership role in their development through good governance and the mobilization of domestic 
resources and developed nations should substantially increase resources for global development 
assistance (Annan, 2002). These appeals by the global community, and lower-income countries 
in particular, pushed the United States to increase its official development assistance.  Another 
reason for this increased commitment included the George W. Bush Administration’s belief that 
addressing global poverty—thought to be a catalyst for terrorism—would reduce the chances of 
attacks such as 9/11 as part of a broader National Security Strategy (Bush, 2002b).   
The MCA was originally planned for US $5 billion per year starting in 2006.  Actual 
appropriations amounted to far less; Congress has appropriated only one-fifth of the original 
request, or US $1.2 billion on average, for every year between 2004 and 2014 (Tarnoff, 2015).  
Globally, the increase represents approximately the same size as the US annual contribution to 
the Asian Development Bank’s Asian Development Fund and Switzerland’s annual bilateral 
development aid budget.  Nevertheless, the MCA represents one of the most significant increases 
in US bilateral development assistance since the John F. Kennedy Administration (1961–1963) 
established the Alliance for Progress in 1961 (Radelet, 2003).  President Bush signed the 
Millennium Challenge Act into law in January 2004 as part of the Consolidated Appropriations 
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Act of 2004 after bipartisan passage in the US Congress.  The Act created the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation, a federal government corporation, to execute the MCA.  
The MCC was designed to be an independent government agency.  It has a Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) but is governed by a nine-member Board of Directors rather than a 
single departmental head such as the Secretary of Labor or Energy.  Of MCC’s nine-member 
Board of Directors, four members are from the non-profit or private sector.  The agency is also 
exempt from select federal statutes, particularly in relation to the hiring and status of employees 
and procurement regulations, which is common among federal government corporations 
(Government Accountability Office, 1995).  The label “independent” is a misnomer, however.  
In the most important respects, the MCC is a public US government entity.  Most federal 
government corporations are constitutionally dependent on the President and MCC is no 
different (Breger & Edles, 2000).  The President appoints the majority of the Board of Directors 
including MCC’s CEO and controls its budget request to Congress.  In turn, MCC is wholly 
dependent on Congress to appropriate some or all of that request every fiscal year.  Thus, the 
MCC is similar to federal government corporations that came before it such as the Tennessee 
Valley Authority and Overseas Private Investment Corporation (Kosar, 2011).  
The MCC was intended to be a beachhead organization to move the field of US foreign 
assistance closer to the image of multilateral development banks in development finance. Many 
Bush Administration officials involved in its creation spoke about an “MCC model” and the need 
for a demonstration effect.  They also wished to establish a new agency that would represent an 
incubator for ideas and strategies that they wanted to see proliferate in development finance as 
the field transitioned from the “Washington Consensus” paradigm to the “Post-Washington 
Consensus” era.  Some of the highest-ranking officials in the Administration’s National Security 
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Council, Council for Economic Advisors, and Cabinet such as Condoleezza Rice, Glenn 
Hubbard, and John Taylor were directly involved in spearheading both the MCA-MCC and 
global development finance reform (White House, 2002; Taylor, 2002b).  
The “Washington Consensus” is a term that symbolizes the structural adjustment policy 
paradigm of the influential international financial institutions’ (IFI) in Washington, DC such as 
the International Monetary Fund, US Treasury, World Bank, and Inter-American Bank during 
the 1980s and 1990s (Babb, 2012).  The Post-Washington consensus, not a consensus in the 
earlier sense of the term, includes a set of ideas and strategies preoccupied with freeing nations 
and individuals from “poverty traps”.  Most mainstream development economists believe that the 
Washington Consensus’ private property-based, market-oriented reforms were necessary; they 
just needed to be supplemented with prior interventions at the level of nations and individuals 
(Reddy, 2012). The task of the macroeconomic diagnostician was to identify what is required for 
a country to overcome its poverty trap (Rodrik, 2009; Sachs, 2006).  Microeconomists must find 
“what works” at the individual and community level so that the poor can take advantage of 
market opportunities. This “Washington Consensus plus” position critiques the early paradigm 
for its insufficiency and “focus[es] on what is necessary to alleviate obstacles to spontaneous and 
self-sustaining growth and development based on the grasping of market opportunity” (Reddy, 
2012: 4).  
At this same time, the discipline of development economics was undergoing 
transformation. Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, development economics, with its 
statist approaches to modernization based on models of stages of growth and surplus labor, 
struggled to discover a new identity after being pushed aside in American economics 
departments by free market macroeconomic orthodoxy (Hirschman, 1981).  At the turn of the 
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century, new empirical approaches helped development economists experience a comeback.  
Their reliance on more “relevant” growth models for developing countries and preference for 
empiricism over formalism, both of which earlier marginalized them in academia (Bøås & 
McNeill, 2004), were seen as strengths in a post-paradigmatic Post-Washington Consensus 
period.  A number of new methods, principally the three studied here, emerged to tackle key 
questions that were also amenable to how governance strategies were changing in global 
development finance.  The MCC existed at the crossroads of these changes.  In other words, it 
represented the new face of development governance and applied development economics in the 
Post-Washington Consensus era.  
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for this dissertation is based on applying three science studies 
concepts—the principle of symmetry, trials of strength, and opening the black box—to the study 
of state experts and their methods.  These concepts are buttressed by theories of power and 
sociological approaches to quantification.  
Sociologists of science who claimed that historians approached the investigations of 
“successes” and “failures” of science asymmetrically advocated for the principle of 
symmetry.  The principle of symmetry suggests that both successes and failures should be treated 
equally, approached with sociological explanatory principles and methods, and have their 
sociological, rational, irrational—and I argue political—elements.  For example, Yonay (1998) 
did not accept the textbook version of the history of economics where the contemporary postwar 
neoclassical school is a natural outgrowth of the prewar classical school based on the superiority 
of its mathematical modeling of marginal costs and prices.  The institutional school was equally 
compelling but lost to the neoclassical school as the two schools’ groups engaged in a social and 
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political “struggle over the soul of economics” (Yonay, 1998).  The principle of symmetry 
dispels technocrats’ narrative that they are the bearers of rationality able to resolve conflict 
because their special relationship with truth favors improving collective welfare rather than the 
interests of various constituents (Centeno, 2010).  Furthermore, it investigates the political work 
of economic experts, which shows that the “post-political” neoliberal condition, which is closely 
associated with orthodox economic rationality, is not a given or inevitable state.   
I combine with the principle of symmetry theories of power to explain experts’ politics.  
Framing politics as power distances us from the depoliticization and post-political rhetoric that 
frames politics narrowly as resistance to the state.  Such literatures position state domination on 
one side and strategies for counteraction on the other (Scott, 2008).  However, if politics is 
understood as power, and as Foucault suggests, all social relations are relations of power 
(Foucault, 2001), then experts are implicated in power relations as well.  They are not simply the 
bearers of rationality—a property they either do or do not possess based on their training, 
credentials, and reputation—but are complex agents able to exercise various strategies of power 
in their relationships. 
I approach the state as an arena of competing experts with their respective rationalities 
(i.e., paradigms rooted in episteme or praxis) by applying science studies’ concept of trials of 
strength.  Experts, like scientists, have to conduct their work and defend it from critics, 
particularly other state expert groups with conflicting rationalities.  Paradoxically, even while 
development is a deeply contested topic in academia, scholars researching development expertise 
in the state often treat it monolithically.  In doing so, they also inadvertently cast the state as 
having a unitary logic (e.g., Goulet, 1986).  This is a product of neo-statists’ attempts to dispel 
views of the state as “society-centric” (the state as one among many outcomes of structural social 
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forces) with arguments for state autonomy and Weberian theories of bureaucracy that separate 
state and bureaucratic rationality from other rationalities such as the practical rationality of 
politics or local communities (Jessop, 2001).  
Methods become black-boxed when debates over the procedures of (social) scientific 
practice appear settled and their internal workings are overlooked.  Opening the black box of 
methods can reveal experts’ intermediate choices and political values, which, when methods are 
stabilized as policy devices, can engender political effects (MacKenzie, 2005). A genre of 
sociological literatures that falls under the broad rubric of “sociology of quantification” helps us 
“get inside” a wide array of expert methods to understand their biases and effects (e.g., Espeland 
& Stevens, 2008).  I ask how expert methods make decisions and how those decisions affect 
organizational power relations and the distribution of resources. 
Significance of the Research 
Research Significance. This dissertation makes a contribution to the debate over the 
power and influence of experts in planning and development.  It fills a gap in the literature by 
examining experts’ efforts to establish their methods and the power those methods have.  As 
mentioned earlier, the prevailing belief about expert power in planning and development is that 
intellectual rationality is experts’ primary source of power, this power is strong and stable, and 
the power of intellectual rationality is drawn from its ideas and discourse.  Without political 
power, however, experts cannot realize the power of their intellectual rationality and without 
looking at methods we cannot understand the full extent of the power of intellectual rationality 
This dissertation is not the first to question this prevailing belief.  While the presumed 
power of intellectual rationality represents the dominant framework, other theoretical and 
empirical works both within and outside of planning have revised this position.  Some studies 
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have suggested that experts are not as powerful as many think.  Elite theorists in the social 
sciences have argued that experts are not powerful in themselves but are rather instrumentalized 
by political, economic, and interest-group elites (Mills, 2000; Reed, 2012).  Some heterodox 
planning theorists agree that experts’ power is exaggerated, but not for the reasons elite theorists 
put forward; experts’ intellectual rationality is no match for rationalizations made by actually 
powerful actors (Flyvbjerg, 1998).  Others, by contrast, believe in the power of intellectual 
rationality but only under conditions of “expert autonomy”—experts must liberate themselves 
from bureaucratic and legislative authority in order for their rationality to prevail (Bimber, 1996; 
Dargent, 2011). 
This dissertation argues that experts are powerful because they establish methods that do 
work on their behalf (Eyal & Levy, 2013).  In other words, experts’ intellectual rationality is 
powerful, but not in the ways we originally thought.  They must first establish their methods as 
policy devices, which requires them to exercise power thought to be the reserve of politicos such 
as legislative representatives or bureaucratic officials.  Thus, methods, as a form of intellectual 
rationality informed by ideas and discourse, are a strong but not necessarily stable form of 
power.  Experts must do political work to stabilize methods and this makes their methods 
contingent and contestable. 
Political Significance. The effects of the asymmetrical treatment of experts and politics 
extend beyond a proper scholarly accounting of state expertise; it frames political action as 
well.  As it stands, there is a problematic contradiction within liberals’ “rational dream” of 
advancing human welfare through a state guided by science, reason, and expertise (Toulmin, 
2009).  Achievement of the rational dream undermines two other deeply held liberal values: 
equality and neutrality (Turner, 2001, 2003).  State expertise threatens equality of voice in a 
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liberal democratic polity that strives to afford equal weight to all views.  It also threatens the 
liberal state’s goal to remain neutral in the face of competing viewpoints.  This engenders a 
technocracy-democracy divide where technocracy and democracy are locked in a zero-sum 
struggle.  As Collins and Evans (2009) put it: “Democracy cannot dominate every domain, that 
would destroy expertise, and expertise cannot dominate every domain, that would destroy 
democracy” (Collins & Evans, 2009: 8). Consequently, for postmodernist critics of experts the 
principal response has been to decentralize and diversify knowledge through popular 
epistemology.  Postmodernists reject the notion that the state or science has some privileged 
position in society or relationship with truth; everyone’s knowledge is equally important and 
valid and deserves to play a role in planning and governance (Fuchs, 1997; Harper & Stein, 
1995).   
The postmodernist reaction to state expertise is theoretically and rhetorically appealing 
but when taken to its logical conclusion results in a “postmodern abyss”—an undermining of the 
intellectual base of the modernist planning project without an alternative guide for the role of 
knowledge for public action (Beauregard, 1991).  Postmodernists risk being handmaidens to 
regressive views by discrediting state expertise without presenting alternatives (DuPuis & 
Gareau, 2008).  As multiple philosophers of expertise have pointed out, state experts are not 
going anywhere for the foreseeable future because they contribute to essential decision-making 
tasks such as complexity reduction and knowledge aggregation (Selinger & Crease, 2006; 
Turner, 2013).  Turner (2008) rhetorically asks, “Should development economists just shut up”?  
Turner answered this question by saying: 
Realistically, they don’t know how to produce vibrant economies in the Third World or 
lead millions out of poverty under the actual political and cultural conditions of 
impoverished nations. Does this mean they should stop trying as experts to formulate 
policies and policy ideas? Probably not…This is perhaps a domain in which the urgency 
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is such that trying on the basis of very limited understanding is the only option (Turner, 
2008: 40). 
 
Examining how certain experts, like orthodox economists, have gained power and 
dominant methods, like orthodox economic rationality, come to be stabilized and have specific 
effects is meaningful for planning and political practice in two ways.  First, it encourages 
reflective practice that can lead to subsequent reform if so desired.  If we discover that methods 
influence the ends of planning and administration, we can debate whether the effects we see are 
those that we want.  Technocrats are complex actors with experience and values and many are 
open to reform (Roy, 2012; Wilson, 2006).  Accordingly, rather than addressing the “democratic-
deficit” resulting from technocratic governance through popular epistemology alone, we can 
pursue democracy by “getting inside” the techniques (Latour, 1998).  Second, and more 
importantly, one modest route out of the post-modern abyss is to investigate the state as a plural 
arena of competing rationalities and interests.  Describing how dominant experts win trials of 
strength demonstrates that the state is an arena of competing rationalities where other experts can 
likewise establish their methods.  Orthodox economic governing rationales, and perhaps other 
currently dominant approaches, are not structurally given and inevitable.  They are political 
projects like any other and thus contingent and vulnerable. 
Overview of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized according to the following chapters: Literature Review (2); 
Research Design and Methodology (3); one chapter each on case studies of Governance 
Indicators (4), Growth Diagnostics (5), and Randomized Controlled Trials (6); Interpretation of 
Findings (7); and Conclusion (8).  The Literature Review explains the conceptual framework and 
significance of the research by surveying the major debates surrounding three sources of expert 
power—their intellectual rationality, institutional relationships, and methods.  The views on 
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these sources of expert power are drawn from diverse literatures such as planning, public policy, 
and political science.  The instances where the field of science studies has implicitly addressed 
shortcomings in other dominant genres are identified. A presentation of the major theories of 
power from both modern and postmodern perspectives supports these genres.   
 The Research Design and Methodology chapter (3) describes the dissertation’s research 
approach, design, methodology, data sources, and procedures used to answer questions about the 
power of economic expertise.  The dissertation questions are approached through an embedded 
case study design of the economic methods involved in creation of the MCA and how the MCC 
designs and evaluates development investments.  The embedded research design was chosen for 
its ability to allow for a mixed methods research approach.  The data sources include both 
primary data sources in the form of 50 interviews and secondary data sources in the form of 
hundreds of documents and multiple quantitative data sets. 
 The Governance Indicators case chapter (4) describes the rise of governance indicators 
and the Bush Administration’s adoption of a particular set of indicators, the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), for its aid effectiveness strategy.  It then describes 
how this rationale of using indicators for selecting countries, promoted by the economic policy 
community, came into conflict with the foreign policy community’s geopolitical rationale and 
what state economic experts did to overcome the foreign policy community’s opposition.  
Finally, the chapter presents the MCA’s country selection criteria and the WGI’s effects on how 
low-income countries’ institutions are depicted in development finance decisions and the 
distribution of MCA resources. The Growth Diagnostics case chapter (5) describes the origins of 
growth diagnostics and how they transformed the development-planning environment at the 
MCC.  It then discusses how economists went about building a diagnosis and how the growth 
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diagnostic rationale conflicted with social, gender, and environmental experts’ rationale for how 
country development programs should be designed.  The chapter closes with an explanation of 
how growth diagnostics reshaped the participatory planning process and the composition of 
development programs.  The RCT chapter (6) describes the rise of RCTs, the opposition MCC 
evaluation economists faced when introducing RCTs to MCC, and how RCTs were 
disproportionately applied to agricultural and rural development projects.  It explains how 
evaluation economists overcame opposition to randomly assigning participants to projects, which 
was irreconcilable with implementers’ desire to target participants purposely according to 
sociological theories of diffusion.  The chapter concludes by describing the effects of RCTs on 
the composition of project participants and project implementation. 
 The Interpretation Chapter (7) describes the main findings from the three empirical cases. 
The cases combine empirical evidence of how economic experts achieved autonomy and 
overcame opposition from other expert groups with modern and postmodern theories of power.  I 
find that economic experts’ actions were motivated as much by political interests as any other 
group because they had an interest in stabilizing their methods as governing rationales. Also, 
economists’ political work required the exercise of power because the more opposition the 
economists’ method faced the more power they had to exercise to stabilize their methods.  
Finally, when both politicos and experts transferred their decision-making authority to methods, 
and those methods became codified in legal agreements, methods had political effects that were 
not simply discursive. These effects included the reshaping of bureaucratic power relations, a 
shift in decision-making processes and actors, and the distribution of global development finance 
resources that point to a need to combine modern and postmodern concepts of power rather than 
rely on a single approach alone.  
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 The Final Chapter (8) describes the implications of the study’s findings for planning 
research, practice, and development policy.  I contend that a science studies approach can benefit 
other planning scholars studying state experts and their methods.  The chapter also describes 
what the three development economic methods studied here mean for development policy with 
respect to participatory planning and inequality.  It goes on to explain in detail how revealing 
methods’ political values and assumptions can instigate reflective practice.  Importantly, the final 
chapter describes what the reframing of experts and methods in this study could mean for 
practicing planners, particularly advocacy planners, as the discipline continues to grapple with 
the postmodern abyss.  The chapter closes with a discussion of the limitations of this study and 
suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Major Debates over the Power of Experts 
Introduction 
Scholars who have studied experts have debated their power and its basis in their 
knowledge or intellectual rationality. Scholars have also examined the relationships between 
experts and legislative and bureaucratic authorities and, moreover, asked whether “expert 
autonomy” was essential to expert power and, if so, how experts attained it.  Finally, scholars 
have debated the importance of experts’ governance methods, also known as policy instruments 
or devices; as this chapter shows, some having dismissed the weight of expert influence over 
methods while others more recently have suggested that the power of expert methods has been 
overlooked and deserves closer attention.  These scholars have not engaged in direct debate over 
experts’ sources of power, but their juxtaposed work highlights their contrasting views. Scholars 
of science studies have often implicitly addressed shortcomings in other dominant genres. This 
chapter highlights three instances when this has occurred.   
To narrow the review’s scope, I focus principally on experts in or directly associated with 
the state rather than look at professions or lay expertise.  Finally, most of the examples and 
empirical references are drawn primarily from studies of economic expertise and supported by 
examples from development studies.   
The Asymmetrical Treatment of State Experts 
The Rational Dream and Its Critics. A group of scholars in planning theory, the policy 
sciences, and public administration known broadly as “social reformers” are driven by faith in 
and commitment to the rational dream (Boyer, 1986; Friedmann, 1987; Hall, 2002; Tugwell, 
1954).  This rational dream is an enduring conviction, which dates back to the ideas of Francis 
Bacon and Saint Simon, that scientific, rational planning has the power to overcome politics 
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(Baum, 1980; Turner, 2003).  This linear model is predicated on a division between a world of 
values, occupied by decision-makers who grapple with problems, and a world of facts, occupied 
by experts who analyze problems and propose solutions based on their specialized knowledge 
and skills (Baum, 1980; Weiss, 1979).  Within this division, the authority of experts is intimately 
tied to a body of abstract theoretical knowledge that sociologist and theorist Max Weber referred 
to as intellectual rationality (Altshuler, 1965a; Weber, 2009).  Intellectual rationality is a source 
of experts’ claims to legitimacy and governing authority.  This form of authority differs from 
administrative authority claimed by executives, constitutional authority claimed by political 
officials, and ideal-based authority typical of interest groups (Brint, 1990).   
Social reformers implicitly assume that experts are uniquely suited to “end ideology” 
because of the way the linear rational model frames experts’ relationship with knowledge and the 
state (Bell, 1965; Friedmann, 1987).  Experts are powerful because they can blunt the 
parochialism of partisan interests and populist passions by speaking truth to power (Mannheim, 
1950; Wildavsky, 1979).  In other words, they mobilize “truth”, or scientific 
knowledge, to power, that is, to the real decision-makers such as administrators and elected 
officials.  Social scientists are presented as the bearers of rationality, not powerful agents, 
decision makers, or actors with personal interests. Here, knowledge is largely understood as 
information that represents the public interest or that is delivered at strategic moments as advice 
intended to inform decision-making and policy processes (Altshuler, 1965b; Baum, 
1980).  When this model breaks down, the power of expertise evaporates.  
Neo-marxist geographers, postdevelopmentalists, and other critical theorists oppose the 
rational dream but nonetheless implicitly share social reformers’ normative and theoretical 
positions.  These scholars believe that the authority of experts derives from their relationship 
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with and access to knowledge and the state (Escobar, 2011; Sachs, 1992).  They believe, 
reflecting Max Weber’s theories of bureaucracy, that the state is the locus of technical 
rationality, which can be mobilized and put to use in a brutally efficient way (Mitchell, 2002; 
Scott, 1998).  Goal-oriented professional technocrats, including social scientists whose 
legitimacy derives from the epistemological foundations of modern science, administer this 
technical rationality (Breslau, 1997; Eisenstadt, 1958).  For example, in his discussion of 
contemporary environmental politics, Swyngedouw (2009) states that technocratic governance 
“is a politics legitimated by a scientific consensus which, in turn, translates into a political 
consensus” (2009: 602).  According to Slavoj Zizek (2014), it is a politics that “legitimizes itself 
by means of a direct reference to the scientific status of its knowledge” (2014: 211).   
Like social reformers, critical theorists believe that expert-led governance constrains 
politics.  One group of neo-marxist critical theorists believe that the post-Cold War neoliberal 
political economy and the performance-driven managerial state constitute a structurally 
predetermined state of affairs (Beveridge, 2017; Swyngedouw, 2014).  To them, this technocrat-
led administrative state operating in the name of free markets is depoliticizing (Beveridge & 
Koch, 2017).  This is because technocratic governance forecloses the space in which alternatives 
to the so-called neoliberal consensus can emerge.  Inside the institutions responsible for 
neoliberalism, reformers either become co-opted or legitimize the consensus (Beveridge, 2017; 
Swyngedouw, 2005).  In other words, past the point of viable political alternatives, we become 
post-political.  Consequently, the only legitimate political activity that remains is protest politics 
that exists outside of, and acts antagonistically towards, consensus-driven actors and institutions 
(Beveridge & Koch, 2017; Flinders & Wood, 2014).  
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Postdevelopmentalist scholars think similarly to post-political theorists.  Development 
experts cast inherently political questions and issues, such as access to land or public services, in 
technical terms (Ferguson, 1994).  Thus, they regard the expansion of the development state as a 
depoliticizing force, one that creates a situation of anti-politics (Ferguson, 1994; Sachs, 1992). 
Here, real politics takes place beyond the boundaries of the state and its experts (Esteva & 
Prakash, 1998).  Postdevelopmentalists equate politics with political challenges to the 
development state (Kiely, 1999).  These scholars’ stance reinforces the enduring divide between 
rationality and politics in political and planning theory.  Postdevelopmentalist theories frame 
politics narrowly and conceive of relationships between state experts and the public in binary 
terms.  Thus, the only way to politicize governance and development is to engage in 
participatory or protest politics (Turner, 2003).  When such activities are successful, state experts 
are (partially) dethroned, and governance and development become political again. 
The Chastened Dream and Limits of Expertise. While the social reformers’ enduring 
faith in “knowledge as power” and the leftist critical theorists’ narratives of expert-led 
depoliticization give us the impression that experts are influential, a third group claims that 
rationality is in fact a weak form of power and no match for “realrationalitat,” or the 
rationalizations of actually powerful agents (Flyvbjerg, 1996).  From this perspective, expert 
advice and knowledge is routinely ignored or dismissed by those with real power.  Studies of 
expert-state relations and knowledge utilization at the municipal level concluded that expert 
knowledge has little or no effect on decisions and that experts are inconsequential (Collingridge 
& Reeve, 1986).  A case study of sustainable urban development in Aalborg, Denmark found 
that rationality is a weak form of power and is no match for rationalizations made by the 
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powerful (Flyvbjerg, 1998).  If rational methods are to be effective, they have to conform to 
existing political paradigms and agendas (Innes, 1990).  
Political scientists and sociologists who espouse an elite theory of the state believe that 
powerful elites instrumentalize experts, who become mere “servants of power” (Brint, 1990).  
That is, experts become “window dressing” to justify decisions made by politicians for non-
technical reasons (Banfield, 1961).  For example, John Kenneth Galbraith argued that the 
technocratic elite would either prove unable to challenge political leadership or be transformed 
by its participation in governance (Galbraith, 1972).  There is evidence to support the elite 
theorists’ view.  Indian planners in the immediate aftermath of independence suggested that 
foreign economic advisers provided “airforce cover for the army”—not suggesting a way 
forward so much as providing reinforcement for what had been already planned (Engerman, 
2013).  Tendler (1977) cited the use of economists’ cost-benefit analyses to support foreign-aid 
investment decisions after the fact.  Experts and planners who decry their lack of voice and 
influence in decision-making and governance add to elite theorists’ views (Baum, 1980; 
Lindblom, 1979).  These positions and analyses give the impression that experts and their 
rationality are failures and that power has prevailed.  This impression has led to what Jal Mehta  
(2009) calls the “chastened dream”.  
The Asymmetrical Treatment of Experts. The literatures described thus far make it 
appear as though experts have no politics of their own.  Not only does this occlude the myriad 
ways that experts actually inform the policy process, it allows the continued depoliticization of 
experts and their actions.  Both the reliance on instrumental-rational knowledge and the desire to 
keep knowledge and politics separate—what Latour (2012) calls the “modernist settlement”—
has led to idealized conceptions of the roles of experts and politicos and how expert knowledge 
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should be applied to policy problems (Baum, 1980; Grindle, 1977).  Furthermore, when the 
presence of experts increases in planning and administration, criticism arises that development 
has become depoliticized or dominated by technical approaches (Wilson, 2006).  As a result, 
experts are treated asymmetrically.  When the linear rational model breaks down, social 
reformers conclude that politics, or real power, has won. When the linear model is most ardently 
followed and experts are in charge of planning and administration, critical theorists decry that 
planning and administration have become depoliticized.  Either way, experts’ work is not cast as 
political.  
The Principle of Symmetry in Science Studies. Asymmetrical explanation has long 
been a problem in so-called Whig histories of science.  Sociologists of science claimed that Whig 
historians and others approached true beliefs, or science’s “successes”, with rationalist 
explanations and approached false beliefs, or science’s “failures”, with sociological explanations 
(Sismondo, 2011).  To correct this tendency, several sociologists of knowledge at the University 
of Edinburgh advocated the principle of symmetry (Bloor, 1991; MacKenzie, 1981).  The 
principle of symmetry suggests that science’s successes, or its beliefs thought to be true, should 
be explained with factors such as ideology, interests, and politics, which are usually reserved for 
science’s failures and beliefs thought to be false.  In other words, the same factors are involved 
in the production of truth as in the production of falsity (Bloor, 1981).  The principle of 
symmetry is most closely associated with sociologist David Bloor, who outlined “four tenets” for 
the sociology of scientific knowledge.  Two of the most important points stipulate that the 
sociology of scientific knowledge should be: 1) impartial with respect to truth and falsity, 
rationality and irrationality, and success or failure; and 2) symmetrical in its style of explanation, 
so that the same types of causes would explain both true and false beliefs (Bloor, 1991).  
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A paradigmatic case of the application of the principle of symmetry is Leviathan and the 
Air Pump, where the success of chemist Robert Boyle’s experimental methods was understood as 
a social and political achievement over the powerful philosopher Thomas Hobbes’ prevailing 
plenist ontology (Shapin & Schaffer, 2011).  Shapin and Schaffer (2011) treat truth, objectivity, 
and scientific adequacy as accomplishments, and the problem of generating and protecting 
knowledge as a political problem.  Likewise, they engage in symmetrical explanation by taking a 
“stranger’s” or outsider’s perspective of Boyle’s characterization of natural philosophy or 
Hobbes (simply a “failed experimentalist”).  Shapin and Schaffer (2011) stated: “Our goal is to 
break down the aura of self-evidence surrounding the experimental way of producing 
knowledge, and ‘charitable interpretation’ of the opposition to experimentalism is a valuable 
means of accomplishing this” (Shapin & Schaffer, 2011: 13).  Meanwhile, in a paradigmatic case 
study of rationality and power in planning in Aalborg, Denmark, Flyvbjerg (1998) describes the 
city bureaucracy’s attempts to implement an award-winning plan and the Aalborg Chamber of 
Commerce’s successful attempts to alter the plan to suit its interests.  In Flyvbjerg’s depiction, 
the social reason among Aalborg planners represented rationality and the Chamber’s 
opposition—or private reason—represented irrationality (Turner, 2008).  Flyvbjerg characterized 
the Chamber of Commerce as exercising power but did not consider the bureaucrats’ plans as 
expressions of power.  Thus, Flyvbjerg was engaging in the type of asymmetrical explanation 
that is common in planning scholarship (Turner, 2008).  The principle of symmetry 
reconceptualizes the role of experts from one of speaking truth to power to one of constructing 
rationality as power.   
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Experts and Theories of Power 
If rationality is politics by other means and politics is a code word for power (Baum, 
1983a) then expert rationality is arguably a form of power.  I now review what the key theories 
and literatures on power say about experts. The literature on power is extensive but its 
approaches can be roughly divided into two camps: modern and postmodern.  These approaches 
are often referred to respectively as “power over” and “power to” (Clegg, Courpasson, & 
Phillips, 2006).   
Modern Approaches to Expert Power. Three concepts are central to modern 
approaches to power: hierarchy, authority, and constraint.  In modern approaches, the 
distribution of power is known—it is concentrated at the top.  For Thomas Hobbes, one of the 
earliest theorists of power, the first line of authority was the Leviathan (Clegg, 1989).  The 
organizing power of the monarchical system was the individual’s relationship with the sovereign, 
rather than, say, with other individuals.  Max Weber, one of the earliest and most important 
theorists of the state and bureaucracies, posited that hierarchy was instrumental to understanding 
power, which was concentrated at the top of the state’s vertically organized institutions (Weber, 
2009).  Weber defined power as the probability of an actor carrying out his or her will even when 
sh/e is opposed (Uphoff, 1989).  Authority is central to this idea of power and has its basis in 
coercion.  Authority is dependent on a special position or role that enables the person occupying 
it to make commands.  This is usually justified by the right to act based on the property of an 
office.  The Romans called this potestas (Höpfl, 1999). Even in the case of potestas, the office 
holder must be seen as legitimate, or have the capacity to inspire respect.  The Romans called 
this quality auctoritas.  Those without auctoritas are not “right and proper” and the objects of an 
officeholder’s command may not see an obligation to obey (Höpfl, 1999).  Those with authority 
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can exercise constraint.  Constraint is the ability to determine the alternatives open to others 
either by direct force, which involves the use of negative physical sanctions, or inducement, 
which involves sanctions and rewards to influence the calculations and decisions of others (Scott, 
2008).  Economic resources are central to modern power.  Actors who can wield resources to 
induce groups through sanctions and rewards are powerful, even if they do not possess the 
legitimate authority of an office.  Likewise, authority is a matter of degree and is greater when 
combined with economic resources (Uphoff, 1989).  
Modern theorists believe that monopolization of information and specialized forms of 
knowledge afford experts power through resources and authority.  By gaining and controlling 
access to information and knowledge, they can equalize power relations by wielding their 
resources against others (Benveniste, 1972; Turner, 2013).  This gives experts the power to 
sanction or reward.  For example knowledge monopolization is achieved through licensing and 
credentials (Freidson, 1988; Larson, 1979).  Scholars in the sociology of professions study the 
process through which experts professionalize knowledge, making it a scarce resource, as a 
means to gain authority (Eyal, 2013).  This authority requires a demarcation between 
professional and lay knowledge.  How this boundary is created matters less than how the 
boundary improves the claims of professionals to authority and resources (Gieryn, 1983).  
Through this process, experts gain legitimacy and, among their audiences and clients, create the 
sense that their knowledge and counsel is valid, reliable, and should be followed (Scott, 2008).  
One limitation of the sociology of professions is that it does not address the issue of social 
relationships among experts either inside or outside of the state. 
Another possibility is that experts can become elites (Zald & Lounsbury, 2010).  Some 
experts can reach the “command posts” of hierarchical organizations and bureaucracies such as 
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central banks, ministries of finance, environmental protection agencies, public utilities, and non-
state organizations with a technical focus.  For example, economists have recently risen to high-
level positions across various branches in Latin American states (Markoff & Montecinos, 1993).  
These experts are afforded both control over knowledge and professional legitimacy as well as 
the power to issue legitimate commands because of the office they occupy (Scott, 2008).  They 
are in the minority, however.  Most experts work as mid-level bureaucrats at the command of 
their hierarchical superiors (Coats, 2001). 
Postmodern Approaches to Expert Power. Postmodern power is concerned more with 
networks than hierarchy, strategy than authority, and practices than resources.  Postmodern 
power is a non-hierarchical form of power; there is no single entity “pulling the strings.”  One 
actor affects another even if s/he is not some authority with an endowed form of power 
(Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991; Clegg, 1994).  The philosopher Michel Foucault, a major 
influence on postmodern approaches to power, was concerned with power in “institutionalized 
strategic complexes,” such as hospitals, prisons, schools, and factories, and their everyday 
relations with people (Heiskala, 2001).  For example, power operates through a network of 
connected actors, such as attorneys, judges, wardens, and guards in a penal system, rather than 
commands coming down from a warden’s office (Foucault, 2012).  
The roots of postmodern power lie in the thought of Niccolo Machiavelli rather than that 
of Thomas Hobbes.  To Machiavelli, power is derived from strategy, not coercion.  Deals, 
negotiation, fraud, and conflict play central roles in securing order by a strategically-minded 
prince (Gilbert, 1984).  Actors’ strategies are often aimed at building coalitions of allies.  
Postmodern theories of power are concerned with what power does, not what power is (Clegg, 
1989).  This power operates through micro-social practices rather than economic resources 
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(Foucault, 1978).  A principal practice in Foucault’s work is discipline.  Disciplinary power 
through practices, such as “the gaze”, is productive rather than coercive: postmodern power is 
ultimately concerned with the production of subjects (Foucault, 2001, 2012).  Such power can 
create, for example, docile bodies.  Ultimately, the targets of postmodern power willingly 
conform to power without coercion (Burchell et al., 1991).   
With respect to knowledge, postmodern theories believe experts gain power through 
generosity or the sharing of their knowledge and practices rather than monopoly.  
Monopolization of knowledge is isolating and isolated experts are not powerful.  The goal of 
experts is not to restrict access or achieve legitimacy but to graft their work onto what others are 
doing (Eyal, 2013).  This work involves the dissemination of ideas and discourses.  Ideas claim 
to describe the world, the causal relationships, or the legitimacy of certain actions (Parsons, 
2002).  For example, one popular idea is that government spending will stimulate economic 
growth (Béland, 2010).  The power of experts’ ideas lies in their ability to construct both general 
and particular social and political interests.  They can help convince actors that the existing state 
of affairs is inherently flawed and that major changes are necessary in order to solve its problems 
(Beland & Cox, 2010). Several case studies in development have shown how economists’ ideas 
have changed the missions of the World Bank, Economic Commission for Latin America, and 
United Nations Development Program at particular moments in time (Cooper & Packard, 1998; 
Fukuda-Parr, 2011; Sikkink, 2012).  
Discourse involves linguistic and symbolic practices such as narrative, rhetoric, and 
dialogue, which are expressed through speech, text, visual representations, and cultural artifacts 
that create new phenomena (Wetherell, Taylor, & Yates, 2001).  For Foucault, discourse is more 
than language; it is a system of representation that governs the way a topic can be reasonably 
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talked and reasoned about (Mills, 2012).  This “discursive regime”, when coupled with power 
(the couplet “power/knowledge”), generates truths (Foucault, 1980).  In order for something to 
be established as fact or as true, other equally valid statements have to be rendered invalid, 
denied, or categorized as taboo.  Together with statistics (i.e., organized numerical data), 
discourse constructs the “normal” (Mills, 2012).  By defining what is normal, experts can 
determine and govern what is wrong or deviant (Foucault, 1978).  For example, expert 
discourses decide who is undeveloped or poor by creating norms of (western) progress (Escobar, 
2011; Watts, 1993).  Experts’ statistics then inform where and how development programs 
should intervene (Li, 2007).  Their use of discourse and discipline is a major focus of 
governmentality studies, which emerged in the 1980s as an important early effort to fuse 
knowledge, power, and the work of experts (Burchell et al., 1991).  
 According to postmodern theorists, experts do not need to become elites to be influential.  
These theorists focus more on “distributed agency”—that is, the “multiplicity” of intervening 
agents in a network.  Some of the most important networks form epistemic communities (Eyal & 
Buchholz, 2010).  An epistemic community is a network of experts or professionals with 
recognized competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to knowledge within 
that domain or issue area (Haas, 1992). It is an “invisible college,” whose members span 
academia, different arms of government, non-governmental organizations, policy circles, and 
think tanks. Their members work together collaboratively and share principled beliefs and values 
(Haas, 1992; Maxwell & Stone, 2004).  Ultimately, however, the social character or individual 
positions of their members is less important than the ability of its members to be effective 
channels for the circulation of new ideas from the communities to governments (Eyal & 
Buchholz, 2010).   
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Expert Autonomy and Expert Power. If postmodern scholars of power focused on state 
experts and their generosity of knowledge and membership in knowledge-based networks, others 
who conceive of power in more modern, hierarchical terms sought to comprehend the autonomy 
of state experts from legislative and bureaucratic authorities.  Some political scientists and 
sociologists believe that experts’ relationships with knowledge and like-minded experts were not 
enough to make them powerful—they also needed expert autonomy.  If experts lack autonomy 
and become “politicized” in their connection with elites then the power of expertise becomes 
subsumed into the power of elected officials, bureaucrats authorities, or interest groups (Bimber, 
1996; Dargent, 2011).  Unlike elite theorists, however, scholars of the politics of expertise 
express a lack of conviction that experts are inevitably politicized.  Under the right 
circumstances and with the appropriate strategies, state experts gain power by freeing themselves 
from the instrumentalization of their knowledge by others (Centeno & Silva, 2016).  
Scholars of the politics of expertise approach the issue of autonomy in two different 
ways, acting from different motivations. One group frames autonomy as the insulation of experts 
from the partisan interests of politicos such as elected and bureaucratic officials.  These scholars 
focus on the political conditions necessary to achieve the rational dream—an ideal implicitly 
worth pursuing (Bimber, 1996).  Joyce (2011) recounts the history of the US Congressional 
Budget Office and the efforts needed to maintain its independence, credibility, and ability to 
produce “honest numbers” over four decades.  Bimber (1996) explains how one US Office of 
Technology Assessment director achieved greater autonomy for the office by liaising and 
networking with other influential actors while another director failed to garner as much respect 
and thus autonomy by falling back on appeals to his scientific authority.  These two studies take 
a relatively uncritical stance towards the role of experts in governance.   
  35 
A second group of scholars takes a more critical stance towards state experts.  Similar to 
the objectives of social scientists focused on state autonomy, these scholars have been occupied 
with investigating the conditions and strategies both inside and outside expert institutions and 
organizations that did or did not permit expert autonomy (Centeno & Silva, 2016; Dargent, 
2011).  They argue that without autonomy, experts would be the instruments of other agents 
rather than agents of their particular ideas and approaches (Dargent, 2011).  Expert autonomy is 
a concern not only because experts often serve at the discretion of and are subordinate to their 
hierarchical superiors but also because the autonomy of unelected knowledge-based authorities 
posed a danger to democratic norms and decisions (Centeno, 2010).  This group does not 
subscribe to the rational dream or technocrat narrative that technical solutions can optimize 
resources and resolve social and political conflict (Centeno & Silva, 2016).  
Rationality as Political Accomplishment 
Studies of state autonomy have effectively demonstrated the importance of autonomy as 
an important source of expert power.  Nevertheless, they do have shortcomings.  These studies 
principally focus on the relationship and power dynamics that exist between state experts and 
politicos rather than between experts.  They do not discuss struggles between different expert 
groups and their respective rationalities within the state.  However, a few sociologists do.   
One excellent example of such a struggle is Espeland’s (1998) description of conflicting 
rationalities between engineers and environmental analysts at the Department of Interior over the 
siting and construction of a dam on Native American land in the American Southwest.  Another 
example is Reay’s (2007) discussion of how economists perceived and reacted to conflicts with 
other professionals such as lawyers, engineers, and agronomists within the US federal 
bureaucracy.  
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By ignoring the presence of diverse groups of state experts and the roles they play in 
governance, studies of expert autonomy reinforce the impression among many that particular 
manifestations of the rational dream, such as the neoliberal or managerial state, are foregone 
conclusions once experts have achieved autonomy.  Furthermore, by framing the autonomy of 
experts as a threat to democracy, these literatures bolster the rationality-politics divide among 
social reformers and critical theorists; expert-led governance depoliticizes liberal, representative 
democracy rather than represents a distinct form of politics resulting from experts’ sources and 
strategies of power. 
Trials of Strength in Science Studies. Unlike studies of expert autonomy, struggles 
between groups of scientists (or engineers) and their competing paradigms are at the center of 
science studies (Shapin & Schaffer, 2011; Yonay, 1998).  Science studies investigates how a 
network of experts and their allies withstand “trials of strength” in order to stabilize their way of 
doing things (Latour, 1988).  Science studies’ concept of trials of strength represents particular 
scientific paradigms as political accomplishments over other paradigms. Withstanding trials of 
strength involves acts of power in the form of translating interests and enrolling allies in order 
for scientists to strengthen their intellectual projects and make them more defensible (Latour, 
1988; Yonay, 1994).   
Science studies presents scientists and engineers not only as knowledge-based experts but 
also as entrepreneurs (Latour, 1988).  As entrepreneurs, they are creating something novel, and 
novelty can appear threatening, so it is often resisted (Garud, Hardy, & Maguire, 2007). Thus, 
scientists try to convince peers and outsiders—especially those that disagree with them—that 
their contribution or project is valid, useful, or promising.  Scientific ideas, methods, and 
paradigms have to be promoted and defended from criticism, competition, or attack (Latour, 
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1988).  Scientists achieve this by imposing their version of reality onto as many actors as 
possible through translation (Law, 2011).  The steps of translation involve promoting a project 
(i.e., a paradigm or methodology), enrolling various human and non-human entities (e.g., natural 
or technological phenomena), and aligning their interests with the project by framing the 
problem and providing them with a new social role or identity (Cabantous & Gond, 2015).  This 
process is similar to the one institutional scholars suggest institutional entrepreneurs engage in to 
make change in their organizations or fields (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009).  However, 
institutional scholars do not specify the exact strategies that expert entrepreneurs might employ, 
while science studies scholars focus more on laboratories than they do on institutions involved 
in planning and policy, such as the state (Pickering, 1992).  
When translation is successful, actors who were once bystanders or opponents become 
enrolled as allies (Callon, 1984). Entities align themselves with the scientists’ project and their 
network, increasing the latter’s authority.  The more human agents and non-human “actants” that 
a group of scientists can motivate to comply, the more powerful those scientists become (Law, 
2011).  Successful acts of translation and enrollment establish their projects as “obligatory 
passage points” that other actors must “pass through” to accomplish their goals (Callon, 1984).  
By establishing themselves as obligatory passage points, scientists force others to move along 
paths they have defined while barring them from other possible paths (Law, 2011).  Planning 
theorists and political scientists also discuss how experts gain power by enrolling allies, or, what 
they these scholars call “building coalitions” (Baum, 1980; Benveniste, 1972).  Relevant 
literature in science studies differs from these studies because it considers non-human entities as 
possible allies, details the translation process which is different from coalition building, and 
discusses enrolling allies specifically in order to overcome opposition by other experts. 
  38 
The classic case of successful translation strategies by scientists is provided by Callon’s 
(1984) explanation of the domestication of scallops at Saint-Brieuc Bay in Brittany, France.  In 
Callon’s account, a group of scientists was able to translate the interests of diverse actors, such as 
scientific colleagues, fishermen, and scallops (pectin maximus), in order to pursue their particular 
scallop cultivation strategy in a new marine environment.  As a result, successful translation and 
enrollment led the scientists to speak authoritatively on behalf of all “enrolled entities”: “At the 
end … three researchers said what these entities are and want” (Callon, 1984: 210).  Experts who 
can successfully withstand trials of strength bolster the network for their project and can 
overcome opposition from competing projects.  This was the case of Bayesian statisticians who 
overcame opposition by “frequentists” in decision science and neoclassicists by institutionalists 
in economics (Cabantous & Gond, 2015; Yonay, 1994).  
Experts’ Methods and Power 
Studying the methods of scientists, particularly their experiments, forms a major 
commitment in science studies (Latour, 1993; Latour & Woolgar, 2013; Law, 2011).  Science-
studies scholars do not divorce the power and authority of scientists from their work in science.  
Earlier, I reviewed literature that considered the power of expert knowledge as a property or 
resource; ideas that affect interests and institutional missions; and discourse that produce 
identities, truth, and deviance.  These are all valuable ways to understand the power of experts, 
but scholars have overemphasized these means at the expense of experts’ practices and work.  As 
sciences studies scholar John Law said of science: “The process of building scientific knowledge 
is also an active matter.  It takes work and effort” (Law, 2004: 19).  
When scholars examine expert power as discourse alone they, in one sense, depoliticize 
experts by taking their statements at face value.  In describing the “dark side” of planning, 
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theorist Bent Flyvbjerg cautioned against relying on speech and text because experts “participate 
in deception … they play games of power dressed up in technical reasoning” (Flyvbjerg, 1996: 
387).  Taking expert knowledge at face value divorces it from its existing political context, 
which includes the organizational and technical work of experts and their allies. The focus on 
experts’ ideas emphasizes their intellectual output but neglects the political work necessary to 
establish and execute their methods.  According to one science studies scholar: “We cannot 
simply denounce knowledge as ideology; applied social science and quantification more 
generally is hard work” (Breslau, 1998: 109).  Governmentality studies is an excellent resource 
for understanding the emergence of a particular governmental program but explains neither the 
role of social scientists in the development of governmental technologies such as state statistics 
nor whether the effects of surveillance and normalization had anything to do with the production 
of statistics inside state organizations (Fraser, 1981; Jessop, 2001).  One could conclude, to 
borrow a phrase from the public administration literature, that governmentality is “governance 
without government” (Peters & Pierre, 1998).   
Studies that examine experts’ methods introduce an important concept called “practice 
ontology” (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011) to the study of state experts as a supplement to existing 
programs that focus on ideas and discourse.  Best (2014) said that “[t]o grasp the dynamics of 
global governance, we therefore need to understand the production of expert knowledge as a 
kind of practice—a task…that is particularly suited to the insights of actor-network scholars such 
as Callon and Latour (Best, 2014: 24). This focus on practice recovers the expert agency lost in 
Foucauldian-inspired governmentality studies (Fraser, 1981; Jessop, 2001).  
Expert “policy devices”, or methods for doing the work of seeing and deciding, have 
been neglected as a source of power for state experts—economists in particular (Hirschman & 
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Berman, 2014).2  This is surprising since scientific method is a core tenet of rationality (Popper, 
1972; Toulmin, 2009).  Until recently, scholars have studied the policy devices of experts only 
obliquely and have often concluded that they influenced only the choice of technical matters or 
policy instruments, or their details (Anderson, 2008; Brint, 1990).  In a set of significant early 
case studies Nelkin (1975) concluded that expert influence was restricted to moments without 
conflict and to the instruments of planning and policy rather than political values.  Studies of 
national-income accounting have concluded that economists are more influential in debates that 
are technical, focused on the particulars of policy instruments, and shielded from public scrutiny 
(Hall, 1989). In other words, experts have an impact on the means but not the ends of planning.  
For social reformers, this had the effect of exacerbating the chastened dream.  At the same time, 
these studies depict expert influence in technical matters of planning, policy, and public 
administration as unremarkable and politically insignificant. 
Hirschman and Berman (2014) agree that experts may have the most say and influence 
over the technical aspects of policy, but they do not dismiss such influence as limited or 
apolitical.  They cite policy devices as pillars of expert power with potential political effects that 
can sometimes extend to policy ends.  Even when they do not extend this far, the effects still 
merit deeper empirical investigation for their “small-p” political effects (Hirschman & Berman, 
2014).  Scholars are beginning to examine the policy devices of experts and their potential 
political effects more closely.  For example, Hood (2017) and Viscusi (2009) surveyed the 
efforts of the Office of Management and Budget and Environmental Protection Agency to 
                                                
2 The term policy devices is used in lieu of methods when referring to the term’s use by its original authors.  The 
terms are meant to signify the same thing, however.  
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measure the statistical value of life (Hood, 2017; Viscusi, 2009).  Much more terrain remains to 
be covered, however. 
A sub-discipline of sociology, the sociology of interventions, is less concerned with 
expert strategies designed to achieve autonomy and thus avoid politicization, than with those 
designed to establish methods that do work on their behalf.  Inspired in part by science studies, 
scholars committed to this intellectual program focus on experts’ methods and how they 
intervene in their organizational environments and produce political effects (Asdal, Brenna, & 
Moser, 2007; Eyal & Buchholz, 2010).  In other words, they focus on the content of what experts 
actually do.  For example, economists usually intervene through calculative tools designed to 
bring about governability (Eyal & Levy, 2013).  
Opening the Black Box of (Social) Scientific Practice. Policy devices come in many 
different forms such as indicators, models, matrixes, algorithms, decision trees, and 
(e)valuations, to name a few.  A collection of literature that falls under the broad rubric of 
“sociology of quantification” makes sense of these diverse devices.  The sociology of 
quantification, as defined here, includes literatures from sociology and science studies but also 
critical accounting studies, history, and anthropology that investigate the core functions of 
methodological work such as classification (Bowker & Star, 1999), standardization 
(Timmermans & Epstein, 2010), measurement (Power, 2004), quantification (Espeland & 
Stevens, 2008), calculation (Callon & Law, 2005), commensuration (Espeland & Stevens, 1998), 
valuation (Lamont, 2012), and ranking (Espeland & Sauder, 2007).  These bodies of literature 
have in turn been applied in a variety of fields such as medicine, public health, public policy, and 
finance and economics (Berten & Leisering, 2017; Besedovsky, 2018; Maiers, 2017; Mansnerus, 
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2013; Mügge, 2016).  These literatures open up black boxes and get inside a wide array of expert 
methods to understand their biases and effects.   
 Science-studies scholars “open the black box” to better understand scientific practice.  
The “black box” is a concept that appears to have originated among electric engineers and 
represents a device that transforms given inputs into predictable outputs in cases where the 
process for doing so is opaque or considered settled (Latour, 1988; MacKenzie, 2005).  In 
practice, users of black boxes are content to disregard their internal structure and workings so 
long as they function as intended.  Modern society is replete with black boxes from technologies 
such as automobiles and automated teller machines, organizations such as departments of 
taxation and post offices, and expertise such as surgery and sailing (MacKenzie, 2005).   
One major source of the black box’s power is its ability to mask the internal workings of 
(social) science including a field’s paradigms or elementary theories and methods (Law, 2004; 
Pinch, 1992).  When black boxes conceal the inner workings of science, they conceal the moral, 
ethical, and political content of the inputs entering the black box and choices that determine how 
those inputs are transformed into outputs (Eyal & Levy, 2013; Steen, 2015).  This process is 
powerful because actors who wish to reveal these biases do what they can to open the black box 
while scientists do whatever they can to ensure that the black box remains closed and continues 
to operate reliably and opaquely (MacKenzie, 2005).  When the methods of experts are 
successfully black boxed and adopted into governance contexts, the political and moral content 
of the methods’ inputs and design choices engender political effects.   
Marshaling black-boxed methods as governing rationales is an important source of power 
for state experts.  Getting inside these methods can reveal their small-p political effects—
intended or unintended—such as what and whom experts make visible or invisible, include or 
  43 
exclude, and elevate or demote (Alonso & Starr, 1989; Desrosières, 2002; Espeland & Stevens, 
1998, 2008).  Hirschman and Berman (2014) document how policy devices, once stabilized, had 
the ability to shape attention among actors.  For example, the national-income accounts produced 
by economists have drawn attention to aggregate growth rather than the distribution of national 
income (Hirschman, 2016).  
Methods are not limited to small-p political effects, however.  As decisional devices, they 
can also have “big-P” political effects by influencing power relations and organizational 
outcomes (Nathan, 1987).  For example, the World Bank’s adoption of structural adjustment 
models increased the influence of macroeconomists at the expense of sector specialists (Pereira, 
1995).  The United States Department of Labor’s adoption of net-impact analysis shifted power 
from street-level bureaucrats implementing labor-market reentry programs to evaluators and 
senior Department of Labor bureaucrats (Breslau, 1997).  Regarding organizational outcomes, 
Carolini (2008) describes how the UN’s national-income and public-sector accounting standards 
concealed for-profit motivations that reduced social investments in low-income Brazilian 
neighborhoods.  Willis (1995) describes how financial formulas contributed to the different 
architectural forms of early twentieth-century American skyscrapers in New York and Chicago.  
The influence of policy devices on power relations and organizational decisions has received 
relatively less attention than their impacts on how decision-makers and organizations see. 
Economic Methods. Science-studies scholars have focused more on economists’ use of 
“market devices” to shape markets and market behavior than on policy devices to affect policy 
and planning (Hirschman & Berman, 2014).  Economists affect markets whenever, over time and 
with repeated use, their models create the behavior, such as the characteristics of “homo 
economicus”, that they describe (MacKenzie, Muniesa, & Siu, 2007).  According to this idea, 
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economic theories and models intervene in reality rather than simply reflect it.  At the same time, 
economists have played an increasingly prominent role in planning and policy in the past half-
century (Markoff & Montecinos, 1993).  Scholars are starting to give this specific group of social 
scientists and their methods the attention they warrant.  Economists deserve this attention 
because their methods employ two unique strategies: monetization and quantification.  What 
separates economists from accountants and financial analysts in their use of monetization and 
quantification strategies is their fusion of these skills with the core tenets of neoclassical 
economic theory.  State economists frequently rely on a series of “insights and practical 
techniques” from microeconomics (Reay, 2007).  These include instinctively considering costs 
as well as benefits (i.e., cost-benefit analysis), incentives, market equilibrium, and opportunity 
cost (Reay, 2007).  They also employ counterfactual thinking in which economists ask “what if?” 
and then try to quantify and monetize the counterfactual scenario (Abbott, 2004).  I would add to 
this list the allegiance of economists to generalized linear reality—i.e., the general linear model 
and fundamental assumptions that permit its use (Abbott, 1988).  
With respect to economists’ methods and according to the relevant literature, they 
generally narrow decision-makers’ field of vision, establish formal decision-making processes, 
and restructure political relations around them (Hirschman & Berman, 2014).  Economists can 
also contribute to casting non-economic topics in economic terms and putting non-economic 
decision-making domains under their technical jurisdiction (Berman, 2011).  Methods can help 
them to present themselves as official spokespersons of objectivity and rigor (Porter, 1996).  
They can remake the outside world in the image of an economic experiment or model (Mitchell, 
2005).  Methods can elevate some values while rendering others invisible (Espeland & Stevens, 
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1998), make economic planning and policy goals more legitimate than others, and make 
quantifiable ends more legitimate than qualitative ones (Centeno, 1993).   
Economists can use a variety of methods, so long as they are amenable to quantification, 
monetization, or both.  The most popular methods in contemporary developmental economics are 
governance indicators, decision trees, and randomized controlled trials (Akbulut, Adaman, & 
Madra, 2015; Rodrik, 2008).  Except for the studies described in this review, limited work has 
been done on these specific methods, particularly in the field of development finance.  The 
authors of an edited volume, Governance by Indicators, describe how indicators can displace 
subjective, non-quantitative data with “scientific” objective data, determine how problems are 
framed, and influence action, including the allocation of resources (Davis, Fisher, Kingsbury, & 
Merry, 2012).  Generally, indicator effects include combining multiple diverse qualities or 
quantities into a single metric (i.e., commensuration), ranking entities along that metric, and 
eliciting reactions from the entities they measure and rank (Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Espeland 
& Stevens, 1998). Decision trees and RCTs have been analyzed in fields other than that of 
development.  A study of decision analysis shows how decision trees disciplined the beliefs and 
preferences of decision-makers, visually represented a decision scenario, quantified a limited set 
of possible decisional alternatives, and arrived at a set of ranked options that could be 
implemented (Cabantous, Gond, & Johnson-Cramer, 2010).  A study of impact evaluations in 
US domestic policy, including randomized controlled trials, showed that they can make 
illegitimate problems legitimate and justify contentious programs by using evaluative outcomes 
to argue in favor of continued funding (Breslau, 1997; Breslau, 1998).  They can redistribute 
agency away from program recipients and toward program interventions and the bureaucrats that 
implement them (Breslau, 1998).  
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter reviewed the major debates over the power of experts.  
Orthodox and heterodox planning theorists, neo-marxists, and postdevelopmentalists contribute 
to the prevailing belief that experts’ power in planning and development is certain and derived 
from their intellectual rationality.  Meanwhile, others cast doubts on the power of experts’ 
intellectual rationality.  Social scientists ascribing to elite theory and a number of empirical case 
studies across various disciplines claimed that politicos instrumentalize experts or if they do have 
influence it is limited to narrow technical matters.  These scholars’ arguments fuel the chastened 
dream and asymmetrical treatment of rationality and power in planning, policy and development.   
The politics of expertise qualifies the power of intellectual rationality.  This literature 
suggests that intellectual rationality is powerful but only under conditions of “expert 
autonomy”—experts must do work and create the necessary conditions to liberate themselves 
from bureaucratic and legislative authority in order for their rationality to prevail.  Science 
studies and the sub-discipline of the sociology of interventions likewise argue that experts must 
do political work to be influential.  These genres are more concerned, however, with rationality 
as a political accomplishment—experts’ power is derived from their ability to establish black-
boxed methods that do work on their behalf.  In other words, experts’ intellectual rationality is 
powerful, but not, as many in planning and development believe, because of their ideas and 
discourse alone or, as the politics of expertise literature argues, because they achieve autonomy 
from politicos. Rather, experts’ power is derived from their ability to overcome opposition from 
other experts to advance their methodological projects.   
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Chapter 3:  Research Approach and Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter will describe the research approach, design, methodology, data sources, and 
procedures used to answer questions around the power of economic expertise.  This study faced 
the challenge of using research methodology to study research methods.  The most appropriate 
approaches for such a task are phronesis and mixed methods.  Phronesis focuses on planning 
practices and their power.  Mixed methods permit an eclectic use of research designs, methods, 
and data sources to answer the questions at hand.  Together, these philosophical approaches led 
to an embedded case study design using comparative case analysis and mixed methods.   
The case chosen for analysis is a new fund for global development, the United States 
(US) Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), and the agency responsible for executing it, the US 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).  Fifty in-depth interviews, hundreds of documents, 
many obtained through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, and several quantitative 
data sets were analyzed.  The many diverse sources of empirical data allowed for multiple forms 
of triangulation.  The unique case study design meanwhile facilitated detailed descriptions of 
processes and outcomes.   
This chapter will first introduce the value-rational, phronetic approach.  Then, it will 
describe the embedded case study design and mixed methods approach in detail.  The primary 
and secondary data sources and data collection and analysis procedures supporting this approach 
are then presented.  The chapter closes with a discussion about how this research met data 
quality and ethical standards. 
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Research Approach 
This dissertation investigates whether state expertise is powerful, and if so, how.  It 
strives to answer these two questions by examining how development economic methods get 
stabilized within development governance and affect development agencies and programs.  
There are two principal philosophical approaches driving this study’s methodology: “studying 
up” and phronesis.  Studying up is an approach to researching elites (Aguiar & Schneider, 2016).  
As a response to ethnographers who ventured into “the field” to study marginalized populations, 
Laura Nader, a notable anthropologist, suggested that ethnographers instead “study up” (Nader, 
1969).  Studying up shifts the focus to officials and experts in positions of authority and 
influence in institutions such as political parties, the state, academia, corporations, the military, 
and non-governmental organizations (Aguiar & Schneider, 2016).  I follow in this tradition by 
studying economic expertise in development.  Much of development studies has been focused on 
“studying down”.  Too often development is focused on the recipients of development projects 
or the “development subject” (e.g.,Yapa, 1996).  Meanwhile, we know relatively less about the 
work of economic experts in development.   
The other methodological approach is phronetic research.  Phronetic research is based on 
Artistotle’s philosophy of phronesis (Flyvbjerg, 2001).  Phronesis can be translated as prudence 
or practical wisdom.  It is considered a value rational approach rather than an instrumental 
rational approach. Value rationality involves reflexive analysis and discussion of values and 
interests (Flyvbjerg, 2004).  I investigate economic expertise’s role and influence in governance 
because I am interested and committed to asking the key questions in phronetic planning 
research: where are we going with such an approach to governance, who gains and loses from it, 
and are the outcomes desirable (Flyvbjerg, 2004)?    
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The issue of power is central to phronetic research.  Classic Aristotelian phronesis 
neglected issues of power.  Flyvbjerg, though, places power at the center of his approach.  He 
goes as far as to say that “[t]here can be no adequate understanding of planning without placing 
the analysis of planning within the context of power” (Flyvbjerg, 2004: 292).  For Flyvbjerg, the 
main question is not only the Weberian one of “who governs?” but also the Foucauldian question 
of “what ‘governmental rationalities’ are at work when those who govern govern?” (Flyvbjerg, 
2004: 293). By combining a Foucauldian interpretation of power with a Weberian one, the 
central question becomes how power is exercised rather than merely asking who has power and 
why they have it.    
This study’s focus on economists’ methods aligns with phronetic planning research’s 
emphasis on the “micropractices” of planning.  Experts’ methods are the minutia of planning, or 
the “little things” of the world that philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche said too many had come to 
despise (Flyvbjerg, 2001).  Phronetic planning research is decentered in its approach, taking 
these planning minutia as its point of departure (Flyvbjerg, 2004).  Most studies of experts are 
concerned with their social status or big ideas (Beland & Cox, 2010; Schwendinger & 
Schwendinger, 1974).  However, ignoring experts’ little things (like methods) can result in 
misleading or hyperbolic accounts divorced from the reality of experts’ daily practices (e.g., 
Easterly, 2014).  
In effect, this study takes a practice ontology towards economists’ work (Feldman & 
Orlikowski, 2011).  Rather than focus primarily on economists’ discursive acts, this study 
focuses on economists’ work to gain power and establish their methods.  It also examines the 
work those methods do on economists’ behalf.  While scholars’ focus on discourse tempts 
readers to continually think of things as being simpler than they are, phronetic research attempts 
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to avoid this problem by focusing on planning practices regardless of whether they occur inside 
UNDP headquarters, a local planning office, a particular plan or project, a grassroots 
organization, or a neighborhood (Flyvbjerg, 2004).  What people actually do in planning is seen 
as more fundamental than what people say through discourse, text, or theory.  
Research Design 
Value rational questions focused on the power of planning practices are best examined 
through case studies (Flyvbjerg, 2004).  Case studies are in-depth, multidimensional 
investigations of social phenomena through mainly, though not exclusively, qualitative and 
inductive methodological approaches (Yin, 1984).  They are useful for answering “how” 
questions and understanding issues where processes and connections are imperative but are 
misunderstood or incompletely comprehended (Peattie, 1983).   
This study is concerned with processes of how experts introduce and stabilize economic 
methods in governance.  Some scholars have approached the issue of economic expertise and its 
effects using large sample quantitative techniques such as multivariate regression models.  They 
argue that this helps them investigate the influence of economic ideas by establishing causality 
and answering the “how much” question of expert influence (Chwieroth, 2007).  Large sample 
quantitative studies are the exception to the norm.  The vast majority of studies of state expertise 
are usually approached through case studies.  This dissertation is no different.  I investigate the 
role and power of economic expertise using a case study of United States global development 
finance at the turn of the 21st century.   
My case study approach departs from existing approaches in important respects, 
however.  Case studies of expertise have largely been based on historical cases or analysis of 
discourse.  Archives are a rich source of empirical material.  One can conduct a rather 
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straightforward discourse analysis of experts using their intellectual outputs.  Because state 
experts are elites though, scholars often have a hard time gaining access for primary source 
material such as interviews (Lilleker, 2003).  Each of these approaches—archives and 
interviews—has its advantages and limitations.  Historical case studies can provide an incredibly 
detailed assessment of the role and work of experts.  Nils Gilman’s Mandarins of the Future is a 
fine example (Gilman, 2003). Yet, their holism entangles a number of experts’ sources of 
influence such as scientific authority, social status, institutional position, and methods.  The 
obvious problem with a discursive approach is that it assumes a power that experts may not 
actually have.  There may be a wide gap between what experts say (or even do) and what their 
influence is.  It is a good approach for explaining experts’ intentions, but not necessarily their 
effects.  
In contrast to historical case studies or analyses of discourse, embedded case studies 
involve more than one unit of analysis and are more amenable to mixed-methods approaches 
(Scholz & Tietje, 2002).  An embedded case study approach is useful when subunits, such as 
particular actors, objects, or practices deserve focused attention.  For example, in an 
organizational case study the main unit may be the organization as a whole and the subunits that 
receive more focused attention may be specific departments or groups of individuals (Scholz & 
Tietje, 2002).  Cases that analyze the larger unit can miss specific phenomena’s operational 
detail (Yin, 1984).  Some important operational details are the micropractices of planning such as 
economists’ methods.  
Given the complexity of units of analysis such as experts and expertise, it is difficult to 
isolate the influence, if not impact, of major economic ideas and practices such as national 
income accounting.  The difficulty is used to argue for their irrelevance (Breslau, 1998).  This 
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supposed irrelevance could be a result of limitations in existing empirical approaches.  An 
embedded case study design allowed me to isolate methods from other sources of expert 
influence such as ideas, scientific authority, social class, and institutional position. This was 
accomplished through focusing on methods’ role in governance rather than isolating methods as 
a variable in a generalized linear model or similar reductionist and positivist approach (Abbott, 
1988).  For example, I am primarily concerned with ideas in so far as they influence economists’ 
methods.  Also, I address the issue of institutional position by treating it as an outcome of 
economists’ attempts to gain influence and stabilize their methods rather than an explanatory 
variable for economists’ power.  Still, comparative case approaches are employed to analyze 
economic governance methods’ impacts when they are applied in decision-making versus when 
they are absent.  These strategies will be described in more detail below. 
While I argue that case studies are the best research design to investigate economic 
expertise, I break from the phronetic approach’s allegiance to interpretivism.  For strict 
interpretivists, generalizing from specific contexts is both impossible and undesirable (Lin, 
1998).  The better approach is to explain in great detail respondents’ diverse perspectives in 
order to explain a phenomenon within its context.  Because of its focus on interpretivist 
accounts, phronetic research rejects attempts at generalization.  It considers this the purview of 
episteme, or universal, invariable, and context-independent “scientific” knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 
2004).   
At the same time, a complete rejection of attempts at generalization is unwarranted.  One 
way to bridge phronetic research and generalization is to rely on “naturalistic generalization”.  
Naturalistic generalization is well suited for phronetic research and can contribute to externally 
valid and useful knowledge without trying to establish a new law or paradigm.  Naturalistic 
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generalization is based on a partnership between readers and researchers.  Readers use their 
intellect and tacit knowledge of their own experiences to determine whether a case study’s 
findings can be transferred to other contexts or cases the reader is familiar with (Stake, 1983).  
The responsibility of each reader is to determine how much a particular case fits with his or her 
personal experiences or circumstances (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  The researcher’s job is not to 
establish a representative sample and declare generalizations but provide a sufficient level of 
contextualized empirical information to facilitate the reader’s judgment as to whether a particular 
case can be generalized.  Such detail is often but not exclusively provided through interpretivist 
narratives.  The researcher can also draw his or her own conclusions and develop theory so long 
as enough detail is provided for readers to draw their own, potentially different, conclusions 
(Hellström, 2008).  
Embedded case studies have the advantage of maintaining the rich contextual detail of 
cases that permit naturalized generalization while accommodating a mixed-methods approach 
(Scholz & Tietje, 2002; Stake, 1983).  Mixed methods research moves beyond the 
“incompatibility thesis”, which is driven by the supposed incommensurability of quantitative, 
positivist and qualitative, interpretivist research paradigms (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  It 
does so by mixing or combining quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, 
approaches, concepts, or language into a single study.  Doing so draws on the strengths and 
minimizes the weaknesses of each paradigm (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  A mixed method 
approach likewise focuses on what qualitative and quantitative methods share.  Both approaches 
describe data, construct explanatory arguments from those data, take pains to ensure the validity 
of arguments, and speculate about why the observed outcomes happened as they did (Sechrest & 
Sidani, 1995).  
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Notably, mixed methods research is based on the philosophy of pragmatism (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Pragmatism focuses on identifying solutions that best help to understand or 
address the problem.  It embraces eclecticism and pluralism in research design and methodology 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  In contrast to studies taking a narrative, phenomenological, or 
ethnographic approach, pragmatist designs employ whatever sources or data best address the 
questions posed.  As a result, the embedded case study approach could be described as more 
eclectic and opportunistic than narrative-based case studies. 
 Description of the Embedded Case Study Design. This study is based on an embedded 
case design of three paradigmatic economic governance methods within the Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA) and Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).  The focus is on 
three major economic methods—governance indicators, growth diagnostics, and randomized 
controlled trials—that comprise the embedded subunits of the broader case of the MCA and 
MCC.  The embedded case study design permits a greater focus on these economic methods as 
governance rationales and sources of economic experts’ power.  Each component case also 
employs its own unique comparative analytical approach that illuminates the methods’ effects on 
the distribution of development finance resources.  Because the MCC adopted these methods, the 
case components are supported by secondary case examples from multilateral development 
banks (MDB) to confirm findings and give confidence about any generalizations that might be 
drawn. 
Embedded Case Components: Economic Methods at the MCC. The MCA-MCC was 
chosen as a case study because it represents a paradigmatic case (Flyvbjerg, 2006) of changes in 
global development finance governance during a period of change.  Three “subunits”, or 
embedded case components, were selected for in-depth examination and form the basis of this 
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study.  Each of these components is a method in the development economics discipline that state 
economists introduced as governance rationales to the MCC. Like the overall case, these case 
components were selected because they are paradigmatic cases. The three methods—governance 
indicators, growth diagnostics, and randomized controlled trials (RCT)—were the most popular 
contemporary methods in both development economics and development finance during this 
period (and still are as of 2018).  The methods’ creators work in some of the most prestigious 
development economics research departments in the world and are among the most widely cited 
and influential scholars in the field.  Each of the methods has been adopted, to differing degrees 
and sometimes in different forms, by various development finance organizations such as the 
World Bank, International Fund for Agriculture, and USAID.  
In addition to being paradigmatic cases, these methods are also extreme cases (Flyvbjerg, 
2006)—the ideas and practices that would inform global development finance were most 
enthusiastically applied in the MCC.  MCC adhered to governance indicator criteria more 
faithfully for country selection, used growth diagnostics more directly for development planning, 
and executed RCTs for project evaluation more often than its development finance agency 
counterparts.  As a result, the processes and outcomes described in this study could be more 
pronounced than in other contexts. In this study examples and evidence are drawn, when 
appropriate, from secondary cases of global development finance organizations such as the 
World and Asian Development Banks.  This triangulation corroborates findings from the primary 
case of MCC. 
The first case component is MCC’s use of governance indicators for country selection.  
Governance became an important concept for development following development and 
international macroeconomists’ interest in the field of new institutional economics.  Governance 
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indicators attempt to measure and quantify a wide range of institutional experiences in a country.  
They aggregate various expert opinions on topics such as rule of law, bureaucratic effectiveness, 
political stability, democratic norms, and extent of corruption in a country.  Indicators then rank 
countries from “best” to “worst” governed according to their governance score. MCC began 
using governance indicators to rank and select countries for MCA grants at inception.  
This case component examined how governance indicators were introduced and 
stabilized as part of the MCA.  The process of selecting countries by indicators was compared to 
existing foreign policy approaches to selecting countries for aid.  The MCA began with 16 
indicators (as of 2016 it had 20) to provide an annual snapshot, or scorecard, of countries’ 
economic, governance, and human development performance. Of these 16 indicators, five were 
derived from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) database. Scoring well 
on the WGI indicators was critical to a country’s eligibility status.  To assess the impact of 
governance indicators on the distribution of development finance, countries that performed well 
on the WGI were compared to those that did not.3 
The second case component is MCC’s use of growth diagnostics to plan and design 
country investment programs known as “compacts”.4  Growth diagnostics, called “constraints 
analyses” at MCC, involve a diagnostic approach to understanding bottlenecks to private 
investment.  Rather than standardizing a particular reform program, as did the Washington 
                                                
3 Ideally the study would have compared the distribution of US bilateral economic development assistance between 
MCA eligible and ineligible countries since the MCA’s establishment in 2004.  However, a number of confounding 
variables that affect the distribution of the State Department Economic Support Fund and Development Assistance 
Fund make such a comparison difficult.  A development policy expert at the Center for Global Development advised 
me that such an analysis would not result in very meaningful results. The analysis in this study focused instead on 
governance indicators’ effect on the distribution of new MCA funds on candidate countries.  
4 MCC also has a “Threshold Program” that provides small grants to countries that are on the cusp of meeting 
MCC’s indicator eligibility criteria for larger compact grants.  The Threshold Program, while subject to the 
economic governance methods described here, is a marginal program and not included in this study. 
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Consensus, growth diagnostics recommend understanding each country's unique context and 
various possible paths to growth through a decision-tree analysis.  
MCC implemented growth diagnostics in 2009.  This second case component examines 
how growth diagnostics were introduced and stabilized within MCC’s Department of Compact 
Development.  The technique’s influence is assessed using an interrupted time-series design by 
comparing the development of compacts before and after growth diagnostics were introduced.  
Nineteen compacts were developed before 2009 when no standardized diagnostic process was 
involved.  These nineteen compacts were compared to 14 compacts developed with a growth 
diagnostic to assess the impact of this method on bureaucratic power relations, development 
planning, and distribution of development resources.  
The third component involves MCC’s use of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to 
evaluate investment projects. Randomized controlled trials randomly assign project participants 
to a control and treatment group.  Because of this randomization process RCTs are considered 
the most rigorous form of impact evaluation, which focus on determining an intervention’s effect 
by establishing a counterfactual.  RCT proponents claim that counterfactuals created by 
randomization isolate the impact of a project based intervention (i.e., treatment) from other 
observable and unobservable confounding variables such as weather and participant motivation.  
As of 2015, MCC had initiated 57 project impact evaluations (out of 144 total 
evaluations) of which 23 were RCTs.  This third case component examined how RCTs were 
introduced and stabilized within MCC’s Department of Accountability. I analyzed a subset of 
those RCTs on a particular development intervention—farmer technical assistance and 
training—carried out between 2005 and 2012.  Among farmer training projects with RCTs, I 
examined one in Ghana that was evaluated using an RCT and one in Honduras where an RCT 
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was initiated but where the research design faltered and eventually failed during project 
implementation. 
Data Sources 
Primary Data Sources. Empirical evidence for this study was derived from both primary 
and secondary sources.  Primary data were derived from semi-structured interviews conducted 
in-person and over the phone.  Semi-structured interviews employ prompts to spur free-flowing 
conversations and are a particularly good method for case studies focusing on elites (Beamer, 
2002). The sample frame for each case component’s interviewees was established based on an 
assessment of the key actors involved in particular processes using the internet, the professional 
networking site LinkedIn, key informants, organizational charts, and other government 
documents. The sample frame was not based on a statistical sample meant to achieve 
representativeness but instead was constructed to represent the universe of actors involved with 
global development finance reform and stabilization of economic methods.  Interview subjects 
included, among others, policy advisors and officials involved in MCA and MCC’s creation, 
economists involved in creating and conducting governance indicators, growth diagnostics and 
randomized trials, senior MCC officials, and program officers managing and implementing MCC 
activities. 
When examining governance indicators the priority was to speak to members of the 
select group responsible for designing the MCA selection system.  For growth diagnostics, I 
prioritized those whose tenure at MCC was long enough to have experienced compact 
development processes with and without growth diagnostics.  For RCTs, the priority was on 
actors involved in bringing RCTs to MCC and designing and executing RCTs for the Honduras 
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and Ghana rural development projects. Across all three cases, the goal was to achieve a balance 
between the participation of senior officials, economists, and non-economist experts.  
Interview totals for each case were drawn from this sample frame and based on time and 
resources available for the study and the number of individuals needed to achieve saturation on a 
particular line of questioning.  Saturation is achieved when no new information is collected (or is 
expected to be collected) from respondents (Sandelowski, 1995).  Individuals were prioritized for 
an interview based on their relevance to the study topic and questions, availability for an 
interview, and position within my professional network.  (For sample frame and target interview 
quantities see  
 
Table 3.1.) 
The sample frame consisted of 95 individuals of which 59 were targeted for interviews. 
Contact was established with these 59 individuals and 50 were available for, agreed to, and 
participated in an interview resulting in a response rate of 85 percent.  Interviews were conducted 
between June 2015 and August 2016 in Washington, DC or over the telephone.  Eight 
interviewees who were central to the questions being asked in the study served as key 
informants. Their initial in-person interviews were followed up with one or more phone calls and 
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Table 3.1 
Sample Frame, Target Interviews, and Number of Respondents 
 Case 1:  
Governance Indicators 




Sample Frame 31 28 36 
Target Interviews 19 22 18 
Interviews:    
Senior officials / managers 6 7 2 
State Economists 4 6 5 
Other State Experts 1 7 4 
Non-state Economists 1  1 
Other 2  3 
Total Interviews 15 20 15 
 
Secondary Data Sources. Secondary data sources included hundreds of documents and 
several datasets (see Table 3.2). The main sources of secondary data included official government 
documents, speeches, meeting minutes, organizational charts, studies, and presentations; outputs 
from government consultants; think tank events’ transcripts; Congressional hearings’ transcripts; and 
development economists’ publications.  Other secondary data sources included newspaper articles 
and conference proceedings.  Government documents were obtained from the MCC, Department of 
Treasury, Department of State, US Congress, United Nations, World Bank, Asian Development 
Bank, George W. Bush Presidential Library, and William J. Clinton Presidential Library. 
 Datasets included official MCC data on country selection and impact evaluations.  Two new 
unique datasets were constructed from MCC documents for this study: one on MCC investments 
using MCC compact project descriptions, multiyear financial plans, and monitoring and evaluation 
plans and another on diagnostic analyses and growth constraints using MCC growth diagnostic 
reports.  These datasets were used to answer questions about the effects of development economics 
governance methods.  
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Table 3.2   
Secondary Data Sources, Including Dataset Sources 




– Transcripts of congressional hearings and testimony of the US Senate 
and House of Representatives 
– Archival records of the Bush Administration NSC and CEA 
– Minutes and reports of board meetings from the MCC, World Bank, 
and Asian Development Bank 
– Official speeches from the United Nations Monterrey Conference on 
Financing for Development 
– Official speeches and presentations of US government officials 
– Organizational charts of US government agencies 
– Econometric research on aid, governance, and growth 
– Reports from the Center for Global Development and Brookings 
Institution 
– Records and publications of the World Bank Annual Bank Conference 
on Development Economics 
– Newspaper articles 
For years 2004 to 
2012: 
– MCC candidate 
country reports 
– MCA eligible 
country reports 
– MCC Scorebooks 
– MCC country 
selection data 





– Growth diagnostics and related reports for MCC countries 
– MCC guidance on conducting growth diagnostics 
– Intermediate growth diagnostic analyses 
– Report on an MCC survey of MCC’s experience with growth 
diagnostics 
– MCC documents on the compact development processes 
– MCC presentations on the objectives and processes of growth 
diagnostics 
– Guidance and evaluations of MCC’s compact development 
consultative process 
– Country compact agreements, including annual financial plans 
– MCC organizational charts 
– Transcripts of think tank events on MCC economic analysis 




– Compact program 
descriptions  








– RCT research design and data collection reports 
– RCT baseline and final reports 
– Field reports from project implementers 
– MCC project design reports 
– Publications on impact evaluations in development finance from think 
tanks 
– Transcripts from think tank events on impact evaluation 
– MCC presentations on impact evaluation and RCTs 
– MCC RCT peer review reports 
– Executive education course material from JPAL 
– Planning and implementation documents on MCC’s agricultural and 
rural development projects 
– Documents and presentations from MCC conferences and workshops 
on RCTs in agriculture and rural development 
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Procedure 
Several factors facilitated access to the empirical material.  As a development 
professional and former MCC employee I had access to a wide network of individuals who 
served as potential interviewees.  This did not, however, eliminate challenges inherent with 
interview-based qualitative research.  People leave institutions, move away, or are unwilling to 
participate.  Where potential interviewees were unavailable or declined interview requests, I used 
a snowball sampling method via social networking platforms such as LinkedIn to find 
replacements.  LinkedIn shows an individual’s work and professional history, which can 
determine if s/he is an appropriate interviewee.  It also shows how an individual is connected to a 
researcher or someone a researcher might know.  This can facilitate introductions and interview 
requests.  Finally, I attended meetings open to the public at MCC and related Washington, DC 
institutions such as The Center for Global Development and The Brookings Institution (see 
Table 3.3).  These events, all held in Washington, DC, provided an opportunity to make contacts 
and ask questions.  
Table 3.3  
Public Events Attended 
Event Date Host 
A Conversation with MCC CEO Dana J. Hyde April 24, 2015 CGD 
MCC Quarterly Public Town Hall June 18, 2015 MCC 
Global Development and the 2016 Electio July 20, 2015 CGD 
Strengthening a Bipartisan Legacy of Modernizing U.S. 
Foreign Assistance 
July 28, 2015 Modernizing Foreign 
Assistance Network 
MCC Quarterly Public Town Hall September 24, 2015 MCC 
Assessing the Impact of Foreign Assistance: The Role of 
Evaluation 
March 30, 2016 Brookings Institution 
What Should Tomorrow’s Aid Agencies Look Like? June 21, 2016 CGD 
Deep Dive into MCC’s Nicaragua Farmer Training Impact 
Evaluation 
June 30, 2016 MCC 
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 Potential interviewees were contacted by email.  The email included the researcher’s 
background, the study’s purpose, how the person’s contact information was obtained, a reason 
for why the person was being asked to participate, an explanation that their participation was 
voluntary, a reference to the study’s Columbia University internal review board clearance, and 
an invitation to ask any questions about the study prior to participation.  Participants were 
interviewed in their offices or a public place nearby.  Each interview lasted for one hour on 
average.  Respondents were informed that their identities and responses would be kept 
confidential.  Confidentiality and anonymity were important to the study because of the 
potentially sensitive matters discussed.  Respondents are more forthcoming and frank in their 
responses when their identities are kept anonymous (Leech, 2002).  As a result of this 
confidentiality, throughout the study respondents are identified by their professional position 
rather than name.  Interview responses were documented through detailed and copious note 
taking.  Respondents were asked to pause or repeat responses if necessary to document potential 
quotes for use in the study (respondents’ quotes throughout the study should be treated as 
approximately rather than exactly verbatim; pauses in speech and transition worlds such as “so”, 
“um”, “like” etc. are often excluded from quotes).  Notes were transcribed into a word 
processing software the same day of the interview and saved in a password protected file on a 
password protected computer.  
 For the secondary data sources, I accessed documents and data through the Internet, 
George W. Bush Library’s archives, and Freedom of Information Act requests (FOIA).  Many 
documents, such as compact agreements between the US and partner country governments, 
monitoring and evaluation plans, constraints analyses, and evaluation design reports were 
available online.  For those that were not readily available online, I obtained files by visiting the 
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George W. Bush Library archives in Dallas, TX and submitting twelve FOIA requests in 2015. 
One FOIA request each was filed with the Treasury Department, State Department, MCC, and 
USAID.  Eight FOIA requests were filed with the George W. Bush Presidential Library, which is 
subject to FOIA under the Presidential Records Act.  Of these twelve requests, nine resulted in 
the release of documents.  The State Department never completed its request, the request at 
USAID resulted in “no records” response (i.e., the agency could not identify any records based 
on the criteria provided), and one request with the George W. Bush Presidential Library is still 
pending.   
Construction of data sets took different forms for each case component.  For the first case 
on governance indicators, MCC’s selection data for years 2004 to 2012 was downloaded from 
MCC’s website.  This included all the selection criteria data from the original 16 indicators by 
country and year.  This data, however, lacked country income data.  Country income in the form 
of gross national income (GNI) per capita was available from MCC annual scorebooks.  Country 
GNI per capita data was manually entered into the database.  Data on whether a country was a 
candidate or eligible for MCA funds in a given year was obtained from MCC country candidate 
and eligibility reports and also added to existing data.  
 For the second case on growth diagnostics, two databases were constructed.  The first 
database was on MCC investments for 33 compacts designed between 2005 and 2015.  
Compacts’ multiyear financial plans were analyzed and relevant investment data extracted and 
entered into a database.  Dollar figures were normalized to 2015 values using inflation 
adjustment ratios from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  
Each investment was coded: 1) as a sector according to codes from the OECD’s Development 
Assistant Committee’s Common Reporting System for development finance organizations; 2) as 
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being either rural in focus, urban in focus, or focused on both (such investments were often 
national in scope); and 3) for whether it was an investment in policy and institutional reform.  
The second data set was compiled using twelve of MCC’s growth diagnostic final reports.  The 
data set included all the analyses conducted to inform the diagnostic and the diagnostic’s 
identification of constraints. Every table, chart, or figure in the twelve reports was entered into a 
database and coded according to what type of analysis it represented.  This included whether the 
analysis was descriptive or more complex (e.g., a benchmarking exercise) and whether it was a 
snapshot in time or longitudinal.  The institutional data sources for each analysis were also 
entered and coded.  Reports were analyzed for constraints and those constraints entered into the 
database and coded as either a “binding constraint” or “non-binding constraint”.    
For the third case on RCTs, a database of MCC’s impact evaluations as of 2015 already 
existed.  The database included every impact evaluation at MCC.  Data for the evaluations 
included the evaluation’s respective project, design and methodology, firm or consultant, start 
date, actual or anticipated end date, and approximate budget.   
Data Processing 
Data processing of primary and secondary data involved three steps for each case.  First, I 
created categories of themes and topics important for the cases such as the introduction of 
economic methods, stabilization of methods, opposition to methods, expert power necessary to 
overcome opposition to methods, and effects of economic methods.  Categories included issues 
relevant for every case and those unique to the three case components.  Next, primary data 
sources in the form of typed notes from interviews with participants were then analyzed with 
these categories in mind.  Participants’ statements or quotes were highlighted when they 
corresponded to a relevant category.  The same was done with secondary data sources such as 
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government documents.  Each secondary data source was reviewed for material that 
corresponded to the established analytical categories.  When something relevant was found it 
was highlighted and coded.  Finally, highlighted and coded sections from both primary and 
secondary sources were brought together and analyzed jointly.  
 Analysis of the data from the first case’s country selection database focused on how 
performance on the World Bank’s WGI and other selection indicators affected different 
countries’ eligibility for MCA funds.  Analysis of the second case’s databases focused on the 
most frequent types of analyses conducted in the course of a growth diagnostic and the most 
frequent constraints, binding and nonbinding, identified in diagnostic reports.  Finally, MCC’s 
impact evaluation database demonstrated which project types and sectors were most frequently 
evaluated with an RCT. 
Quality Assurance 
Data quality was assured through triangulation.  Triangulation is a strategy for improving 
the validity of research findings by multiplying the number of data points or perspectives about 
phenomena under study.  While verification is the default and desired goal in social inquiry, 
Mathison (1988) suggests that complication or contradiction is just as valuable an outcome.  
There are four types of triangulation: data, investigator, theory, and methodological (Denzin, 
1973).  Data triangulation involves using several data sources to verify, complicate, or contradict 
a set of research findings.  In navigation and land surveying, triangulation improves confidence 
in any single tool or method’s identification of a location.  The type of triangulation employed in 
this study was data triangulation.  Interviewees’ responses to questions were triangulated with 
each other.  There was sufficient sample size among subcategories of respondents to verify one 
respondent’s claims with another’s.  Data triangulation was also employed in the analysis of 
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secondary data.  For example, individuals’ prepared remarks in speeches and congressional 
testimony were compared with more open responses and discussions in think tank event 
transcripts.  Finally, findings in secondary data were used to triangulate interview responses and 
vice versa.  There was also triangulation among cases. Findings about economic methods in 
MCA and MCC were triangulated with findings about similar methods in other cases from 
multilateral development banks. 
Research Ethics 
Steps were taken to ensure the research process was ethical and met federal regulations 
for the protection of human subjects.  I passed a course on Human Subjects Protection and 
Conflict of Interests on January 23, 2015 with Columbia University’s Collaborative Institutional 
Training Initiative.  This study underwent a complete Columbia University Internal Review 
Board process. The study was approved on April 29, 2015.  The study was eligible for and 
deemed exempt from Category 2 regulatory guidelines for the protection of human subjects.  As 
a result of this exemption, written and signed consent forms were not necessary for human 
subjects participating in this research project.  Nevertheless, I followed the Basic Elements of 
Informed Consent at the outset of every interview by stating the objectives of the research, what 
participants could expect by participating, and that participation was voluntary. 
Steps were also taken to ensure that participants’ responses were protected and kept 
confidential.  I maintained data on an external storage device used for interview data from this 
project.  Electronic folders on that device were password protected and the password known only 
to the researcher.  The research did not collect any personal information that was not already 
available in the public domain (e.g., on the Internet) through a participant’s employer. Nor did 
the study collection any personal information of a sensitive nature.  Any government documents 
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with individuals’ personal and sensitive information was redacted by agencies’ FOIA 
representatives prior to public release.  The federal government’s own internal FOIA guidelines 
prevent the release of individuals’ private or sensitive information. 
Conclusion 
This study answers the question of whether and how state expertise is powerful by 
closely examining economists’ methods within the field of global development finance.  It does 
so through a research strategy of studying up and phronesis, which both contribute to a value 
rational rather than instrumental rational approach to the study of experts.  Both experts’ power 
and practices are placed at the center of the inquiry.   
The questions are approached through an embedded case study design of the economic 
methods involved in creation of US Millennium Challenge Account, a new development finance 
account, and how its implementing agency, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, designs and 
evaluates development investments. The three economic methods chosen for examination were 
governance indicators, growth diagnostics, and RCTs.  Both the case of the MCA-MCC and 
these three development economic methods were selected because of their paradigmatic qualities 
in the global development finance field.  The embedded research design was chosen for its 
ability to isolate, as reasonably as possible, the economic methods’ effects, permit enough 
contextual detail to permit naturalistic generalization, and allow a mixed methods research 
approach.   
The data sources include both primary data sources in the form of 50 interviews and 
secondary data sources in the form of hundreds of documents and multiple quantitative data sets. 
The variety of data sources allowed for robust data quality assurance through multiple forms of 
data triangulation.  Finally, this research complied with important federal guidelines on the 
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protection of human subjects in research by undergoing and passing a Columbia University 
Internal Review Board process.  The next three chapters describe the findings for each of the 
embedded case components derived from the research process outlined in this chapter. 
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Chapter 4: The Power of Governance Indicators in Global Development Policy 
Introduction 
This first case study examines how the Bush Administration’s Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA) employed the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (among others) 
to decide which countries to award large development finance grants, known as compacts.  It 
first describes how World Bank economists developed governance indicators and brought them 
together with econometric research on “aid-effectiveness” to analyze the influence of governance 
on growth.  This was a major catalyst for the development-aid strategy of “selectivity”, or 
choosing countries based on their performance according to a set of defined quantitative 
indicators.  It shows how state economists were able to employ governance and other indicators 
to shape the Bush Administration’s strategy of selectivity that allowed senior officials to justify 
increases in aid funding in the face of skepticism from conservative lawmakers. The chapter goes 
on to describe how the economic policy community overcame opposition from the foreign policy 
community to establish its strategy of selectivity by indicators.  After being stabilized as 
selection criteria, the Worldwide Governance Indicators influenced who made funding decisions 
and how they were made.  The chapter concludes by presenting evidence of how the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators affected the distribution of MCA resources. 
The Origins of Governance Indicators 
 The World Bank’s Legacy of Cross-Country Research. The World Bank’s 
Development Research Group is considered the largest development research institution in the 
world (Gilbert & Vines, 2006).  The World Bank’s research arm, started as the Economics 
Department in the 1960s, went through several evolutions but always grew in size and stature.  
One of the most influential moments was in 1972 when former World Bank president Robert 
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McNamara elevated the Economics Department to the status of Vice Presidency for Research.  
Twenty years later, in 1992, much of the Bank’s scattered research across regions, sectors, and 
country offices was brought together in the Development Economics Vice Presidency (Stern & 
Ferreira, 1993).   
By the late 1990s, the Development Economics Research Group accounted for 
approximately three-quarters of all Bank research (Gilbert & Vines, 2006).  It has at anytime 
about half a dozen research units named after the topics its staff researches such as Poverty, 
Trade, Finance & Private Sector Development, Public Services, Infrastructure, and Growth and 
Macroeconomics.  Each unit employs, on average, fifteen social scientists, largely economists, of 
various ranks.  In 1997 the World Bank spent US $25 million on the Research Group’s 
development economics research, which amounted to 2.5 percent of the Bank’s entire operating 
budget.  This money produced nearly 4,000 papers, books, and reports between 1998 and 2005 
(Banerjee, Deaton, Lustig, Rogoff, & Hsu, 2006). 
 These financial and human resources contribute to the Bank’s tremendous comparative 
research advantage: its ability to aggregate data for cross-country comparison.  This advantage 
has been a feature of the Bank’s research since its inception and “from the early days at the 
Bank, and certainly from the establishment of the research sections in the early 1970s, it was 
recognized that one of the Bank's strongest comparative advantages lay in its ability to assemble 
data and experience from many countries” (Stern & Ferreira, 1993: 547).  
The World Bank’s focus on cross-country data and macroeconomics in the 1980s paved 
the way for a handful of economists in the Research Group’s Macroeconomics and Growth 
program to generate new datasets and conduct econometric analyses in the late 1990s.  During 
Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz’s tenure (1997–1999), economists merged data on aid and 
  72 
governance with an extensive collection of existing country data to examine novel relationships 
and hypotheses inspired by New Institutional Economics (NIE).  They publicized their findings, 
well before publication in peer-reviewed journals, through the Bank’s Policy Research Working 
Papers series.  These papers are meant to encourage the exchange of ideas and disseminate the 
findings of work in progress and make an impression on academics and policymakers (Banerjee 
et al., 2006). 
New Institutional Economics. An intellectual movement called New Institutional 
Economics transformed the way mainstream neoclassical development economists thought about 
economic growth.  In 1993 Douglass North won the Nobel Prize in economics “for having 
renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in 
order to explain economic and institutional change” (Nobel Media, 2014).  North, Oliver 
Williamson, and Robert Coase were the chief proponents of new institutional economics.  North 
became the scholar most closely associated with the movement and whose work had the greatest 
influence on economists working on development in the 1990s.  In a book that summarized much 
of his work he said, “Third world countries are poor because the institutional constraints define a 
set of payoffs to potential economic activity that do not encourage productive activity” (North, 
1990: 110). 
North was an economic historian who had a deep appreciation for neoclassical economic 
(NCE) theory.  His body of work can be described as trying to get economic historians to pay 
closer attention to changes in institutional structures and neoclassical economists to pay closer 
attention to the role of institutional change in economic performance.  North’s early work 
analyzed the experiences and sources of economic growth in the United States and Europe 
(North, 1966; North & Thomas, 1976).  Through this work, North concluded that property rights 
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were the most critical institution for bringing down the costs of bargaining and exchange, i.e. 
transaction costs.  When property rights are poorly defined, say, only for a narrow group of 
individuals, they permit rent-seeking behavior, unjust taxation, and confiscation.  Ultimately, it is 
the polity, or political institutions such as the state, that play a leading role in enforcing these 
rights (North & Thomas, 1976). But informal institutions, such as norms, are also important.   
North and other institutional economist scholars wished to introduce this theory of 
institutions to neoclassical economics.  Neoclassical economists ignored institutions because 
they believed they adapted naturally over time to yield a more efficient allocation of resources.  
This was a result of neoclassical economics’ assumption of instrumental rationality and costless 
bargaining (North, 1994). For neoclassical economics, market exchange was a self-correcting 
system (North, 1994).  Coase, North, and others showed that this assumption was flawed:  
humans operated in a world of bounded rationality—information was costly and unevenly held 
(Simon, 1997). This led to costly exchange that, rather than gradually correcting itself, would 
become path-dependent.  What humans needed were institutions such as property rights to 
reduce uncertainty in exchange and political institutions responsible for the enforcement of these 
rights (North, 1990). 
The Rise of Governance Indicators. When new institutional economics’ theories were 
being introduced and becoming popular, no global measures of institutions that coincided with 
new institutional theories existed.  Political scientists had been interested in institutions decades 
before economists but their indicators focused on questions of political instability, violence, and 
democracy (Williams & Siddique, 2008).  These did not approximate the institutions, such as the 
bureaucracy and judiciary, which institutional economists considered essential for contract 
enforcement. Thus, economists turned to proxy indicators based on professional experts’ and 
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regular households’ subjective perceptions.  These governance measures were produced largely 
by private organizations rather than academics (Williams & Siddique, 2008).  While some of 
these indicators have been around for as long as political scientists’ databases, the majority 
began to appear in the mid-1990s a few years after North’s receipt of the Nobel Prize. 
Organizations interested in measuring and monitoring one or several aspects of 
“governance”—an idea that captured multiple concepts like democracy that interested political 
scientists and “regulatory quality” that interested economists—assembled subjective indicators 
using responses to questionnaires.  The vast majority of these surveys were based on the 
perceptions of either some externally or self-identified experts or representative households and 
business owners.  These experts came from all professional sectors—private, public, and non-
governmental—and may or may not be citizens of the countries they opined on. 
Organizations commissioning these surveys included non-governmental organizations 
(NGO), investment risk analysis firms, multilateral development banks, and publications such as 
The Economist.  In recent years some university research institutes have also begun measuring 
governance.  The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) published a users’ guide to 
governance indicators in 2004 that documented 33 sources with reference to an additional twenty 
sources (UNDP, 2004).  Each indicator producer may collect information on several broad 
aspects of governance, such as bureaucratic effectiveness and corruption, or it may be interested 
in a very specific aspect of governance such as budget transparency, press freedom, or election 
fairness. Regardless of which organization is collecting the information, it is almost always 
headquartered somewhere in the Global North with an interest in measuring governance beyond 
its borders. Some producers concentrate on particular regions of the world, such as Africa or 
Latin America.  Others, meanwhile, aim to measure governance globally.  This variation across 
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producers, respondents, definitions, and regions has led to a dizzying diversity of indicators.  The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) went as far as to call the 
governance indicator landscape a “jungle” (Arndt & Oman, 2006). 
Some economists have attempted to tame this jungle by creating composite, or what 
Ravallion (2012) aptly calls “mashup”, indices of governance.  Composite governance indices 
are indicators that aggregate multiple, diverse indicators of governance into a single measure. 
The primary motivation behind such exercises is to reduce measurement error: “By adding up 
multiple indices one may hope to get closer to that truth; in principle there can exist an aggregate 
index that is more informative than any of its components” (Ravallion, 2012: 3). 
Among the five most widely used indicator sources, two are composite indices: 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) (Arndt & Oman, 2006).  Three Research Group economists in the 
Macroeconomics and Growth Program—Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido-
Lobaton (“Kaufmann and Kraay”)—created the WGI.  It is the most ambitious effort of its kind 
and has arguably become the most extensively used set of governance indicators (Malik, 2002) 
(producers interchangeably use the term “indicator” and “index” when referring to composite 
indices. The WGI will be referred to as an indicator throughout the chapter).5  Like all 
governance composite indices the WGI aggregates multiple producers’ sources into a single 
indicator on a specific topic.  The WGI’s topics, each comprising a separate composite indicator, 
include: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government 
                                                
5 The difference between an indicator and index depends on what and when data is aggregated.  If data is aggregated 
directly from survey responses, it is an indicator. If two or more indicators are aggregated together, it becomes an 
index.  Indices are often referred to as indicators, because the underlying data has become obscured, or black-boxed.  
While the WGI is technically an index, throughout this chapter we will refer to the WGI as an indicator because that 
is how its producers refer to it.   
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Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.  Many research 
economists consider these good proxy indicators for the institutions, transaction costs, and 
related enforcement capacities that NIE emphasizes in its work.  
In the early 2000s, bilateral and multilateral development finance agencies began 
employing governance indicators to target their development funds.  This policy strategy became 
known as selectivity—the concentration of development finance in fewer countries that exhibited 
good governance. Directing development financing selectively to countries with measurably 
“better” governance extended to Western bilateral and multilateral donors as a whole, including 
multilateral development banks, the European Union, and UN agencies such as the International 
Fund for Agricultural Development (Hout, 2010).  The use of governance criteria represented the 
development finance community’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) priorities and 
informed private and nonprofit investment patterns originating in Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) countries.6 
Governance Indicators and Aid Effectiveness 
Neoclassical economists were able to speak with greater authority about a topic normally 
reserved for other experts by adding these governance indicators as a new explanatory variable 
for growth to their cross-country growth regressions.  They could speak with greater authority 
about governance, a topic usually reserved for political scientists, lawyers, jurists, and 
philosophers, by relating governance indicators to an ontological category economists had 
worked decades ago to place squarely within their domain of authority—gross domestic product 
                                                
6 Established in 1960 (then as the Development Assistance Group), DAC originally had 11 members from North 
America, Europe, and Japan. Today it has 30 member countries, including former ODA recipients, as well as 
participation from the multilateral development banks.  It was created as a forum for consultations among aid donors 
on assistance to less-developed countries.  It is meant to be the "venue and voice" of the world's major donor 
countries. 
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(GDP).  Three economists affiliated with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank—
Paolo Mauro, Stephen Knack, and Philip Keefer—were the first neoclassical economists to use 
governance indicators in cross-country growth regressions in the mid-1990s.  They established 
the blueprint for how to use governance indicators for applied economics research.  
Paolo Mauro of the IMF published “Corruption and Growth” in the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics and Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer of the World Bank’s Research Group co-
published “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative 
Institutional Measures” in Economics & Politics (Knack & Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995).  Both 
papers were published two years after North received his Nobel Prize and cite North’s book 
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance in their opening paragraphs.  For 
instance, Knack and Keefer stated that “North (1990, p. 54) asserts, for example, that ‘the 
inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most 
important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third 
World’ ” (Knack & Keefer, 1995: 207).  
Cross-country growth regressions evolved alongside neoclassical economic growth 
theories as a way to bring theory and empirics closer together (Durlauf, 2009). The most 
common growth regression is a simple multiple linear regression model.7  Researchers’ 
motivation for using the model is to test theories about what determines countries’ growth levels 
or rates.  The researcher includes a set of independent variables known to be strongly related to 
growth but that are not particularly interesting.  These are called control variables and usually 
include measures of investment, savings, and consumption (McGrattan & Schmitz, 1999). S/he 
                                                
7 A multiple linear regression attempts to model the relationship between two or more independent, or “x”, variables 
and a dependent, or “y”, variable by fitting a linear equation to observed data.   
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must also choose a set of independent variables whose relationship to growth is suggestive, 
hypothesized to have a significant effect, and deemed worthy of examination.  These are called 
explanatory variables.   
New institutional economics changed the growth model and led to additional growth 
regressions that examined the relationship between institutions and growth.  Neoclassical 
economists used the growth regression to tie the empirical work of creating governance 
indicators back to the theoretical work of new institutional economics.  They are principally 
concerned with the efficient allocation and distribution, or “flow”, of productive inputs such as 
capital, labor, and technology.  If inputs are not flowing, it must be because there are 
impediments to such flows.  Prior to the new institutional economics agenda, impediments were 
largely viewed through the lens of restrictions on market operations and deficits in human 
capital. The work of institutional economists pointed to an additional barrier that required 
amelioration—poor governance. Institutions that exacerbated transaction costs, failed to protect 
property rights, or failed to enforce contracts limited capital and technological investment.  Like 
policies that restricted economic transactions, institutions could limit productivity and growth 
(Taylor, 2002a).  If this was the case, then institutions belonged alongside economic policies and 
other explanatory variables in the growth regression.   
Mauro and Knack and Keefer believed that investment risk analysts’ perceptions were the 
best available proxies for institutions: “If applied empirical economics using ‘large-n studies’ 
was to make inroads into the new institutionalism, it needed institution-based data.  The 
discovery of country risk data compiled by private consultancies provided them” (Pistor, 2012: 
171).  Crucially, the three authors examined these indices’ relationship with per capita GDP. 
Both studies found statistically significant relationships between their indices of institutions and 
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various measures of GDP: “This paper has used a newly assembled data set consisting of 
subjective indices of bureaucratic honesty and efficiency to provide empirical evidence on the 
effects of corruption on economic growth.  The negative association between corruption and 
investment, as well as growth, is significant in both a statistical and an economic sense” (Mauro, 
1995: 705) and “Institutions that protect property rights are crucial to economic growth and to 
investment.  Some of the regressions above point to effects that rival even those of education” 
(Knack & Keefer, 1995: 223).  
It’s not clear that North would have agreed with this use of his ideas. North warned that 
changing institutional circumstances in what he called the Third World was no easy task. 
Transferring the formal rules of successful western market economies to the developing world 
was no panacea for solving poor economic performance and even when formal rules were 
changed informal norms would follow only gradually, if at all (North, 1995).  If governance 
indicators black-boxed some of North’s more complex and nuanced arguments around 
institutions, then including these indicators as determinants of growth in growth regression 
models translated and instrumentalized North’s ideas for development policy:  
Beyond the historical case studies about economic growth and development in the United 
States, which North offered, there was little hard empirical evidence to support the notion 
that the asserted relation between private rights, markets, and growth held true around the 
world. The new applied institutional economics, which was formed by Mauro, Knack and 
Keefer, and others, provided this evidence…Critically, the indicators were not simply 
used in their original form; they were transposed from descriptive indicators about 
investment conditions into normative tools for policy reforms (Pistor, 2012: 171).  
 
Steps from where Kaufmann and Kraay were creating the WGI and Knack and Keefer 
were comparing institutional indices and growth, another pair of World Bank Research Group 
economists was bridging governance indices with research on aid effectiveness.  Craig Burnside 
and David Dollar published two Policy Research Working Papers that would fundamentally 
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upend development and aid policy.  In their first Working Paper, “Aid, Policies, and Growth” 
(1997), they introduced economic policies into the growth equation by interacting, or 
multiplying, a policy index (meant to represent a country’s “economic policy environment”), 
with a variable for foreign aid (aid as a percentage of a country’s GDP).8  They found that aid 
has a positive, causal relationship with growth but only in a “good” policy environment, i.e. 
where a country’s budget surplus and inflation rate are low and trade openness is high.  In a 
second Working Paper published the following year, “Aid, the Incentive Regime, and Poverty 
Reduction” (1998), they expanded on earlier work by incorporating Knack and Keefer’s 
Institutional Country Risk Guide index (1995) into their policy index (Burnside & Dollar, 1998).  
The new index that included measures of property rights, corruption, and bureaucratic quality 
was called an “index of economic management”.   
Later that year David Dollar brought these two empirical exercises together in a World 
Bank Policy Research Report, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why (World 
Bank, 1998).  In one of the report’s appendices, Dollar indicated that the index of economic 
management had a positive, statistically significant, and causal relationship with per capita 
GDP.9  The report summarized the findings of that analysis and Burnside and Dollar’s broader 
research agenda thus: “Aid effectiveness largely depends on the institutions and policies of 
recipient countries.  Where economic management is sound, aid leads to higher private 
                                                
8 The index is the combination of a country’s budget surplus, inflation rate, and trade openness.  The authors 
weighted the individual indicators’ values in the index according to their correlation with growth. The index can be 
interpreted as a country’s predicted growth rate given its budget surplus, inflation rate, and level of trade openness.  
Trade openness itself is an index generated by economists Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner.  Warner was, 
incidentally, the first economist hired by MCC. 
9 Burnside and Dollar’s use of an instrumental variable to establish causality was controversial and a point of 
contention.  Development economists grew increasingly weary of instrumental variables as the decade progressed.  
This led, in part, to the rise of randomization as an objective, untainted, and supposedly unproblematic instrument 
for development economics research.  
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investment, more rapid growth, lower infant mortality, and a faster decline in poverty.  Where 
economic management is poor, aid has little effect on development” (World Bank, 1998: 28).  It 
also pivoted from careful and qualified research conclusions to forceful policy recommendations: 
“Clearly development assistance needs to be more concentrated on where it can be most effective 
in reducing poverty.  It needs to take more account of the environment in which it is placed.  
Finance is most effective in reducing poverty in those countries that have both mass poverty and 
a good policy and institutional environment” (World Bank, 1998: 44). 
Stabilizing Governance Indicators: Making Aid Selective 
Burnside and Dollar’s research became very influential in the development finance 
community (Interviewee 1A, personal communication, June 1, 2015).  It was a major catalyst for 
the development-aid strategy of selectivity or choosing countries based on their performance 
according to a set of defined quantitative criteria.  Development agencies immediately began 
citing Burnside and Dollar’s working papers. For example, the Canadian International 
Development Agency put out a draft policy paper in June 2001 that said World Bank researchers 
provided compelling evidence that good governance and a sound policy environment are the 
most important determinants of aid effectiveness (Easterly, 2003). Bilateral and multilateral 
development agencies eventually turned this praise into policy (Hout, 2004, 2010).  The 
Burnside and Dollar studies became a major catalyst for selectivity and the “intellectual support” 
for the Bush Administration’s Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) (Interviewee 1C, personal 
communication, June 16, 2015).  Senior administration officials routinely referenced Burnside 
and Dollar’s research conclusions and The White House described the new initiative in the 
following way: “The MCA is selective, targeting those countries that ‘rule justly, invest in the 
health and education of their people, and encourage economic freedom’. By selecting on those 
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countries that have adopted policies that encourage growth, MCA assistance will more likely 
result in successful sustainable economic development” (Foreign Affairs Budget, 2003: 74).   
Selectivity was adopted because it dovetailed with the Administration’s broader global 
economic growth agenda and philosophy of metrics-based management.  It simultaneously 
addressed two problems: increasing aid, which was a key demand of the global community, and 
accounting for aid’s contribution to growth, which was a conservative governing philosophy.  
Administration economic policy makers could support good governance because it 
represented a set of preconditions to enable market-driven development (Khan, 2007). The Bush 
Administration was very worried about a slowdown in global growth following the September 
11th terrorist attacks.  There was a push to “come up with a prescription for growth” among 
National Security Council (NSC) and US Treasury officials (Interviewee 1J, personal 
communication, August 5, 2015).  This strategy was decidedly market-driven.  John Taylor, 
Treasury’s Undersecretary of International Economic Affairs, was focused on free trade, 
reducing barriers to investment, and human capital.  The Administration felt that these could 
ameliorate a drop in global growth from the terror threat.  The strategy was to “ignite a new era 
of global economic growth through free markets and free trade” (Bush, 2002b: 17).  The Bush 
Administration’s National Security Strategy released in September 2002 stated that “[w]e will 
use our economic engagement with other countries to underscore the benefits of policies that 
generate higher productivity and sustained economic growth…The United States and other 
developed countries should set an ambitious and specific target: to double the size of the world’s 
poorest economies within a decade” (Bush, 2002b: 21) 
Administration leaders had three principles that they believed increased growth in lower 
and lower–middle income countries.  These were “ruling justly”, “investing in people”, and 
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fostering “economic freedom”.  “Ruling justly” refers to good governance, or rule of law, 
contract enforcement, and control of corruption. “Investing in people” refers to human capital 
development, specifically through education and health.  “Economic freedom” means unhindered 
trade in goods, services, and new technologies.  These categories corresponded to what 
economists believed were the principal barriers to the accumulation of physical capital, human 
capital, and technology.10  
Taken together, the administration believed that these principles and programs would 
restore the flow of investment to low- and middle-income countries (Bush, Hubbard, & 
Kroszner, 2003). This investment would translate into higher productivity and better paying jobs.  
This causal narrative foretold the orthodox economists’ Holy Grail of “catch-up” where lower-
income countries attain the productivity and per capita GDP levels of wealthier countries over 
time.  This pattern has been observed in Europe and North America but proven stubbornly 
unattainable globally (see Figure 4.1).  The principles of economic freedom and human capital 
for generating investment, productivity, and growth were well established in economic thought 
and policy but did not resolve the catch-up problem.  At the turn of the century good governance 
emerged as the newest potential antidote to global disequilibrium.  According to the chairman of 
the Council of Economic Advisors, Glenn Hubbard, this required the development community to 
“[t]ake governance and growth seriously” (Hubbard, 2002). 
 
                                                
10 According to thinking among Bush administration economic officials, poor governance creates disincentives to 
invest, start new firms, or expand existing businesses. This negatively impacts capital formation and 
entrepreneurship.  Workers without adequate education do not have the requisite skills to work in high productivity 
jobs or adopt technology and unhealthy workers cannot work as often or as hard.  Lack of openness to international 
trade, monopolistic state marketing boards, and excessive regulations create disincentives for the private sector to 
invest and innovate (Bush, Hubbard, & Kroszner, 2003; Taylor, 2002c). 
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Figure 4.1. The Puzzle of Global Disequilibrium According to the US Treasury 
 
 
Source: Taylor (2002c), New Policies for Economic Development. presentation given at the Annual Bank 
 Conference on Development Economics in Washington, DC on April 30, 2002.  
It was unclear in the early stages of the Administration, however, what role aid would 
play in this growth agenda.  There was considerable suspicion around aid, especially in a 
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conservative Administration and Congress.  A director in the NSC’s International Economics 
division said he was “working with a bunch of Republicans who thought development was 
money down a rat hole” (Interviewee 1F, personal communication, July 2, 2015).  According to 
a former USAID administrator, “There was not much support among conservatives anywhere 
unless dynamics of the aid system were changed” (Interviewee 1M, personal communication, 
August 28, 2015).  At the same time, calls for increased aid were growing globally.  Countries’ 
leaders adopted the Millennium Declaration at the United Nations Millennium Summit held in 
September 2000 that included the series of time-bound targets known as the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG).  A key concern of the Millennium Declaration was financing the 
MDGs:  “We are concerned about the obstacles developing countries face in mobilizing the 
resources needed to finance their sustained development … We call on the industrialized 
countries to grant more generous development assistance” (United Nations, 2000: 4).  
After The Millennium Summit, Senegal’s president Abdoulaye Wade led a delegation of 
African presidents from Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, and South Africa to the 27th G8 summit in 
Genoa, Italy to present the New Africa Initiative, which called for “a new relationship of 
partnership between Africa and the international community, especially the highly industrialised 
countries, to overcome the development chasm that has widened over centuries of unequal 
relations” (New African Initiative, 2001: 2).11  At the G8, “After three days of discussions, 
everyone, including the American President George Bush, was aware of the chasm between the 
North and the South, between the rich of the G8 and Africa” (Harsch, 2001: 4).  Part of the New 
                                                
11 The New Africa Initiative would later be called the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, or NEPAD. 
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African Initiative strategy called for the mobilization of development finance from private and 
public sources, including official development assistance (New African Initiative, 2001).12 
Following Genoa, G8 leaders called on the U.S. to meet its commitment to 0.7 percent of 
annual GDP for development assistance.13  Civil society organizations were also raising their 
voices.  Bono, the Irish rock star and lead singer of U2, along with Bobby Shriver and Jamie 
Drummond, established an advocacy NGO called DATA (Debt, AIDS, Trade, Africa) to lobby 
for greater debt relief and aid for Africa.  Despite these calls from UN, African, European, and 
NGO leaders and President Bush’s own evolution on the issue, Bush and other conservatives in 
both the executive and legislative branches were still skeptical about the US committing greater 
resources to ODA: “The President believes that the development debate has focused too much on 
inputs on levels of aid—arbitrary levels of aid from the developed countries, and not enough on 
ensuring tangible outcomes” (White House, 2002: 1).  
This gulf between global demands and domestic apprehensions presented a problem in 
search of a solution.  How would the Bush Administration contribute to these global efforts that 
were gaining momentum and reaching consensus if the broader perception among conservative 
Republicans was that aid was failing?  Gary Edson, Bush’s Deputy National Security Advisor for 
International Economics and a close confidant, was familiar with “some World Bank 
economists’ research where countries that focus on good governance and their own efforts 
experience greater growth” (Interviewee 1K, personal communication, August 11, 2015).  White 
House officials started looking for a way to tie aid into their overall economic policy agenda.  If 
                                                
12 The OECD defines ODA as funds that are: 1) provided by official agencies, including state and local 
governments, or by their executive agencies; 2) administered with the promotion of the economic development and 
welfare of developing countries as their main objective; and 3) concessional in character and convey a grant element 
of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent). 
13 The United States is the largest bilateral donor in absolute terms but falls below the average commitment of the 
G8 in relative terms.   
  87 
aid, as a source of capital, could be coupled with good policies and institutions, it could 
contribute to the Administration’s global growth objectives.  
Creating Standards for Selectivity. Gary Edson called Alan Larson, Undersecretary of 
State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, one Sunday morning in September 2001 
to discuss the President’s interest in “doing something big” in terms of development (Interviewee 
1D, personal communication, 2015).  Larson had recommended that Edson speak to Steven 
Radelet, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Asia, the Americas, and Africa, who was 
known to be “a development guy”.14  Edson asked Radelet during a White House breakfast 
meeting in December 2001 how these well-governed countries could be picked.  That was when 
the idea of using indicators to select countries for MCA assistance began.  As of then, selectivity 
had no “flesh on the bones” (Interviewee 1E, personal communication, June 28, 2015).  About 
two months later, in his first public comments on the MCA at the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB) headquarters in Washington, DC, President Bush said, “I'm here today to 
announce a major new commitment by the United States to bring hope and opportunity to the 
world's poorest people…Today, I call for a new compact for global development, defined by 
new accountability for both rich and poor nations alike…These funds will go into a new 
Millennium Challenge Account” (Bush, 2002a).  Bush went on to outline the MCA’s approach to 
selectivity, “I've directed Secretary [Colin] Powell [State] and Secretary [Paul] O'Neill 
[Treasury] to reach out to the world community, to develop a set of clear and concrete and 
objective criteria for measuring progress. And under the Millennium Challenge Account, we will 
apply these criteria rigorously and fairly” (Bush, 2002a). 
                                                
14 Radelet’s reputation as a development expert came from 15 years at the Harvard Institute for International 
Development where he held several senior positions until Larry Summers brought him into the Clinton 
Administration in 2000 (Interviewee 1E, personal communication, June 28, 2015). 
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 Later that month, over fifty world leaders (including Bush), two hundred ministers, and 
myriad development experts, civil society representatives, and business leaders gathered at the 
first ever United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, 
Mexico.  The Center for Global Development attended the Monterrey Conference as an 
accredited NGO and civil society member.  On the “sidelines” of the Monterrey Conference, 
CGD held a workshop attended by InterAction, a development and aid advocacy alliance of over 
150 NGOs, the Carter Center, African and Latin American development leaders, and Hilde 
Johnson, Norway’s Minister of International Development. This was the first of a series of five 
workshops on the MCA that the CGD would hold between March and September of 2002.  The 
Center for Global Development, meanwhile, was advocating for “eligibility standards” to select 
these well governed countries. Established only a few months before the Monterrey conference, 
this development think tank was bringing together a diverse group of development experts to 
advise the Bush administration on the MCA selection system’s design. 
Two more workshops were held at CGD offices in Washington, DC on April 5th and 
April 16th.  George Soros, a wealthy philanthropist and democracy advocate, and Jeffrey Sachs, a 
prominent development economist, were keynote speakers.  The sessions were invitation-only 
and targeted to “senior specialists from the executive branch, Congress, the NGO community, 
the research community, and international financial institutions” (CGD, 2002: 1).  The April 
workshops’ objective was, according to the invite, “to help policymakers think through the 
analytical issues relevant to designing and implementing the performance benchmarks to which 
disbursements from the Millennium Challenge Account will be linked” (CGD, 2002: 1).  Some 
questions the sessions posed were: “What should be the performance benchmarks in the three 
principal areas identified by the President: good governance, investment in human capital, and 
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economic freedom?  Should anything else be benchmarked, and what priority should each area 
have relative to the others?” (CGD, 2002: 1). 
The Monterrey Conference and April workshops culminated, in part, in a report released 
on May 22, 2002 titled Guiding Principles for Design and Implementation of the MCA by Nancy 
Birdsall, Sarah Lucas, and Sonal Shah who all played a role in the Washington, DC and 
Monterrey, Mexico sessions. The report laid out a hypothetical proposal for the MCA’s design 
and implementation, particularly how to determine countries’ eligibility for funding, based on 
seven “principles” (Birdsall, Lucas, & Shah, 2002).  While the actual MCA design departed in 
several ways from CGD’s original proposal, it nonetheless showed the think tank’s early level of 
engagement and leadership on the MCA.  The CGD was not just engaged in an intellectual 
exercise but building a network in support of selectivity through indicators.  According to a 
former USAID administrator, “Think tanks are the intellectuals that have a lot of influence over 
policymaking, and in any administration, left or right, think tanks are influential” (Interviewee 
1M, personal communication, August 28, 2015). 
Solving the Aid Effectiveness Problem with Governance Indicators.  Steven Radelet, 
a CGD affiliate, served as a key link between World Bank economic researchers, NSC officials 
concerned with growth, CGD experts focused on selection standards, and state economists at 
Treasury.  He was central to introducing governance indicators into the Treasury department’s 
efforts to design the MCA selection system. Radelet transitioned from his position as Deputy 
Assistant Secretary at Treasury to Senior Fellow at the CGD in July 2002 while the think tank 
was conducting its MCA workshops.  According to one State Department official, “Radelet was 
a huge force; the intellectual underpinning of the MCA model and selection approach” 
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(Interviewee 1A, personal communication, June 1, 2015).15  Radelet reached out to his personal 
network, which included Research Group economists David Dollar, Daniel Kaufmann, and Aart 
Kraay, to brainstorm about operationalizing selectivity (Interviewee 1E, personal 
communication, June 28, 2015).  He referred to Kaufmann and Kraay, the WGI creators, as “my 
friends at the World Bank” (The Millennium Challenge Account: A New Way to Aid, 2003: 44).  
Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay met with the Bush administration team at least three times to 
discuss the WGI and their suitability for selecting countries for assistance: “When we started to 
narrow in on specific indicators, that’s when we would sit down with people like Dani Kaufmann 
and his team…we would sit down with them to dig into the actual construction and coverage of 
the indicators themselves” (Interviewee 1J, personal communication, August 5, 2015). Radelet’s 
ties with Kaufmann and Kraay brought the WGI under early and serious consideration as a set of 
indicators for selecting countries: “Burnside and Dollar provided the intellectual support for the 
[MCA] initiative and Kaufmann and Kraay provided the indicators to make it happen, the tools 
to operationalize something like conditioning aid on a policy environment” (Interviewee 1C, 
personal communication, June 16, 2015). 
The Administration and Bush’s directors in the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) in particular were highly receptive to governing MCA country selection by indicators 
(Interviewee 1A, personal communication, June 1, 2015). Designing government programs to 
employ private sector–inspired techniques came naturally to Bush, the United States’ first 
president with a master’s degree in business administration (Pfiffner, 2007).  “Metrics permeated 
through everything we did,” noted one senior administration official (Interviewee 1H, personal 
communication, July 19, 2015).  For example, in the first week of his presidency, Bush proposed 
                                                
15 In fact, Radelet literally wrote the book on the MCA while a CGD Senior Fellow (see Radelet, 2003) 
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the No Child Left Behind Act.  No Child Left Behind aimed to address educational “failure” 
through much greater federal control over local schools and an accountability regime rooted in 
standardized testing (Mehta, 2013). This thinking carried into the Administration’s development 
assistance programs because of the high level of agreement in the Administration around results-
based management.  The idea that development assistance should produce measureable results 
was one of Treasury Undersecretary John Taylor’s ten departmental “rules” and was a widely 
accepted administrative principle by other economic policy officials in the NSC and CEA.  
Taylor was fond of saying, “What gets measured gets done” (Taylor, 2005).  Selectivity allowed 
a simultaneous tracking of governance and growth through indicators to judge progress and, 
more importantly, make the claim to conservative skeptics in Congress that aid was being 
delivered on the basis of evidence and accountability.  
Conflicting Rationalities in Country Selection 
Senior NSC and White House officials consented to a strategy of aid selectivity because 
it resolved their conundrum of increasing aid while accounting for aid’s contribution to growth.  
They left the details up to development experts such as CGD fellows and Treasury economist 
Steven Radelet.  They were the main forces behind the definition of MCA selection criteria, 
which included proposing indicators for country selection.  The use of governance indicators like 
the WGI, in addition to other indicators, to distribute aid funding was a novel, (neo)liberal 
internationalist approach to bilateral aid.  We now turn our attention to how this approach was at 
odds with the rationality of political realists, who have historically distributed foreign aid 
through a geopolitical rationale, in the US federal government’s interagency process. 
 The Interagency Process: Origins of the Millennium Challenge Account. Once 
selectivity through governance indicators was agreed upon as an approach, the task of selecting 
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these indicators and designing the selection system fell to an interagency working group 
(“Interagency Group”).  The MCA and its implementing agency, the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC), were created within the Bush Administration’s NSC interagency policy 
process (see Figure 4.2).  The Deputy National Security Advisor (NSA) for International 
Economics, Gary Edson, chaired the process (President George W. Bush created the Deputy 
NSA as a new position in his 2001 National Security Presidential Directive).  Two statutory and 
two non-statutory agencies participated in the MCA interagency process: the departments of 
State and Treasury and the Department of Commerce and United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), respectively. 
Figure 4.2. Organizational Structure of Bush’s National Security Council 
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There are three main levels to the interagency process in descending hierarchy: the 
Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, and Policy Coordinating Committee (see Figure 
4.3).  The Principals Committee is the highest-level interagency forum for consideration of 
policy issues affecting national security. The NSC Principals Committee’s regular attendees 
included the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Chief 
of Staff to the President, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (White 
House, 2001).  The NSC Deputies Committee included deputy secretary level officials such as 
the Deputy Secretary of State who monitored the work of the interagency process, did crisis 
management, and when necessary, pushed unresolved issues to the Principals Committee for 
resolution.  The NSC Policy Coordinating Committees managed the development and 
implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States 
Government (USG). Each NSC Policy Coordinating Committee included representatives from 
the executive departments, offices, and agencies represented in the Deputies Committee (White 
House, 2001). The Policy Coordinating Committees were the primary fora for day-to-day 
interagency coordination and provided policy analysis for consideration by the more senior 
committees of the NSC system. President Bush established six regional and eleven functional 
Policy Coordinating Committees.  The International Finance Policy Coordinating Committee 
managed the MCA design process. 
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Figure 4.3. The NSC Interagency Participants and Policy Making Process 
 
Source: Marcella (2008). Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security. The Army War College 
Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA491602.  
Notes: NSC: National Security Council; State: Department of State; OSD: Office of the Secretary of 
Defense; JSC: Joint Chiefs of Staff; DCI: Director of Central Intelligence; USUN: United States Mission at 
United Nations; Treas: Department of Treasury. 
 
Key members of the NSC Principals Committee for the MCA were Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell, 
Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, and Commerce Secretary Donald Evans.  Key members of the 
NSC Deputies Committee for the MCA were Gary Edson, Alan Larson, John Taylor, and 
USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios (see Figure 4.4).  Officials and experts were “detailed”, 
or asked to serve a temporary rotational assignment, from their respective agencies to join one of 
three working groups located within the International Finance Policy Coordinating Committee.  
Clay Lowery, Director for NSC International Economics, chaired the Performance Indicators 
Working Group (“Working Group”).  Senior officials in the Office of Management and Budget’s 
(OMB) International Affairs Office chaired the MCA Administrative Structures group that 
determined how the MCA would be administered.  A group on MCA Legislative Strategy was 













F gure 3. Bush Administration Inter gency Pro ss.
  The plethora of existing IWGs was abolished by NSPD1. The activities of IWGs were transferred 
to the new PCCs. The PCCs were the most important structural changes made by the Bush 
Administration. According to NSPD1, they were the “Day-to-day fora for interagency coordination 
of national security policy. They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior 
committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the president.” 
The centralization of authority over national security matters reached levels not seen for many 
years. However, it remained to be seen whether the system would work effectively. In Spring 2003, 
a senior national security careerist who was intimately involved with policymaking referred to 
interagency relations as “the worst in 20 years.” An experienced foreign policy hand commented: 
“The interagency system is broken” and averred that instead of centralization of authority, there is 
fragmentation.9 Explanations for this state of affairs varied. They included the intrusion of group 
think dynamics among senior ne -conservative d cision akers, th  rol  of strong personalities, the 
bypassing of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Condolezza Rice, as well 
as the delibe ate isolation of he Departme t of State.10
 Another important interagency reorganization made by the Bush administration was the 
creation of th  Department of Hom land Security (DHS), an a unified military ommand, the 
Northern Command. The creation of DHS involved the transfer of responsibilities, people, and 
resources from existing age cies and departments to a ew entity. DHS has over 170,000 employees 
and an anticipated budget of 40 billion dollars. It constitutes the largest reorganization of the U.S. 
Government since the creation of the Defense Department. DHS combined 22 agencies “specializing 
in various disciplines,” such as: law enforcement, border security, immigration, biological research, 
computer security, transportation security, disaster mitigation, and port security.11 Though it is a 
national security department it will not be involved in power projection, a crucial difference with 
the Defense Department. Yet, it will use many skills and resources that reside across the agencies: 
military, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, and logistics. Homeland security also involves 
the concept of federalism, whereby some 87,000 state and local jurisdictions share power with 
federal institutions. The challenge of integrating federalism injects into national security planning 
will be immense.
 Policy is often made in different and subtle ways. Anthony Lake, writing in Somoza Falling: The 
Nicaraguan Dilemma, A Portrait of Washington At Work, discusses how the answer to an important 
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personnel worked together with multiple White House Executive Offices including the NSC, 
CEA, and OMB (see Figure 4.4).  In all, approximately 20 key executive branch officials were 
involved in designing the MCA selection process, passing legislation, and establishing the 
independent corporation (MCC) that would eventually manage the funds. At times, these three 
groups consulted with civil society groups, think tanks, and academics.  The whole process 
lasted two years (January 2002–December 2003).  It culminated with passage of the Millennium 
Challenge Act in January of 2004.   
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Figure 4.4. Organizational Chart of Key Bush Administration White House and 
Departmental Personnel Involved in the MCA’s Creation 
 
Source: Constructed by author based on interviews and multiple primary and secondary source documents. 
Notes: Rectangles with hard edges represent White House staff.  Rectangles with soft edges represent US 
executive branch departments and agencies. Ellipses represent non-USG agencies.  
 
The Interagency as an Arena: Conflicting Rationales for Aid. The history of post-
WWII US foreign assistance has been a marriage of geopolitics and geoeconomics.  Geopolitics 
is about the effects of geographical location and other geographical features on the foreign policy 
of a state and its relations with other states.  For example, a foreign policy rooted in geopolitics 
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may assess a state’s strategic global location, natural resources, and access to waterways 
(Mamadouh, 1998).  Geopolitics can involve economic components, such as bilateral trade 
agreements, sanctions, and the geostrategic provision of aid for otherwise liberal and moral goals 
such as social, political, and economic development.  This is referred to as geoeconomics, or the 
use of economic instruments to achieve geopolitical goals. Blackwill and Harris (2016a) aptly 
refer to geoeconomics as “war by other means”.   
Geopolitics and geoeconomics are forms of political realism.  Political realists believe 
that human nature is governed by egoistic self-interest, states are the most important actors in 
international relations, and the international arena is characterized by anarchy rather than the rule 
of law (Morgenthau, 1963).  As a result, states are principally concerned with the pursuit of their 
own self-interests, which requires the attainment and projection of power.  Geopolitical realism 
was the primary US foreign policy orientation during the Cold War.  Bilateral relations were 
evaluated on states’ allegiances to one or the other superpower and their location in “spheres of 
influence” such as Eastern Europe (Soviet Union) and Central America (US). The Marshall Plan 
was organized around economic and technical assistance but had the broad strategic objective of 
territorially containing the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. USAID’s bureaucracy was 
modeled on the State department and had four world regional bureaus. Its work was often 
planned or assessed foremost through a geopolitical lens and intended to make foreign assistance 
a strategic tool to achieve foreign-policy objectives even if most actual development assistance 
was built on economic presumptions about growth for development (Essex, 2013).  Only as the 
Cold War wound down in the late 1980s did universal economic rationales of liberalization and 
market-oriented reforms begin to take center stage in USAID’s programming and US foreign 
assistance (Essex, 2013).   
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In the MCA interagency process, many Department of State officials, USAID officials, 
and NSC regional department members—the foreign policy community—approached MCA 
country selection through a realist and geopolitical lens.  Neoclassical economists’ rationales for 
aid, meanwhile, fit squarely within the liberal internationalist school of thought.  Aid given to 
achieve the universal objective of growth through good governance is a strand of liberal 
internationalist thinking.  Liberal internationalism is fundamentally a vision of an open, rule-
based system in which states trade and cooperate to achieve mutual gains (Ikenberry, 2009). 
Within this framework, foreign aid is a set of programmatic measures designed to enhance the 
socioeconomic and political development of recipient countries.  When the flow of economic aid 
from the developed to the developing countries can enhance world peace and prosperity, aid is 
often considered part of the idealist school of liberal internationalism where ethical and moral 
arguments are often mobilized to justify aid (Hattori, 2003; Pankaj, 2005).  The trend that began 
in the early 1980s of using Western economic aid to enroll countries in the international liberal 
order through free and stable markets in the name of growth is referred to, often pejoratively, as 
neoliberal (Ikenberry, 2011). 
Neoclassical economists generally disapprove of realist approaches to giving aid: “The 
standard-bearers of economic thought during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had 
little problem using economics as an instrument of state power, whereas their neoclassical 
successors thought that markets were best kept free from geopolitical interference” (Blackwill & 
Harris, 2016b: 107).  To neoclassical economists, choosing countries based on geopolitical 
rationales amounts to “selection bias” (Interviewee 1L, personal communication, August 12, 
2015).  They much preferred selectivity through indicators, which has been called a “purist” 
approach to ODA for its focus on pinpointing funds to achieve a narrow objective—growth: 
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“The MCA’s allocation criteria, based solely on economic performance and governance, would 
be the closest to a development purist’s blueprint for aid that the United States has ever 
attempted. In many respects, the MCA is precisely the sort of fund that development advocates 
had hoped would emerge as the Cold War wound down” (Brainard, 2003: 155).  This type of 
approach to aid is economistic and aspatial. At a State Department conference on sustainable 
development, CEA chairman Glenn Hubbard put it like this: “If the MCA is to achieve its 
laudable objective of triggering growth by encouraging good governance…Good performance in 
the poor nations must be recognized regardless of the region or country in which it is achieved” 
(Hubbard, 2002: 7). 
Nevertheless, the foreign policy community can make a case for geopolitically motivated 
aid and an established social science discipline, political science, is dedicated to understanding 
the determinants of aid allocations rather than aid effectiveness (Bearce & Tirone, 2010). 
Furthermore, the two objectives—geopolitical strategy and economic growth—are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive.  Cold War donors may have wanted not only to strengthen 
political alliances with allies but also help them succeed economically.  The strategic nature of 
aid to countries like South Korea and Taiwan during the Cold War did not blunt its effectiveness 
at improving economic and human development (Dreher, Klasen, Vreeland, & Werker, 2013).  
Thus, while liberal internationalists may disagree with the political motives behind realism and 
geopolitics, this approach is nonetheless a legitimate and established rationale for interstate 
relations.  
While economists aimed to select countries based on quantitative measures of 
governance, economic policies, and human capital, some in the State Department wanted to 
channel funds to key allies. A senior Treasury official said, “State’s fear was that certain 
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countries they like for diplomatic reasons weren’t going to get money and a bunch of others that 
we provide assistance to for national security reasons weren’t going to pass the indicators. Some 
State officials worried that this cute little thing for development assistance was going to infringe 
on their ability to give money for political reasons” (Interviewee 1E, personal communication, 
June 28, 2015).  Sometimes these foreign policy rationales were expressed in more parochial 
terms. A foreign policy community member was often aligned with a particular country or region 
rather than the indicators. A senior State Department official remarked, “The state regional 
bureaus had economists but they care a lot about the countries, they get clientitis. They care 
deeply about their offices and would always fall on the sword…They were advocates of their 
particular countries, not necessarily some universal logic” (Interviewee 1D, personal 
communication, June 22, 2015).  
Department of Treasury staff, NSC International Economic Affairs members, and 
Deputies and Principals Committee members aligned with the White House’s aid selectivity 
agenda—the economic policy community—were committed to their universal logic of growth 
via good governance.  They disagreed with their foreign policy colleagues’ geopolitical views. 
These conflicting rationalities set up “a policy dissonance at conception” (Interviewee 1H, 
personal communication, July 19, 2015).  A tension existed in the MCA interagency process that 
was a microcosm of a broader rift between neoclassical economic and realist geopolitical 
rationalities.  For example, Blackwill and Harris (2016b) stated that “[t]he neoclassical economic 
orthodoxy survived the Cold War, as did the resulting divide between economists and foreign 
policy thinkers” (Blackwill & Harris, 2016b: 107).  Some of this tension was calmed by White 
House officials’ promise that the MCA was going to supplement funding and not affect existing 
ODA levels.  A senior Treasury official said,  “The White House made the case that this was 
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about additional money, existing money would not be affected and it [the selection criteria] 
would only apply to the new MCA funds” (Interviewee 1E, personal communication, June 28, 
2015).  This calmed concerns somewhat but the US foreign assistance budget is notorious for 
being “a relatively tight budget with little wiggle room” (Interviewee 1G, personal 
communication, July 14, 2015).  Tensions remained throughout the MCA creation process 
largely because the two communities’ rationalities were irreconcilable. 
This raises the question of how individual donor countries like the United States were 
able to move their bureaucracies towards greater aid selectivity.  In other words, how did the US 
executive branch change path-dependent patterns of distributing aid rooted in geopolitics to those 
rooted in “purer” development concerns?  How did economic expertise wrest development 
assistance decision-making away from America’s foreign policy community to influence the 
distribution of the largest increase in bilateral development in forty years? 
The economic policy community advocating for selectivity overcame the foreign policy 
community’s resistance through a strategy of cultivating a “trust in numbers” over foreign policy 
officials.  Economic policy community members enrolled likeminded White House officials and 
Congressional representatives in their selectivity efforts.  As part of this strategy, the economic 
policy community cast the foreign policy community as political and subjective while presenting 
themselves as apolitical and objective. The Treasury Department’s reputation as a center of 
objective, technical competence within the federal government aided the community’s strategy.  
“Breaking” the Foreign Policy Community. Bush’s choice of Edson, the primary NSC 
official on international economic policy matters, to shepherd a foreign policy initiative like the 
MCA signaled the rising clout of economic expertise within the White House.  The New York 
Times reported, “President-elect George W. Bush plans a major change in his National Security 
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Council, adding economics experts to involve it far more in the economic changes that have 
caused upheaval around the world” (Sanger, 2001: 1).  Edson enlisted experts and leaders from 
the Cabinet departments and executive agencies such as State and Treasury as part of the 
interagency process and served as a liaison between Bush and those departmental officials.  
Edson had informally reached out to and involved State and Treasury officials such as 
Alan Larson and Steven Radelet. There was no similar regard shown to USAID officials.  In fact, 
since the agency was not a statutory NSC member, its participation was not guaranteed.  
According to Reverend David Beckmann, President of Bread for the World, who was involved in 
the MCA process as a civil society advisor: “When the conversation started after the President’s 
MCA speeches, AID was not in the working group.  They had to work like the dickens even to 
get invited to the meetings” (The Millennium Challenge Account, 2003: 78).  Ultimately USAID 
was included in the interagency process but only because the actors involved, Patrick Cronin and 
John Simon, were political appointees and not career USAID bureaucrats.  As one NSC official 
put it,  “The NSC wanted to exclude USAID from the discussion but they accepted Cronin and 
John Simon.  They were external to AID, not typical ‘AIDers’. They were viewed as acceptable 
and came from other sectors” (Interviewee 1B, personal communication, June 11, 2015).  
 Despite USAID’s diluted participation, this did not prevent the foreign policy community 
from raising realist or geopolitical arguments in the Interagency Group or putting up opposition 
to the use of universally applicable indicators for selection.  Nor did it ensure that Congress 
would approve the Administration’s request for a substantial increase in foreign assistance 
funding.  To make progress on these fronts, the economic policy community had to develop a 
strategy of “trust in numbers” (Porter, 1996) —strengthening relatively weak bureaucratic elites 
with quantitative methods to gain autonomy from mistrustful legislatures—through an alliance 
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with congressional representatives who favored selecting countries based on indicator 
performance.   
The Bush administration thought it wise to shift decision-making, and thus 
accountability, away from foreign policy and aid bureaucrats.  Another NSC official who was 
part of the interagency process said “[t]he president decided on a whole series of measures that 
would change the aid debate and hopefully make it easier to sell to a Republican congress and 
more conservative think tanks like the Heritage Foundation and American Enterprise Institute” 
(Interviewee 1M, personal communication, August 28, 2015).  One of these measures was the 
indicator selection system, which the administration believed “would allow the executive branch 
some freedom and authority to do some things and they can say back that this is not just a 
Secretary of State slush fund.  One way [Congress] can judge us is by these indicators” 
(Interviewee 1F, personal communication, July 2, 2015).  
With help from the CGD, the MCA interagency Group built bridges with Republican 
legislators such as Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana and the US Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations’ and House Committee on International Relations’ staff to sell the indicator selection 
system.  The CGD strategically disseminated its proposal for a metrics-based country selection 
system to a “select group of congressional staffers who have responsibility for issues relating to 
U.S. development, foreign assistance, and international economic policies” at a luncheon on June 
10th at the Capitol building (Weiner and Lucas, 2002).  The economic policy community used 
this and other network-building efforts across Congress to triangulate against the foreign policy 
community and neutralize any opposition to an indicator-based selection system.  While doing 
so, they cast the arguments of the foreign policy community as “subjective”, “political”, and 
rooted in personal interests while their arguments were cast as “objective”, “apolitical”, and free 
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of subjective discretion.  They argued that the foreign policy community was too biased in their 
funding allocation decisions.  An NSC official remarked,  “Congress wanted to get away from a 
system where the Secretary of State has an itch it wants to scratch to give away money and 
Congress has to appropriate the funds” (Interviewee 1F, personal communication, July 2, 2015).  
Another official said, “A few billion more for USAID was not on the table.  It would not have 
gone over well with Republicans” (Interviewee 1G, personal communication, July 14, 2015).  
The economic policy community capitalized on the fact that when it came to foreign aid “[t]he 
Hill wanted numbers demonstrating success” (Interviewee 1H, personal communication, July 19, 
2015).  
The Rise of the Treasury Department in US Foreign Policy. Treasury’s reputation was 
central to the economic policy community’s enrollment of allies.  The Clinton Administration’s 
National Economic Council (NEC) set the stage for Condoleezza Rice’s recommendation that 
President Bush include the Treasury Secretary as a statutory member of the NSC.  Established in 
1993 to coordinate and monitor the federal government’s economic policymaking, the NEC was 
successful in “making certain that discussions of domestic issues included consideration of 
economic elements” (Seidman, 1996). In a memo to President Clinton, Robert Rubin, the NEC’s 
first director, put the NEC’s success in this way: 
The early part of the NEC’s first year was spent establishing ourselves institutionally…to 
provide proper weight to economic consideration in areas that traditionally have 
underweighted economic impacts…better process should result in all agencies supporting 
whatever is agreed upon and should result in proper weighting of economic 
considerations in what have traditionally been thought of as non-economic areas (Rubin, 
1993: 1). 
  
The field of foreign assistance did not escape this rise of economists and economic rationales in 
US federal policymaking.    
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Once Treasury had a seat at the NSC interagency table, its reputation as the federal 
government’s center for excellence on matters of international economics became an asset for 
involvement in an aid initiative whose objective was cast in terms of raising global economic 
growth.  The economic policy community’s appeals to the objectivity and neutrality of economic 
goals such as growth helped elevate Treasury over other actors in the MCA interagency process. 
One senior Treasury official recounted, “Treasury had a different kind of knowledge [than 
USAID], macroeconomic knowledge, development knowledge with the multilateral development 
banks. It was a policymaking body; a think tank” (Interviewee 1H, personal communication, July 
19, 2015).  The State Department and USAID also had international economics teams.  
Nonetheless, the Interagency Group perceived Treasury to possess the level and type of 
economic expertise necessary for MCA’s creation. This included familiarity and comfort 
working with international financial institutions’ economic researchers and quantitative data.  A 
senior congressional staffer involved in MCA’s creation put it this way: “Treasury had people 
who could look at numbers.  It had PhD economists…they could hit the ground running, 
traditionally worked with the World Bank, so had those relationships and familiarity.  A USAID 
ag[ricultural] economist who knows a lot about rice is not going to tell you about indicators” 
(Interviewee 1G, personal communication, July 14, 2015). 
The interagency group decided that Treasury, given its human resources and brand of 
economic expertise, should lead the performance indicator-working group responsible for 
designing the country selection system.  But stronger technical competency in quantitative work 
was not the sole reason.  An equally or more important facet of Treasury’s brand of economic 
expertise was its perceived objectivity and neutrality.  Economists’ familiarity with quantitative 
empirics has given them a widespread reputation as being scientific and therefore neutral and 
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apolitical.  This characterization influenced the Bush White House’s efforts to place trust in an 
indicator-based selection system rather than foreign policy bureaucrats.  Funding allocation 
decisions based on governance had to be perceived as being rooted more in quantitative rules 
than subjective discretion.  After all, John Taylor, the Treasury official in charge of the MCA 
indicator group, authored the famous “Taylor Rule”.16  Taylor strongly preferred a rule-based 
approach to policymaking:  “If there is anything about which modern macroeconomics is clear 
however—and on which there is substantial consensus—it is that policy rules have major 
advantages over discretion in improving economic performance” (Taylor, 1993: 197).  As one 
senior Treasury official put it, “Treasury would have been more bloodless about the indicators.  
State would have tried to game indicators and the selection process so that the countries they 
would want to give money to, the US’s friends, would get selected “(Interviewee 1H, personal 
communication, July 19, 2015).  In the end, neoclassical economic rationales and quantitative 
policy devices were successfully mobilized in the name and spirit of objectivity: “The policy 
people, mostly Edson, were busy fighting hard to keep the foreign policy folks out…the NSC 
econ[omics] leaders wanted to break the foreign policy approach of State and USAID.  Sticking 
to numbers meant no subjectivity” (Interviewee 1B, personal communication, June 11, 2015). 
As the indicator group’s lead agency, Treasury became responsible for vetting indicators 
for the MCA country selection system. This work took place in Treasury’s Office of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for International Debt, Development, and Quantitative Policy under the 
guidance of the Office of the Undersecretary for International Affairs.  State Department and 
                                                
16 The Taylor Rule recommends that a central bank raise the nominal interest rate by a larger percentage than any 
percent increase in inflation.  For example, a one percent increase in inflation should prompt a central bank to 
increase the nominal interest rate by more than one percentage point. The rule’s goal is to foster macroeconomic 
price stability and full employment (Davig & Leeper, 2007). 
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USAID staffers played a supporting role on the Working Group by searching for indicators that 
Treasury could vet (Interviewee 1F, personal communication, July 2, 2015).  The Debt, 
Development, and Quantitative Policy economists (“Treasury economists”) became obligatory 
passage points for any effort to operationalize the principle of selectivity in foreign assistance 
(Callon, 1984).  As leaders of the indicator Working Group, they positioned themselves between 
the White House and the entire set of actors with a stake in selectivity.  If the economic and 
development policy communities and Congress wanted to select countries in an “objective” way 
their efforts had to pass through Treasury economists’ methods.   
Managing Dissent for Policy Expediency 
The economic policy community prevailed in enshrining indicator-based selectivity as a 
strategy but its members did not necessarily agree on which indicators were suitable for the task 
of ranking and selecting countries. Given the variety of indicators available, choosing the 
appropriate ones presented a “selection dilemma”.  There was debate in the Interagency Group 
over which indicators to include the selection system, particularly over whether the World 
Bank’s WGI should be used to rate countries’ governance 
 The MCA Selection System. On November 25, 2002 the White House released a fact 
sheet outlining the key characteristics of the Bush Administration’s MCA initiative including 
country qualification criteria (White House, 2003).  The quantitative qualification criteria, as 
determined by the Working Group and approved by President Bush, included per-capita income 
and indicators to judge countries’ performance.  MCA qualification criteria also allowed the 
MCC Board—comprised of the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, US Trade 
Representative, MCC’s CEO, USAID Administrator, and four rotating civil society members—
to exercise discretion in considering “other material information”, both quantitative and 
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qualitative, in making its final eligibility determination. Use of such material was typically 
reserved for countries that passed the performance indicators and qualified for funding (only a 
subset of qualifying countries are granted funding).  Finally, the fact sheet mentioned that 
countries statutorily prohibited from receiving assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act were 
not eligible for MCA funds (White House, 2003).  
The Bush Administration intended for the MCA to make substantial new financial 
resources available to low-income countries.  Thus, it was necessary to restrict candidacy to 
relatively lower income countries in some way.  The interagency group decided to use World 
Bank gross national income (GNI) per-capita data and guidelines to determine MCA candidacy.  
In the MCA’s first year of operation, fiscal year 2004, countries that were allowed to borrow 
from the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) and had per capita 
incomes below $1,435, the IDA cutoff, would be considered candidates.  In fiscal year 2005, all 
countries regardless of IDA eligibility with incomes below $1,435 would be considered. In fiscal 
years 2006 and beyond, all countries with incomes up to $2,975, the World Bank cutoff for 
lower middle-income countries at the time, became candidates.  Beginning in 2006, separate 
competitions would be run for countries with incomes below $1,435 (the “low-income” group) 
and those with incomes between $1,435 and $2,975 (the “lower middle-income” group) (White 
House, 2003).17  Countries that met these income criteria and were not barred by the Foreign 
Assistance Act from receiving U.S. assistance were called “MCA candidate countries”. 
Once candidacy was determined, countries would have to compete with their income 
category peers on a set of performance criteria.  The interagency group settled on 16 indicators 
(see Table 4.1).  To qualify as a “better performer” a country would have to score above its 
                                                
17 The income cutoffs changed for every subsequent year since 2006 for both groups. 
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peers’ median score on half of the indicators in each of three policy areas: Ruling Justly, 
Investing in People, and Economic Freedom.18 These categories corresponded to what the 
Council of Economic Advisors concluded, based on neoclassical economic theory and empirics, 
were the primary determinants of growth (governance, human capital, and macroeconomic 
policies, respectively). These categories, or “buckets” as Interagency Group members called 
them, bore similarities to categories used in multilateral banks’ institutional and policy 
assessments. The World Bank uses a Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) to 
determine allocations in its concessional lending and grant-making program for relatively lower 
income countries (i.e., IDA countries).19  Regardless of its performance on other criteria, a 
country also had to score above its peers’ median score on the WGI Control of Corruption 
indicator (White House, 2002).  This requirement was referred to colloquially as the “corruption 
hard hurdle”.  Candidate countries passing the performance indicator criteria “qualified” for 
MCA funding. 
 
                                                
18 There was one exception to countries competing against its peers.  Countries were not required to score better than 
the group’s median score on the inflation indicator but instead had to fall below a threshold, usually 15 percent. 
19 This is an internal assessment conducted by World Bank staff using 20 criteria in four categories: Economic 
Management, Structural Policies, Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity, and Public Sector Management and 
Institutions.  The MCA’s Ruling Justly category was like the CPIA’s Public Sector Management and Institutions 
category.  Investing in People bore some resemblance to the CPIA’s Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity category.  
The MCA’s Economic Freedom category was similar to the CPIA’s Economic Management and Structural Policies 
Categories.   
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Table 4.1 
Original MCA Qualification Criteria 
 
Source: Radelet (2003), Challenging Foreign Aid: A Policymaker’s Guide to the Millennium Challenge 
Account, Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. 
 
The Working Group began meeting at least once a week in the White House Situation 
Room starting in the spring and then throughout the summer of 2002 to narrow down the set of 
indicators used to rank and choose countries (Interviewee 1J, personal communication, August 5, 
2015).  The Working Group was responsible for vetting indicators and coming up with a shortlist 
for the wider Interagency Group to consider and approve (see Figure 4.5).  At least 70 possible 
indicators were originally considered, including over 25 governance indicators.  The foremost 
desired indicator characteristics included: 1) transparency and independence, 2) positive 
relationship to economic growth, 3) high country coverage, and 4) measurement validity 





Table 1.  Eligibility Criteria for the MCA 
 
Note:   To qualify, countries must be above the median on half of the indicators in each 
of the three sub-groups. 
 
Indicator Source 
I.  Ruling Justly  
     1.  Control of Corruption World Bank Institute 
     2.  Rule of Law  World Bank Institute 
     3.  Voice and Accountability  World Bank Institute 
     4.  Government Effectiveness  World Bank Institute 
     5.  Civil Liberties   Freedom House 
     6.  Political Rights   Freedom House 
  
II.  Investing in People  
     7.  Immunization Rate: DPT and Measles WHO/World Bank 
     8.  Primary Education Completion Rate  World Bank 
     9.  Public Primary Education Spending/GDP World Bank 
     10.  Public Expenditure on Health/GDP  World Bank 
  
III.  Economic Freedom  
     11.  Country Credit Rating Institutional Investor 
     12.  Inflation IMF 
     13.  Regulatory Quality   World Bank Institute 
     14.  Budget Deficit/GDP IMF/World Bank 
     15.  Trade Policy Heritage Foundation 
     16.  Days to Start a Business World Bank 
 
Source: "Fact Sheet: Millennium Challenge Account," distributed by the administration 
on November 25, 2002, available at www.cgdev.org. 
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Development report, On Eligibility Criteria for the Millennium Challenge Account (Birdsall, 
Levine, Lucas, & Shah, 2002).  
 The Interagency Group considered an indicator transparent and independent if a non-US 
government, third-party source produced it (if the indicator and perhaps its underlying data were 
publicly available, that was considered a bonus).  The stronger an indicator’s positive correlation 
was with economic growth the more favorable it appeared to the group.  Likewise, the greater an 
indicator’s country coverage, or whether it had data measuring a country’s performance, the 
better. The group also considered it important that an indicator represent the spirit of what its 
respective bucket intended to measure, i.e. an indicator should be an accurate representation of 
governance, investment in human capital, or free market economic policies. 
Figure 4.5. Indicator Work Plan Circulated to the MCA Interagency Group Members 
 
Source: Performance Indicator Working Group (2002a). Draft Work Plan. April 5, 2002. Washington, DC: 
US Department of the Treasury.  
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Governance Indicators as “Plywood.” When choosing indicators for the three specific 
buckets, there was little disagreement over proposed indicators for the Investing in People and 
Economic Freedom categories.  Selecting indicators for the Ruling Justly category proved 
contentious, however.  Academic economists in the economic policy community were skeptical 
of the WGI’s aggregation methodology and thus its measurement validity as well.  The WGI, 
however, was more suitable for operationalizing the MCA’s global indicator-based competition 
for funds.  When it came to the WGI’s use in the selection system, policy expediency trumped 
methodological concerns. 
There was broad agreement that there had to be a mix of input and outcome indicators in 
the Investing in People category and the Interagency Group felt the proposed indicators on public 
expenditures, immunization rates, and education completion rates met the relevant criteria.  The 
Economic Freedom indicators were reminiscent of the earlier structural adjustment era.  Five of 
the indicators were focused on what might be traditionally considered macroeconomic criteria. 
They were either the same indicators or close proxies examined by structural adjustment 
programs that sought to stabilize countries’ macroeconomic environments, liberalize their 
markets for finance, goods, and services, and deregulate industry and production.  One indicator, 
“Days to Start a Business”, was novel and focused on the microeconomic environment.  There 
was general agreement on these indicators even if some interagency group members did harbor 
concerns about these indicators’ “free market bias”.  As one Interagency Group member from 
Treasury put it, “NSC International Economics was very committed to the ‘rising tide lifts all 
boats’ approach to growth...there was a commitment to the idea that growth was a good thing 
and should be encouraged and that the free market approach was the best way to do that” 
(Interviewee 1J, personal communication, August 5, 2015). 
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The primary issue for the proposed Ruling Justly indicators was whether the indicators 
that made up the majority of proposed criteria in this bucket—the WGI—possessed sufficient 
measurement validity.  After all, it was Douglass North who said, “We cannot see, feel, touch, or 
even measure institutions; they are constructs of the human mind” (North, 1990: 107).  These 
essentially qualitative mental constructs had to be translated into quantitative measures like the 
WGI using database generation and modern statistical models.  This was not without its pitfalls: 
“It is useful to remember that governance is essentially a qualitative phenomenon, the 
quantification of which would always be subject to considerable empirical limitations” (Malik, 
2002: 3).  John Taylor, who was directing the Working Group on behalf of Treasury, had 
reservations about the WGI’s empirical limitations.   
The WGI’s six indicators are each a composite index of governance. When the WGI was 
first compiled in 1996 it included eleven sources. By 2011 the number of sources had grown to 
thirty one (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011).  Kaufmann and Kraay constructed each of the 
six aggregate WGI indicators by averaging together data from underlying sources they believed 
corresponded to the respective composite indicator’s governance category.  This was (and still is) 
done in three main steps.  First, individual questions from the underlying producer data source 
are assigned to each of the relevant aggregate indicators; for example, questions on bribery are 
assigned to the Control of Corruption composite index.  Next, questions from the individual data 
sources are rescaled from 0 to 1 with higher values corresponding to more preferable outcomes; 
for example, a score of 4 on a question ranging from 1 to 5 is rescaled as 0.75.  This rescaling 
does not make individual sources comparable to each other, however.  This is accomplished 
through the last step, the construction of a weighted average of the individual source indicators 
with a statistical methodology known as an Unobserved Components Model.  The resulting 
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governance indicators represent a weighted average of each source’s data, with Kaufmann and 
Kraay assigning greater weight to sources that tend to be more strongly correlated with each 
other.  The final composite indicators’ values ranged from –2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to more preferable outcomes (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido, 1999a). 
The Unobserved Components Model is essentially an aggregation method.  The WGI 
brings together governance indicators that differ in terms of the governance concept measured, 
nature of respondents providing information, sample of countries they cover, and units of 
measurement (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido, 1999b).  Kaufmann and Kraay’s primary motivation 
for aggregating these diverse indicators was to provide a more precise measure of governance 
than individual indicators could to facilitate formal hypothesis testing of cross-country 
differences in governance (Kaufmann et al., 1999a).  Their argument is that individual 
governance indicators are imperfect signals of actual existing governance.  Given the diversity 
among indicators and variety of governance definitions, the measurement error of each 
individual indicator is quite high (e.g., can a single survey of households’ perceptions of bribe 
payments reflect a country’s corruption?).  Combining indicators, however, can theoretically get 
us closer to the true nature of a country’s governance, or in statistical laymen’s terms, improve 
the signal relative to the noise:  
Since “true” governance is difficult to observe and we can observe only imperfect 
indicators of it, how can we best extract a “signal” of unobserved governance from the 
observed data?  Under this view, all individual indicators of corruption, for example, 
should be viewed as noisy or imperfect proxies for corruption.  Aggregating these 
together can result in a more informative signal of corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2011: 
238). 
 
Treasury Undersecretary John Taylor took issue with the WGI’s aggregation process. 
One of his associates recalled that “[h]e referred to the indicators as plywood—it looked like 
wood, but it wasn’t really. It was a bunch of layers of measures laid on top of measures to look 
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like wood but wasn’t nearly as strong as wood” (Interviewee 1B, personal communication, June 
11, 2015).  Also, Taylor reportedly said, “Is what you are measuring in Tanzania the same as in 
Kenya? They say it is Tanzania, but are we sure that bureaucratic efficiency in Tanzania is the 
same as bureaucratic efficiency in Kenya, and should we be comparing those two? Even more so 
between say Vietnam and Tanzania. Are these indicators capable of flattening and presenting the 
concept as the same across such varied environments?” (Interviewee 1B, personal 
communication, June 11, 2015).  Taylor’s main contention was that separate indicators and 
measures making up the index should not be aggregated because they used different surveys in 
different countries that lacked a standardized approach. 
If the WGI’s estimates raised questions about measurement validity, then this posed a 
challenge for selecting countries based on performance.  How would the MCA architects know if 
a country was actually performing better than its peers on the WGI?  On this issue, Taylor was 
not alone.  Kaufmann and Kraay did not shy away from their composite indicators’ 
shortcomings.  They candidly concluded that “[d]espite several optimistic assumptions, we find 
that governance is not very precisely measured using these aggregate indicators.  In particular, 
although it is possible to identify statistically significant differences between countries at 
opposite ends of the distribution of governance, it is much more difficult to discriminate among 
the majority of countries with any degree of confidence” (Kaufmann et al., 1999a: 27).  
Aggregation did little to improve measurement errors, which remained high.  Consequently, 
confidence intervals around the composite indicators’ point estimates were very large.  This 
made comparison of governance across countries practically meaningless.  When the distribution 
of WGI’s governance estimates was split into quartiles, large confidence intervals made it 
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difficult to say with any statistical certainty where in the distribution a particular country 
belonged (see Figure 4.6):  
For a small group of countries at each end of the distribution of governance, we can 
conclude with a great deal of confidence that these countries are in fact in the top and 
bottom quartiles.  However, for the middle quartiles the situation is much less clear, as 
very few countries’ 90% confidence intervals lie entirely within a given quartile…In 
particular, for the ‘typical’ country around the middle of the distribution of governance, 
governance is not significantly different form nearly half of all other countries in the 
world (Kaufmann et al., 1999a: 16–18).  
 
In other words, the WGI could, for example, confidently conclude that governance was “better” 
in Scandinavia than Central Africa, but precious else about differences in the rest of the world.  
 
Figure 4.6. Plot of Countries' WGI Government Effectiveness Point Estimates with 
Confidence Intervals and Quartile Distributions 
 
Source: Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Zoido, P. (1999a). Aggregating Governance Indicators (SSRN 
Scholarly Paper No. ID 188548). Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. Retrieved from 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=188548 
Notes: The dotted line represents the country’s point estimate and the vertical bars represent its confidence 
interval.  The horizontal lines define cutoffs for the quartiles.  Some countries’ confidence intervals were so 
large (e.g., Guyana) they could fall in the same quartile as the country with the worst point estimate, Iraq, 
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Kaufmann and Kraay were concerned enough about measurement error that they wrote a 
discussion paper specifically for the MCA interagency group.  In the paper they generally 
concurred that it was worthwhile to measure governance and choose countries based on 
quantitative criteria, but also sounded the alarm that the WGI should not be used to run 
“horseraces” between countries to determine MCA eligibility: “It is difficult to assign [many 
countries] with a high degree of confidence to a definitive performance category according to 
their estimated level of governance” (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2002: 4).  As a result, there is a “non-
trivial probability” that countries could be mistakenly disqualified; the authors recommended the 
use of supplemental in-depth, country governance diagnostic surveys to make qualification 
decisions (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2002).  
 While Taylor, Kaufmann, and Kraay were all interested in influencing policy, they 
wished to do so without betraying the limitations of social scientific methods.  They were in 
favor of applying these methods to policy so long as doing so respected the boundaries of what 
the evidence and tools reasonably allowed.  Their first commitment was to ontological 
objectivity, or getting as close to the ultimate structure of reality as possible (whether such a 
governance reality does or can exist is another matter). Senior economic policymaking officials 
in the NSC were not interested in methodological debates or ontological objectivity.  They were 
interested in whether the final outputs of social science methods could further their goals, in this 
case, providing a set of indicators that united the Administration’s good governance and growth 
agendas while selecting countries for funding.  
A divide began to emerge in the MCA interagency group between academic research 
economists on one side and the economic policymakers on the other.  In early May 2002 Taylor 
instructed some of his Treasury staff members on the indicator-working group to come up with 
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Treasury’s own governance indicator as an alternative to the WGI. Taylor wanted to substitute 
the WGI with an unambiguous set of specific survey questions that captured MCA’s governance 
priorities while providing greater transparency (Treasury 2002a, 2002b).  Ten questions were 
extracted from three out of twenty four possible sources: the World Economic Forum’s 
Executive Opinion Survey, Columbia University’s State Capacity Project, and World Bank’s 
Business Environment Survey (see Figure 4.7).   
Figure 4.7. Individual Components of Treasury's Proposed Composite Governance Index 
 
Source: Treasury (2002b). Treasury Governance Indicator.  Washington, DC: US Department of the 
Treasury.  
 
The Center for Global Development, which was influential early in the MCA process in 
setting the standards for “optimal” eligibility criteria, had a different understanding of 
transparency than Taylor did, however.  The Center for Global Development recommended that 
any eligibility criteria “be accessible to non-governmental organizations and researchers in the 
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U.S. and potential recipient countries. This is the only means to achieve the transparency and 
clarity that will distinguish the MCA” (Birdsall, Levine, et al., 2002: 6).  According to CGD, 
indicators were transparent if they were public and accessible. Taylor, meanwhile, believed 
indicators were transparent if they were accurate and valid.  NSC economic policymakers’ found 
common cause with CGD’s conception of transparency.  The Treasury index produced by a 
small group of government economists was riskier because it could be cast as private and 
provincial.  Unlike the World Bank’s WGI, the Treasury index could more easily be branded a 
“US government product” and associated with narrow US economic or foreign policy interests 
(Interviewee 1B, personal communication, June 11, 2015).  NSC officials needed to project 
objectivity as strongly as possible to overcome opposition from the foreign policy community.  
Indicators perceived as public, accessible, and independent could be contrasted as a more 
righteous alternative to the foreign policy community’s parochial geopolitical concerns and more 
easily gain the support of Congress and development practitioners. 
The Treasury index also had not been “externally validated” in the same way that WGI 
had been.  The CGD report advised that “[d]ata sources that have been used extensively in 
research study, and indicators that have been correlated to outcomes of interest, are far more 
desirable than brand new data sources that have had no external validation” (Birdsall, Levine, et 
al., 2002: 6).  The WGI met this criterion.  Kaufmann and Kraay had studied their indicators’ 
relationship to growth in World Bank Policy Research Papers. They later disseminated these 
findings in an International Monetary Fund magazine, Finance & Development, through stylized 
facts that clearly depicted their indicators’ relationship to GDP per capita (see Figure 4.8).  
Moreover, Treasury economists conducted econometric work similar to the World Bank’s to 
determine indicators’ relationship with growth. (Interviewee 1J, personal communication, 
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August 5, 2015) (see Figure 4.9).  The WGI had a strong positive relationship with countries’ 
per capita income. This was an important part of the vetting process because indicators lacking 
this positive relationship with economic growth were not considered for inclusion.  
Figure 4.8. Stylized Fact Representing Positive Relationship between WGI's Rule of 
Law Indicator and Per Capita Income 
 
Source: Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Zoido-Lobatón, P. (2000). Governance matters: From measurement to 
action. Finance and Development, 37(2), 10. 
 
Figure 4.9.  Example of Analysis Conducted by Treasury Economists in the Indicator 
Working Group 
 
Source:  Council of Economic Advisors (2015). Kroszner, Randall (Randy) – Subject Files in Trade: 
Millennium Challenge Account. Dallas, TX: George W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum. 
Notes: Variables starting with “KK” are WGI indicators.  The variable GDP1 refers to countries’ GDP per 
capita between 1995 and 1999.  GDP2 refers to countries’ GDP per capita between 1990 and 1995. 
 
reflect the fact that richer countries are able to “afford the
luxury of good governance”—as is argued by some of the
practitioners of the worst governance in the world.
In our research, we found a large causal effect running
from improved governance to better development outcomes.
An improvement of one standard deviation in the rule of law
from the low level prevalent in Russia to the “middling” level
in the Czech Republic or, alternatively, a reduction in corrup-
tion from the very high level prevalent in Indonesia to the
lower level in Korea leads to between a two- and fourfold
increase in per capita incomes, a decline in infant mortality
of similar magnitude, and an improvement of 15–25 per-
centage points in literacy levels. Two examples of this “devel-
opment dividen ” are shown in Chart 2, which shows the
beneficial impacts of improved citizen “voice” on infant
mortality, for a sample of 173 countries, and of improved
rule of law on per capita inc me, for a sample of 166 coun-
tries, using data for the late 1990s. These large causal effects
suggest that good governance should be given a high priority
on the development and poverty-reduction agendas.
Developing in-depth diagnostics
Aggregate indicators based on existing sources of governance
data are a powerful tool for drawing attention to relevant
issues. They are also indispensable for cross-country research
into the causes and consequences of governance. But they are
a blunt tool to use in formulating policy advice.
To move forward, we need better data and better tools.
There is considerable scope to improve the quality of interna-
tionally comparable governance indicators. One such effort is
the World Business Environment Survey, which will cover
some 10,000 firms in about 90 countries. This survey asks
detailed questions about various dimensions of governance
and probes quantitatively into issues typically considered as
qualitative. For example, it elicits specific information about
the share of bribes paid in total revenue and on the percent-
age bribe fee “cut” in public procurement projects, rather
than vague opinions regarding countrywide corruption. With
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s
participation, this enterprise survey is virtually complete for
transition economies. By investigating grand forms of cor-
ruption, such as “state capture” through the purchase of
decrees and parliamentary laws and public procurement
kickbacks, this survey approach provides new insights into
the prevalence and implications of enterprises—including
firms benefiting from foreign direct investment—engaging in
grand corruption. This suggests a need to address the incen-
tives for perverse corporate strategies and state capture when
formulating anticorruption strategies.
Yet better cross-country data from one survey can take us
only so far. Countries embarking on governance and anticor-
ruption programs need to analyze in depth the specific insti-
tutional challenges they face. Country diagnostic tools such
as those developed at the World Bank Institute, in collabora-
tion with others inside and outside the World Bank, can help
generate new information, build local capacity, develop
strategies and policies, and support coalition building to
improve governance. Key ingredients of these governance
diagnostics are in-depth, country-specific surveys—carried
out by domestic nongovernmental organizations—of thou-
sands of households, enterprises, and public officials that
gather specific information about vulnerabilities within the
country’s institutions. The “self-assessment” responses of
these three groups of stakeholders are compared for consis-
tency and pooled to facilitate in-depth analysis and identifi-
cation of priorities for action. (See World Bank Institute and
Europe and Central Asia Public Sector Group, 1999 for
details on implementation of a process also supported by
bilateral donors and nongovernmental organizations such as
Transparency International and the Carter Center.) For
instance, diagnostics performed in Albania, Bolivia, Ecuador,
Georgia, Latvia, and Paraguay have identified key areas for
reform such as the legal/judiciary, customs, police, and the
subnational level of government, and are also providing
empirical insights into the governance-poverty nexus.
Surveys of public officials are particularly relevant. Their
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Chart 2
The development dividend
  Sources:  Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (1999 a and b). 
  Notes: The ch rts show the relationship between a  indicator of rule of law and per capita incomes for 166 countries during 1997–98 (left panel) and an indicator of voice and accountability and 
infant mortality for 173 countries during 1997–98 (right panel). (Infant mortality is measured as the annual number of deaths of infants under one year of age per 1,000 live births.) The lines show the
estimated effect of better governance on per capita GDP and infant mortality, controlling for reverse causation, omitted variables, and measurement error, using an instrumental variables procedure. 
Selected countries are indicated for illustrative purposes. Countries' relative positions on the rule of law and voice and accountability indices are subject to significant margins of error (see Chart 1) 
and reflect the perceptions of a variety of public and private sector organizations.  Countries' relative positions in no way reflect the official views of the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund.
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Finally, there was the issue of country coverage. The WGI covers “virtually all countries in the 
world” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobatón, 2000).  In 1999 the WGI covered 155 countries 
and by 2009 it covered 211, which permitted comparisons, albeit imprecise, across a much larger 
set of countries than was possible using any single indicator (Kaufmann et al., 2011).  Country 
coverage was instrumental to operationalizing a global competition to satisfy performance-
oriented conservatives. According to an NSC official, “There were tensions over data quality and 
coverage.  Coverage won out because the selection system required wide country coverage to 
work” (Interviewee 1B, personal communication, June 11, 2015).  Choosing countries for 
funding required comparing countries’ scores in a standardized, universal way.  Countries whose 
governance and other characteristics could not be seen could not be properly evaluated.  This 
form of global aid management requires the state—in this case the US federal government—to 
“see” the globe (Scott, 1998).  This applies not only to state practices within but also across 
borders (Broome & Seabrooke, 2012). The WGI, because of its successful aggregation process, 
was best positioned to see and evaluate the largest number of countries (see Figure 4.10). 
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Figure 4.10. Country Coverage Comparisons Between WGI and Treasury's Proposed 
Indicator 
 
Source: Treasury (2002b). Treasury Governance Indicator.  Washington, DC: US Department of the 
Treasury.  
 
For these reasons, “The majority of the working group did not favor the Treasury 
Governance indicator as an option to replace the Kaufmann-Kraay indicators” (Performance 
Indicator Working Group, 2002b: 2).  Despite Kaufmann and Kraay’s admission that the WGI 
did not precisely measure governance and the composite indices were, at best, modest 
improvements over individual governance indicators, the WGI still presented the best option to 
instrumentalize governance indicators for aid allocation.  Taylor ultimately consented to the 
WGI even if he still held reservations and the Interagency Group came to accept that a bad 
governance measure was better than no measure at all.  Treasury economists, with help from the 
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CGD report and guidelines, successfully mediated between Taylor’s commitments to ontological 
objectivity and the NSC economic policymakers’ commitments to policy expediency.   
The Power of Method:  Statistical Consensus and Concealing Bias 
Contestation over which indicators to use for selection demonstrated that while the 
economic policy community bemoaned the foreign policy community’s selection bias, in reality 
bias had shifted from the selection of countries to the selection of indicators and the biases these 
indicators possessed.  The WGI’s use had an effect on the nature of decision-making as well as 
the distribution of development finance.  It collapsed incredibly complex country polities into a 
singular metric that ignored important factors for governance such as years since independence 
and institutional path dependencies.  The WGI’s inclusion in the MCA selection system meant 
that decision-making was shifted away from the Washington, DC foreign policy community and 
towards an assemblage of country risk analysts, survey instruments, and statistical models.  In 
the end, the WGI’s incorporation as a decision-making tool for aid allocation did not lead to 
rationality taming subjectivity but swapped the subjectivity of foreign policy experts for the 
subjectivity of a diverse and distributed network of mostly country investment risk analysts.  
The indicators included another type of bias—income bias.  Wealthier countries routinely 
performed better on the WGI than did relatively poorer ones.  As the remainder of this chapter 
will show, countries that passed four or more WGI indicators and qualified for MCA assistance, 
were, on average, wealthier than those that did not.  Because WGI scores barely changed over 
time, this resulted in a set of countries that became a “global underclass” when it came to 
eligibility for global development finance. 
The Changed Nature of Selection Bias. The WGI aggregates the massive diversity of 
governance conditions around the world into a simplified and standardized common metric. 
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Commensuration transforms different qualities into a single quantity.  It converts difference into 
magnitude (Espeland & Stevens, 1998).  When many different governance data sources are 
aggregated into a single composite index, it makes it easier to talk about “more or less 
governance” rather than different kinds of governance (Espeland & Stevens, 1998).  Tellingly, 
Kaufmann and Kraay refer to their successful commensuration as a “statistical consensus”, 
“Although different sources measure governance in very different units, statistical techniques are 
available that allow us to anchor each source in a common set of units” (Kaufmann et al., 2000: 
11). 
This statistical consensus foreclosed discussions around the context in which countries’ 
institutions took shape. Take the case of countries in the Central Asia region, for instance. The 
MCA’s reliance on the WGI resulted in a rejection of countries in this low-income region of the 
world.  Central Asia consists of three low-income countries, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan, and one country that transitioned from low-income to lower-middle income, 
Turkmenistan (Kazakhstan is part of Central Asia but was only considered in 2006 and 2007 
after which it graduated from the lower middle-income country category and was no longer a 
candidate for MCA funding).  Nine years of potential MCA qualification across Central Asian 
countries represented 36 possible instances of qualification.  Failure to score above the median 
on the WGI’s four indices in the Ruling Justly category disqualified Central Asian countries 
exactly half the time (18 instances) (see Table 4.2).  These countries nonetheless passed the other 
two categories of Investing in People and Economic Freedom the majority of the time.  No other 
region’s countries exhibited this pattern so often.  Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan were 
the most affected. Uzbekistan, however, was regularly statutorily prohibited from receiving 
funds because of the US Congress’ and State Department’s concerns of human rights violations.    
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Table 4.2  
Central Asian Countries Disqualified from MCA Consideration Due to WGI Scores 
Country GNI / capita in 
2008 (US $) 
Number of Years Failed 
to Qualify due to WGI 
Years in Which Qualification 
Prevented due to WGI 
Kyrgyzstan 590 6 2004–08, 2011 
Tajikistan 460 5 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011 
Uzbekistan 730 5 2004–08 
Turkmenistan 3040 2 2007–08 
Source: Based on author’s calculations of MCA performance data.  GNI per capita data taken from the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Development Indicators.  
 
Irrespective of whether Central Asian countries would generate a good “return” on US 
bilateral assistance, reliance on governance indicators like the WGI obviated questions and 
discussions that might take countries’ or regions’ unique history into account.  The WGI neither 
accounts for when these and other countries began their own efforts at improving governance nor 
their specific institutional path dependencies.  Former colonies in the Global South gained their 
independence from different empires and as a result inherited vastly different institutional 
legacies.  
 Central Asian countries are nestled in between Russia, China, and Iran.  Every Central 
Asian country was a once part of the Soviet Union as a Soviet Socialist Republic until it 
achieved its independence in 1991. Many post-Soviet Union countries in Eastern Europe, the 
Caucasus, and Central Asia performed well in the Investing in People category because the 
Soviet Union invested heavily in basic literacy and health across its republics.  The immediate 
post-Cold War era saw several former Soviet Union territories’ administrations, including those 
in Central Asia, move quickly to adopt market-based economic reforms.  These countries 
routinely scored above the median on MCA’s macroeconomic indicators measuring inflation, 
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fiscal deficits, and trade openness.  At the same time, the legacy of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union presented path dependencies for Central Asian countries’ governance, institutions, 
and norms.  Many Central Asian administrations were slow to adopt democratic reforms and 
embrace freedom of association, opposition, and the press.  By the end of the 1990s, Central 
Asian countries’ administrations had built a reputation for being authoritarian with high levels of 
corruption and uneven property rights’ definition and enforcement. As a result, countries in the 
region received negative governance assessments and routinely fell below the median on all four 
Ruling Justly WGI indicators.  This precluded them from MCA assistance.  
A discussion about Central Asian countries’ unique context might have been had by the 
Board to select eligible countries from the pool that qualified for assistance (i.e., passed the 
scorecard) but not for those that, for example, failed all four WGI indicators in the Ruling Justly 
category. The WGI’s statistical consensus made it more difficult to consider important, nuanced 
contextual factors affecting countries’ governance scores.  In weighing funding decisions the 
foreign policy community might have considered, for example, that Central Asian countries were 
some of the last to have achieved independence among MCA candidate countries.  By contrast, 
many West and Central African countries gained their independence from France in 1960.  Most 
former Portuguese African colonies gained their independence in 1975.  Factors such as years 
since independence and institutions inherited at independence influenced performance on the 
MCA indicators.  Having an extra fifteen or thirty years of independence could have a material 
affect on countries’ actual institutions or how institutions are perceived.  Likewise, reform 
programs that grapple with a legacy of French or Portuguese colonial institutions versus Soviet 
communist institutions presented very different options and paths for countries to follow.  
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The indicators included another type of bias—income bias.  Choosing indicators based on 
their positive relationship with per capita income proved problematic because it meant richer 
countries would have a higher probability of scoring better on performance indicators. The 
interagency group became caught between its commitment to indicators that had a positive 
relationship with growth, largely to appease the economic policy community, and rising concern 
over what they called income bias: “Countries with higher per capita income, can that have a 
bias towards a specific indicator?  Answer is almost always ‘yes’ for most of these 
indicators…there was an income bias” (Interviewee 1F, personal communication, July 2, 2015).  
Income bias is a problem because “to the extent that income levels themselves are driving a 
countries [sic] rating on the indicator, it raises the possibility that countries are being (indirectly) 
penalized simply for being poor.  In such cases, the MCC selection process would be 
biased…low income would cause poor performance on the indicators and lower likelihood of 
qualification” (MCC Development Policy, 2005: 36). 
This potential built-in bias against poorer countries concerned many members of the 
interagency group, particularly those in the NSC Office of African Affairs.  Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the region with some of the lowest per capita incomes in the world, would be very affected by 
any income bias.  Jendayi Frazer, the NSC Office of African Affairs’ director, and some of her 
colleagues were concerned that something countries might not be able to control, such as 
geography, was related to performance in a way that unduly punished them (Interviewee 1B, 
personal communication, June 11, 2015).  One NSC official remarked, “What if all your 
neighbors are poor or all your neighbors are rich? Do your neighbors affect your governance, and 
if you happen to be surrounded by poor countries, are you really better at governance than the 
indicators suggest?  Similarly the opposite when surrounded by rich countries” (Interviewee 1B, 
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personal communication, June 11, 2015). The Brookings Institution shared the NSC Office of 
African Affairs’ concerns and made them public in a 2003 policy brief titled Making the 
Millennium Challenge Account Work for Africa (Brainard & Driscoll, 2003).  
The NSC Office of African Affairs began conducting its own regression analysis to see if 
Africa was discriminated against on the basis of income.  On the basis of this analysis the NSC 
Office of African Affairs raised its concerns to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice in 
an official memo outlining the risks of income bias and its potential effect on Sub-Saharan 
African countries’ selection (Interviewee 1B, personal communication, June 11, 2015).  The 
Interagency Group ultimately decided to address the issue of income bias by creating separate 
competitions for low-income and lower middle-income countries.  Countries’ performance on 
the indicators would be assessed against their per-capita income peers.  
The WGI’s inclusion in the MCA selection system meant that households’ and experts’ 
subjective perceptions would inform how billions of dollars of aid funding would be distributed.  
There were Interagency Group members who took objection to the decision: “Jendayi Frazer has 
worked on the ground [in countries]. She was skeptical of how surveys of governance were done.  
She knew it was done by some guy sitting in a café filling out a survey” (Interviewee 1B, 
personal communication, June 11, 2015).  Kaufmann and Kraay acknowledged these types of 
concerns but found their exclusive use of perceptions based data to measure governance 
completely acceptable and somewhat inevitable.  
The WGI’s overreliance on investment risk analysts is important because such experts are 
prone to bias.20  The largest contributors of governance information in the WGI are what 
                                                
20 The unobserved components model assumes that measurement errors in individual governance indicators making 
up the composite indices are uncorrelated with each other.  In reality, measurement errors are likely related because 
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Kaufmann and Kraay refer to as “commercial business information providers” (Kaufmann et al., 
2011).  In 2009, among the WGI’s 31 sources, the five investment risk analyst sources alone 
contributed one-third (34 percent) of all data points.  This does not include a few surveys, such 
as the World Economic Forum’s and Institute for Management and Development’s 
competitiveness surveys, which pose similar questions to similar groups of experts.  Meanwhile, 
the nine NGO sources account for only 20 percent of all data points. More importantly, the five 
investment risk analyst firms have the highest country coverage among the various sources 
(Kaufmann et al., 2011).  This means that for many countries, usually the smallest and poorest, 
they are one of the few sources of governance data available.21   
An analysis of risk experts at Institutional Investor, a country risk appraisal guide similar 
to those used in the WGI, showed that its analysts had an overly adverse view of less-developed 
countries in the late 1980s (Somerville & Taffler, 1995: 293).22  Furthermore, analysts may be 
influenced by “sentiment” about particular countries rather than data on economic fundamentals.  
When this sentiment is widely shared, it becomes a herd effect and generates bias (Somerville & 
Taffler, 1995).  Kaufmann and Kraay themselves acknowledged this potential for “halo effects” 
when one-off economic or political events or recent experiences with growth affect an analyst’s 
perception of governance (Kaufmann et al., 2011).  
                                                                                                                                                       
experts tend to follow each other’s opinions, are more pessimistic than optimistic, and unduly influenced by high 
profile, one-off events. 
21 The unobserved components model is “unbalanced”. A balanced model would mean that all comparisons across 
countries and time would rely on the same set of data sources.  An unbalanced model, by contrast, includes a 
country in a given year for an aggregate index if any individual indicator has an observation for that country in the 
given year.  This greatly expands the number of WGI’s observations across space and time but increases the risk that 
changes in governance are simply the result of changes in the underlying data. 
22 Incidentally, Institutional Investor was an indicator source in MCA’s Economic Freedom category 
  130 
The WGI’s inclusion in the MCA selection system meant that decision-making was 
shifted away from the Washington, DC foreign policy community and towards an assemblage of 
country risk analysts, survey instruments, and statistical models. Kaufmann and Kraay’s 
quantification and aggregation processes lent the WGI an aura of objectivity.  In the end, 
however, the WGI’s incorporation as a decision-making tool for aid allocation swapped the 
subjectivity of foreign policy experts for the subjectivity of a diverse and distributed network of 
mostly country investment risk analysts.  Consequently, a theoretical claim about the appropriate 
standards for evaluating governance accompanies this assemblage: what is good for private 
foreign finance is good for official development assistance.   
The Power of Method: The Distribution of Development Funding 
The Deserving and Undeserving Poor. Indicators incorporated into the country 
selection system affected which countries qualified for MCA funding. Qualification was 
determined based on countries’ performance on the Interagency Group’s chosen indicators 
summarized on a scorecard.  Qualification did not guarantee MCA eligibility, however.  Every 
year there were more countries that qualified than were made eligible.  The MCA Board of 
Directors determined final MCA eligibility among qualifying countries using data on indicator 
performance as well as supplemental information. 
The Board could use its discretion to qualify countries that did not pass the scorecard. 
However, in only two cases in MCC’s history did the Board deem a country eligible in its first 
year of qualification without it having passed the indicator criteria: Georgia and Mozambique, 
both in 2004.  Between 2004 and 2015, ninety-three percent of countries selected by the Board 
met the indicator criteria at the time they were first selected (Rose & Wiebe, 2015a).  This is in 
stark contrast to multilateral development banks that have routinely made exemptions to their 
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selection criteria (Kaja & Werker, 2010; Kilby, 2006).  Thus, the most basic and influential 
effect of the selection indicators is in the “rule based” qualification stage of country selection. 
A country’s performance relative to its peers on the WGI was critical to MCA 
qualification. The WGI wielded a disproportionately large influence on country qualification.  
This single source made up five of the sixteen selection indicators.  In other words, very close to 
one out of three indicators in MCC’s selection system was derived from Kaufmann and Kraay’s 
project of aggregating governance data.  In the Ruling Justly category, WGI contributed four out 
of the six indicators, or 67 percent (the other two come from Freedom House’s Freedom in the 
World report).  Because countries had to pass at least three indicators in each category, failure to 
pass the WGI’s four indicators in the Ruling Justly category eliminated a country.  Furthermore, 
a country had to score higher than the WGI Control of Corruption’s median score to qualify 
irrespective of performance on all other fifteen indicators.  
 Like the other MCA selection indicators, the WGI indicators are positively correlated 
with a country’s income levels, as measured by GDP per capita.  In theory, this relationship 
would suggest that countries with higher per capita incomes would have higher than median 
WGI scores and a greater chance of qualifying relative to poorer countries.  As described earlier, 
some interagency group members were troubled by this income bias.  Results of MCA’s 
qualification process shows that their concern was warranted.  Among the low-income group (72 
countries per year, on average), qualifying countries have higher GNI per capita on average than 
countries failing to qualify for every year of selection between 2004 and 2012 (see Figure 
4.11).23  The pattern is the same for countries passing and failing the Ruling Justly WGI 
                                                
23 This period was chosen for analysis because in 2013 MCC substantially revised its qualification criteria. The 
Ruling Justly category changed for the first time. The WGI Voice & Accountability index was substituted with the 
Freedom of Information index.  The new index is a product of Freedom House and the Open Net Initiative.  Also, it 
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indicators (see Appendix B for methodology and data). Countries that score below the median on 
all four of the WGI indicators—and thus fail to qualify for MCA assistance—have lower GNI 
per capita, on average as a group, than countries that score above the median on at least one WGI 
indicator.  The differences are substantial.  In 2004, the average GNI per capita of countries 
scoring above the median on at least one Ruling Justly WGI indicator was 47 percent higher than 
countries failing all four Ruling Justly WGI indicators. On average, across the nine years 
examined, countries scoring above the median on at least one Ruling Justly WGI indicator had a 
GNI per capita 34 percent higher than those countries failing all four indicators.  In none of the 
selection years was the average GNI per capita of the group that scored below the median on all 
four Ruling Justly WGI indicators higher than countries that passed at least one WGI Ruling 
Justly indicator (see Figure 4.12).  Because many statutorily prohibited countries, like Myanmar 
and Zimbabwe, also perform poorly on the WGI and have low incomes, their exclusion from 
qualification could influence the results.  The analysis was repeated without prohibited countries 
and no significant change in the results was found. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
was no longer essential that a country score above the median on at least half of the ruling justly indicators.  A 
country could score above the median on at least half of all indicators, irrespective of which category the indicators 
were in, and still qualify.  They would still need to pass the Control of Corruption hard hurdle and a new hurdle was 
introduced – a country must score above the median on at least one of the two original Freedom House indicators.  
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Figure 4.11. Differences in GNI Per Capita among Low-Income Countries Qualifying or 
Failing to Qualify for the MCA 
 
Source: Based on author’s calculations of MCA performance data.  GNI per capita data taken from the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Development Indicators.  
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Figure 4.12. Differences in GNI Per Capita among Low-Income Countries Passing or 
Failing the WGI 
 
Source: Based on author’s calculations of MCA performance data.  GNI per capita data taken from the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Development Indicators.  
 
The story is different for the lower-middle income group.  Differences in GNI per capita 
among this group were far more muted (see Figure 4.13).  The greatest gap was in the first year 
these relatively richer countries were considered for MCA assistance. 24  In 2006 the average 
GNI per capita among lower middle-income countries scoring above the median on at least one 
Ruling Justly WGI indicator was 11 percent higher than those countries scoring below the 
median on all four.  In general, qualifying lower middle-income countries were not substantially 
richer than non-qualifiers (see Appendix B, Table B-2).  Over the seven-year period analyzed, 
                                                
24 The analysis for lower middle-income countries spans seven years, from 2006 to 2012.  This is because lower 
middle-income countries were not considered for assistance until two years after MCA began evaluating countries 
for funding in 2004.  
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qualifying lower middle-income countries had, on average, a GNI per capita five percent higher 
than non-qualifiers.  Meanwhile, countries that scored below the median on all four Ruling Justly 
WGI indicators had essentially the same GNI per capita as those that did not (see Figure 4.14).  
Like the analysis for low-income countries, the analysis for lower middle-income countries was 
repeated with prohibited countries excluded and the results were likewise not significantly 
different. 
 
Figure 4.13. Differences in GNI Per Capita among Lower Middle-Income Countries 
Qualifying or Failing to Qualify for the MCA 
 
Source: Based on author’s calculations of MCA performance data.  GNI per capita data taken from the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Development Indicators.  
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Figure 4.14. Differences in GNI Per Capita among Lower Middle-Income Countries 
Passing or Failing the WGI 
 
Source: Based on author’s calculations of MCA performance data.  GNI per capita data taken from the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Development Indicators.  
 
The significant differences in income between countries performing better and worse on 
the WGI in only the low-income country group demonstrate that the positive relationship 
between governance and income weakens as per capita incomes rise.  The Interagency Group’s 
decision to run separate competitions based on GNI per capita cutoffs mitigated, but did not 
eliminate, income bias.  Income bias was a substantial feature of MCA selection between 2004 
and 2012, especially among low-income countries, and the use of governance indicators, and the 
WGI in particular, contributed to it. 
The phenomenon of income bias was not unique to MCC; it was a broader feature of 
selectivity in official development assistance during this period.  While the Bush Administration 
was striving to establish and operationalize the MCA it was also advocating for a reform strategy 
in multilateral development banks’ concessional lending operations. Each bank has a fund for its 
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concessional lending portfolio, such as the World Bank’s International Development Association 
and Asian Development Bank’s Asian Development Fund (ADF), separate from non-
concessional funding. 25  Capital for these funds comes from wealthier multilateral development 
bank members such as the United States, France, and Japan (every four years the funds need to 
be replenished).  
The U.S. federal government is a major contributor to concessional programs.  This 
provides the U.S. leverage over how the funds are distributed.26  As Deputy Treasury Secretary 
Kenneth Dam said during a speech, “Since we are the biggest contributor to most of these 
institutions, and since the executive boards use weighted voting, we have considerable voice in 
whether, when, how much, and under what conditions they lend” (Dam, 2002).  The Bush 
Administration’s Treasury Department sought to use this leverage to enact three “sweeping 
reforms” in multilateral development bank concessional lending: 1) increase grant funding vis-à-
vis loans to the poorest countries; 2) link concessional window funding to the achievement of 
results; and 3) focus more IDA resources on key productivity-driving activities (Replenishment 
authorizations, 2002).  Together with the MCA, this focus on productivity-driven growth at the 
multilateral development banks was part of the Bush Administration’s economic growth agenda: 
“The President also noted importantly that this approach that we’re using in our bilateral 
assistance is also the same approach that we’re using in our so-called growth agenda or reform 
                                                
25 Concessional lending occurs on much more lenient terms including lower interest rates and longer repayment 
periods and is reserved for lower income countries or countries that face barriers to private sources of capital. A 
portion of this window’s funds is also distributed as grants that require no repayment. 
26 The US is not as significant a contributor when replenishments are examined relative to contributor countries’ 
GDP.  It is also the country that owed the most to the World Bank IDA and “routinely fails to make good on its 
MDB pledges”.  In 2002 the US was approximately $500 million in arrears to global MDBs (Morris, 2017). 
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agenda for the multilateral development banks, where we’re also trying to have a closer marriage 
between policies and contributions” (White House, 2002: 3).  
Emphasis on policies, which included institutions, meant increasing the weight given to 
governance in the multilateral development banks’ internal country assessment formulas (e.g., 
the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment). The Asian Development Bank 
and African Development Bank were looking to incorporate performance-based allocation 
systems similar to the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment into their concessional 
lending programs.  Such performance allocation systems were similar in spirit if not form to the 
MCA country selection system and were meant, like the MCA, to reward countries that had 
relatively better governance: “These systems provide more resources to those countries that 
improve governance and take steps to combat corruption, while those who do not take such steps 
receive fewer resources. For example, under the most recent replenishment of funds in IDA, 
seventeen countries will have their resource allocations reduced” (Combating Multilateral 
Development Bank Corruption, 2004).  
During negotiations for ADF’s eighth replenishment in 2004, the Asian Development 
Bank’s management agreed, at the behest of Treasury and other donor government officials, to 
place governance at the center of ADF’s allocation.  The effective weight of governance before 
the revision was 30 percent.  After ADB’s board and management revised the system, 
governance’s effective weight increased to 53 percent (ADB, 2004).  The ADF’s eighth 
replenishment was a US $7 billion dollar program to be distributed over a four-year period, from 
2005 to 2008, averaging US $1.75 billion a year (this was equal to Congressional appropriations 
for the MCA in 2006 and 2007).  Asian Development Bank managers anticipated an inequity in 
funding allocations of this amount as a result of the emphasis on governance performance and, 
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indeed, the strong performing group ended up receiving, on average, 5.2 times that of the 
weakest performing group (ADB, 2010).  ADB management did not necessarily anticipate, 
however, that this would also result in an inequality in allocations between relatively poorer and 
richer countries.  They later concluded: 
The amount of support to the poorest countries eligible only for ADF funding has 
declined since the system was introduced…While the amount distributed through the 
[performance based assessment] system grew by about 22%, differences across country 
groups are notable. In the first biennial period of ADF IX, $30 million less per year went 
to the poorest ADF-only countries.  This is equivalent to the average lending program for 
a country like Kyrgyz Republic or Lao People’s Democratic Republic…In contrast, the 
large blend countries have benefited greatly under the revised system—their combined 
annual program gained more than $200 million per year (ADB, 2008: 4).   
 
In the absence of the revised allocation system, the poorest countries would have received more 
(see Table 4.3).  This meant that funding was shifting away from countries like Cambodia, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Nepal, and Laos to countries like Bangladesh, Pakistan, and 
Vietnam (ADB, 2008).   
 
Table 4.3 
ADF Performance-Based Shares by Country Group, 2002–2008 
 
Source: Asian Development Bank (2008), Refining the Performance-Based Allocation of Asian 
Development Fund Resources, Manila: Asian Development Bank.  
 
The ADB concluded that “[t]he revisions to the PBA system were designed to strengthen 




stabilized (Table 3). However, the largest countries gained in every period, with their share 
increasing from 57% to nearly 64%. As a comparison, consider what would have occurred in the 
abs nce of performance differences: if only popula ion and GNI p r capita differenc s affected 
the allocation shares, the poorest ADF countries would receive about 24%, while the largest 
would receive 56%—close to the shares that prevailed during ADF VIII. 
 
2. Effect of Policy Changes on Allocation Trends 
12. The revisions to the PBA system were designed to strengthen the link between 
performance and allocation. Individually, the changes tended to divert resources away from the 
poorest countries. Taken together, they created a wide gap between the share of resources 
going to the poorest countries and the share going to the large blend borrowers. 
 
13. The original PBA system had limits on the size of changes in allocations—the so-called 
collar—to avoid large fluctuations that would disrupt country programming.10 While preventing 
abrupt shifts in allocations, the limits also delayed the transition to a full PBA system. All of the 
poorest countries benefited from the collar in some years of ADF VIII, with Cambodia, Kyrgyz 
Republic, and Lao People’s Democratic Republic benefiting every year. On the other hand, 
allocations for Bangladesh and Pakistan, two of the large blend countries, were held down by 
the collar in some years, as the increase would have exceeded the upper limit. If the original 
system had not included the collar, the share of the poorest countries would have been about 
18% during ADF VIII, which is still greater than their actual 2005–2006 shares. This suggests 
that removal of the collar is not the sole explanation for the observed allocation trends. 
 
14. During the time that ADB has applied PBA, the measurement of country performance 
has evolved (Appendix 3). The performance of the poorest countries has generally risen, but not 
as rapidly as the largest blend countries. Differences in performance ratings among country 
groups are relatively small. However, under the new formula these small differences are 
magnified, which reduces the allocations to the poorest borrowers, other things being equal. 
                                                
10 The collar refers to upper and lower limits on the change in a country’s allocation compared with its historical 
lending average in order to smooth year-to-year changes in allocations. For 2002 and 2003, the range of the collar 
was 85%–115% of a country’s 5-year historical lending average. The collar for 2004 had a wider range: 75%–
125% of the 3-year historical average.  
Tabl  3: Perform nce-Based Allocation Shares by Country Group, 2002–2008 
(%) 
 
 Allocation Share  Difference from Previous Period
Country Group 2002–2004 2005–2006 2007–2008  2005–2006 2007–2008 
Pacific a 4.5 4.5 4.5  0.0 0.0 
ADF Only 24.9 22.0 21.1  (2.9) (0.9) 
Poorest 21.0 16.9 16.9  (4.1) (0.1) 
Other 3.9 5.1 4.3  1.2 (0.8) 
Blend 70.6 73.5 74.4  2.9 0.9 
Largest 57.1 60.6 63.7  3.6 3.1 
Other 13.6 12.9 10.7  (0.7) (2.2) 
PBA Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  0.0 0.0 
( ) = negative value, ADF = Asian Development Fund, PBA = performance-based allocation. 
a Pacific group includes the set aside for Timor-Leste of $10 million on average per year since 2007–2008. 
Source: Asian Development Bank. 
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resources going to the poorest countries and the share going to the large blend borrowers” (ADB, 
2008: 5). In negotiations for the ninth ADF replenishment in 2008, the ADB made adjustments 
to the performance allocation system to counter this decline to poorer countries.  The result was a 
fairer distribution of ADF resources with respect to countries’ per capita incomes (ADB, 2010).  
A Global Underclass. Unlike the Asian Development Bank’s board and management, 
the MCC Board of Directors and management never undertook a similar review of potential 
income bias in its allocations.  The only path towards qualification for relatively lower income 
countries was to leapfrog and sizably outperform their wealthier and already higher scoring 
peers.  This required, at least in part, transforming institutions, economic policies, and human 
capital investment patterns.27  Douglass North believed, however, that institutions are path 
dependent, prone to reproduce themselves, and obstinate to change.  A reversal of institutional 
paths is possible, but usually requires a massive shift in the structure of the state and norms 
governing the polity: “While the rules may be changed overnight, the informal norms usually 
change only gradually. Since it is the norms that provide ‘legitimacy’ to a set of rules, 
revolutionary change is never as revolutionary as its supporters desire and performance will be 
different than anticipated” (North, 1994: 366).   
Countries’ WGI scores over time appear to corroborate North’s conclusions.  Based on an 
analysis of countries’ changes in WGI scores over a one-decade period, 2000 to 2009, roughly 
equivalent to the analysis of MCA qualification outcomes above, Kaufmann and Kraay 
concluded that “changes in our estimates of governance in most countries are relatively small” 
(Kaufmann et al., 2011: 234).  In fact, over this period, less than ten percent of all countries in 
                                                
27 Since governance indicators are based on perceptions, one could presumably just run a campaign to alter the 
impressions of a country’s institutions among the diverse actors populating the polls and surveys that measure 
governance but this could also be challenging, costly, and lead to accusations of “gaming the indicators.” 
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the WGI database recorded a statistically significant change in governance scores (Kaufmann et 
al., 2011).  Moreover, not all these changes were improvements.  Changes were about equally 
divided between improvements and deteriorations in scores setting up a zero-sum competition 
between countries, which is a feature of indicators like the WGI (Espeland & Sauder, 2007).  
Kaufmann and Kraay graphically represented this phenomenon using scatterplots of countries’ 
scores accompanied by two trend lines (see Figure 4.15). 
 
Figure 4.15. Scatterplot Comparison of Countries' 2000 and 2009 WGI Voice and 
Accountability Estimates 
 
Source:  Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2011). The worldwide governance indicators: 
methodology and analytical issues. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 3(2), 220–246. 
Notes: For each indicator, the trend lines almost completely overlap, demonstrating that statistically 
significant changes over this period were rare. 
 
Limited changes in WGI scores over time mean that initial scores risk locking countries 
into either a qualifying or non-qualifying track—the same countries will keep qualifying or 
failing year after year.  Because WGI performance is correlated with income, this means that 
over time relatively richer countries will keep qualifying for funds and relatively poorer 
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Mauritania, Eritrea, Djibouti, Cambodia, Laos, Papua New Guinea, among others, failed to 
qualify in every year between 2004, the first year of the MCA competition, and 2012.  
Meanwhile MCC has had a hard time finding new qualifying countries.  The agency has resorted 
to signing additional compacts with countries that already received them because so few new 
countries qualify.  This is not something the agency ever envisioned doing (Rose & Wiebe, 
2015a).  
These and other similarly “poorly” performing countries represent a new global 
underclass.  The MCA interagency group elevated conservative philosophies around poverty in 
the US to a global scale.  While the economic policy community’s efforts reversed an 
accelerating downward trend of US bilateral ODA during the 1990s, its strategy ensured that the 
money would only go to those countries governance indicators deemed deserving.  Countries that 
failed to measurably demonstrate a culture of “self help” through improvements in governance 
were deemed undeserving (Katz, 2013). 
Conclusion 
This chapter described how following the 27th G8 Summit in Genoa, the Bush 
administration found itself in a conundrum. At the international level, it was faced with calls to 
increase development financing for relatively lower-income countries.  Domestically, it faced 
rising skepticism around the benefits of foreign aid, particularly by conservatives who happened 
to occupy many White House offices, key Cabinet posts, and control Congress.  It described how 
NSC officials came to settle on selectivity—spending foreign aid in countries where it will be 
most effective—as a strategy for simultaneously increasing development finance budgets and 
curbing criticism based on World Bank econometric research.  They knew little, however, about 
exactly how to select these countries.   
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The research presented here showed how a group of Treasury economists, led by Steven 
Radelet who had strong ties to World Bank economists and the Center for Global Development, 
solved the NSC’s selectivity challenge.  In doing so, economic experts proactively presented a 
solution—targeting countries based on “objective” and “transparent” governance (among other) 
indicators—that put them in charge of shaping the details of the MCA country selection 
system.  The NSC, in turn, gained more freedom to move forward with its new aid initiative in 
an unreceptive environment. This chapter also described how the road to selectivity by indicators 
was not an entirely smooth process. Treasury economists and their economic policy partners in 
the NSC faced opposition from the foreign policy community and had to engage in the kind of 
political work often believed to be the reserve of politicos to overcome resistance.   
Finally, the chapter presented evidence of the political ramifications of a selectivity 
strategy based on World Bank governance indicators.  The WGI did not eliminate bias in the 
selection of countries for funding as the economic policy community claimed, but rather 
introduced the biases of an assemblage of actors such as survey instrument writers and 
responders, World Bank research economists, and Treasury economists into bilateral aid 
decisions. These new biases affected how decisions were made, such as the dismissal of 
countries’ unique institutional circumstances, and funds were distributed, such as disfavoring 
relatively lower-income countries.  
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Chapter 5: The Power of Growth Diagnostics in Development Planning 
Introduction 
This second case examines the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC) use of 
growth diagnostics to determine what is included in multi-million dollar development grants to 
country governments.  Three Harvard university economists devised a decision-tree framework 
and a set of data-driven empirical tests to determine what specific constraints limit a country's 
level of private investment.  This approach was a reaction to dissatisfaction with the 
shortcomings of prescriptive structural adjustment programs.  MCC began using growth 
diagnostics after having already developed nearly 20 bilateral aid agreements, or compacts, with 
partner countries in a more ad-hoc fashion and relying on existing planning vehicles such as 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.  This chapter describes how MCC economists were able to 
adapt growth diagnostics for compact development purposes and why the agency eventually 
adopted the method.  It discusses how the rationale driving growth diagnostics was at odds with 
a more political-economic and social justice oriented approach to development and what form 
this tension took inside the organization. It goes on to compare the process and outcomes of 
MCC’s earlier compact development process and outcomes with the process and outcomes for 
developing 14 compacts using growth diagnostics.  The chapter closes by providing evidence of 
how growth diagnostics contributed to changes in organizational power relations and outcomes 
such as the distribution of funding across sectors, space, and project types. 
Growth Diagnostics in Perspective 
Origins of Growth Diagnostics: Harvard’s Kennedy School. Growth diagnostics is a 
methodology pioneered by three economists—Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrik, and Andres 
Velasco—at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government.  They continued a 
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long tradition of Harvard University involvement in development issues.  Rodrik is the most 
well-known due in part to having published a popular book titled One Economics, Many 
Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth (Rodrik, 2009). He has a doctorate in 
economics from Princeton University and is the only one of the three to have not served as a 
senior government official.  Rodrik is currently Ford Foundation Professor of International 
Political Economy at the Kennedy School.  Ricardo Hausmann has a doctorate in economics 
from Cornell University and is the Professor of the Practice of Economic Development and 
Director of the Kennedy School’s Center for International Development.  He was previously the 
Inter-American Development Bank’s chief economist and Venezuela’s Minister of Planning 
from 1992 to 1993.  Andres Velasco, also a Latin American, has a doctorate in economics from 
Columbia University and was Professor of Development and International Finance at the 
Kennedy School from 2000 to 2011.  He was Chile’s Finance Minister from 2006 to 2010.  
Harvard’s involvement in contemporary international development can be traced back to 
the Development Advisory Service, also known as the Harvard Advisory Group, which Edward 
S. Mason established in 1962 at the then Harvard Center for International Affairs.  The Advisory 
Group consisted of a small circle of approximately ten economists that counseled newly 
independent countries on economic planning (Gordon, 1963).  The Harvard Advisory Group 
would later be converted into the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID).  
Dwight Perkins was HIID’s first president.  Jeffrey Sachs, an important figure in contemporary 
debates in development economics and an influential policy advisor to the United Nations, took 
over in 1995.  The HIID produced over 700 Development Discussion Papers and a number of 
policy analysis products such as the Global Competitiveness Report, a methodology focused on 
firms’ and enterprises’ impressions of country governance and operating conditions.  The HIID 
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was dissolved in 1999 and Sachs formed the Center for International Development at the 
Kennedy School.  The Center for International Development is now Harvard’s hub for 
international development and the institutional home for Rodrik, Hausmann, and Velasco 
(HRV).  They all teach in its Masters in Public Administration / International Development 
(MPA/ID) degree program.  In conjunction with the Kennedy School, the Center for 
International Development created the MPA/ID to train those seeking careers in international 
development.  The faculty “was dominated by eminent development macroeconomists” and the 
degree focused on “PhD level economic theory” and “hard mathematics” (Blattman, 2008).  The 
Center for International Development is also focused on research.  It has solicited over 300 
working papers from across Harvard, conducts policy evaluations, and established the Growth 
Lab where growth diagnostics have been conducted for at least 10 countries.  
Growth Diagnostics and the (Post-) Washington Consensus. In 1989 John 
Williamson, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (a Washington-
based think tank) who coined the term Washington Consensus convened a conference with 
reformers from ten Latin American countries at the Peterson Institute to “convince a skeptical 
Washington that policies were indeed changing” (Williamson, 2003).  The Washington 
Consensus was originally a synopsis of policy reforms introduced by economists and economic 
policy officials from these Latin American governments. The Consensus was adopted and 
adapted by influential development institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
World Bank, United States Treasury (Treasury), and Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB).  Rightly or wrongly, Williamson’s synopsis became synonymous with these 
institutions’ approach to structural adjustment lending and policy programming that included 
administrative requirements of conditionality that made funding disbursements contingent on 
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country governments executing a set of economic, policy, and institutional reforms.  
The Washington Consensus approach to policy reform for growth and development 
resulted in widespread disappointment and in some cases outright protest.  These reforms aimed 
at macroeconomic stability and market liberalization were explicitly directed at reviving growth 
but implicitly geared towards resolving the Third World debt crisis that emerged at the end of the 
1970s (Vasquez, 1996).  Evidence would later show that reforms were more successful at 
ensuring debts were repaid than reviving growth.  The 1980s would come to be known as Latin 
America’s “lost decade”, the Washington Consensus approach to development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa actually retarded growth, and the IMF recommendations to eliminate capital controls in 
South East Asia exacerbated the Asian financial crisis (Van De Walle, 1999).  
Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco developed growth diagnostics as a direct response to the 
embattled Washington Consensus set of policy reforms popular in the 1980s and 1990s.  Many 
economists, including proponents of a growth diagnostic approach to reform, agree that the ten 
reforms laid out by Williamson can go a long way towards spurring growth.28  Their problem is 
less with the specific reform program per se than the way a set of reform experiences from select 
Latin American countries became a standardized prescription for policy reform across the globe 
(Hausmann, Rodrik, & Velasco, 2004; Headey, 2009).  Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco also felt 
that the program tried to do too much all at once without any process of comparing or 
prioritizing reforms.  Dani Rodrik described it as “doing as much reform as you can, the best as 
                                                
28 This reform program argued that: 1) Budget deficits should be small enough to avoid inflation; 2) public 
expenditure should be allocated efficiently; 3) taxes should be drawn from a broad base and cut when possible; 4) 
interest rates should be determined by liberalized financial markets; 5) exchange rates should be unified to increase 
exports; 6) trade restrictions should be lifted and tariffs lowered; 7) barriers to FDI should be abolished; 8) state 
enterprises should be privatized; 9) regulations that restrict market entry or competition should be eliminated; and 
10) private property right should be established and secured (Williamson, 2004). 
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you can” (Rodrik, 2009). The diagnostic approach aims to select the “binding constraint” to 
growth and is meant to take a country’s context, or unique economic environment, into account.  
It also prioritizes among multiple constraints by estimating the “growth dividend” derived from 
the removal of various constraints.  Rodrik stated, “Rarely will the advisor ask whether the 
problem at hand constitutes a truly binding constraint on economic growth, and whether the long 
list of institutional reforms on offer are well targeted at the economy’s present needs.  But 
governments are constrained by limits on their resources … They have to make choices” 
(Rodrik, 2009: 5).  
The Mechanics of a Growth Diagnostic 
The Decision Tree. The growth diagnostic relies on a decision tree framework.  A 
decision tree is a pre-structured decision-making template that allows organizational actors to 
structure choices, specify alternatives, and identify outcomes all while respecting the logic of 
causality (Cabantous et al., 2010).  As an analytical tool, the decision tree has been around for 
decades and is not unique to growth diagnostics.  Its roots can be found in the field of decision 
analysis that emerged in the 1960s as a discipline distinct from decision theory, system 
modeling, and operations research.  Decision analysis is built on two main foundations. The first 
is the Bayesian School of probability. The second is the economic approach of utility 
measurement (Headey, 2009).  According to Rodrik, the growth diagnostic “sketches a 
systematic process for identifying binding constraints and prioritizing policy reforms in 
multilateral agencies and bilateral donors” (Rodrik, 2009: 35). How a decision tree is populated 
is important.  A decision tree starts off “naked”.  It gets “dressed” as theory is added to guide 
questions and data is added to answer them (Cabantous et al., 2010).  While Rodrik emphasizes 
that diagnostics require eclecticism in both the use of theory and evidence and have no room for 
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dogmatism, ultimately the theories and data chosen for the exercise express a distinctive 
rationale for what is possible by how they define problem(s), diagnose causes, and identify 
solutions.   
The ultimate goal of growth diagnostics is to increase the rate and level of growth via 
private investment and entrepreneurship.  The growth diagnostic decision tree heuristic is used to 
diagnose the problem of low private investment by conducting a battery of data-driven, empirical 
tests.  Figure 5.1 illustrates the growth diagnostic framework. 
 
Figure 5.1. Growth Diagnostic Decision Tree 
 
Source: Hausmann, R., Rodrik, D., & Velasco, A. (2008). Growth diagnostics. The Washington consensus 
reconsidered: Towards a new global governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
In the decision-tree represented in Figure 5.1, the “High cost of finance” branch 
represents constraints that are related to relatively high interest rates that prevent returns on 
investment and low capital accumulation rates that in turn stunt growth.  This can be due to 
slightly, we can interpret  as the rate of interest relevant for investment 
decisions in the economy in question. In turn, this could be connected to
two kinds of policy problems:
• Bad international finance: country risk is too high, foreign direct invest-
ment conditions are unattractive, debt maturity and denomination increase
macro risk, there remain excessive regulations on the capital account, etc.
• Bad local finance: when domestic capital markets work badly, collateral
cannot be aggregated properly among domestic borrowers (Caballero and Krish-
namurthy 2003) and the risk of banking crises and nonpayment rises. Both of
these increase the cost of capital, especially foreign capital.
Low Private Return to Domestic Investment
The other component of the growth equation is given by the pri-
vate expected return on domestic investment, given by r (1 – ). A low such
return can be due to
• high  : high tax rates and/or inefficient tax structure and/or high 
expected expropriation risk
• high  : large externalities, spillovers, coordination failures
• low a: low productivity, too little technology adoption or “self-
discovery,” weak public incentives
• low x: insufficient human capital, inadequate infrastructure, high trans-
port, telecommunications or shipping costs
Moving Down the Multilemma
The logical structure of the analysis can be portrayed in the form
of a decision tree, shown in figure 2.1. The tree naturally organizes the pol-
icy questions, which can be asked in logical order. 
Is the problem one of inadequate returns to investment, inade-
quate private appropriability of the returns, or inadequate access to 
finance? If it is a case of low returns to investment, is that due to insuffi-
cient supply of complementary factors of production (such as human capi-
tal or infrastructure)? Or is it due to poor access to appropriate technolo-
gies? If it is a case of poor appropriability, is it due to high taxation, 
poor property rights and contract enforcement, labor-capital conflicts, or
learning externalities?
Or alternatively: if it is a case of poor finance, are the problems
with domestic financial markets or external ones?
G R O W T H  D I A G N O S T I C S 65 66 C H A P T E R  T W O
Moving down the branches of the decision tree is tantamount to
discarding candidates for the most binding constraint on growth. The over-
arching lesson from our theoretical analysis is that it is this constraint, once
identified, that deserves the most attention from policymakers. 
COUNTRY EXPERIENCES: IDENTIFYING
THE BINDING CONSTRAINTS
We now have a framework to think of growth diagnostics. In this
section we apply our approach to three countries with three very different
growth experiences: Brazil, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic.
The first two countries have had lackluster growth in spite of quite
impressive reforms. The last had a sustained period of very rapid growth
triggered by rather modest reforms, but more recently has stumbled into a
financial crisis from which it has had difficulty extricating itself fully.
Both Brazil and El Salvador made major efforts at dealing with
their perceived problems during the 1990s. Brazil returned to democracy in
the 1980s, started opening up its economy in the early 1990s, stopped











































Problem: Low levels of private investment and entrepreneurship
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either “bad international finance” where the country is too “risky” and is having trouble 
attracting capital from outside or “bad local finance” where the risks of moral hazard and adverse 
selection increase or savers are not being linked to borrowers (i.e., poor intermediation).  The 
other major branch of the tree—“Low return to economic activity”—represents constraints that 
are less about attracting capital than generating “expected” private returns on that capital, or 
enough profits.  Under that branch,  “Low social returns” refers to: i) insufficient human capital 
(e.g., skilled people) to generate returns on an investment; ii) inadequate infrastructure, such as 
electricity or roads, that makes investing more costly and therefore drives down profits; and iii) 
poor geography (e.g., isolation) as exhibited by high logistical transaction costs that hamper 
profits. 
The other constraint to growth is “Low appropriability” or the capacity of the firm to 
maximize profits from its added value.  One aspect that limits appropriability is government 
failures. These are viewed as actions actively taken or avoided by the government that affect 
firms’ profits (e.g., bribes, poorly defined property rights, or high taxes).  The others are 
government failures in the macro economy such as high national debt and poor monetary policy, 
both of which can lead to inflation or currency depreciation and affect firms’ savings.  Low 
appropriability can also be affected by market failures such as the inability to identify and 
generate productive activities within a particular context.  
A slide from an MCC presentation (see Figure 5.2) from its Economic Analysis 
department shows what the agency believes to be some common examples of growth constraints  
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Figure 5.2. MCC Examples of Growth Constraints 
 
Source: Wiebe, F. (2007, March 19). Economic Analysis in the MCC. Presentation delivered at MCC-
University. Washington, DC: Millennium Challenge Corporation. 
 
Multiple schools of economic thought are captured in Figure 5.2.  This is something that growth 
diagnostics’ creators advocated and hoped for (Headey, 2009).  The first two bullet points on 
investment in infrastructure and human capital represent a renewed role for public provision of 
public goods.  The third and forth bullet points represent recent thinking on institutions and their 
importance to growth and development.  The bullet point on macroeconomic stability represents 
the continued emphasis on approaches important to promoters of the Washington Consensus. 
 To narrow-down possible constraints to growth, analysts eliminate constraints they feel 
do not apply a particular country’s case based on prior research or analysis and then conduct tests 
on the remaining candidates.  Ricardo Hausmann and others at Harvard published a guide to 
doing growth diagnostics called a “Mindbook” where they outlined four diagnostic tests.  As 
they put it, “No single test or symptom is clearly definitive…A differential diagnosis requires the 
application of several tests, which are collected and aggregated in the proper Bayesian 
5 
Examples of root causes of 
constrained growth 
Ø  Not low productivity in rural areas, but 
instead, perhaps 
v Poor roads 
v Poorly-defined property rights 
v Poorly-functioning input and product markets (why?) 
Ø  Not inadequate access to finance, but 
instead, perhaps 
v An uncompetitive financial sector 
v Poor technical capacity of banks 
v Macroeconomic risk raising domestic cost of capital 
More examples of growth constraints: 
Ø  Underinvestment in critical public goods (e.g., transportation 
infrastructure) 
Ø  Inadequate investment in human capital (e.g., health, education) 
Ø  Specific public policies that distort or undermine incentives for private 
investment 
Ø  Limited effectiveness of government institutions providing the 
foundation for private economic activity 
Ø  Macroeconomic instability 
Ø  Important, well-documented market failures (e.g., related to 
information provision) 
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framework” (Hausmann, Klinger, & Wagner, 2008: 31).  The four tests for each potential 
constraint analyze: 1) the constraint’s (shadow) price; 2) the relationship of the constraint to 
investment and growth levels; 3) private actors’ response to the constraint; and 4) how 
“intensive” actors are in the constraint (Hausmann et al., 2008).  Each of these will be discussed 
in detail later. 
MCC Compact Development: The Early Years  
MCC began adopting growth diagnostics for compact development, or designing bilateral 
investment treaties with partner country governments, about half a decade after its inception in 
2009.  Before MCC began using the growth diagnostic, the agency designed nearly twenty 
bilateral investment agreements, or compacts.  Early compacts were developed in an ad hoc way 
among MCC senior officials, sector specialists, and a partner government’s “core team” 
comprised of officials from the Prime Minister’s office and various ministries. Country proposals 
for compact funding were often informed by or directly based on Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSP), a vehicle for donor assistance governed jointly by the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, and the country government using varying degrees of civil society input.  Senior 
officials and MCC economists were uneasy with this informal approach to compact 
development, albeit for different reasons, that produced compacts with many disjointed parts 
from country proposals full of “pork barrel” spending.  Economists also felt that MCC-sector 
officials were not objective in their negotiations with the core team and steered projects towards 
their own sectors. 
Planning Without Diagnostics: “Making the Sausage.” Prior to growth diagnostics, or 
constraints analyses (CA) as MCC called them, there were four general parts to the compact 
development process: country visits, project development, compact negotiation, and project 
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appraisal, or “due diligence” (see Figure 5.3).  Different actors in the organization played 
different roles in these processes.  Country team leaders, senior officials, and sector specialists 
dominated country visits.  An MCC delegation consisting of the CEO and/or other senior 
officials such as Vice Presidents and senior sector specialists visited their core team 
counterparts—a group of senior ministry and other government officials set up by the country’s 
President or Prime Minister.  It was common for trips to take place every two to three months 
over a 1 to 2 year process.  In general, MCC senior officials dominated early trips.  
 
Figure 5.3. Early Compact Development Process 
 
Source: MCC (2005b). Working with MCC: Overview of Steps and Processes. Washington, DC:  
Millennium Challenge Corporation.  






The following chart illustrates the various stages of the MCC Compact development processes. 
 
 
    






















Opportunity Memorandum: This document describes the country’s proposed MCC program, including an 
initial assessment of whether it has promise and effectively reflects basic MCC principles (poverty reduction, 
growth impact, consultative process, measurable results, etc.).  The Opportunity Memorandum makes a 
recommendation to the Investment Committee to deploy MCC resources to conduct a full and detailed due 
diligence exercise on those elements of the proposed program that merit due diligence.   
 
Due Diligence: Due diligence will focus on, inter alia, the country’s strategy for economic growth and poverty 
reduction; the consultative process; any policy reform plans; what is expected to be achieved; how progress will 
be measured; the merits and risks of each component of the program; fiscal accountability; monitoring and 
evaluation; donor coordination; the beneficiaries, disaggregated by income level, gender and age, where 
practical, and environmental and social (including gender, resettlement, indigenous people, etc.) safeguards.   
 
Consultation Memorandum: The Consultation Memorandum makes a recommendation to the Investment 
Committee that MCC commence consultations with Congress.  Such 15 day consultation period is required 
under MCC’s authorizing legislation prior to the start by MCC of negotiations of a Compact with an eligible 
country. 
 
Investment Memorandum: The Investment Memorandum serves as the basis for decision making and, as 
such, describes the proposed terms of the Compact, provides an analysis of the program (based on the results of 
the due diligence) and makes a recommendation to the Investment Committee that MCC complete negotiations 
with the country over the text and terms of the Compact document.   
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The initial trip was usually a diplomatic formality where the delegation would describe 
how MCC working principles were similar to or different from other United States (US) 
government agencies and international donors. Sector specialists joined on subsequent trips.  On 
these trips and the periods in-between, the outline of the proposal would take shape through 
iterative, interactional project development negotiation.  In later trips, other technical staff from 
Economic Analysis, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), and Environmental and Social 
Assessment (ESA), usually after the outlines of a proposal had been developed, would visit their 
counterparts. The technical staff’s trips were usually focused on identifying and collecting data 
for various project appraisal tasks such as identifying monitoring indicators, calculating 
economic rates of return (ERR), and developing environmental and social impact assessments.  
The economists would produce “Growth Reports”.  Growth reports focused on the 
macroeconomic situation in a country and how it might affect the compact. A growth report for 
Cape Verde asked questions such as “Are the ‘consensus’ views about growth constraints 
accurate and/or backed up by evidence?” (Warner, 2004: 2).  In answering that question, the 
report stated that “[m]any infrastructure deficiencies are also identified as ‘constraints’; the 
problem is that there is much less clarity about which of these are economical to remove…The 
local [core] team is well capable of identifying problems but seems to be trying to satisfy a donor 
checklist rather than providing any sort of growth analysis from which project priorities could be 
rationally derived” (Warner, 2004: 2).  These growth reports foreshadowed economists’ 
dissatisfaction with country proposals. 
Following the initial visits the core team was officially invited to submit a Compact 
Proposal outlining its development program.  Neither the exact compact amount nor content was 
known at that time, although the core team often had a general idea of what they were going to 
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include.  As compact development progressed the core team liaised with the MCC Transaction 
Team—a group of more junior technical and sector officials from sectors, ESA, M&E and other 
technical divisions led by a Transaction Team Leader.  There was regular telephone and 
electronic communication that included the sharing of documents, spreadsheets, and other 
program or project level data.  This process was often conducted under intense time pressure.  
One senior official referred to the process as a “SWAT team” approach, referring to the specially 
equipped and trained United States (US) law enforcement units reserved for high intensity and 
risky situations (Interviewee 2H, personal communication, March 2, 2016).  
 Negotiating a compact was a process that involved the core team deciding which projects 
to propose and the transaction team deciding which projects to fund. It was sometimes a 
downright disorderly process (Interviewee 2B, personal communication, February 11, 2016).  
Beyond MCC’s baseline requirements for environmental and social protection for things like 
endangered species and displaced populations, technical feasibility in the form of engineering 
guidelines, and economic rates of return, there was no structured decision-making framework.29  
There was considerable flexibility in what a country could propose and advocate for and limited 
guidance on what MCC would ultimately accept.  In the words of one senior MCC official, “In 
trying to come to some sort of agreement in the country, we had no good analytic tools for 
asking ‘does it make sense’?” (Interviewee 2P, personal communication, March 29, 2016).   
Countries would propose projects to be financed by MCC using the rationale they desired 
and proposals were often based on national development plans called Poverty Reduction Strategy 
                                                
29 A project’s economic rate of return (ERR) had to surpass a “hurdle rate” equal to two times the average growth 
rate in a country’s GDP over the most recent three years of data—but this was usually an afterthought. This 
formulation was amended in 2007 to include a minimum rate of 10 percent, applicable to slow-growing countries, 
and a maximum of 15 percent, to “protect” faster growing countries.  The current hurdle rate is 10 percent 
irrespective of the country (Rose & Wiebe, 2015a).  
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Papers (PRSP).  Local participation was an important component of compact development. The 
backlash against structural adjustment’s heavy-handed, top-down development approaches 
spurred new governing philosophies among development finance organizations (Best, 2014).  
This reformed approach was pioneered through the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(PRS), the mechanism that facilitated the creation of PRSPs.  At the time MCC was created, 28 
countries had already produced a PRSP and another 45 countries were in the process or near 
completion (Bretton Woods Project, 2003).  The PRSP outlines a national program for poverty 
reduction that is the foundation for lending programs with the World Bank and IMF.30  Six core 
principles underlie the development of poverty reduction strategies. Strategies should be: 1) 
country-driven; 2) results-oriented; 3) participatory; 4) comprehensive; 5) partnership oriented; 
and 6) focused on the long-term (Piron & Evans, 2004).  By “country-driven” and 
“participatory” the designers believed that strategies should represent a consensual view of what 
actions should be taken based on broad-based participation by all relevant stakeholders, 
including civil society institutions.    
The content of PRSPs was meant to serve as the assistance framework for external 
partners, including bilateral donors like the MCC.  This was referred to as donor alignment in the 
development assistance community.  Alongside multilateral development banks (MDB), the 
United States government and its major bilateral development agencies adopted the poverty 
reduction strategy’s principles of donor alignment and called it “Country Ownership”.  Country 
ownership means that partner country governments should exercise leadership in the design and 
                                                
30 Countries looking for debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative were required to produce a 
PRSP that would then require approval from the World Bank and IMF boards. The World Bank and IMF developed 
the PRSP approach as a response to evident weaknesses in relations between poor countries and the Bretton Woods 
Institutions—in particular a lack of focus on poverty and no country ownership of reforms (Bretton Woods Project, 
2003). 
  157 
implementation of their own national development strategies with meaningful participation from 
local stakeholders.  In particular, bilateral agencies should support the partner country’s 
leadership in these roles by closely aligning with local priorities (Rose, Kalow, Parks, & Masaki, 
2016).  The MCC always consulted a country’s PRSP, if available, and other national or sectoral 
planning documents when reviewing country proposals and developing compacts.  Among 
MCC’s first 19 compacts, 13 had some basis in the PRSP.  The other six had their basis, at least 
in part, in national development plans that usually included a poverty reduction focus and 
priorities similar to those found in PRSPs.   
Because PRSPs and these national plans were broad and, as some have critiqued, lacked 
focus or an emphasis on priorities, there were multiple ways a compact could be formulated and 
designed and still fit within the PRSP framework.  Some countries would use its PRSP as a 
rhetorical device while others would align their proposals very closely with ongoing PRSP or 
national planning exercises (Interviewee 2T, personal communication, April 5, 2016).  
Furthermore, MCC’s legislation required compact-eligible countries to conduct consultative 
processes specifically for compact development.  Like the PRSP consultations, these varied 
greatly from country to country and MCC’s experiences with them will be discussed later.  Thus, 
MCC’s project definition phase of compact development was an iterative process of 
development diplomacy and negotiation.    
Once an initial proposal was submitted, negotiations would begin and outcomes were 
contingent on context and strategy.  According to Whitfield (2009): “The outcomes of aid 
negotiations are the product of the encounter between recipient and donor preferences…the 
ability of each actor to successfully achieve their preferred outcomes is heavily constrained by 
the conditions under which each faces the other and the negotiation strategies they adopt” 
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(Whitfield, 2009: 38).  In the negotiation process at MCC, some of the key variables dictating 
whether MCC or the country would hold more sway included the specific transaction and core 
team members, diplomatic relations between the US and the partner country, and contextual 
factors specific to that country’s planning environment.  These factors determined a country’s 
“negotiating capital” (see Figure 5.4).  One senior sector specialist remarked, “Sometimes MCC 
would exercise a heavy hand…sometimes governments would have much more of a say in what 
was going to be funded” (Interviewee 2B, personal communication, February 11, 2016).   
 
Figure 5.4. Simplified Model of an Aid Negotiation 
 
Source: Whitfield, L. (2009). The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Another senior sector specialist compared these early compact negotiations at MCC to 
how legislation is made on Capitol Hill: “I know there were interests from many sides, and those 
interests coalesced around certain options.  I won’t tell you that there was no influence from the 
President or other political angles, but … politics is making the sausage. And the sausage 
Whitfield, Lindsay, ed. The Politics of Aid : African Strategies for Dealing with Donors. Oxford, GB: OUP Oxford, 2008. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 15 December 2016.
Copyright © 2008. OUP Oxford. All rights reserved. 
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sometimes was made in ways that we didn’t like too much, but it had to be made.  Otherwise 
things would not move forward” (Interviewee 2Q, personal communication, March 29, 2016).31   
The unstructured and informal nature of the compact development process made the 
economists and some senior officials uneasy.  There were three main concerns around country 
proposals in the early years.  The first was that the most powerful ministries in-country were 
dominating the process and presenting projects they favored.  One senior official rhetorically 
asked, “Politically important, politically connected, powerful people running the ministries, they 
get the largest donor financed projects, and guess whose projects show up first when MCC asks 
countries to propose stuff?” (Interviewee 2J, personal communication, March 15, 2016).  
The second main concern was that countries were proposing projects that other donors 
rejected, often because they didn’t make sense or were of dubious quality.  MCC officials, 
curiously, referred to these projects as “dogs”: “It wasn’t prevalent, but there were some 
countries that just threw dogs at MCC…What happened was some countries were very cynical 
about [the process] and just started throwing projects out there, some that had been rejected by 
the World Bank or USAID or by other big donors” (Interviewee 2J, personal communication, 
March 15, 2016). According to a senior official, “[the core team] would put out…a project that 
had been sitting on the shelf for a while, in some cases it hadn’t been done because it made no 
damn sense or because it was too complicated” (Interviewee 2P, personal communication, March 
29, 2016).  This phenomenon was not widespread but it occurred often enough to frustrate some 
senior MCC officials. It often fell to the transaction team leader, sector leaders, and their 
respective core-team counterparts to sort it all out and narrow the focus of the proposal.  
                                                
31 For an in-depth discussion of how some aspects of this negotiation unfolded see The Millennium Challenge 
Corporation and Ghana (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2009). 
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This led to the third main concern. Economists grew worried that sector specialists were 
engaging with the core team and “drumming up business” for their respective sectors 
(Interviewee 2F, personal communication, February 23, 2016).  According to one economist, on 
trips to countries sector specialists would assure their core team counterparts that their sectors or 
projects would be represented in the compact.  According to another MCC economist, “Very 
often [compact proposals] have contained a multitude of activities across several sectors, with no 
clear connection to the country’s key impediments to growth…MCC often felt compelled to 
invest resources in such proposals due to the time and political capital invested by the sponsor or 
preferences of MCC sector specialists” (Anderson, Breitbarth, & Osborne, 2010: 2).  They were 
also concerned about MCC funding projects resembling the proverbial “bridge to nowhere” 
(Rose & Wiebe, 2015b).  Economists accused sectors of engaging in “selection bias” that would 
lead to “pork barrel” spending (Warner, 2004).  They believed that pork barrel spending, in 
addition to being inherently wrong and inefficient, also detracted from economic growth and 
ultimately hurt the poor: “the political priority to use MCC grant funds may be very high but 
may be entirely unrelated to the most pressing problems that limit investment and growth in the 
country as a whole” (Rose & Wiebe, 2015b: 8).  
Summary of Early Compacts. This interactionist and iterative negotiation process led 
by senior officials and sector specialists resulted in MCC’s first set of 19 compacts signed 
between 2005 and 2009.  These compacts provided, on average, US $401 million to each 
selected country (all dollar figures throughout are in US 2015 constant terms).  Among these 
early compacts, the median compact provided US $354 million because a few compacts like 
Tanzania’s ($773 million) were much larger than others.  MCC committed over $7.2 billion in 
total across the 19 compacts.  These compacts represented 212 unique activities.  The typical 
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compact had three projects with each project having between four and five activities (see Table 
5.1).  Projects focused on an objective in a particular sector.  For example, a transport project 
might be oriented around reducing travel times and costs in a particular region of the country.  
The activities might include the construction of new roads, rehabilitation of existing roads, and 
the establishment of a road maintenance and safety fund.  
 
Table 5.1 
Basic Profile of First Nineteen Compacts, 2005–2009 
 Mean Median Min Max Total 
Number of Sectors 4.3 4 1 7 18 
Number of Projects 3.3 3 1 5 57 
Number of Activities 13 14 2 19 212 
Compact Funding ($) 401 354 76.1 787 7,218 
Project funding ($) 123 104 8.6 413 6,978 
Activity funding ($) 32.9 12.7 0.12 390 6,978 
Source: Compacts’ Summaries of Multi-Year Financial Plans. 
Notes: All dollar figures are in 2015 millions of dollars committed. Project and compact funding totals 
differ because compact funding includes general administrative and management costs.  First 19 compacts 
include those signed between 2005 and 2009: Armenia, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, El Salvador, 
Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nicaragua, Senegal, Tanzania, Vanuatu. 
 
Eighteen sectors were represented in the first set of compacts.  Among these 18 sectors 
were a total of 58 sectoral sub-activities.  The sector with the highest level of investment was 
Transport, followed by Agriculture, Water and Sanitation, and Land and Property Rights. These 
four sectors make up just over three-fourths of all funding among these compacts.  The 
remaining 13 sectors make up 24 percent. Exact figures and percentages are displayed in Table 
5.2. 
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Table 5.2 
Sector Distribution of First Nineteen Compacts 
Rank based on 
funding Sector Funding ($) 
Percent (%) of 
Total 
1 Transport 2,924,398,304 41.9 
2 Agriculture 1,555,610,617 22.3 
3 Water & Sanitation 496,281,544 7.1 
4 Land & Property Rights 323,866,864 4.6 
5 Energy 287,592,460 4.1 
6 Education 251,747,195 3.6 
7 Other - Multisector 221,744,696 3.2 
8 Banking & Financial Services 172,034,161 2.5 
9 Health 157,338,077 2.3 
10 Fishing 131,092,974 1.9 
11 Industrial Development 126,306,371 1.8 
12 Social Infrastructure & Services 110,999,082 1.6 
13 Business Development Services 83,858,836 1.2 
14 Tourism 75,219,899 1.1 
15 Education, level unspecified 37,014,052 0.5 
16 Forestry 15,872,319 0.2 
17 Government & Civil Society 5,923,527 0.1 
18 Reproductive Health 1,513,547 0.0 
 Total 6,978,414,526 100.0 
Source:  Compacts’ Summaries of Multi-Year Financial Plans. 
Notes: All figures in 2015 dollars. Total does not include funding for general management and 
administration. Sector and sub-activity definitions are taken from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 
While compacts with three or four projects or sectors and a dozen or so activities were 
typical, some compacts, such as the Morocco’s first compact, had as many as seven distinct 
sectors. The Lesotho Compact had nineteen activities across five sectors.  Compacts with several 
sectors and many different, sometimes disconnected, projects and activities came to be known as 
“Christmas Trees”. One transaction team leader said, “We came up with Christmas tree 
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compacts which are hellish to implement. A Christmas tree because you get seventeen different 
activities in three different sectors, some of which hang together, some of which don’t, but it’s 
what you get from the universal hundred things [the core team] wanted” (Interviewee 2R, 
personal communication, March 30, 2016).  The many activities of a compact represented the 
different ornaments on the tree.32  Most involved in compact development grew frustrated that 
after all this work a proposal still resulted in a Christmas tree compact.  MCC senior managers 
felt that the negotiation process of winnowing down proposals from long laundry lists (as early 
proposals were often called) was inefficient and wearisome. As a new agency with limited staff, 
the MCC implementation teams found it taxing to manage such compacts, especially within the 
mandated five-year implementation timeline.  The Christmas metaphor had another meaning as 
well—many of these compact projects and activities were more like gifts than thoughtful 
economic investments.  Some MCC officials and many economists believed that the different 
projects and activities were gifts to different ministers, government agencies, or sector interests.   
Stabilizing Constraints Analyses 
The Pitch: Constraints Analyses for “Enhanced Engagement.” Senior managers were 
looking for a solution to what was a laborious compact development effort—they wanted a way 
to quickly winnow proposals down into compacts. MCC economists pitched growth diagnostics, 
or constraints analysis, to bring an “objective” framework to this “politicized” process. They had 
a solution to MCC’s laundry list proposals, Christmas tree compacts, and laborious and ad-hoc 
compact development process.  A report by MCC’s economic analysis team put it thus: “These 
experiences highlighted the need for an objective framework to focus compact proposal 
                                                
32 American Christmas trees are known for their bountiful and often quirky ornaments, usually gathered over many 
years from various friends and family members.  While they all get added to the tree before the Christmas holiday, 
they don’t necessarily relate to each other or the tree’s presentation as a whole. 
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development.  The Growth Diagnostic approach, proposed by Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco 
(HRV), provides such a framework” (Anderson et al., 2010: 2).  MCC economist Ben Dennis 
proposed the following in a memo published on August 22, 2006:  
One of the ways in which Economic Analysis staff can better serve their transaction 
teams is to provide earlier guidance on both the types of projects for which financing 
should be considered and (later) the economic viability of proposed projects. Early 
guidance can avoid the waste of time and resources resulting from: (i) poor program 
design, and (ii) due diligence on projects that can be known to be untenable from the start 
(Dennis, 2006: 1).   
 
The economists called this diagnostic approach to compact development “Enhanced 
Engagement”.  They clearly felt that there needed to be an upfront framing of issues when MCC 
engaged a country. They argued to MCC senior officials that enhanced engagement through a 
constraints analysis would save transaction teams time and effort and improve proposal and 
compact quality by focusing the transaction team, core team, and the compact development 
process on growth. 
 While others at MCC were also interested and concerned about issues of growth, senior 
officials were primarily concerned with operational issues.  They were seeking a way to narrow 
the list of projects countries initially proposed to put “a little more rigor around the project 
identification process” (Interviewee 2J, personal communication, March 15, 2016).  Narrowing 
down the list of potential projects was a broader MCC organizational problem that demanded a 
solution.  One MCC economist recounted what an MCC Vice President at the time said of 
constraints analyses (CA): “Yes, we really need something like this, the constraints analysis can 
be very useful, it can help us get the dogs off the table” (Interviewee 2I, personal 
communication, March 4, 2016).  The economist suggested that the CA “gives MCC some 
rationale, it gives the appearance of objectivity, if you will. It’s a structured approach” 
(Interviewee 2I, personal communication, March 4, 2016, emphasis added).   
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The growth diagnostics’ creators claimed that through a Bayesian, data-driven process 
analysts could identify the most binding constraints to growth.  In early documents discussing 
the constraints analysis, MCC economists alluded to the CA’s ability to narrow priorities because 
they “[p]rovide guidance on the key constraints facing growth as soon as possible once eligibility 
has been determined so as to shape the proposal” (Dennis, 2006: 1, emphasis added).  This 
would solve an operational problem for MCC by providing what one senior official called a 
sieve through which to funnel projects.  One senior technical specialist suggested that the CA 
took a huge weight off of management’s shoulders: 
I’d say that pretty much there was a big sigh of relief that we had this analytical tool so 
we weren’t constantly engaging in political battles with our counterparts.  What I mean 
by that is they would put on the table projects A, B, C, and D and project B was 
something that no else would fund and project A was something that a very powerful 
minister and his cronies in the industry would want and you have to push back at that 
kind of politicization of choices.  In many ways the CA was a pure enough methodology 
so that it covered their asses as well as ours for the choices being made (Interviewee 2G, 
personal communication, February 26, 2016).    
 
MCC economists’ appeals to Harvard professors’ academic authority provided a source 
of legitimacy for constraints analysis work at MCC.  MCC economists developed links with 
growth diagnostics’ creators at the Kennedy School. Several MCC economists sought their 
counsel on the implementation of growth diagnostics at MCC and Ricardo Hausmann and MCC 
economists communicated regularly (Interviewee 2C, personal communication, February 18, 
2016).  MCC economists presented their work at a Kennedy School International Development 
Seminar and Ricardo Hausmann presented on growth diagnostics at MCC headquarters.  This 
legitimacy was sufficient for economists to gain senior officials’ consent. 
Building a Diagnosis 
Before we can understand how constraints analyses conflicted with other expert groups’ 
planning approaches and rationales we must understand how economists diagnose countries’ 
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constraints to growth.  There were three main, multifaceted steps to completing a constraints 
analysis: data collection, conducting tests, and report writing.  These steps involved identifying 
the CA team, desk research, work-planning sessions to organize data collection, running the tests 
on assembled data, discussing results, and writing the report.  This all required a considerable 
amount of human and technical resources that needed to be marshaled and maintained over 
several months.  
Human Resources. The CA was an economist-led process.  While early CAs left room 
for business leaders to shepherd the CA process, later MCC guidance emphasized the role of 
economists, “MCC expects that core teams will be staffed with an economist as early as is 
practical who will serve as the CA team leader” (MCC, 2013: 3).  For example, for El Salvador’s 
second compact Carlos Acevedo, President of El Savador’s Central Reserve Bank, led the 
Salvadoran CA team.  In Malawi, Alex Gomani, an economist at the Ministry of Finance and 
former deputy chief economist to President Hastings Banda, led the CA.  While there were 
exceptions to this, economist-led CA teams were the norm and notable local economists working 
in either government or academia carried out the technical work. 
MCC was one of, if not the, first development organizations to systematically incorporate 
growth diagnostics as a planning tool.  This was a US economic method that development 
agencies were quickly attempting to make a global standard. The overall framework was foreign 
even to many economists and especially those in MCC partner countries.  When MCC 
economists realized that partner countries’ core teams could not conduct CAs on their own, they 
employed recent MPA/ID graduates as consultants (Interviewee 2I, personal communication, 
March 4, 2016).  While these consultants were helpful in introducing the decision tree 
framework, gathering data sources, and keeping the process on schedule, additional intellectual 
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resources were still necessary for some of the analysis, interpretation, and writing.  For this, 
MCC drew on institutions with a long history of economic analysis—multilateral development 
banks.  Senior economists from the World, Asian, African, and other development banks often 
partnered with in-country core team members to conduct CAs and write CA reports.  
Despite the involvement of consultants and senior economists from other agencies, there 
were still usually anywhere from half a dozen to a dozen core team technical members involved.  
For example, Zambia had nine members and Liberia had eleven (Ministry of Finance and 
National Planning, 2010; National Millennium Compact Development Project, 2013).  While the 
Kennedy School and development bank consultants were doing the high-level framing and 
analytical work, local economists, along with their local sector colleagues, often served as data 
providers.  They carried out analyses too, but often in silos for specific diagnostic tree branches 
while the consultant or advisors steered the overall process.  These local economists were 
nonetheless a key part of the CA network.  They liaised with ministry staff, private sector and 
civil society groups, and academics, among others, to ensure that data were made available to the 
consultants and advisors. As an MCC economist put it, “The CA was not a desk exercise, you 
could not do a CA from DC alone. You needed the in-country data and experience to complete 
the CA” (Interviewee 2F, personal communication, February 23, 2016).  
Data (Re)sources. The CA is not explicitly quantitatively data-driven, but numbers are at 
its heart.  There is room and flexibility for qualitative analysis and narrative to enter the CA.  
Other economic reports such as PRSPs, relevant growth diagnostics, and donor-supported sector 
reviews are consulted and focus group discussions with targeted populations or places are also 
sometimes held.  In the end, however, the CA’s promoters believe that the four diagnostic tests 
Hausmann and his colleagues recommend in the Mindbook, supported by benchmarking, 
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surveys, and other data-driven approaches, “elevates the discussion above the usual discourse of 
opinions that are often more informed by narrow interests than empirical evidence” (MCC 
Department of Policy & Evaluation, 2010: 4). 
The CA includes not just economists and others conducting the analysis but the myriad 
data sources that form the foundation of its results. Broadly speaking, the CA requires 
information on levels, trends, and cross-country comparisons with resect to a variety of variables 
and parameters, on both the micro- and macroeconomic levels, as well as qualitative evidence 
indicating the presence of constraints” (MCC, 2009: 4).  Suggested macroeconomic variables 
included aggregate public and private investment, factor prices such as wages and interest rates, 
domestic and foreign savings levels and rates, inflation, fiscal balance, public debt, the trade 
balance, and the current account.  Suggested microeconomic variables included educational 
attainment levels, health of the labor force, borrowing and lending flows, quality of economic 
and political governance, the “cost of doing business”, and quantity and quality of infrastructure 
(MCC, 2009).  MCC guidance on conducting CAs included a 13 page Technical Annex that 
went into detail on these data sources for each possible constraint.  
My comprehensive review of 12 CAs from as many compact countries identified and 
classified each analysis’ primary and secondary data source.  This analysis resulted in 33 
individual sources, which are outlined in Appendix C along with the percent of analyses that 
relied on a particular source.  One unmistakable feature is the World Bank’s dominant role.  The 
World Bank is the primary data source for 33 percent of all analyses in CAs.33  This figure does 
not include some investment climate diagnostics that are funded by the World Bank such as the 
                                                
33 The World Bank relies heavily on local data sources to compile its databases and indicators.  Thus, distinguishing 
how “national” a “World Bank source” is can be impossible and perhaps unnecessary 
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Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic.  National government sources also play a dominant 
role contributing to about a quarter (23%) of all analyses.  This jumps to close to a third (31%) if 
national central banks are included.  The United Nations, despite its important global role, plays 
a marginal role at seven percent.  Two sources on “economic competitiveness”—the World 
Economic Forum and Economist Intelligence Unit—contribute almost as much as the whole UN 
system at six percent.  Scholars and think tanks make up less than four percent.   
It is more informative to understand the sources used for specific branches of the 
diagnostic tree (see Appendix C).  This is accomplished by linking data used for individual 
analyses to the branches, or constraints, they were meant to interrogate. One major data source is 
the International Monetary Fund and national central banks. This is unsurprising given these 
institutions’ historic role in macroeconomic and financial management.  They are the primary 
data source for possible constraints under the high cost of finance branch and for the constraint 
of macro risks.  Another data source that stands out, perhaps less obviously, is competitiveness 
surveys.  These include “enterprise”, “doing business”, and “executive opinion” surveys 
conducted primarily by the World Bank and World Economic Forum. Competitiveness surveys 
interview a range of small, medium, and large formal enterprises as well as foreign and 
multinational corporations operating in a country.  They are a dominant data source for analyzing 
micro risks, infrastructure, and information externalities as possible constraints to growth.  
Running Diagnostics. For each compact in development, the CA team analyzed this data 
and conducted diagnostic tests on plausible constraints to growth.  The CA used a variety of 
diagnostic tools, but MCC recommends one in particular: benchmarking.  Benchmarking a 
country against “similarly situated comparison countries” is part and parcel of the CA: “By 
assessing the country of interest against plausible comparator countries…we may identify 
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constraints to growth causing the country to lag behind its potential growth path” (MCC, 2013: 
5).  Benchmarking was used nearly half the time (47%) for all analyses in the CAs examined.  
Most of these were snapshots of cross-country comparisons at a point in time but time-series 
analyses were also frequently employed when data was available. For a detailed assessment of 
analyses used in MCC’s constraints analyses see Appendix C, Table C-6.  
 The CA team usually conducted four tests to determine which of the ten possible 
constraints were binding, or a primary bottleneck to growing private investment.  Test 1 seeks to 
understand if the price or shadow price of a constraint is high. When prices appropriate to the 
constraint are available, such as interest rates, they are used.  When such prices are unavailable, 
the analyst employed shadow prices.  A shadow price substitutes for unknowable or difficult to 
calculate costs as when “perfectly competitive markets” are distorted and market prices are 
unavailable or give misleading signals.  Dreze and Stern (1990) define them as “the social 
opportunity costs of the resources used” (Drèze & Stern, 1990).  MCC defined them as “the 
marginal value to the entire economy of the opportunity cost of an additional unit of the factor” 
(Partnership for Growth, 2011).  Economists determined whether a shadow price was high using 
proxy prices such as gross domestic product per capita, returns to an investment or public good 
(e.g., an extra year of schooling), or costs to economic activity when the constraint is present 
(e.g., economic losses due to power outages).  A bivariate analysis comparing the proxy price to 
the presence of the constraint or its removal across several countries usually forms the basis of 
this test (see Figure 5.5). The further a country’s data point falls below the trend line, the more 
potentially binding is the constraint.  For example, the diamonds labeled “SG” and “GH” 
represent the relationship between road quality and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 
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Senegal and Ghana, respectively.  Economists interpret road quality as thus presenting a greater 
bottleneck to growth in Senegal than Ghana. 
 
Figure 5.5. Example of Test 1: Shadow Prices for Transport as a Binding Constraint 
 
Source: MCA-Benin. (2012b). 4: Test analyses for Roads. Contonou: Millennium Challenge Account-
Benin.  
Notes: The Natural Log of GDP per Capita is a Shadow Price for Road Quality. Diamonds represent 
country-level data.  
 
 Test 2 examines how the relief of a constraint relates to investment or growth levels.  
This is referred to as an economic actor’s “impulse response”.  If a constraint is binding, growth 
or investment should increase as it is relaxed.  For example, an analyst may ask if a denser road 
network correlates positively with higher growth or investment levels or if improved 
transparency or lower corruption have a positive association with investment levels.  Bivariate 
analyses comparing investment or growth levels with the intensity of the constraint across 
several countries form the basis of the test (see Figure 5.6).  The further a country’s data point 
falls below the trend line, the more potentially binding the constraint in that country.  For 
example, a diamond-shaped data point represents a country’s relationship between its gross fixed 
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capital formation (the aggregate value of physical fixed assets minus land) and a composite 
indicator of corruption from the World Bank.  If a country’s data point falls below the trend line 
corruption may be hindering capital formation in that country relative to its peers. 
 
Figure 5.6. Example of Test 2: The Relationship Between Investment Levels and 
Corruption 
 
Source: MCA-Benin (2012a). Corruption – Test 2. Contonou: Millennium Challenge Account-Benin.  
Note: GFCF stands for Gross Fixed Capital Formation. Diamonds represent country-level data. 
 
 Test 3 examines how private actors try to circumvent the constraint.  The more binding 
the constraint is the more intensive the circumventing activity will be.  Examples of private 
actors’ coping behavior include firms training their workers in skills that schools do not provide, 
using generators to supply electricity, paying extra to use air transport rather than road or rail, 
and paying bribes (see Figure 5.7).  Analysts try to identify coping mechanisms, quantify their 
frequency, and aggregate costs to firms and other actors.  For example, economists might 
examine competitiveness surveys to assess the percent of firms that employ private generators 
for electricity and then try to monetize the cost of running those generators.  
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Figure 5.7. Test 3: Examples of Coping Mechanisms 
 
Source: Hausmann, R., Klinger, B., & Wagner, R. (2008). Doing Growth Diagnostics in Practice: A 
“Mindbook” (CID Working Papers No. 177). Center for International Development at Harvard University.  
 
Test 4 focuses on which sectors or economic activities thrive in a country.  The less 
consequential a constraint is to an economic activity, the more likely it is to survive.  This is 
referred to as the “camels and hippos test” (see Figure 5.8).  The authors invoke the metaphor of 
camels and hippos to demonstrate that animals that require less of a resource, in this case water, 
survive and thrive in the Sahara while those more reliant on the resource, such as hippos, are 
absent.34  For example, in countries with arid environments where water is a constraint, water-
intensive industries such as textiles should be rare.  This may not, however, affect the presence 
of call centers whose most important input is a strong and reliable telecommunications network.  
This fourth test is infrequently conducted and the one that faces the greatest data availability and 
measurement challenges. 
 
                                                
34 The authors, who speak a great deal about innovation in the economy, completely ignore the role of evolutionary 
environmental adaptation in allowing camels to thrive in the desert, but this contradiction will not be addressed here. 
 
figures on the country’s investment climate assessment, which indicated firms are 
investing a great deal more in their own power generators than in comparator countries. 
Similarly, in Malawi a new uranium mine (Paladin) had to invest in its own power 
generation because the state provider could not meet their basic requirements (Agar 
2007), even though self-generation is much more expensive. 
 
Table 6  
Private responses to constraints 
If this constraint is 
binding… 
 
then we might expect to see: 
Labor market regulations Higher than normal levels of informal employment 
Contract enforcement The emergence of extra-legal contract enforcement 
mechanisms like trading within social groups or organized 
mafias enforcing contracts (Dixit 2005) 
Electricity infrastructure Many businesses investing in their own generators 
Crime and security Large outlays for private security guards 
Uncertainty of monetary 
stability 
Dollarization, use of inflation indexed contracts. 
Coordination failures in 
the discovery of new 
activities 
Vertical integration in new successful business.  
Efforts for industry groups to share costs in feasibility studies 
for new sectors and markets 
Low appropriability due to 
high taxes 
Greater use of cash for business transactions 
 
 
As shown by this example, some of the evidence of age ts bypassing binding
constraints can be found in hard data sources, but many examples will be qualitative 
and anecdotal, gleaned from in-country research and interviews, as well as stories in the 
popular press. The idea is to incorporate the widest and most varied set of indicators 
and signals possible, while always remembering what a reasonable counter-factual 
might be.  
 
4) Agents Less Intensive in a Binding Constraint Should be More Likely 
to Survive and Thrive, and Vice Versa 
 
Consider the following metaphor. Suppose you were asking: what is the binding 
constraint to animals thriving in the Sahara desert? This is not unlike the question of 
what limits economic growth in a country. However, in the Sahara, it is instructive to 
note that of those few animals that do thrive in that environment, a very large 
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Figure 5.8. Test 4: A Search for "Camels and Hippos" 
 
Source: MCC (n.d.c). Introduction to Constraints Analysis (a.k.a. Growth Diagnostics). 
Millennium Challenge Corporation. Washington, DC. 
 
According to an MCC economist, tests 1 and 2 are the most consequential.  If these tests 
do not show a constraint to be a problem or binding, the constraint is likely discarded 
(Interviewee 2M, personal communication, March 22, 2016).  Tests 3 and 4 are weaker and 
result in more ambiguous conclusions. The results may not automatically exclude a constraint 
and more of a discussion and negotiation can ensue about their inclusion in a CA report.  The 
data analyzed and the people doing the analysis also matter.  According to the same economist, 
“The quality of the test depends on whether data is convincing or all the alternative hypotheses 
have been considered” (Interviewee 2M, personal communication, March 22, 2016). 
Conflicting Rationalities in Compact Design 
Growth diagnostics are congruent with the so-called Finance Ministry tendency, or 
rationale, held by the Finance Ministry community in development. At MCC, the economics 
team was most closely aligned with the Finance Ministry tendency.  Growth diagnostics 
contended with the so-called Civil Society tendency, or rationale, held by the Civil Society 
28 
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group.  At MCC, the environmental and social assessment (ESA) team was most closely aligned 
with the civil society tendency.  The main points of contention between the two groups were 
over whether and how to address inequality.  The faith of MCC economists in competitive 
markets as a solution to growth made them more tolerant of inequality.  They believed that 
competitive markets and market-led development could resolve structural inequalities over the 
medium to long term. The civil society group believed that structural inequalities affecting social 
institutions also affected markets: markets cannot resolve inequalities on their own, and 
marginalized groups needed to be purposefully targeted. National-level sectoral reform programs 
tailored to aggregate private investment would not suffice. 
The Finance Ministry Rationale. During consultations for the 2000 World Bank World 
Development Report on “Attacking Poverty”, the director of the consultative process, Ravi 
Kanbur, found that there was considerable disagreement between the Finance Ministry group and 
Civil Society group on the nature of economic and poverty reduction policies and programs and 
how their consequences should be assessed (Kanbur, 2001). The Finance Ministry group 
included, broadly speaking, members of finance ministries in the Global North and South, 
economic policy managers at the IFIs, economic analysts, and orthodox academic economists. 
The Civil Society group included, again, broadly speaking, analysts and advocates in a broad 
range of advocacy and NGO groups in the Global North and South, members of certain United 
Nations specialized agencies, social sector ministries in the Global South, and many academic 
non-economists (Kanbur, 2001). 
According to Kanbur, members holding one rationale assailed the motives and, 
importantly, analytical approaches of those holding the opposite rationale. When it came to 
issues of economic policies and their effects, potent disagreements remained and the two groups 
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possessed, as Kanbur described it, “differences in perspective and framework” (Kanbur, 2001).  
The disagreements centered on how economic policies’ effects on distribution and poverty were 
assessed.  These differences in “aggregation, time horizon, and market structure” can be distilled 
as differences in how the two groups approached inequality. The main contention was whether, 
as the Finance Ministry group believed, inequalities between people and places within a country 
would be worked out naturally over time as constraints to “mutually beneficial exchange” in 
national markets were relaxed, or, as the Civil Society group believed, policies and programs 
should be designed to address specific constraints faced by historically or spatially marginalized 
people that may not rely on market exchange because mainstream economists’ market 
assumptions were unrealistic abstractions (Kanbur, 2001).  While Kanbur’s analysis was focused 
on the structural macroeconomic, financial, and trade policies of the 1990s, much of the Finance 
Ministry tendency’s features remain salient to contemporary development approaches including 
MCC’s constraints analyses. In modified form, these disagreements spilled over into the MCC.  
The Finance Ministry Tendency and Growth Diagnostics. The Finance Ministry 
group’s faith in competitive markets as an institutional solution to growth makes its members 
more tolerant of inequality. The group is influenced by orthodox economic thought and believes 
that maximizing mutually beneficial transactions is the best or most efficient way to address 
inequality and issues of distribution.  Its members believe that when markets are free of failures 
market transactions are mutually beneficial and those transacting do not have power over each 
other (Kanbur, 2002).  When markets have failures, such as the under-provision of a public good 
like education that make transactions inefficient or asymmetrical information that might give one 
actor power over another, the government should actively address such failures.  These 
interventions should be aimed at markets and not inequality, however, because issues of 
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efficiency and equity should be addressed separately (Kanbur, 2002).  Adherents of the Finance 
Ministry tendency design and evaluate policies and programs in national aggregative terms 
(Kanbur, 2001).  They are less interested in whether a set of policies or programs benefits, for 
example, the poor or rural areas relatively more than the rich or urban areas so long as national 
average per capita gross domestic product (GDP) increases.  They evaluate the impact of 
economic policy reforms with national level statistics and indicators on GDP and poverty.  
Finally, the Finance Ministry group interprets the value of interventions over a “medium-term” 
time horizon of five to ten years (Kanbur, 2001).  Economic reforms may generate inequality at 
first but through free and competitive markets and increased aggregate growth, inequality will be 
reduced over time.  Equilibrium or equality along some metric such as income between groups 
and places will be achieved as firms and other economic actors seek out abundant inputs with 
lower marginal costs (Kanbur, 2001).  Competitive markets and market-led development can 
resolve structural and enduring inequalities via the price mechanism.  
Growth diagnostics’ creators shared the Finance Ministry’s rationale.  They believe that a 
Pareto optimal allocation of resources that maximizes welfare through competitive markets is 
limited by a host of “real world complications” rooted in “market imperfections” (Headey, 2009; 
Rodrik, 2009).  Economists’ responsibility is to make an effort to address these market failures to 
bring out their welfare maximizing potential. 35  They assume that mutually beneficial market 
transactions arise because individual agents engage in “purposeful behavior” to make themselves 
better off (Rodrik, 2009).  Growth diagnostics share fealty to an evaluation of interventions at the 
national level.  Ricardo Hausmann wrote, “Growth diagnostics goes from a very aggregate 
                                                
35 Their approach can be better described as “neoclassical structuralism” because it acknowledges that markets are 
not “perfect”: if left to their own devices markets will not produce equilibrium prices and maximize surplus because 
they might possess significant flaws that vary from country to country and may require state intervention to correct. 
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outcome, such as the growth rate of an economy, to its potential causes. As such, it is a top-down 
approach” (Hausmann et al., 2008: 20).  They are focused on constraints that differ across but 
not necessarily within countries.  Finally, growth diagnostics claim to get at the “policy roots” of 
what constrains economic growth.  As such, they are focused on economic policy and 
institutional reform.  Addressing the root causes of what ails an economy is a longer-term 
process that requires a longer time horizon to realize results than, as the Civil Society group 
might favor, the distribution of immediate benefits through subsidies, social protection programs, 
or basic services.  In the Finance Ministry group’s view, targeting the poor in the latter way 
would only delay the actions necessary for self-sustaining growth and poverty reduction.  In the 
words of one MCC economist, “The policy reform issue is important if you want to get the 
patient not only off the table but get them walking again” (Interviewee 2C, personal 
communication, February 18, 2016).   
The Finance Ministry Rationale at MCC. MCC and in-country economists were more 
closely aligned with the Finance Ministry tendency.  This rationale determined what data MCC 
economists trained in the neoclassical tradition looked at, ignored, and collected (Interviewee 2L, 
personal communication, March 22, 2016).  MCC economists relied heavily on competitiveness 
surveys to conduct CAs (see Appendix C, Table C-4). These were often the only surveys of 
private firms’ owners and managers.  They are produced by organizations that share the Finance 
Ministry tendency and capture the views of a relatively small sample of business owners in urban 
areas in the formal sector. For example, the World Bank’s Doing Business survey’s indicators 
refer to a specific type of business, generally a local limited liability company operating in the 
commercial capital (International Finance Corporation, 2011).  The focus on a specific, narrow 
set of private investments and firms meant that households and their economic activities, which 
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include informal household enterprises, went ignored.  As a result, the informal sector became a 
blind spot and the CA failed to “see” the informal sector’s various economic constraints.  This 
bias extended to agricultural workers and women, which are populations that disproportionately 
make up the informal sector (Lund & Srinivas, 2000).   
It is not entirely clear, however, if MCC economists would have sought out or employed 
data sources that focused on the informal economy even if they had been available. MCC 
economists saw the informal sector as a problem that needed to be corrected.  As one MCC 
economist put it,  “To do a CA one needs to have some sense of how development needs to 
happen…social sector folks are more concerned with work and investment in the informal sector 
but I’m looking 20 years into the future [and asking], ‘What’s going to create new jobs?’ ” 
(Interviewee 2N, personal communication, March 22, 2016).  This view implies that “new jobs” 
were those created in the formal sector resulting from a process of long-term growth. 
Virtually all the data used to measure income, growth, and investment in a MCC 
constraints analysis was collected at the national level.  Data on GDP and investment, which play 
an important role in the first two tests, is almost exclusively available from the IMF, multilateral 
development banks, and national governments. The IMF and multilateral development banks, as 
multilateral institutions whose members are nation-states, have since their founding organized 
data collection at the national level.  Countries in the Global South, in turn, are drawing on data 
collection infrastructure for a construct called “the economy” developed during colonialism 
(Mitchell, 2002).  This reliance on national-level data is exacerbated by MCC economists’ 
emphasis on using comparator countries for benchmarking exercises that require data on similar 
scales across units of analysis.  Thus, this comparative approach, which is a tradition in 
development economics, extends the logic of the competitive market to economic epistemology. 
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The tests MCC economists conducted as part of the CA also shared the Finance Ministry 
tendency.  Test 1 manufactured fictitious markets characterized by perfect competition and 
equilibrium when no such markets existed.  It achieved this by estimating shadow prices where 
they did not exist or imputing shadow prices to those things that are not or cannot be subject to 
market exchange.  Test 2 examined the relationship between measures of capital formation (e.g., 
investment or growth levels) and the presence or absence of a constraint.  Where the constraint 
was present and capital formation was low the constraint was thought to be binding.  Such 
relationships were usually examined at the national level without regard for the intranational 
distribution of capital.  If constraints must be relaxed in a way to maximize capital formation, 
investments were usually made in areas with abundant complementary factors such as skilled 
labor or where economies of scale already existed such as large cities.  
The Finance Ministry tendency informed the way MCC economists approached a very 
common investment category at MCC—infrastructure.  They believed that if you improve 
investment opportunities for formal businesses by lowering the costs of their social overhead 
capital, economic benefits would reach the poor and informal workers over time in the form of 
increased jobs.  For example, Test 1 analyzes the operating revenue losses from interruptions in 
infrastructure services such as water or electricity.  When the impacts of these stoppages, such as 
blackouts, are estimated for different groups of people, those that are already better off are 
estimated to suffer disproportionately more. When aggregated, such shadow prices signal that 
investments to ameliorate stoppages will reduce operating losses and raise revenues far more for 
large, formal firms than informal household activities.  One country director involved in 
designing a compact explained it this way: 
If you got blackouts in the southern part of [Country], they’re high valued blackouts, 
because you’ve got businesses and so forth that depend on the electricity.  So if you are a 
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bottler and lose electricity even for a few minutes it could cost hundreds of thousands of 
dollars.  Even though there are lots of benefits in terms of residential usage like education 
or chores and things like that, those are more difficult to value so we don’t value 
them…that cost of non-served kilowatt-hour is a lot less (Interviewee 2R, personal 
communication, March 30, 2016). 
 
 Finally, MCC economists prioritize private-sector reform of infrastructure sector 
institutions over an infrastructure sector’s storage capacity or service expansion, which affects 
the time horizon they use to evaluate outcomes.  MCC economists made it clear early on that 
they preferred policy and institutional reform to service expansion:  “For some sectors, such as 
energy, under-capacity and lack of growth may be due more to a deficient regulatory 
environment (e.g., tariffs set too low) that stifles private investment and prevents sufficient cost 
recovery and maintenance…it should be clearly communicated to the recipient country that 
funding for these kinds of projects is unlikely unless certain reforms are enacted” (Dennis, 2006: 
2).   
The Civil Society Rationale. The Civil Society group believed that capital and labor 
were not mere factors of production but a set of social and power relations; the aggregate 
national picture hid regional differences and pockets of distress; and policies should be assessed 
according to their short-term consequences (Kanbur, 2001).  This is because the Civil Society 
tendency takes a political-economic and broader social, historical, and cultural approach to 
development.  The Civil Society group views market structure as riddled with market power. 
Market transactions usually benefit one party at the expense of another.  Capital and labor are not 
simply factors of production but a set of social relations where actors belonging to each group 
are engaged in constant negotiation (Kanbur, 2001).  Relationships between them are often zero-
sum and market liberalization can give capital the upper hand.  Also, local markets and 
economies are segmented, which makes problematic neoclassical economic theory about self-
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interested maximizing agents and equilibrium prices reducing special or demographic 
inequalities over time.  Marginalized groups do not necessarily receive the opportunities or pay 
of their non-marginalized peers and inequalities in existing social overhead capital such as 
infrastructure limit how much core and peripheral regions can be integrated (Kanbur, 2001).   
The Civil Society group’s concern for inequality leads them to consider development 
interventions and their outcomes at a lower level of aggregation than the nation-state (Kanbur, 
2001).  Its members are more interested in whether policies or programs benefit those worse off 
relatively more than the better-off regardless of whether everyone benefits in absolute terms.  
They argue that local conditions may differ significantly from the picture aggregate, national-
level economic and poverty statistics paint and may obscure pockets of distress (Kanbur, 2001).  
They are committed to and actively engaged in addressing conditions in these distressed areas or 
among distressed groups.   
Finally, the Civil Society tendency has a much shorter time-horizon than five to ten years.  
Those working directly with the poor and vulnerable are focused on the short-term consequences 
of economic reform or immediate benefits from development projects (Kanbur, 2001).  They do 
not share the Finance Ministry group’s faith in competitive market equilibrium. This leads the 
Civil Society group to have a greater tolerance for “pork barrel” spending.  Some projects, while 
economically inefficient in the Finance Ministry group’s eyes, can be justified on grounds of 
distributional equity (Ellwood & Patashnik, 1993). 
The Civil Society Rationale at MCC. The Civil Society group was represented by set of 
actors dispersed across MCC’s various technical functions and in-country core teams. Members 
of MCC’s Environmental and Social Assessment team were some of the strongest advocates of 
the Civil Society tendency.  They argued that the CA methodology did not adequately account 
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for segmented economies and labor markets in the Global South.  One ESA specialist asserted 
that the CA exhibited a “formal sector bias” in its use of data sources and surveys to examine 
constraints (Interviewee 2L, personal communication, March 22, 2016).  This in turn had 
implications for how CAs addressed issues of poverty and gender.    
A review of early CAs by MCC’s environmental assessment team critiqued the CA’s 
“rather stratospheric trickle-down look” into countries’ situations.  As the author put it, “A 
limitation of the CA is the national level approach which precludes consideration of existing 
documentation of 20 identified pockets of poverty in the country” (Feld, 2009: 3).  The ESA 
specialist’s principal point was that disregarding important in-country variation precludes 
bottom-up approaches to growth and development rooted in sub-national realities (Feld, 2009).  
Investment should not be directed on the basis of shadow-prices, which assume or imagine a 
competitive market, or relationships to capital formation without regard for where capital is 
specifically invested. Rather, they should be channeled to marginalized populations such as 
informal workers, women, and the rural poor; sectors in which lower-income individuals are 
disproportionately employed such as agriculture; and marginalized regions in the periphery.  
These groups, regions, and sectors often overlap and provide a clear picture of where investment 
is most needed.  Because these populations and places are often relatively lower-income and face 
any number of multidimensional hardships, the Civil Society group does not view investments in 
them as “transfers” or “wasteful” if they do not generate long-term, aggregate growth.  As long 
as investments address these inequalities they are worth making.   
Investments in policy reform rarely meet the Civil Society tendency’s criteria.  The Civil 
Society group would, for example, prefer increasing immediate access to basic services rather 
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than reform of the legal, policy, and administrative institutions responsible for delivering those 
services.  
Most early MCC compacts and their respective proposals implicitly advanced the Civil 
Society tendency by emphasizing intranational differences and targeting the majority of funds to 
a specific region or zone of the country.  These regions were often those that were 
disproportionately poor or rural.  Economic geographers would deem that these proposals and 
the eventual compacts exhibited a “place-based approach”. Such an approach considers that 
geographical context, as defined by the economic, social, cultural, and institutional dimensions 
of a locality, really matters (McCann & Rodríguez-Pose, 2011).  A senior official in MCC’s 
development policy team compared early compacts to an approach that was popular in 
multilateral development banks in the 1970s when their focus was on poverty reduction, “Many 
of the compact proposals from our partner countries include elements that are similar to aspects 
of the integrated rural development approach… Integrated Rural Development Programs 
(IRDPs) were designed to increase incomes and other aspects of welfare among the rural poor” 
(Kelly, 2007: 1).  
Compacts with a place-based emphasis included those with Nicaragua, Ghana, El 
Salvador, Mozambique, Morocco, Senegal, Mali and Madagascar.  Nicaragua’s compact focused 
on the Northern Pacific Region, Ghana’s on the Afram Plains and Volta regions, El Salvador’s 
on the “Northern Zone”, Mozambique’s in the “Northern Triangle”, Morocco’s in the “Corridor 
of Poverty”, Senegal’s in the Senegal River Valley region, Mali’s in the Alatona region, and 
Madagascar’s in the Vakinankaratra-Mania and Menabe “zones”.  Nicaragua’s and El Salvador’s 
compacts were focused on regions disproportionately suffering from high poverty. Senegal and 
Mali’s compacts were focused on highly fertile areas adjacent to major rivers with promise for 
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agricultural development.  In Morocco’s MCC proposal the central government was concerned 
about a balance between urban and rural constituencies.  One agriculture official involved in the 
early stages of compact development for Morocco said, “Their king wanted to show that the 
farmers were included in the process, he wanted to show people in the mountains that not 
everything was going to be absorbed by people in the city” (Interviewee 2Q, personal 
communication, March 29, 2016).   
Even in compacts that did not have an explicit zonal focus, there was still an emphasis on 
populations in what Gunnar Myrdal called “the periphery” (Myrdal, 1971).  Examples of this 
included compacts in Georgia, Armenia, and Tanzania.  Georgia’s compact focused on 
infrastructure and urban development in small municipalities outside of the capital region.  
Armenia’s compact focused on irrigation development that was scattered but nonetheless in the 
poorer parts of the north and west of the country.  Tanzania’s compact had energy, water and 
road projects far from Dar-es-Salaam near the borders with Burundi and Kenya.  Meanwhile, 
MCC’s chief economist, Franck Wiebe, believed that programs aimed at “connecting or opening 
regions that remain on the country’s periphery” were rooted in national political objectives and 
not economic rationality (Rose & Wiebe, 2015b). This is because orthodox economics consider 
such policies to be either politically motivated or misguided attempts at improving welfare.     
Power Relations 
Despite their conflict with the Civil Society rationale, constraints analyses were 
incorporated into compact design with little to no resistance.  This was because constraints 
analyses received senior officials’ blessing and the ESA team’s work was mostly about reducing 
harm (e.g., environmental permitting, proper resettlement) rather than proactively addressing 
inequality.  Even if the ESA team took a proactive role, its members were scattered across the 
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agency, which made it more difficult to build a network at MCC and with like-minded social 
ministries in partner countries to resist the push for constraints analyses.  Ultimately, MCC’s 
adoption of constraints analysis elevated economists in the compact development process.  
Sector specialists were demoted and relegated to the role held earlier by economists—data 
providers. 
The Smooth Stabilization of Constraints Analysis.  Senior officials, to whom 
economic, ESA, and sector specialists reported, were comfortable handing the reins of compact 
development over to economists.  This was because they believed economists were helping the 
organization make decisions based on evidence. One senior official noted, “I think [the 
constraints analysis] certainly increased the economists’ role early on in the process and 
therefore diminished the role of country programs, but that was a good thing because the 
economists were doing the analytical work and trying to get at a thoughtful evidence based 
decision” (Interviewee 2P, personal communication, March 19, 2016).  Senior officials stood 
back and let various experts do the work. This hands-off attitude allowed the economists’ 
rationality to overpower other experts’ rationalities. Because identifying constraints was no easy 
task this also weakened senior officials’ influence over compact design and made them 
dependent on economists: “To actually do the constraints analysis the way [Hausmann, Rodrik, 
and Velasco] designed it, it was hard.  You needed a PhD economist to do it” (Interviewee 2J, 
personal communication, March 15, 2016).  Nonetheless, transferring leadership over to 
economists was a sacrifice senior officials felt was worthwhile.   
 The environmental and social assessment experts’ ability to mount a challenge to the 
economists and the CA was limited. Their work at the time was largely defensive—when CAs 
were introduced in the late 2000s ESA’s primary role was to ensure that MCC investments “do 
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no harm” (Interviewee 2G, personal communication, February 26, 2016).  Their expertise was 
drawn upon after compacts had been negotiated to assess whether proposed projects posed a 
threat to vulnerable ecosystems, non-human species, and human populations. Their work 
centered on environmental and social impact assessments and resettlement plans.  Moreover, 
ESA’s organizational position distanced the group’s members from compact development 
decisions.  
The Civil Society group was not unified organizationally at MCC headquarters.  This was 
important because unlike other donors and development finance agencies that have 
semipermanent offices in countries, most of the decision-making at MCC during compact 
development occurred in Washington, DC.  In 2008, by which time constraints analyses were 
fully operational, ESA experts were split between the Departments of Compact Development 
and Implementation (economists were located in both departments but also the influential 
Department of Policy and International Relations).  ESA members most sympathetic to the Civil 
Society tendency were located in the Department of Compact Implementation, which left them 
little to no influence over how compacts were designed.  Their functions were also meant to 
manage project risks, putting them in a position to critique CA outcomes without necessarily 
presenting a cohesive alternative rationale for framing compact development or selecting 
projects.  Without a network or cohesive theoretical alternative, the Civil Society tendency did 
not present an obstacle to MCC economists and the CA.  
Ministries of Rural Development, Labor, Health, or Social Welfare along with civil 
society and poverty observatory groups made up the in-country Civil Society group.  Their 
proposed projects had more “social” objectives that lacked “clear links to economic growth” and 
were discounted more often than Ministries of Finance, Infrastructure, or Trade and 
  188 
Development (Anderson et al., 2010).  The CA shaped public consultations to focus on economic 
growth rather than social programs and laid the foundation for possible dismissal of proposed 
projects that could not make a compelling case for economic growth (Anderson et al., 2010).   
The Ascendancy of the Economist.  Timing was a key factor for influencing what 
compacts looked like.  CAs reversed the timing of when sectors and economists became 
involved in compact development.  Prior to the CA, MCC senior officials and sometimes sector 
specialists would first meet with core team counterparts and team leaders and senior officials told 
economists to withhold judgment until enough details were available to determine a project’s 
viability.  Meanwhile, “steam would build up” around projects during negotiations and generate 
important political capital.  One MCC economist recounted that “a lot of effort and money goes 
in from MCC’s and the country’s side in a project.  Interests are ginned up in a country and 
momentum and interests and political commitment builds. If the project is not ultimately viable, 
that buildup of interests weakens the economists’ decision-making power on the project” 
(Interviewee 2F, personal communication, February 23, 2016). According to one senior manager, 
“As far as economists, back in the early compacts, they were just doing some [economic rates of 
return analyses]” (Interviewee 2H, personal communication, March 2, 2016).   
The constraints analysis changed all this (see Figure 5.9).  After the CA, MCC 
economists would visit their core team economic counterparts as the first step in compact 
development.  This was appealing to those in the agency looking to make compact development 
more rational: 
[the CA] brings economic thinking and analytical capacity to the start of the conversation 
with the country, which changes the whole tenor of how you engage with a country.  If 
you start by showing up with your ag[riculture] people and your infra[structure] people 
and your country relations people, versus if you show up with economists, and you say to 
the country give us your economists, that’s who is having the initial set of conversations 
…for somebody who is interested in getting evidence into the policy process that’s a 
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fantastic place to start and it sets the tone for a relationship that I think carries forward 
(Interviewee 3C, personal communication, May 26, 2016).   
 
According to an MCC economist, the CA “helped move economists concerns up front—if you 
can get projects designed and approved that are consistent with the constraint you are halfway 
there” (Interviewee 2F, personal communication, February 23, 2016).  A sector specialist dubbed 
this shift in roles and responsibilities as the “ascendancy of the economist” (Interviewee 2E, 
personal communication, February 24, 2016).   
 
Figure 5.9. Compact Development Process Charts 
Without Constraints Analyses 
 




 If the economists were ascendant, then the sector specialists were descendant.  After the 
CA was instituted, sector specialists “don’t go out to the countries anymore to negotiate 
compacts” (Interviewee 2H, personal communication, March 2, 2016).  Their role was pushed to 
the end of the compact development process similar to when and how economists would engage 
prior to the stabilization of CAs.  This was welcome news to the economists who believed that 
“[s]ector folks are not the most objective and may not be the best to send out to the country…If 
you’re a carpenter, everything looks like a nail” (Interviewee 2I, personal communication, March 
4, 2016).  The sector specialists’ role was relegated to what economists mainly did before CAs—
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identifying and providing relevant data sources.  Sector specialists in the partner country 
provided data sources relevant to their sector.  More often than not, MCC sector specialists 
would be brought in after the CA was completed to provide data and analysis for the sector to 
identify and vet projects (Interviewee 2M, personal communication, March 22, 2016).  
Nonetheless, the economists maintained editorial control of the CA findings and the process in 
general.  Sector specialists went along with this subordinate role because contributing data and 
input was a way to have some say in compact design. 
The Power of Method: Diagnosis 
The power of constraints analyses affected not only power relations at MCC but 
organizational outcomes in the form of the diagnoses that could be reached.  By 2015, MCC 
constraints analyses informed fourteen compacts.  The economic analysis team identified, on 
average, three binding or highest priority constraints to growth.  While MCC economists decried 
the subjective biases of sector specialists, bias had now shifted to the decisions that economists 
made in diagnostic analyses such as which constraints to consider and test.  Constraints 
regarding infrastructure, micro risks to private investment, and human capital were tested most 
often. Data availability and quality were often themselves a constraint on what could be 
reasonably examined.  
Diagnoses. In addition to narrowing the focus of compact investments, the other 
motivation for adopting CAs was the elimination of so-called selection bias.  Economists 
believed that sectoral preferences at MCC and ministers’ proclivity for pet projects led to a 
politicized compact negotiation process where individual interests would trump objective, 
rational decision-making.  This, in turn, would hurt prospects for growth and the poor. The 
laborious, analytical, data-driven CA process did not, however, eliminate bias—it changed the 
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nature of bias.  Bias in sector selection became a feature of political values and assumptions in 
the growth diagnostic method and decisions made by MCC economists.  
Once data was gathered the CA team began a process of elimination.  Just as there was a 
laundry list of possible projects that could be proposed, there was also a laundry list of possible 
constraints and sub-constraints that economists could choose to analyze. This list was narrowed 
down in three steps.  First, growth diagnostics’ creators limited the universe of constraints with 
economic theory and existing econometric research. They named ten plausible constraints that 
they organized into a decision-tree (see Figure 5.1).  Second, the analysts conducting the CA 
excluded constraints based on a desk review of earlier economic reports and growth studies 
(Interviewee 2M, personal communication, March 22, 2016).  Third, analysts conducted the four 
diagnostic tests. 
  Table 5.3 demonstrates that certain constraints were examined far more than others.  
Close to 60 percent of all analyses were related to constraints falling under the branches of 
infrastructure, micro risks, and human capital. Some branches made up far less (e.g., 
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Table 5.3 
Distribution of Analyses by Constraint in CA Final Reports 
Constraint 
Number of 
Analyses Percent (%) 
Infrastructure 327 27 
Micro Risks 212 18 
Human Capital 168 14 
Macro Rises 110 9 
Poor Intermediation 110 9 
Information Externalities 89 7 
Geography 79 7 
Domestic Savings 66 5 
International Finance 34 3 
Coordination Externalities 10 1 
Total 1,205 100 
Source: Constraints Analyses’ Final Reports. 
 
These decisions and analyses determined which of the constraints to growth would be 
considered binding. Among the fourteen CAs analyzed, 79 total constraints were identified.  Of 
these, 47 were binding constraints, or considered the most important barriers to economic growth 
(see Table 5.4).  Thus, 60 percent of all identified constraints were considered binding.  The 
constraints identified most frequently were on the infrastructure branch, usually identifying 
deficits in particular sectors, and micro risks branch, usually identifying governance issues such 
as regulation and property rights. These were also among the constraints most often identified as 
binding (see Table 5.4).  Human capital, or deficits in education and health, represented 15 
percent of all constraints.  Human capital constraints were considered binding about half the 
time.  Those three constraint categories are responsible for close to 80 percent of all the 
constraints identified.  Poor Geography was identified only three times and every time it was 
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identified as binding.  Poor Intermediation, meanwhile, only showed up six times.  International 




Number of Times Constraint Identified in Final Report and Classified as Binding 












Bad Infrastructure 18 11 29 62 37 
Low Human Capital 5 7 12 42 15 
Poor Geography 3 0 3 100 4 
Low 
Appropriability 
Micro Risks 15 6 21 71 27 
Coordination 
Externalities 3 2 5 60 6 
Info Externalities 1 1 2 5 3 
Macro Risks 0 1 1 0 1 
Bad local finance 
Poor intermediation 
(Access) 2 4 6 33 8 




finance 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 
 
47 32 79 60 100 
Source: Constraints Analyses’ Final Reports. 
 
By comparing the identified constraints with the sectors eventually selected for 
investment we see that MCC invests in a sector recommended by the CA report three-fourths of 
                                                
36 A large motivation for choosing these constraints implicitly includes what MCC can reasonably address.  As a 
bilateral development finance agency that operates on the project finance model, MCC has a limited ability to 
address macroeconomic constraints and much more flexibility in addressing constraints in areas such as 
infrastructure and human capital. 
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the time (74 percent) (see Table 5.5).  Binding constraints are almost always identified within 
these sectors (one exception was the decision to invest in education in El Salvador’s second 
compact where human capital was identified as a non-binding constraint).  This means that one-
fourth of the time a non-constraint makes its way into the compact.  It should be noted that this 
was most often the case in the earliest compacts designed with a CA when MCC was still 
transitioning towards stabilizing the method.  As time passed, the correspondence between 
binding constraints and sectors selected for investment grew stronger.  As one MCC economist 
put it, “It is almost always the case that if a constraint is excluded, projects won’t be developed 
around that constraint in the compact” (Interviewee 2M, personal communication, March 22, 
2016). 
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Table 5.5 
Distribution of Identified Constraints Matched to Final Compact Investments 
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According to CA reports, energy was cited most frequently as the binding constraint to 
growth (eight times).  But roads were not far behind (six times).  Education was cited most 
frequently but it was binding in only four instances.  Irrigation does not show up at all.  Only 
Moldova, the first country to undergo a CA, had any irrigation or agricultural development 
investments in its compact and its CA report did not cite this as a constraint whatsoever; its 
inclusion was the function of other negotiation or argumentation.  
The Power of Method: Reshaping Participatory Planning  
The diagnoses that MCC economists arrived at through CAs influenced MCC’s 
consultative process.  The constraints analysis substituted for the development finance 
community’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and reduced the length, breadth, and 
depth of participatory processes.  PRSP consultations typically gave greater voice to the rural 
poor.  Constraints analyses were, by contrast, more dominated by economists and dismissive of 
rural concerns. 
PRSP-driven Consultative Processes.  As part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
debt relief initiative established in 1996, the World Bank initiated a poverty reduction strategy 
process resulting in poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP).  An ambitious strategy like the 
PRSP was bound to disappoint many observers.  The PRSP was plagued by claims that it was not 
a significant enough break from earlier development bank- and donor-led approaches.  Critics 
argued that the process continued to be government and technocrat-led, parliaments were almost 
always excluded from participation, and the civil society model of participation aspired to but 
did not reach the level of joint decision-making (Kamruzzaman, 2009). The most penetrating 
critique was that it co-opted civil society’s energy and ideas, thereby “depoliticizing” activist 
energies and rendering them ineffective for genuine change (Porter & Craig, 2004).  While 
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participation and partnership in practice fell far short of the rhetoric, there was progress in 
several respects, albeit incremental, and some genuine accomplishments in specific countries.  A 
set of case studies revealed that the PRSP process brought a broader set of actors into the policy-
making process and in some instances were newly created (Piron & Evans, 2004).  The process 
expanded and deepened existing national participatory planning processes by including large 
numbers of participants over an extended period of time.  It also presented an opportunity to 
expand discursive policy possibilities (Cheru, 2006; Dewachter & Molenaers, 2012). 
Conducting a broad participatory process to develop compacts and inform their design 
was part of MCC’s legislation, which stated that “in entering into a Compact, the United States 
shall seek to ensure that the government of an eligible country (1) takes into account the local-
level perspectives of the rural and urban poor, including women, in the eligible country; and (2) 
consults with private and voluntary organizations, the business community, and other donors in 
the eligible country” (Pub. L. 108–199, 2004).  For its first 19 compacts, MCC either accepted 
the PRSP consultative process as a substitute for its own or modeled its consultative process for a 
proposed compact after the PRSP process.  MCC did this because it found civil society 
participation in the PRSP process to be “broad” and “effective” (Lucas, 2006b).  For example, in 
Honduras “the consultative process of the PRSP included attendance by 3500 representatives of 
civil society organizations in 13 cities” (MCC, 2005a: 5).  Most of the participatory processes 
took place over years, not months or weeks, with El Salvador’s being one of the lengthiest: “The 
Government of El Salvador…proposes use of MCA funds for a development program focused 
on the northern region of the country. The program is the result of an eight year consultative 
process led by the National Commission for Development” (MCC, n.d.b: 1).  According to a 
Center for Global Development assessment of compact development for Tanzania’s first 
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compact, “It is certainly appropriate to rely on a good PRS[P] to identify target sectors. And it is 
also okay to sign on to some of the PRS[P]’s specific programs if they too reflect consultation 
and an assessment of poverty impact” (Lucas, 2006b).  
Constraints Analyses-driven Consultative Processes.  Following MCC’s adoption of 
constraints analyses, the consultative process changed.  The CA had replaced the PRSP as the 
basis for the participation process and a source of project proposals. The PRSP continues to be 
consulted by the core and MCC transaction teams, as is required by MCC legislation, but plays a 
diminished role.  According to one senior official who had been present for consultative 
processes both before and after CAs, “We probably did give more space to PRSPs then.  The 
PRSP probably substituted for some of our own internal analyses, but now that we’re doing 
constraints analyses, we don’t rely as much on the PRSP” (Interviewee 2P, personal 
communication, March 29, 2016).  In fact, replacing the PRSP was one of the things motivating 
MCC economists to adopt CAs.  They believed that reliance on the PRPS for the consultative 
process was too “wishy washy” (Interviewee 2O, personal communication, March 25, 2016).  
The CA was meant to “structure the dialogue as much as possible” and serve as a “technical 
resource, a set of vocabulary” to keep the conversation focused (Interviewee 2O, personal 
communication, March 25, 2016).  As one senior official remarked,  “Ultimately the constraints 
analysis has completely transformed the way MCC works, it has almost become a religion to 
refer back to the constraints analysis during discussions and ask, ‘what constraint are we 
relaxing?’ ” (Interviewee 2H, personal communication, March 2, 2016).  A free flowing and 
extensive consultative process was not conducive to rapidly narrowing the priorities of the 
compact.  
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Structuring the consultative process around the CA, however, had implications for the 
nature of local participation and compact design.  Like earlier consultative processes, 
consultation in later compacts involving CAs was diverse with differing degrees of success.  The 
general differences were that the length of time for consultation was dramatically reduced, often 
times to just one week, as was the case for Benin’s and Morocco’s second compacts.  Much of 
the time that was previously spent on consultation in compact development was now spent 
conducting the CA.  As a result, fewer participants were consulted.  The focus was generally less 
on the rural poor or members of the informal economy and more on members or owners of 
formal private-sector enterprises.  Most importantly, earlier consultative processes were rooted 
more in dialogue while consultative processes governed by the CA were focused more on 
validating identified constraints.  An example from Benin’s second compact illustrates the new 
consultative process: 
Consultations around the Constraints Analysis for Benin’s second compact were held in 
each region over approximately a week, and separate consultations were held in Cotonou 
for sectoral input and to synthesize information received and incorporate it into the CA.  
The agenda at each session included: an introduction, validation and discussion of CA 
priorities, guided discussion on key priorities to understand how the constraints are 
experienced by different stakeholders, brainstorming solutions and discussion on next 
steps and how participants could remain engaged (MCC, n.d.a: 6).  
 
The focus of the consultations became about how the identified constraints impacted 
participants.  The underlying assumption was that the constraints did impact them; the questions 
were focused on how.  The CA-led consultative processes diminished the length and depth of 
MCC’s consultative process and constrained the discursive space for new kinds of ideas to arise 
and shape compact design.   
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The Power of Method: Implications for Compact Composition  
As intended, CAs concentrated investments in a smaller number of sectors and projects.  
They also, however, shifted discretionary authority away from presidents and ministers in partner 
countries to White House and MCC officials in Washington, DC.  Energy, rather than Transport 
or Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD), became the dominant sector in MCC’s 
investment portfolio in large part because of the Obama administration’s Power Africa program, 
sometimes in contrast to the priorities expressed by country officials.  Because of their 
neoclassical economic approach, CAs shifted investments from rural to urban areas.  Finally, 
their focus on reform shifted investments from “hard” infrastructure to “soft” policy and 
institutional reform; MCC compacts began to resemble the World Bank’s sectoral structural 
adjustment programs of the past. 
The Distribution of Investments Across Sectors.  One of the reasons senior official 
consented to the CA was to guide the decision-making process and narrow down the choices for 
investment.  The CA succeeded at this. Compacts with CAs had on average half the number of 
sectors and 20 percent fewer activities (see Table 5.6). Compacts developed without CAs 
represented 18 sectors while those developed with CAs represented 13 (a 28 percent decline).  
The drop in total activities was more drastic. Compacts without a CA represented 212 activities 
and those with a CA represented 113—the number of activities was cut almost in half.  The size 
of the compacts in terms of funding stayed about the same.  The median size of a compact 
without a CA was $354 million versus $372 million with a CA.  The average size of compacts 
without CAs was slightly higher ($401 million versus $371 million) but this is because 
Tanzania’s compact was unusually large at $787 million (in 2015 dollar terms). 
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Table 5.6 


























Mean 4.3 3.3 13 401 123 32.9 
Median 4 3 14 354 104 12.7 
Min 1 1 2 76.1 8.6 0.12 
Max 7 5 19 787 413 390 










Mean 2 4.1 10.4 371 118 39 
Median 1 3 9 372 88 15.7 
Min  1 1 2 69.1 5 0.49 
Max 6 7 20 638 353 296 
Total 13 43 113 5,567 4,406 4,406 
Source:  Compacts’ Summaries of Multi-Year Financial Plans. 
Notes: All dollar figures in millions of dollars in 2015 terms. 
 
Not only did CAs reduce the number of sectors and activities in MCC compacts they also 
affected what MCC invested in.  Compacts designed with CAs invested heavily in infrastructure 
and human capital just as the CA reports recommended.  But this does not tell the whole story.  
Infrastructure was always popular at MCC.  However, a shift among sectors occurred.  
Previously, MCC invested heavily in transport and agricultural development, which included 
infrastructure such as irrigation.  After CAs, MCC mostly invested in the energy and water and 
sanitation sectors (see Table 5.7).  
 
 
  202 
Table 5.7 
Distribution of Sectors Among Compacts Developed with Constraints Analyses 
Rank based 
on funding Sector Funding ($) 
Percent of 
Total (%) 
1 Energy  1,702,203,474  38.6 
2 Water & Sanitation  680,319,943  15.4 
3 Transport  493,091,138  11.2 
4 Education  447,543,037  10.2 
5 Other - Multisector  310,906,296  7.1 
6 Social Infrastructure & Services  216,981,402  4.9 
7 Industrial Development  127,000,000  2.9 
8 Government & Civil Society  112,059,837  2.5 
9 Agriculture  100,261,378  2.3 
10 Land & Property Rights  88,087,579  2.0 
11 Basic Health  52,989,063  1.2 
12 Business Development Services  42,828,240  1.0 
13 Environmental Protection  31,415,478  0.7 
 
Total  4,405,686,864  100.0 
Source:  Compacts’ Summaries of Multi-Year Financial Plans. 
Notes: All dollar figures in 2015-dollar terms. 
 
Figure 5.10 shows the difference between compacts designed with and without CAs.  
The top four sectors that made up 75 percent of total investments for the “Without CA” cohort 
were Transport (42%), Agriculture (22%), Water and Sanitation (7%) and Land and Property 
Rights (5%).  For compacts with CAs the top sectors were Energy (39%), Water and Sanitation 
(15%), Transport (11%), and Education (10%).  Transport continued to be among the top four, 
but MCC invested 74 percent less money in transport in compacts designed with a CA.  
Meanwhile investment in the Water and Sanitation sector, also among the top four, doubled.  The 
biggest changes were in the ARD and energy sectors, which swapped places.  After the CA, 
MCC essentially stopped investing in agriculture, dropping its investment in the sector by 90 
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percent.  Meanwhile, energy increased by 90 percent.  Sectors such as Fishing, Forestry, 
Tourism, and Reproductive Health disappeared altogether.  
 
Figure 5.10. Distribution of Funding Across Sectors Between Compact Cohorts 
 
Source:  Compacts’ Summaries of Multi-Year Financial Plans. 
 
 The Power Africa Program and New Forms of Bias.  Did this shift away from the 
agriculture and transport sectors mean that these sectors ceased to be constraints to growth?  Or, 
to put it another way, were country governments able to see the energy and water sectors as 
major constraints to growth only because of the CA?  The answer to both questions is “no”.  At 
the turn of the decade, agriculture and rural development became a priority among countries in 
the Global South, particularly among governments in Sub-Saharan Africa.  A senior MCC 
agricultural specialist said, “There was a demand from the governments of compact 
countries…they had a significant problem in the rural areas. They wanted to show something 
was being done in the rural areas and MCC resources gave the countries some very specific 
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projects to address rural poverty and rural migration to the cities” (Interviewee 2P, personal 
communication, March 29, 2016).  This specialist was echoing the appeals of African leaders for 
the US to increase investments in agricultural production through the MCA (Chissano, Kufuor, 
& Mcpherson, 2002).  This priority dovetailed with civil society organizations’ focus on the 
poor. The development finance institutions’ PRSP process allowed these groups’ joint concerns 
to translate into development and poverty reduction proposals and projects in a sector that had 
been neglected for two decades through the 1980s and 1990s (Bezemer & Headey, 2008).   
As part of MCC compact development, the CA blunted this process.  The CA was unable, 
because of the data it relied on and its practitioners’ orthodox economic proclivities, to perceive 
constraints in the rural economy.  Of the 14 compacts developed with a CA, only one, the 
Moldova compact, which was the first to be developed using the CA methodology, had any 
substantial focus on agricultural and rural development.  However, this was in spite of rather 
than because of its CA report; it did not identify irrigation or other rural development priorities 
as binding or nonbinding constraints.  Constraints analyses for only three countries—Indonesia, 
Malawi, and Georgia—identified irrigation as a constraint (all nonbinding).  None of these 
countries’ eventual compacts invested in agriculture and rural development.  The analytical 
invisibility of binding constraints in the rural economy made it difficult to argue for compact 
investments in agriculture and rural development (Interviewee 2G, personal communication, 
February 26, 2016).  
At the same time, CAs changed the nature of bias in decision making. They created space 
for senior officials’ bias at MCC headquarters to factor into investment decisions.  Pressure from 
Washington always played a role in compact development. Proposals often changed following 
negotiation with MCC headquarters.  However, in earlier compacts, partner countries initiated 
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and led the proposal process drawing on the PRSP and other planning documents and activities.  
With the CA, while the partner country’s economics team was technically in charge, in practice 
they followed the lead of MCC economists (and their consultants) who understood the CA far 
better than they did.  The CA shifted the locus of compact development activity and thus 
negotiating capital back towards MCC headquarters.  This facilitated the entry of White House 
politics into compact development and partly eroded MCC’s commitment to country ownership. 
On average, CAs identified three binding constraints (Table 5.5).  This was because, 
according to an MCC economist, “A single constraint would pigeon-hole the institution into 
doing something in that constraint without any room to maneuver” (Interviewee 2M, personal 
communication, March 22, 2016).  The absence of a ranked prioritization among identified 
constraints left room, albeit more limited than before, for old ways of negotiating, or bias, to 
enter: “You could drive a truck through a lot of [constraints analyses].  And it points you in 
directions, but then there’s a lot of discretion for decision making within those directions” 
(Interviewee 3C, personal communication, May 26, 2016).  
The bias in Washington, DC at that time was towards the energy sector.  In two of 
MCC’s earlier experiences with CAs completed in 2011—Ghana and Tanzania—energy was 
identified as a binding constraint to growth.  According to Eric Postel, USAID’s Associate 
Administrator, the Ghana and Tanzania experiences led to the Obama Administration’s Power 
Africa initiative (personal communication, July 28, 2105).  Power Africa was designed to 
enhance power sector institutions, address constraints to investment, and enhance energy sector 
governance.  According to a Congressional Research Service Report, twelve US agencies 
participating in Power Africa have committed up to $9.7 billion to the initiative through 2018 in 
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the form of technical aid, grants, export and trade capital and risk mitigation tools, loans, and 
other resources (Cook, Campbell, Brown, & Ratner, 2015).  
Power Africa affected MCC’s future compact decisions.  Rather than the “strong 
ministry” culture in partner countries influencing which sector to invest in, the White House 
exerted pressure on agencies involved in Power Africa.  In a situation where multiple constraints 
were identified and one was not prioritized over another, the bias was towards energy.  One 
sector specialist remarked that “[t]he pressure to align MCC with Power Africa led senior 
officials to ignore other sectors” (Interviewee 2L, personal communication, March 22, 2016).  
For example, in Liberia both energy and transport had been identified as binding constraints to 
growth and the country government argued for a compact focused on road development. 
Nonetheless, the energy sector dominated the compact because of Power Africa (Interviewee 2T, 
personal communication, April 5, 2016).  Of the 14 compacts developed with a CA, seven are in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  All but one, Cape Verde’s second compact, focused on the energy sector.  
Meanwhile, of the seven compacts not in Sub-Saharan Africa, only Indonesia’s compact had a 
focus on energy and it is relatively minor. 
 The Spatial Distribution of Development Funds.  In addition to affecting which sectors 
MCC invested in, CAs affected the spatial distribution of development finance.  Two-thirds (67 
percent) of all committed funds in compacts developed with CAs were allocated to activities 
located in or benefiting urban areas (see Figure 5.11).  Before CAs, compact funds were 
invested in urban areas 36 percent of the time.  This represents a 60 percent difference.  
Meanwhile, the MCC invested 54 percent and 28 percent of funds in rural areas in compacts 
developed without and with CAs, respectively.  This decline is not just because of the shift away 
from the agriculture sector.  Prior to MCC’s adoption of CAs, MCC had large programs in, 
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among others, rural water (Mozambique, Lesotho, and Ghana I), rural property rights (Burkina 
Faso, Madagascar, and Nicaragua), and rural roads (Cape Verde, Tanzania I, and Armenia).  
Constraints analyses not only shifted funds across sectors from Agriculture and Rural 
Development and Transport to Energy and Water and Sanitation, but also within sectors from 
investments in rural areas to urban areas.  
 
Figure 5.11. Percent of Total Compact Funds Allocated to Urban or Rural Activities 
 
Source:  Country Compact Descriptions and Summaries of Multi-Year Financial Plans. 
Notes:  MCC does not designate a spatial classification to its activities. The classifications “urban”, “rural”, 
and “both” are subjective assessments applied to each activity MCC has funded between 2005 and 2015.  
 
 The reason we see greater urban programming after CAs were adopted is because of a 
combination of the methodological features of the CA, such as its use of shadow prices, and 
economists’ greater influence over project design and selection. The constraint analysis 
correlates GDP and other measures of capital formation with service levels and implies that 
capital formation as a result of infrastructure levels is a desirable outcome. Thus, infrastructure 
must be delivered in a way to maximize capital formation.  Rural areas exhibit relatively lower 
“impulse responses” or changes in wealth, investment, and agglomeration to infrastructure 
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center rather than rural peripheries, particularly if cost-recovery of service delivery is a 
governing principle.  A senior MCC official put it this way: 
In [Country] there is a focus on moving goods and people as a constraint to growth, but 
the constraints analysis considers this constraint to be within the city confines. Some have 
argued that the transportation constraint should be considered more broadly, say across 
the country.  But the constraints analysis and economists focus on the capital because it is 
the economic hub; it has the main port (Interviewee 2H, personal communication, March 
2, 2016). 
 
Some economic geographers claim that supposedly space-neutral approaches such as growth 
diagnostics are implicitly “capital-city promoting” (McCann & Rodríguez-Pose, 2011).  The 
constraints analysis methodology combined with MCC economists’ Finance Ministry tendency 
favors the center over the periphery.  This in turn disregards agricultural and rural development 
interventions. According to a social and gender assessment specialist who was skeptical of the 
CA’s narrow focus on private investment and formal firms,  “[Growth diagnostics] is about 
growth in the center” (Interviewee 2G, personal communication, February 26, 2016).   
Shifts Towards Policy and Institutional Reform.  Finally, in addition to CAs changing 
the distribution across and within sectors, CAs changed the nature of projects as well.  They 
shifted funding away from hard investments in infrastructure towards investments in policy and 
institutional reform.  MCC has been interested in reform as part of its investments since the 
beginning.  However, MCC did not have the appropriate instruments for carrying out this type of 
work.37  After the CA, the typical compact was focused on a single sector with only three 
                                                
37 Before CAs MCC relied on something called “Conditions Precedents”.  Conditions precedents were, as the term 
implies, conditions that countries would need to fulfill before receiving a disbursement of funds, which occurred 
every fiscal quarter.  Conditions precedents would be agreed upon when compacts were signed and written into the 
disbursement schedule based on a project timeline.  Many conditions precedents involved policy or institutional 
changes like the establishment of a road maintenance fund. The partner country government would have to take 
action on something like this before funding for a highway rehabilitation project would be disbursed.  The issue with 
conditions precedents was that they were often part of checklists that lacked “teeth”, were underfunded, and not 
always strategically integrated into compact design.   
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projects and at least one of those projects was usually focused on reform.  Investments in reform 
involve funding for changes to policy, laws, regulations, and the institutions responsible for 
implementing them.  
Constraints analyses helped change MCC’s work on reform.  MCC now does reform 
“much more, with much greater ambition, and much greater confidence” (Interviewee 2P, 
personal communication, March 29, 2016). According to one senior official, “That’s not only 
because of the constraints analysis, but it was an important part of it” (Interviewee 2P, personal 
communication, March 29, 2016).  Constraints analyses were central to this shift because they 
“allowed a modeling of policy change as a constraint to growth.  The constraints analysis helped 
model policy as a first order constraint and allowed for a comparison of its benefits alongside 
typical ‘hard’ projects like roads” (Interviewee 2B, personal communication, February 11, 2016).  
Compacts developed without a CA invested 9 percent of their funds to reform related activities.  
This jumped to 33 percent among compacts developed with a CA, which represents an almost 
four-fold increase (see Figure 5.12).  
Figure 5.12. Percent of Funds Going to Reform Activities Before and After CAs 
Affected Compact Design (2010) 
 
Source: Compacts’ Summaries of Multi-Year Financial Plans. 
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As a result of the increased focus on reform, MCC’s compacts increasingly resembled 
World Bank Sector Adjustment Loans, or SECALs.  Sector adjustment loans were part of the 
World Bank’s structural adjustment lending in the 1980s and 1990s.  In 1982, the SECAL was 
introduced for policy changes and institutional reforms in a specific sector (World Bank, 2001).  
They focused on major sectoral issues such as the incentive and regulatory frameworks for 
private sector development, institutional capability, and expenditure programs.  Between 1980 
and 2000 the World Bank operationalized 233 SECALs worth $42.5 billion, making up 44 
percent of total structural adjustment lending (World Bank, 2001).  This is how a World Bank 
energy SECAL in Senegal approved in 1998 for $100 million was described: “This program 
promotes reforms in the energy sector, with the aim of providing more efficient electric power 
service and lowering electricity and petroleum prices. These reforms—which support the 
government’s medium-term reform agenda—will reduce factor costs, improve Senegal’s 
competitiveness and growth prospects, and increase job opportunities” (World Bank, 2001: 15).   
The challenge is that MCC is not a development bank, but a bilateral grant-making 
agency.  MCC’s embrace of growth diagnostics—a tool that sought to displace a laundry list 
approach to economic reforms—to narrow down laundry lists of proposed projects altered the 
agency’s portfolio to look more like the World Bank’s structural adjustment lending in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  While many at MCC wanted a tool to narrow down proposed projects, it’s not clear 
they intended to change the fundamental nature of MCC’s programs.  A senior MCC official 
who had worked for years at the World Bank, including on SECALs, put the change in compact 
composition in a broader context: 
We were set up in order to do what’s called a developmental intervention in an eligible 
county for five years and that intervention alone would contribute to economic growth 
and poverty reduction. That was the whole purpose of creating MCC.  The purpose of 
MCC is not to solve a constraint that is inhibiting growth at a macro level… So, why are 
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we focused on that when the whole purpose of creating MCC was project based? 
(Interviewee 2T, personal communication, April 5, 2016).  
 
Conclusion  
As the fields of development policy and development economics reckoned with the 
ramifications of the Washington Consensus, three Harvard University economists developed a 
methodology to diagnose what prevented greater private capital investment in countries.  The 
approach—rooted in contextualized problem-solving—was a direct response to the universal 
prescriptions of the Washington Consensus period.  MCC economists proposed adapting and 
adopting this method to guide investment decision-making for MCC compact development. 
Their concern was that existing approaches were too politicized and therefore inefficient, both in 
terms of organizational processes and economic growth outcomes for countries.  They 
successfully enrolled senior officials in their efforts at enhanced engagement with country core-
teams.  Growth diagnostics were introduced at MCC with little to no resistance despite being at 
odds with the way many MCC environmental and social assessment experts conceived of 
development.  This was principally because these specialists did not, at the time, present a 
solution to senior management of their own, express their opposition as a coherent rationale, or 
organize themselves into an opposing network.   
Growth diagnostics reshaped the compact development process by putting economists at 
the forefront of compact development, including the consultative process.  Expressed through 
various features of the diagnostic such as the use of global competitiveness surveys and tests 
employing shadow prices, their economic rationality influenced the composition of compacts.  A 
comparison of compacts developed with and without growth diagnostics illustrates the method’s 
role in shifting funds away from the agriculture and rural development sector and into the energy 
sector; rural areas and into urban areas; and hard infrastructure into policy and institutional 
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reform investments.  In half a decade, the deployment of a tool designed to reform structural 
adjustment lending practices in an aid agency with a project finance model made MCC’s 
investments look more like the structural adjustment programs one might find at multilateral 
development banks in the 1990s. 
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Chapter 6: The Power of Randomized Controlled Trials in Development Projects 
Introduction 
This third case examines MCC’s use of randomized controlled trials (RCT) to conduct 
impact evaluations of development projects.  MIT’s Poverty Action Lab made RCTs popular by 
the early 2000s.  Around that same time, the Center for Global Development began to review 
how the development community conducted project evaluations.  This chapter describes how a 
network formed around RCTs consisting of the Poverty Action Lab, the Center for Global 
Development, and the Bush Administration’s interagency group working at the time to create the 
Millennium Challenge Account.  It then explains how MCC evaluation economists, with help 
from this network, transformed the academic purposes of the RCT for development evaluation 
and got the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC) Monitoring and Evaluation department 
to adopt RCTs despite resistance from more “traditional” performance evaluators and sector 
specialists.  By 2015, MCC had initiated 23 RCTs, accounting for one out of every six impact 
evaluations at the agency.  RCTs were not, however, distributed evenly among MCC’s 
investments and this chapter lays out the reasons for this imbalance.   
This chapter then discusses how MCC’s adoption of RCTs affected project participant 
selection and implementation on a subset of farmer training projects.  It focuses on how 
randomization and the need to limit contamination between treatment and control groups 
conflicted with project implementers’ existing rationales for project participant selection and 
execution.  It presents evidence of how project participants and implementation were different as 
a consequence of RCTs.  The chapter closes with a discussion of what the outcomes were from 
some of MCC’s earliest RCTs in farmer training projects and what those outcomes meant for 
farmer training projects and MCC’s results agenda. 
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The Rise of RCTs in Development Economics 
Perhaps no other figure is synonymous with the explosion of RCTs in development as 
Esther Duflo, MIT Professor of Poverty Alleviation and Development Economics.  Duflo, 
originally from France, graduated with a doctorate in economics from the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT) in 1999.  The MIT economics department is considered one of the most 
prestigious and influential economics departments globally. It has produced at least 14 Nobel 
Laureates and has a storied history.  Paul Samuelson, who fused economics with mathematics, 
was a key figure in establishing the department and Robert Solow, the “father” of growth 
accounting and modeling, began his career there in 1949 and stayed until reaching emeritus 
status in 1995.   
Esther Duflo’s dissertation Essays in Empirical Development Economics redefined an 
academic field in search of a new identity.  Supervised by Abhijit Banerjee, who co-authored one 
of her dissertation chapters, Duflo studied three cases of development: primary school 
construction in Indonesia, social pensions in South Africa, and reputation’s role on contractual 
outcomes in the Indian software industry.  Given how many dissertations in development 
economics today are based on RCTs, it is perhaps surprising that the method’s chief proponent 
did not employ any in her own. Nonetheless, Duflo’s Indonesia chapter spearheaded the RCT 
movement. This is because she relied on the Indonesian government’s decision to build 61,000 
primary schools across the country between 1973 and 1978 as an instrumental variable.  She 
called this program an “unusual policy experiment” because it both drastically changed the 
Indonesian government’s expenditure levels on primary education and affected a specific 
population of students: children younger than 13 in 1973.  By using the variation in school 
expenditures generated by this policy as an instrumental variable for the impact of education on 
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wages, Duflo was able to isolate and estimate the program’s economic returns to education using 
Indonesian census data (Duflo, 1999).   
The dominant method in development economics research at the time was cross-country 
growth regressions.  In the 1980s and into the 1990s, development economics researchers and 
doctoral students preferred conducting growth regressions to identify the successful determinants 
of economic growth (Durlauf, 2009).  Through deduction and stylized models, they attempted to 
explain the determinants of growth empirically (Milberg, 2009).  These regression studies, 
however, invited critique for their failure to establish causality.  Analysts were accused of 
explanatory variable selection bias for the production and publication of statistically significant 
results (Eble, Boone, & Elbourne, 2017). 
Duflo’s dissertation addressed the identification problem for outcome variables using a 
natural policy experiment, which was highly influential.  This overshadowed the fact that she had 
done so only for a specific sectoral program rather than national level economic policy, which 
was the usual focus of growth regressions.  The important thing was that she had established 
causality in a way that bypassed some of the challenges of identifying an instrument in growth 
regressions.  As a technique for isolating causality, randomization was considered far superior 
and preferable to instrumental variables.  But it was not until she and her former advisor, Abhijit 
Banerjee, began working with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) in India in the early 2000s 
that the idea to use random allocation of program interventions to test impact really began.   
Duflo and Banerjee partnered with Pratham and Seva Mandir, two NGOs working on 
education in India.  Pratham was much larger and worked in several states while Seva Mandir 
was small and had operations only in Rajasthan state.  The key lesson they took away from these 
experiences was that partnering with development organizations allowed researchers to modify 
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and test micro-interventions, such as extra tutors or blackboards in classrooms, through pilot 
programs to discover “what works”.  The quality of the partnership and its limited scale allowed 
randomization and the implementation of RCTs.38 Experimental results could then be built 
inductively without, supposedly, the imposition of theory.   
This argument for rigorous experimental results was appealing to a field that was in 
search of legitimacy within the academy (Bhatt, 2011; Porter, 1996).  The fact that external 
development organizations were willing to partner with development economists and fund 
research was all the more helpful. A decade and a half later, RCTs became a mainstay within 
American economics departments. Mainstream development economics has been gradually 
decimated into “micro-level impact appraisal studies” of developmental projects and the broader 
macroeconomic questions have been displaced from the field (Akbulut et al., 2015).  
In 2003, Duflo and Banerjee institutionalized their approach to development economics 
by co-founding the MIT Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL).  J-PAL’s founders say 
its mission is “[t]o reduce poverty by ensuring that policy is based on scientific evidence” 
(Banerjee & Duflo, 2012).  By early 2016, J-PAL had initiated 732 RCTs on five continents. It 
has already completed 485 of those (J-PAL, 2016).  J-PAL has six global offices and spurred 
partners committed to its mission, namely Innovations for Poverty Action at Yale University and 
the Center of Evaluation for Global Action at the University of California Berkeley.  It would not 
be an overstatement to suggest that J-PAL and its many academic affiliates have transformed 
what counts as development knowledge.  There has been an explosion of published studies using 
the RCT methodology (see Figure 6.1): 
                                                
38 Throughout this chapter I will use the term RCT to refer to a particular form of randomized trial conducted in non-
laboratory social settings, which some scholars prefer to call a randomized field experiment (RFE).  
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Figure 6.1. The Rise of RCTs in Development 
 
Source: 3ie (2015). 3ie (2015). Impact Evaluation Repository. Available: 
http://www.3ieimpact.org/en/evidence/impact-evaluations/impact-evaluation-repository/ 
Notes: QE stands for quasi-experimental designs (i.e., a counterfactual is established without 
randomization).  
 
These research centers also regularly provide training and consulting services to major 
development, philanthropic, and academic institutions across the globe.  The surge in RCTs has 
had a major impact on the practices of multilateral development institutions such as the World 
Bank, philanthropic foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, bilateral donors 
such as the German Corporation for International Cooperation, and international 
nongovernmental organizations. By 2010 the World Bank alone had initiated over 200 RCTs 
(Legovini, 2010).  As one review of the field put it, “development economics can best be 
understood as…responding to the research, project evaluation, auditing requirements of the 
national and international, governmental and nongovernmental institutions of development” 
(Akbulut et al., 2015: 749).  
  218 
Stabilizing RCTs in MCC 
While the empirical turn in development economics throughout North America paved the 
way for the rise of RCTs, how did their popularity in academia translate into their widespread 
adoption among various development agencies?  How did changes in development economics 
dovetail with changes in development policy and administration to make RCTs an attractive 
governmental rationality?  In 2004, the Center for Global Development (CGD) set up an 
evaluation “working group” to review how the development community conducted project 
evaluations.  The working group established standards of evidence.  Based on these standards, it 
determined that there was a significant “gap” between using counterfactuals to assess impact—of 
which RCTs represented the “gold standard” approach—and evaluations that development 
agencies were conducting.  A network formed around RCTs consisting of J-PAL, the CGD 
evaluation working group, and the George W. Bush administration’s interagency group that 
created the MCA. With the help of CGD’s establishment of evaluation evidence standards, MCC 
evaluation economists transformed the academic purposes of the RCT for development 
evaluation. 
 Mind the Gap: RCTs and Accountability Converge Around Impact Evaluation.  In 
the late 1990s a select group of professional economists, or economists “in the wild” (Callon & 
Rabeharisoa, 2003), and development elites began to grow concerned about identifying 
developmental impact.  Their principal complaint was that the development community was not 
learning, specifically, about whether their investments “worked”:  
The frustration I’m referring to is one that I have personally felt over the years working in 
the development business, being asked to design, implement and advise developing 
country governments on complex development programs in the health and education 
sectors with little more to go on than some theory, my own on-the-job experience and 
observations, some good advice from colleagues and the occasional case report in the 
literature…$30 billion of development assistance are spent annually…on well-
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intentioned development programs that are based on very weak evidence about what 
works (When Will We Ever Learn, 2006: 2).  
 
The quote above is from Ruth Levine, co-author of a report of the Center for Global 
Development called When Will We Ever Learn: Improving Lives Through Impact Evaluation 
(“The Report”) (The Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006).  Levine and fellow colleague 
William Savedoff convened the CGD Evaluation Gap Working Group.  The 21-member 
Working Group was comprised of 10 professional and academic economists, five development 
policy and four health sector elites, and two evaluation professionals.  Esther Duflo, co-founder 
of MIT’s J-PAL, was among the economist members.  The Working Group was financed by a 
grant to CGD from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the William and Flora Hewlett 
Foundation to, according to the Report, “Address the lack of information about the effectiveness 
of social programs in low- and middle-income countries” (The Evaluation Gap Working Group, 
2006: 46).  The Working Group sought to understand the reasons for the dearth of good impact 
evaluation and the possible ways to make significant progress toward closing the “evaluation 
gap” (The Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006). 
The Working Group reviewed the current status of impact evaluations in social sector 
programs and developed recommendations to address the evaluation gap problem. In doing this it 
consulted with over 100 stakeholders, including governments, the research community, private 
foundations, multilateral and bilateral agencies, and major international NGOs.  Among the 36 
individuals closely consulted for the Report were Abhijit Banerjee, the other J-PAL founder, and 
Rachel Glennerster, J-PAL’s executive director (Center for Global Development, n.d.). 
The evaluation gap in the Report refers to the space between where the state of 
development evidence is and where it ought to be.  But what is good evidence?  How does one 
define impact?  And how does one go about determining if a program works?  These are all 
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questions of epistemology, or how humans create knowledge.  By answering them, the Working 
Group was establishing standards of evidence and creating a hierarchy of knowledge. The RCT 
as a gold standard in development impact evaluation came to represent one such system of 
authority.  Thus, to identify and direct others’ gaze towards a gap in knowledge requires, first, 
the construction of a hierarchy of knowledge, of elevating the value of some ways of knowing 
above others and, then, to suggest that the knowledge most worth knowing is currently in short 
supply. In other words, these economists cultivated a sense of ignorance and scarcity.  
Prior to the Working Group’s formation in 2004, there was no dearth of knowledge per se 
in the field of development.  Even one of the report’s authors, Ruth Levine, acknowledged this: 
I think you know there’s a kind of perpetual problem that we’ve encountered in this 
project with the word “evaluation”, because it’s really, it’s such a broad word.  It covers 
so many different kinds of knowledge generation. And what we tried in a sort of very 
disciplined way was to consistently talk about impact evaluation.  But there’s a whole 
range of other kinds of evaluations that are done within development institutions (When 
Will We Ever Learn, 2006: 20).   
 
The Working Group identified multiple forms of “other kinds” of knowledge generated by 
development agencies: i) monitoring data, which verifies whether programs were implemented 
according to plan, expected outputs were realized, and intended beneficiaries were reached; ii) 
process evaluations, which ask how and why programs get implemented and generate “best 
practices” and “lessons learned”; iii) accounting data, which are usually compiled in financial 
statements as a way to account for taxpayer spending; and iv) impact evaluations, which generate 
knowledge about whether a program achieved its basic aims (The Evaluation Gap Working 
Group, 2006).  But what is it about these other reports that make them necessary but insufficient?  
If internal evaluation teams contribute important knowledge to “good decisions”, then why are 
we still not learning?  Because, according to the Working Group, learning is synonymous with 
impact, which is invaluable to attribution of the outcome to the intervention. 
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A true impact evaluation must have a counterfactual.  An evaluation that simply assesses 
the effect on beneficiaries before and after the program without reference to a comparison group 
is at best invalid if not entirely harmful and misleading: “To determine what works, it is 
necessary to collect data to estimate what would have happened without the program…By 
examining how people in a particular program fared vis-à-vis an appropriate comparison group, 
it is possible to measure the impact that can be attributed to the specific program.  And it is only 
this impact that truly measures the program’s effect” (Savedoff & Levine, 2006: 2).  Meanwhile, 
process evaluations “[p]rovide little insight into our actual impacts and, although crucial, their 
contribution to knowledge essentially focuses on a better understanding of operational 
constraints and local institutional and social contexts” (Jacquet, 2006: 178).  
 A valid counterfactual, or a state of the world without the program, is a construct, an 
epistemological product that “mimics” a world that in reality cannot be observed.  Experimental 
and quasi-experimental methods are the best methods to achieve credible counterfactuals.  The 
gold standard in experimental methods is the RCT.  It doesn’t produce just any counterfactual, 
but a control group, whose outcomes when compared to those of the treatment group, or 
beneficiaries receiving the intervention, produces the most internally valid estimates of program 
impact.  Other quasi-experimental methods, chiefly statistical matching, interrupted time series, 
and instrumental variable approaches all try to approximate the experimental assignment of 
treatment and control groups but all run into problems of biases related to observable differences 
between the two groups.  The technical features of these methods are less relevant here than the 
recognition that there is an explicitly accepted hierarchy among them with the RCT comfortably 
resting atop.   
 The RCT’s superiority in constructing control groups favorable to attributing project 
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specific effects explains why the method, so popular with American economists in the academy, 
dovetailed with ambitions of economists in the wild to make impact evaluation practices among 
development agencies and policymakers more rigorous and scientific.  But this still does not 
explain how they made their way, despite opposition, into development agencies’ evaluation 
units and, in the case of the MCC, became the preferred evaluation approach.  
Belling the Cat: MCC as an Evaluation Pioneer.  In describing the challenge of getting 
development agencies to adopt impact evaluations, CGD’s William Savedoff asked: “Who will 
bell the cat?” (When Will We Ever Learn, 2006: 10). Belling the Cat is a fable that provides the 
lesson of how easy it is to propose impossible remedies. A young mouse suggested to his fellow 
mice that belling a marauding cat would warn them of her approach. An old mouse replied, 
“That is all very well, but who is to bell the Cat?” (Jacobs, 1909).  The dangers in development 
policy are not as grave but impact evaluations do present a collective action problem because of 
myriad disincentives: negative findings may lead to budget cuts or loss of organizational 
prestige; rapid start-up and implementation are rewarded over the time to conduct evaluations; 
and politicians value social programs to gain electoral advantage rather than long-term social 
goals (The Evaluation Gap Working Group, 2006).  Thus Savedoff pleaded that “[w]e have to 
get pioneers who are willing to take the risk” (When Will We Ever Learn, 2006: 10).  Among 
U.S. development agencies, MCC belled the cat.  
MCC felt comfortable taking this risk in large part because of CGD’s efforts to establish 
RCTs as the gold standard for project evaluation.  The CGD Working Group was not just 
engaged in an intellectual exercise but in building a network through which impact evaluation 
gains power.  As part of its consultations, CGD conducted two “roundtables” where the Working 
Group’s objectives and ideas were discussed and roundtable participants were asked for 
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feedback. One of these roundtables was held at the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation in 
Menlo Park, CA on July 25, 2005 and the other at CGD in Washington, DC on August 1, 2005.  
Attendees of the CGD roundtable included Delia Welsh, MCC’s Associate Director for 
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), and Andrew Warner, MCC’s Senior Economist. Jon Baron, 
Executive Director of the Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy (CEP), an advocacy group that 
lobbies the federal government (including MCC) to use RCTs, also attended.   
While the Working Group was busy setting standards and building an epistemic 
community (Haas, 1992) for impact evaluation, another working group was busy 
operationalizing the MCC to manage the Bush Administration’s Millennium Challenge Account 
(MCA).  The White House put together an interagency working group to establish the MCC 
while Congress reviewed MCA legislation.  It included members from the Treasury and State 
Departments, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), and National Security Council (NSC) (see Chapter 4). In addition to 
“selectivity” (of countries it would fund) and “country ownership” (of investment plans), one of 
MCC’s guiding principles was a “focus on results”.  Members from Treasury and OMB were 
responsible for defining results and to them it meant a reliance on RCTs to evaluate projects: 
“That’s why OMB got so involved with MCC because it was a completely performance driven 
agency…and the RCT thing was really just because the space was wide open.  In the typical 
Bush administration initiative they just had principles but no operational plans” (Interviewee 3K, 
personal communication, July 7, 2016). MCC working group members from Treasury and OMB 
went on to hold senior positions in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) at MCC. 
In the same year that the Working Group was conducting its consultations, J-PAL was 
preparing to launch its first ever Executive Training Course called Evaluating Social Programs.  
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Up until that moment, J-PAL had spent its energy training undergraduate and graduate 
economics students in the arts of field experiments, power calculations, and intent-to-treat 
estimates.  Duflo, Banerjee, and colleagues were now ready to repackage the RCT for popular 
policy consumption. The executive training course ran for five days from March 21st to 25th, 
2005 in Cambridge, MA and consisted of a combination of lectures, group work, and group 
presentations.  There were seven lecturers: three from MIT, three from Harvard, and one from 
Princeton.  Lecture topics included Why Randomize? How to Randomize? Managing Threats and 
Policy Impact and External Validity (Poverty Action Lab, 2005).  Group work centered on 
analyzing early field experiments that J-PAL had conducted in India and Kenya and, more 
importantly, programs that participants were grappling with from their respective agencies.  
There were 24 attendees—ten from multilateral development banks, seven from academia or 
research institutes, three from developing country ministries, three from the UN and NGOs, and 
two from the US federal government.  One of the US federal government attendees was Delia 
Welsh, Associate Director for M&E at MCC (Poverty Action Lab, 2005). 
The CGD Working Group, MCA interagency group, and J-PAL were part of a network 
whose ideas traveled into the state via its members (see Figure 6.2).  In 2008 MCC cohosted an 
event with the Council for Excellence in Government in Washington, DC called Rigorous 
Evidence: A Key to Progress Against World Poverty? At the end of that event, Jon Baron, the 
executive director of the Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy, acknowledged Welsh’s 
contribution at MCC: “Someone who’s in this room who really was a key force in MCC’s focus 
on rigorous impact evaluations, helping to make it part of the whole enterprise. It’s Delia 
Welsh…Could you just stand up for a moment?” (Rigorous Evidence, 2008: 51). 
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Figure 6.2. The RCT Network 
 
Source: Author. 
Notes: Arrows represent common working relationships and exchange of people and influence. 
 
Making RCTs an Organizational Reality.  Between 2004 and 2006 RCTs had become 
an evaluation policy reality at MCC.  The RCT network’s members, connected to MCC through 
Delia Welsh, had the power to translate broad policy ideals such as focusing on results into 
administrative reality.  One way expertise influences development is because its “mundane and 
material technologies make it possible to translate the ‘programmatic’ ideas of government into 
practice” (Justesen & Mouritsen, 2011). The next steps were to build material resources around 
RCTs. 
One important feature to impact evaluation advocates was independence.  The 
PROGRESA evaluation in Mexico was lauded for involving experts outside the Mexican 
government. 39  William Savedoff said, “External actors help with expertise with quality and with 
integrity…It was very important, for example, in Progressa, that the academics were involved, an 
external agent” (When Will We Ever Learn, 2006: 7).  MCC adopted the PROGRESA model 
and the Working Group’s recommendation when it launched an ID/IQ (indefinite delivery / 
indefinite quantity) contracting vehicle to procure evaluation services from a select number of 
                                                
39 PROGRESA was a major conditional cash transfer and social welfare program that started in Mexico in 1997. 
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evaluation firms.  When soliciting bids, the ID/IQ provided a Statement of Work that described 
what the firms would be required to do and requested firms’ proof of prior experience. An MCC 
solicitation for proposals stated that: “[t]he contractor shall provide technical assistance in a 
variety of areas in carrying out evaluations using a randomized design in response to long-term 
and short-term task assignments.  Experience with the methodology of randomized trials is 
required as well as application of the methodology in developing countries” (MCC, 2006c: 6).   
 The ID/IQ contract represented a unification of the Working Group’s recommendations 
and MCC evaluation guidance.  MCC was no longer just trying to bell the cat for symbolic 
purposes but was putting material resources behind RCTs. Human resources were also geared, in 
part, towards RCTs.  In the words of one early M&E manager, “Every time we did recruiting, 
[experience with RCTs] is what we looked for” (Interviewee 3B, personal communication, April 
27, 2016).  
Conflicting Rationalities in Participant Selection 
To compete, a particular intellectual rationality such as RCTs must contend with other 
rationalities, and, if it is to survive and thrive, overcome them.  There are three sites of conflict in 
the context of MCC that warrant examination: the Department of Accountability, Transaction 
Team, and process of compact implementation.  Evaluation economists had to overcome peer 
dissention in the Department of Accountability from M&E staff with decades of experience in 
performance evaluation.40  In the Transaction Team, they had to overcome sector opposition to 
RCTs.  In compact implementation, they had to overcome opposition to RCTs from 
implementers in the field.  Strategic and productive power was central to overcoming this 
                                                
40 Evaluation economists at MCC were often not PhD economists or trained exclusively in economics. They usually 
had masters’ degrees in public policy, international development, or related fields and had training and skills in 
quantitative and data analysis and research design.   
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opposition. 
 Overcoming Conflicting Rationalities.  RCTs have their advocates, but also their 
detractors.  Arguments against RCTs are made most commonly for epistemological, operational, 
and ethical reasons.  The most common methodological critique is that RCTs lack external 
validity.  While particular experiments might generate internally (to the experiment) valid impact 
estimates, what is to say such estimates can be reliably transported to other environments 
(Deaton, 2010; Mookherjee, 2005)?  This has been a longstanding criticism of RCTs that extends 
beyond its use in development economics and remains unsettled.  
Many development practitioners are opposed to RCTs for operational and reputational 
reasons.  There is intense pressure on project managers and implementers to disburse funds, 
deliver outputs to project participants, and do no harm.  The MCC, for example, has been 
pressured to disburse funds quickly and admonished for not doing so (Dugger, 2007).  
Development agencies increasingly face scrutiny and backlash over social and environmental 
harm (Fox & Brown, 1998). The need to account for an RCT among the long list of other 
priorities is, in the short term, viewed as a nuisance to be avoided.  In the long term, there may be 
disincentives to RCTs and impact evaluations more generally to minimize reputational risk.  Few 
agencies and managers are comfortable being responsible for their projects’ impacts when they 
have limited control over project implementation and virtually no control over other exogenous 
variables (e.g., weather patterns, input prices).  
Another relevant challenge for development actors is the ethics of RCTs.  It is ethically 
suspect, especially in resource poor environments, to deny a group of people access to a resource 
that potentially benefits them (Reddy, 2012; Ziliak & Teather-Posadas, 2014).  This is where 
RCT advocates’ exercise of establishing standards of evidence and knowledge is crucial.  The 
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benefit of denying some participants resources is the knowledge, or learning, that can be gained 
from experimentation.  Such knowledge is framed as a public good that will extend well beyond 
the specific project to benefit the entire development community (Stiglitz, 1999).  But this 
definition of knowledge and evidence was created within a particular epistemic community that 
others will likely not share.  If knowledge definitions are particular to epistemic communities, 
then other actors, such as project managers, sector specialists, and implementers, who are trained 
within other epistemic communities such as engineering, agronomy, or public health will have 
different standards of evidence and knowledge. More importantly, they will have other ways and 
means of knowing based on their accumulated development experience. They will not be 
convinced, at least at first, that they are ignorant of what works. These competing knowledge 
claims, between the evaluation economists’ quest for truth through epistemic method and the 
development practitioner’s accumulated knowledge through experience, sets up “conflicting 
rationalities”.   
 Sites of Social Control.  According to Breslau’s study of RCTs in United States’ labor 
market and welfare policy, the success of RCTs is rooted in social control:  
An experiment is more than just a technical problem of research design but is also a 
negotiation of political terrain… The integrity of the experiments was preserved based on 
the degree of cooperation from operating staff, such as street level bureaucrats, and 
clients—Such cooperation requires a resolution of social control…When full social 
control is achieved, experimenters can even become the implementers (Breslau, 1998: 
73).    
 
The concept of “impact” was one of the crucial devices at evaluation economists’ 
disposal to overcome opposition from peer dissenters and sector specialists.  Impact evaluations, 
and thus RCTs, are essentially about accountability (after all, MCC’s evaluation division was 
initially housed in the Department of Accountability). Ruth Levine made the point rather 
explicitly before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the issue of Promoting 
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Effectiveness and Fighting Corruption among multilateral development banks: “Knowing 
whether or not the banks are succeeding in financing programs that directly improve people’s 
lives is the core of accountability” (Multilateral Development Banks, 2006: 1). And for Levine 
accountability was essentially about attribution to a discreet project or program: “Assessing this 
type of performance comes from impact evaluation, defined as evaluations that…can be directly 
credited to the program itself, as distinguished from changes that are due to other factors.  That 
is, they are evaluations that permit attribution of program-specific effects” (Multilateral 
Development Banks, 2006: 2). 
While impact evaluations may essentially be about accountability, the ability to cast them 
as either a tool for accountability or learning is why RCTs were smoothly stabilized within 
MCC’s evaluation division.  This is because impact is a vehicular idea (McLennan, 2004; 
Osborne, 2004).  Its purpose was to get the development community to “move on” from process 
evaluations that tell us a great deal about programs themselves to impact evaluations that will 
allow us to learn about program-specific effects.  Evaluation economists could get behind impact 
because it meant learning what works in a way that made sense to them based on their training in 
economics or public policy.  Senior officials that answered to MCC’s Board of Directors and 
Congress could embrace impact under the broad mantle and mandate for being accountable for 
results.  Under the impact umbrella, senior officials and evaluation economists could coexist, 
benefit, and find meaning.  As on senior M&E official put it: “People didn’t understand RCTs, 
but if it gives us truth with a capital ‘T’, that’s one of our three pillars; let’s go for it. [The Vice 
President of Accountability] didn’t understand RCTs, but he would support it because at that 
time results was a really big word” (Interviewee 3B, personal communication, April 27, 2016).  
With senior officials’ weight behind impact evaluations and RCTs, performance evaluators 
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within the Department of Accountability who had “ground level implementation experience” and 
were wary of the methodology, had little choice but to adjust to the new reality of RCTs.  
Once RCTs and quasi-experimental methods were stabilized within MCC’s evaluation 
division and became official evaluation guidance, the big question facing evaluation economists 
was how to get reluctant sector colleagues on the Transaction Team responsible for program 
implementation to go along with an RCT.  MCC was set up as a matrix organization (see Figure 
6.3).  This meant that teams were formed around different functions that had parity with each 
other.  Each team had members from respective technical staff such as Environmental and Social 
Assessment (ESA), Sector Programs, Fiscal Accountability, Economic Analysis, M&E, 
Procurement, and other administrative and legal functions.  The team was collectively 
responsible to a Country Team Leader (during compact implementation, a Resident Country 
Director was in charge) who reported to senior management.  Each individual technical team 
member, however, was also accountable to his or her technical manager, who was a member of 
senior management. 
Figure 6.3.  MCC's Matrix Management Structure, 2004–2007 
 
Source: Author, based on MCC organizational charts. 
Notes: VP stands for Vice President. Vice Presidents were in charge of MCC Departments. Arrows 
represent reporting relationships. 
 
  231 
In this arrangement the evaluation and sector specialists were equals.  Having a “seat at 
the table” allowed MCC evaluation staff to achieve one of the Working Group’s key 
recommendations—co-designing projects and evaluations.  Ruth Levine of CGD said, “Rigorous 
evaluation almost always requires integration into a project design…Even better, early 
integration of program evaluation and design often permits the rollout of a program to be 
randomized” (Levine, 2006: 25). MCC’s guidance reflects this commitment to “co-
experimentation”: “Ideally, project design and evaluation design should be developed 
simultaneously” (MCC, 2006b: 20).  Furthermore, co-experimentation was something J-PAL’s 
founders initially promoted. According to Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo,  “There was less 
emphasis on one-off evaluations, where the researcher is brought in to evaluate a specific 
program that the organization has already decided to evaluate…From the point of view of the 
researchers, this offered the possibility of moving from the role of the evaluator to the role of a 
co-experimenter, with an important role in defining what gets evaluated” (Banerjee & Duflo, 
2008, emphasis added). 
As mentioned earlier, there are substantial disincentives for program and sector 
specialists to engage in co-experimentation.  For these reasons, sector specialists were reluctant 
to co-experiment and had to be convinced to do so; their interests had to be translated to match 
those of the evaluators.  The main struggle between evaluation and sector specialists was 
whether and how to establish a control group.  Thus, the main question became, “Is establishing 
a control group about learning or is it about accountability?”  If it was about learning—within the 
definition of knowledge as a project-attributable impact along narrow measures such as 
income—then establishing a control group became more attractive.  If on the other hand, it was 
about accountability—within the framework of knowing if impacts can be attributed to your 
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project rather than something exogenous like weather or sector specialists’ own biases—then 
establishing a control group became a chore for sector specialists to avoid.  Framing the 
identification of impact through establishment of a control group as learning was critical to 
gaining sector specialists’ cooperation.   
Translating the Interests of Sector Specialists.  MCC’s evaluation economists enrolled 
their sectors specialist colleagues in Washington and partner countries in the experimental cause 
by stressing the idea of impact evaluation as learning rather than accountability through MCC 
presentations and in-country workshops.  A primary task under the ID/IQ contracting mechanism 
directs evaluation firms to conduct “working sessions or training with MCC staff and country 
counterparts…on the evaluation design” (MCC, 2006c: 7).  It goes on to say, “Evaluations using 
randomized design will require that staff and country counterparts understand the methodology, 
are able to discuss why it is applied to specific projects, explain how the evaluations will be 
implemented, analyze results, and apply lessons” (MCC, 2006c: 7).  MCC evaluation economists 
convened these workshops: they were between 1 to 3 days long, held in a country’s capital, and 
led by a contracted evaluation expert, usually an economics professor.  Evaluation economists’ 
goal was to get people who would be involved with implementation to attend.  A workshop in 
Ghana invited about 75 people—five from MCC, 17 from the Ghanaian core team, 20 from 
Ghanaian governmental ministries, 17 from other donor agencies, and 15 from the NGO and 
research communities (not all invitees attended) (MCC, 2006a).  A workshop in El Salvador had 
55 attendees across a similar spectrum of organizations (MCC, 2007a).  The workshops’ 
objectives were to “[d]iscuss evaluation topics such as selection bias, control groups, 
randomization, matching, and difference in differences.  The purpose of the workshop is to train 
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[local counterparts] and implementing entity staff and to discuss possible impact evaluation 
designs for the El Salvador Program” (MCC, 2007b).   
Evaluation economists believed the workshops were successful in achieving their 
objectives of teaching about impact evaluation, alleviating fears or concerns about 
randomization, engaging non-evaluation specialists in impact evaluation, and embedding 
evaluation design early on in program planning. One summary described the workshop 
experience in this way: 
The impact evaluation workshop was successful and set the table for the upcoming 
meetings with each of the implementing entities. Although some parts of the presentation 
were somewhat technical for the audience, we received positive feedback overall that it 
was very helpful in clarifying many issues. The [attendees] were very interested in 
learning more about impact evaluation and became more receptive to the idea of 
randomization…In sum, [the economist] provided an expert, independent and unbiased 
view of possible designs for impact evaluations, which helped to answer many questions 
and also to alleviate concerns on the topic (MCC, 2007b: 1). 
 
MCC is not the only organization that found evaluation workshops useful.  In a blog post, 
Notes from the Field: the usefulness of early workshops, World Bank economist Markus 
Goldstein outlined why he likes doing an evaluation workshop, especially early in the process: 
The next afternoon and the following morning are spent discussing the design of the 
impact evaluation.  I try and keep this as broad as possible to bring the team in and see 
what kind of things we might do—this expansive list helps get people excited about what 
we are doing here…It’s also good to have a range of the folks implementing different 
components or parts of the program present…they’ll be critical for managing the 
integration of program implementation and the evaluation...A couple of other thoughts 
about why these workshops are useful.  First, this really increases the program team’s 
ownership of the evaluation—they see why it’s useful and they are excited about the 
questions we’ll be able to answer.  This is likely to help boost the chances that the 
evaluation won’t flop—if the team understands the logic of why you are (for example) 
randomizing in the first place, they’re probably less likely to undo the randomization 
(Goldstein, 2011).   
 
The World Bank ran over 25 workshops in a five-year period.  From fiscal years 2005 to 2010, 
over 3,100 people were trained on impact evaluation.  Out of the 167 teams that participated in 
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the workshops, 144 implemented their impact evaluation for an “efficiency rate” of 86 percent 
(Legovini, 2010). 
The ultimate goal of workshops was to transform potential adversaries into stakeholders 
in the learning enterprise.  Workshops bonded participants together around a collective 
identity—experimenters.  The economics professors from esteemed universities that led MCC 
workshops served as important sources and figures of authority in this effort. The focus on 
learning, rather than accountability, made the establishment of a control group much more 
palatable.41  
The outcome of these MCC workshops, conducted in virtually every MCC Compact 
country, was often a tentative agreement on which program activities would be evaluated using 
experimental, quasi-experimental, or non-experimental methods.  This agreement was later 
finalized through follow-up meetings and often resulted in legally binding language on the 
integration of impact evaluations into compact implementation.  Specific design features, such as 
randomization, could then be written into contracts between the MCA and implementers.  
Through its experience with impact evaluations, MCC would later conclude that “aligning 
incentives” was central to successfully implementing RCTs (Farley, Lucas, Molyneaux, Penn, & 
Hogue, 2012).  Part of aligning incentives was “creating clarity and incentives” through 
contracts: “Final contracts should, at the very least, ensure that implementers do not have 
incentives to undermine the evaluation methodology, and ideally creates incentives to actively 
support it” (MCC and USAID, 2011: 7).  Nevertheless, as will be shown later, aligning 
                                                
41 Learning was also cultivated at MCC headquarters through less routine MCC presentations and guest speakers, 
usually from J-PAL.   
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incentives through contractual authority was a necessary but insufficient form of power for a 
successful RCT. 
RCTs and Biases in Project Evaluation 
 RCTs at MCC.  Successful social control aligned the priorities of evaluators and sector 
specialists but did not determine which projects were chosen for an impact evaluation or RCT—
this was largely a feature of the RCT itself.  According to RCT proponents, the first and foremost 
reason to do an RCT over and above a quasi-experimental design is selection bias.  
Randomization ensures that there is, on average, parity between treatment and control groups. 
This is how one MCC evaluation economist pitched RCTs for a farmer-training program to her 
MCC sector colleagues based on an a J-PAL explanation of how randomization can determine if 
schooling improves health: 
For the [country] impact evaluation, we want to randomize, mainly because we worry 
about selection bias.  For example, how do we know if one group of extension service 
beneficiaries is applying new technology, growing [fruit], and increasing their incomes as 
a result of the extension service or because this special group is particularly 
entrepreneurial and driven?  Are we biasing our results because we are selecting 
beneficiaries with high potential?  We may attribute their success to the extension 
service, without really knowing if it was the service or something unobservable about 
these beneficiaries.  Using selection criteria that is unrelated to potential success (i.e., 
randomization) can help us address this problem (Beatty, 2006).   
 
A major selling point for random allocation is that such biases are dealt with through the equal 
chance of being allocated to the treatment or control group.  Evaluation economists believe this 
ensures that any difference in outcomes observed after the project between the groups is a 
function of the intervention and not other “unobservables”. 
While proponents regularly tout this benefit, they rarely ever speak of the structurally 
obscured biases of RCTs themselves.  Several economists have pointed out how RCTs distort the 
research agenda in development economics because the method is not appropriate for all 
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questions (Barrett & Carter, 2010; Basu, 2005).  There is, however, little theorization or evidence 
of this distortion or bias in development economics or policy.  It is important to know why the 
RCT method is directed towards what Barrett and Carter (2010) call a “non-random subset of 
relevant topics” and what the implications of that are. 
Over the decade spanning 2005–2015 MCC initiated over 150 evaluations.  Of these, the 
majority were non-experimental or performance evaluations.  About two out of every five 
evaluations were impact evaluations.  When it came to coverage of MCC’s total investments 
portfolio in dollar terms, experimental evaluations, which include quasi-experimental designs, 
were on par with performance evaluations (see Table 6.1).  Only 15 percent of MCC’s portfolio 
was not under evaluation at all or had an evaluation whose design was undetermined.  
Table 6.1 
MCC's Evaluation Record as of 2015 
 FY 2014–2015 
Activities with: 
N 
Percent of total 
MCC investments 
covered (%) 
Non-experimental evaluations 87 46 
All experimental evaluations (quasi + RCT) 57 42 
     RCTs 23 NA 
Sub-total (non-experimental + experimental) 144  
    Experimental evaluations among subtotal (%) 40  
    RCTs among experimental evaluations (%) 40  
    RCTs among subtotal (%) 16  
Evaluations with undetermined design 8 8 
Total Evaluations 152 NA 
Activities not under evaluation 24 4 
Activities not under evaluation (%) 14 NA 
Source: MCC Impact Evaluation Database.	
Notes: “NA” stands for Not Applicable. 
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Of the 57 experimental evaluations completed or still ongoing in fiscal year (FY) 2014–
2015, twenty-three were RCTs (see Appendix D, Table D-1 for a list of MCC RCTs).42  Twenty-
three may not appear to be a large number of RCTs given the total number of evaluations.  
However, the percent of activities undergoing an RCT was about the same as the percent of 
activities not evaluated at all.  When MCC’s experience with RCTs is compared to the World 
Bank’s, a major RCT proponent, we see that the MCC has initiated more RCTs relative to its 
size.  When accounting for both organizations’ investment levels, the MCC appears to conduct at 
least twice as many RCTs as the World Bank.  In 2015, MCC had annual investments of $1 
billion and executed 23 RCTs.  The World Bank had annual investments of at least $US 41 
billion and executed an estimated 445 RCTs (Legovini, 2010; The World Bank, 2015).43  Thus, 
for every billion dollars of investment, the World Bank executed 11 RCTs to MCC’s 23.  
 Reframing Selection Bias.  There appears to be a discrepancy between what MCC 
invested in and most rigorously evaluated (see Table 6.2).  More than half of MCC’s portfolio 
was in infrastructure, with one-third of all investments in transport alone.  Yet, there was not a 
single RCT on transport.  Most RCTs were in Agriculture and Rural Development.  While 
Agriculture and Rural Development was a major focus at MCC early on and continues to play a 
role, the number of RCTs in Agriculture and Rural Development was disproportionate to 
investment in the sector.  The same goes for the Health, Education & Community Services 
(HECS) sector.  Education made up less than 5 percent of MCC’s total portfolio.  This divide 
extended to the World Bank, whose RCTs likewise focused on education rather than transport—
                                                
42 Because sometimes a randomized design might be converted to a quasi-experimental design or the evaluation may 
be abandoned altogether, the number of RCTs that MCC is running may fluctuate somewhat from year to year. 
43 The figure of 445 RCTs was arrived at based on an extrapolation from trends in the growth of impact evaluations 
and RCTs at the World Bank based on Legovini (2010).  
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21 percent of all impact evaluations were in education and 3 percent in transport while the 
sectors’ investments made up 8 percent and 14 percent of all loans, respectively (Legovini, 
2010).  
Table 6.2 





RCTs (%)  
2014–2015 
Transportation 35 0 
Agricultural & Rural Development* 21 57 
Finance & Private Sector Development 6 9 
Water Supply & Sanitation 9 4 
Health, Education & Community Services 8 22 
Governance 5 0 
Energy 5 9 
Total (excludes administration costs) 89 100 
*Includes irrigation and land tenure programs. 
Source: MCC Annual Reports and MCC Impact Evaluation Database. 
 
This distribution of RCTs across sectors was on par with the development community as 
a whole between 1981 and 2012 (see Table 6.3).  Data from 3ie, an international NGO 
advocating for impact evaluation in development, illustrates the sectoral bias of RCTs.  Most 
RCTs are in social sectors such as health (62%) and education (15%). The Water, Energy, and 
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Table 6.3 









Percent of all 
sector evaluations 
that are RCTs 
Health, Nutrition & Population 1,228 62 83 
Education 304 15 58 
Social protection  139 7 41 
Water & Sanitation 68 3 72 
Finance & Microfinance 51 3 41 
Information & Communications Technology 42 2 67 
Agriculture and Rural Development 45 2 21 
Private sector development 30 2 26 
Public sector management 33 2 45 
Environment & Disaster Management 23 1 30 
Transportation 2 0 22 
Urban development 3 0 16 
Economic policy  0 0 0 
Energy  0 0 0 
 Total 1,968 100  
Source:  Cameron, D. B., Mishra, A., & Brown, A. N.  (2016). The growth of impact evaluation 
for international development: how much have we learned?  Journal of Development 
Effectiveness, 8(1), 1–21. 
 
A closer look at MCC’s RCTs in the infrastructure sectors shows that the RCTs on 
electricity projects evaluated the impact of subsidized vouchers for households to connect to the 
existing electricity grid.  The RCT in the water sector evaluated the impact of a small rural water 
project when MCC’s investments were largely directed at upgraded and expanding utilities and 
urban water networks.  None of the RCTs in the agriculture sector were on large-scale irrigation 
projects, which comprised the bulk of MCC’s agriculture investments.  When we include the 
projects most frequently evaluated with RCTs, farmer technical assistance and training (FTT), 
we see that over half of RCTs were directed at activities with some form of education or training.   
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MCC’s RCTs reveal a deeper pattern that goes beyond sectoral bias—83 percent of 
interventions evaluated by an RCT are delivered at the individual or household level.  The 
remaining 17 percent are delivered at the village or community level.  It is not mere coincidence 
that the rise of RCTs has gone hand-in-hand with individualized interventions such as training, 
credit, and vouchers.  Interventions directed at individual behavior to get at specific material 
effects (e.g., increases in income) are at the heart of randomized trials.   
Development economists allude to this pattern but do not spend time explaining why 
individual interventions are favored.  In his executive education training materials, Abhijit 
Banerjee makes it clear that it is “hard to evaluate monetary policy or freedom of the press” and 
that projects that are the most straightforward to evaluate “serve specific beneficiaries 
(individuals and communities)” (J-PAL, 2006).  Barrett and Carter (2010) state that “[p]olitical 
economy questions that many believe to be of first-order importance in development are clearly 
not candidates for randomization.  Nor are infrastructure issues or any other meso- or macro-
scale intervention that cannot be replicated in large numbers” (Barrett & Carter, 2010: 527).  
Ultimately, there is greater fit between highly individualized, private interventions and the 
measureable impacts in an RCT.  This is because the structural features of such projects make 
both randomization and the attribution of project-specific impacts more feasible.   
Several MCC evaluation experts spoke of searching for activities where randomization 
would be most feasible.  Despite the CGD Working Group’s assertion that learning would drive 
design, it was first and foremost feasibility that determined if a project would be evaluated by an 
RCT.  One MCC evaluation economist put it like this: “I think initially a lot of it was, ‘can we 
use an RCT?’ and if we can we should try.  Like for the highway in [country] we couldn’t use an 
RCT but I mean [country] had a lot of other sectors and we used RCTs in education and 
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agriculture” (Interviewee 3G, personal communication, June 29, 2016). This was sensible 
behavior on evaluators’ part.  They were incentivized to evaluate programs and personally 
committed to excellence, which compelled them to use the supposed gold standard method.  The 
issue was the method itself—no matter how much an evaluator wanted to, the method could not 
adapt to networked infrastructure such as highways, electric grids, or urban water systems 
because of sample size issues or spillovers.  Consider this statement from an MCC evaluation 
economist: 
Well the [projects] that work directly with people tend to be easier, so if you’re giving a 
scholarship, that’s in theory easier to randomize, if you’re training someone, if you’re 
working directly with a person…if you’re building a road, if you’re building water and 
sanitation, in theory you could randomize them if you have enough [sample], but often 
with infrastructure you don’t have the same numbers.  I guess in my mind I think about 
feasibility (Interviewee 3G, personal communication, June 29, 2016). 
 
The first practical issue in determining what to evaluate with an RCT is sample size.  
Where there may be several hundred classroom training sessions or scholarships in a particular 
project, there may only be a handful of roads or a single highway.  Road construction and other 
infrastructure projects are costly, with some highway rehabilitation projects costing over $US 
200 million.  One would need a sample of, at a minimum, several dozen highway-rehabilitation 
projects to, in theory, conduct an RCT. Meanwhile one could train thousands of farmers for one-
tenth of the cost. 
Another issue is oversubscription for project enrollment, which is shorthand for 
controlling exposure to the intervention.  For an RCT to work the evaluator has to control when 
and how a unit of measurement, such as an individual or community, is exposed to an 
intervention.  Such control is not feasible in networked infrastructure projects because they are 
directly antithetical to establishing and maintaining groups that do not receive the treatment. 
Another way to put it is to ask, “How does one control exposure to a highway”?  Controlling 
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access to training, by contrast, is more feasible: “Compared to the energy and roads projects, 
RCTs are just amenable to any type of training program where you have a lot of people in a 
concentrated area and you can kind of say that these villages get it and these villages don’t, that 
kind of thing.  It’s the oversubscription” (Interviewee 3H, personal communication, June 29, 
2016).  
A third issue is that large infrastructure projects, like national level policies, are public 
goods.  RCTs are far more amenable to testing interventions based on private goods, even if they 
are publically provided, than public goods. An RCT’s need to establish a control group that 
cannot be exposed to an intervention for fear of “contamination” or spillover effects complicates 
its ability to experiment with public goods that are by design non-excludable and non-rival.44  
Thus, it is far easier to measure, for example, if an insecticide-treated bed net distribution 
program rather than a neighborhood storm-water drainage system lowers malaria rates.  This is 
because of an assumption within randomized trials called SUTVA, or stable unit treatment value 
assumption. 
Stable unit treatment value assumption is not something development economists like to 
talk about.  You won’t find it anywhere in J-PAL’s executive training materials.  A search of 
MCC’s hundreds of files on evaluation turned up the term, or its economic equivalent “partial 
equilibrium effect”, only once.  The essential idea of SUTVA is that potential outcomes for any 
unit of an experiment are independent of the treatment assignment of any other unit under study 
(Sampson, 2010). In other words, any generation of internally valid estimates from an RCT is 
premised on the assumption of non-contamination or that those receiving the intervention 
                                                
44 Non-excludability refers to the extreme difficulty or cost required to exclude an individual from consuming a 
good or benefiting from it. Non-rivalry means that one person’s consumption of a good does not detract from or 
prevent another person’s consumption of that same good (Stiglitz, 2000). 
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(treatment group) had no social interaction with those not receiving the intervention (control 
group).   
Any such interaction is called a spillover. According to two experts on randomized field 
experiments, spillovers are the Pandora’s box of RCTs (Gerber & Green, 2012).  To a certain 
extent, spillovers and externalities can be modeled and thus estimated, and academic economists 
have advocated as such (Duflo, Glennerster, & Kremer, 2007).  But the selection of projects 
chosen for RCTs shows a desire to minimize spillovers.  If spillovers are too frequent or too 
effective, it is analogous to expanding the treatment group and shrinking the control group, 
posing an existential threat to the experiment’s validity.  Great pains are taken to avoid 
spillovers, and by extension networked infrastructure projects because they are antithetical to 
establishing and maintaining groups that do not receive the treatment.  Regarding the nature of 
infrastructure, Larkin (2013) states, “Infrastructures are built networks that facilitate the flow of 
goods, people, or ideas and allow for their exchange over space. As physical forms they shape 
the nature of a network … Infrastructures are matter that enable the movement of other matter” 
(Larkin, 2013: 238).  
A final point, and no less important, is that most of MCC’s RCTs were for rural or anti-
poverty community development programs.  While this is largely because early Compacts were 
focused on rural development, it is also because experimenting on the rural poor and delaying or 
limiting poor farmers’ exposure to interventions faced fewer barriers than, for example, limiting 
an important municipality’s access to a rehabilitated road, water network, or power plant.  The 
RCT experimental program is implicitly committed to addressing market failures by “nudging” 
risk-averse farmers to engage in “market learning” through subtle behavioral engineering 
(Berndt, 2015).  Such motivations are not explicitly stated, but in the countries where MCC 
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works there are more poor individuals to “choose” from, thereby rendering programs aimed at 
large populations of poor people amenable to RCTs.  
This bias towards highly individualized, private interventions that are excludable and 
rival is revealed in a popular sector for RCTs—Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD).  
Thirty-nine RCTs exclusively focusing on ARD could be identified in 3ie’s database of impact 
evaluations.  Of those, 80 percent were focused on individualized, private interventions such as 
extension and training, credit, insurance, improved inputs, land titles, or cash transfers (see Table 
6.4).  Only 20 percent of the interventions were of a collectivized, public goods nature and even 
those were for small-scale, community-level interventions such as rainwater harvesting.  Only 
one RCT was on governance.  Not a single RCT was on irrigation. 
Table 6.4 
RCTs Among Agriculture and Rural Development Projects in 3ie's Database 
ARD Project Type  Number of Projects 
Evaluated with an RCT  
Percent of Total 
Agricultural extension and training 11 28 
Agricultural finance and insurance 10 26 
Improved agricultural inputs 5 13 
Agricultural information services 2 5 
Rural cash transfers 1 3 
Rural institutions 3 8 
Rural infrastructure 2 5 
Rural land reform 1 3 
Seasonal migration 2 5 
Other 2 5 
Total 39 100 
Source: 3ie (2015).  Impact Evaluation Repository. Available: 
http://www.3ieimpact.org/en/evidence/impact-evaluations/impact-evaluation-repository/ 
This pattern was repeated at the MCC.  Of MCC’s 23 RCTs, fourteen are in Agriculture 
and Rural Developme
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irrigation, is focused on agricultural training and extension services, credit, rural business 
development, or land tenure. Burkina Faso’s RCT also evaluates irrigation at the individual plot 
level rather than, for example, district-wide irrigation.  Over 90 percent of MCC’s Agriculture 
and Rural Development RCTs are on individualized, private interventions.  
Established development economists argue that resistance to RCTs is due to “pure 
political interests” from sector specialists who are biased towards increasing funding for their 
sector’s activities (Pritchett, 2002).  However, while evaluation economists purport that RCTs 
represent the ideal approach for arriving at unbiased, apolitical estimates of project impact, RCTs 
present selection biases of their own.  Not all projects are equally subjected to evaluation by 
RCTs.  This should interest us for two reasons.  If there is a bias towards which projects are 
evaluated with an RCT, then that subset of projects will either receive greater scrutiny from 
accountability-minded impact advocates or become the subjects of a specific “evidence 
discourse”.  Other projects, meanwhile, will either escape scrutiny or have their “less rigorous” 
evaluations face questions of credibility now that the global development community has 
adopted new standards.  Furthermore, as shown below, economic methods have political 
effects—they don’t just observe, they intervene.  The uneven application of economic methods 
means that their political effects are unequally experienced. 
The Power of Method: Participant Selection 
 RCTs were presented as research studies but in reality they were parallel projects that 
unfolded alongside a development intervention throughout implementation.  They randomized 
project participants into treatment and control groups, and these groups needed to be maintained 
over the project’s lifetime.  In farmer training projects, choosing or targeting participants 
randomly conflicted with purposeful targeting based on the project’s program logic.  This logic 
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was geared toward maximizing crop productivity and income, necessitating project participants 
who were most likely to succeed at farming. The targeting criteria of project implementers were 
based on the diffusions of innovations paradigm and included a set of observable (e.g., assets, 
education level) and unobservable (e.g., motivation, skill) factors.  The project implementers’ 
use of unobservable farmer characteristics for project participation was particularly problematic 
for impact evaluation because it confounded implementer judgment with the training itself.  To 
attribute impact to the project intervention—a key objective of accountability—MCC impact 
evaluators had to ensure that project participants were selected randomly.  
Conflicting Rationalities in Participant Selection.  RCTs are pitched and presented as 
research studies, but this is inaccurate. As Figure 6.4 depicts, what an RCT really represents is a 
parallel project that unfolds alongside a development project.  They are less like evaluations and 
more like interventions (Eyal and Levy, 2013).  Other studies in development such as 
performance and ex-post evaluations take place after a project is complete.  Social and 
environmental impact assessments take place before a project commences.  An RCT, by contrast, 
is initiated before a project is fully designed and accompanies it throughout implementation.  It 
therefore is continuously intervening in the project environment in a way that performance 
evaluations or impact assessments never do.  
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RCTs intervene in projects in two fundamental ways: the placement of project 
participants into treatment and control groups and the maintenance of those groups’ statuses over 
the life of the project.  After deciding on an RCT the first step is random selection of 
participants.  The rationality of randomization, however, is at odds with implementers’ rationale 
for choosing program participants.  This sets up the first act of resistance from implementers and 
requires the resolution of conflicting rationalities in evaluation economists’ favor if an RCT is to 
survive.  As mentioned earlier, evaluation economists argue that a randomly selected control 
group is necessary to avoid selection bias.  Evaluation economists assumed that those responsible 
for implementing a project chose participants or participating locations, such as villages, based 
on politics or patronage.  This is referred to varyingly as selection bias or “cherry picking”.  
Economists also have methodological reasons for wanting to randomize.  It allows for internal 
validity so impact can be attributed to a stylized project rather than a project’s dynamic and 
detailed circumstances.  Implementers meanwhile are trying to optimize project implementation 
to minimize cost.  Some places and participants are easier to reach and have natural or 
infrastructural resources that facilitate project implementation and make outcomes more likely.  
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to reach either one or more goals.  For example, they may be trying to achieve an objective such 
as greater growth or relieve a condition such as water insecurity in a region or among a group of 
people.  Therefore they almost always employ some aspect of targeting (Sen, 1992).  
Targeting is usually based on a desire or need to maximize either efficiency or equity.  
This is derived from Okun’s (1975) famous thesis in Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff 
where he states, “If both equality and efficiency are valued, and neither takes absolute priority 
over the other, then, in places where they conflict…some equality will be sacrificed for the sake 
of efficiency, and some efficiency for the sake of equality” (Okun, 1975: 88).45 Regardless of 
whether implementers pursue efficiency or equality, the rationality around targeting project 
participants is decidedly non-random.  Within this framework evaluation economists can be 
understood to be engaging in acts of random targeting. 
When social control around RCTs was successful in Washington and the country capital, 
the RCT design limited implementers’ targeting in two ways.  One, the RCT prevented 
implementers from deviating from original observable screening criteria.  Two, it prevented them 
from working with what they considered the most promising participants first.  Both resulted in 
the rationality of randomization for project-attributable impact prevailing over the rationality of 
selecting participants to maximize project efficiency. Rational-legal authority was important for 
this effort in Washington, DC while more strategic forms of power were necessary to translate 
interests and extend the RCT network in country capitals and the field.  
By taking a closer look at MCC’s farmer technical assistance and training (FTT) projects, 
we can see how RCTs affected participant selection and project implementation.  Among all 
                                                
45 Recent research has shown that efficiency may not come at the cost of equity and both goals can be pursued 
simultaneously (Andersen & Maibom, 2016; Basu & Stiglitz, 2016).  
  249 
projects at MCC, FTT projects were most frequently evaluated with an RCT (see Appendix D, 
Table D-1).  Among the 23 RCTs that had identified a control group, eight were FTT projects 
across the following countries: Armenia, El Salvador, Ghana, Honduras, Moldova, Morocco, 
Namibia, and Nicaragua.  They comprised 35 percent of all RCTs initiated at MCC.  Of these, 
five RCTs were completed (see Table 6.5), one is ongoing as of late 2016 (Namibia), and two 
were converted to quasi-experimental designs (Moldova and Morocco). 
 
Table 6.5 
MCC's Completed FTT Projects with an RCT 















Start – end year 2006 – 2011  2006 – 2012  2006 – 2011  2005 – 2010  2006 – 2011  
Cost (millions) $18.2 $64.4 $62.2 $26.6 $8.5 
Number of 
farmers trained 
45,639 15,363 66,930 7,265 9,104 




Evaluator MPR MPR ISSER NORC UC Davis 
Source: MCC compact monitoring and evaluation plans and FTT project implementation documents. 
Notes: ACDI/VOCA is a merger between a U.S. association of farmer cooperatives, Agricultural Cooperative 
Development International, and international development volunteer organization, Volunteers in Overseas 
Cooperative Assistance.  ADRA is the Adventist Development and Relief Agency, a humanitarian and development 
agency of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. IFDC is the International Fertilizer Development Center, an 
agricultural development agency with roots in the Tennessee Valley Authority. MPR is Mathematica Policy 
Research, a private policy research organization, NORC is the National Opinion Research Center at the University 
of Chicago, UC Davis is the economics department at the University of California at Davis, and ISSER is the 
Institute of Statistical, Social, and Economic Research at the University of Ghana. 
 
The local government agency responsible for implementing the compact was called a 
“Millennium Challenge Account” (MCA).  The MCA Chief Executive Officer and MCC 
Resident Country Director—the lead MCC representative in a country—would together oversee 
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compact implementation (see Figure 6.5).  An FTT project implementer was usually 
contractually bound to the MCA and reported to an MCA official while an evaluation consultant 
was usually contractually bound and reported to an MCC evaluation economist at MCC 
headquarters in Washington, DC.  MCC evaluation economists argued that this maintained a 
level of independence in the evaluation. 
 
Figure 6.5. Implementation Structure of FTT Projects 
 
Source: Author 
Notes: VP stands for “Vice President”.  RCD stands for “Resident Country Director”. Solid lines represent 
formal relationships and reporting lines of authority while dashed lines represent informal relationships and 
collaboration. Rounded rectangles represent governmental entities while ovals represent non-governmental 
entities.  Squares represent local populations. Not all impact evaluations and RCTs involve a separate 
Survey Organization.  Sometimes the Impact Evaluation Consultants implemented surveys. 
 
 
The remainder of this chapter will focus on RCTs’ effects on completed FTT projects.  They 
were not only the most commonly evaluated with randomized trials but also illustrate why RCTs 
should be thought of more as political interventions than evaluations.   
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Farmer Technical Assistance and Training Projects.  MCC’s FTT projects all operate 
on similar assumptions: 1) farmers’ lack of knowledge and skills is a key constraint for adoption 
of improved agricultural techniques, increased productivity, and crop marketing; 2) lack of 
inputs such as fertilizer and credit is a key constraint to increased productivity and investment; 3) 
increases in farmer knowledge will lead to increased business skills and improved access to 
markets; 4) when newly acquired knowledge on improved techniques is adopted and inputs 
applied, they lead to increases in farm productivity; and 5) increases in farm productivity lead to 
an increase in farm income that, in turn, leads to increases in overall household income. They 
also share similar program logic.  Farmers receive training on planting, production, storage, and 
business management for non-subsistence crops and strategic inputs such as improved seeds and 
tools.  Training and technical assistance translates to know-how and strategic inputs alleviate 
income constraints. Application of the training and inputs leads to higher productivity of non-
subsistence crops and value chain integration. This in turn leads to higher income. Figure 6.6 is 
an example of a simplified program logic from the El Salvador FTT. 
 
Figure 6.6. A Simplified Program Logic Framework from the El Salvador FTT 
 
Source: MCC (2012c). Measuring Results of the El Salvador Production and Business Services 
Investments. Washington, DC: Millennium Challenge Corporation. 
 
Each of the projects used what is called a randomized rollout design because it was 
controversial to entirely deny farmers services as part of a government program (see Figure 6.7).  
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The randomized rollout is one approach J-PAL advocates for when pure randomization is not 
possible (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013).  Unlike in a “pure” RCT where a control group is 
established and then denied services, in a randomized rollout some farmers were randomly sorted 
into an early treatment group while others were placed in a late treatment group.  The late 
treatment group would have to wait anywhere between 12 and 36 months to receive services.  
Impacts on the early treatment group would be observed during this time frame. 
 
Figure 6.7. Randomized Rollout Design for FTT Projects 
 
Source:  Campuzano, L. & Blair, R. (2011). Final Impact Evaluation Design for the Production and 
Business Services Activity of the Productive Development Project – Revised (ESVED-264). Princeton, NJ: 
Mathematica Policy Research.  
 
Targeting in Farmer Training Projects.  The program logic of MCC FTT projects was 
aimed towards efficiency.  The projects’ objective was increased farmer productivity through 
behavior change in farmers’ relationship with improved techniques and inputs.  Implementers 
were usually responsible for meeting benchmarks for increases in farmer adoption of improved 
inputs, crop productivity, and farm incomes.  The logic behind efficiency-based targeting in 
farmer training is rooted in a concept derived from rural sociology.  In the 1930s Bruce Ryan and 
Neal Gross set out to understand how hybrid corn seed diffused in two Iowa towns.  Their 
research resulted in a program on “diffusion of innovations” that transformed not only 
agricultural research but also the way behavior change was studied in the social sciences.  A key 
takeaway from this research program relevant to targeting is how an agricultural innovation, such 
MEMO TO: Rebecca Tunstall and Claudia Argueta 




8. Collect second follow-up data close to the end of Evaluation Cycle 2. The specific 
dates for the second follow-up survey vary by value chain as presented in Table 3 in 
the data collection section.  
FIGURE 2 
 
SEQUENCE OF ACTIVITIES OF THE CORE RANDOMIZED ROLLOUT DESIGN 
 
 By 2010, the first five activities were completed for each of the value chains in the 
evaluation:  
 
 Dairy chain. Mathematica randomized 28 groups with 595 eligible individuals into 
treatment and control groups: 14 productive groups with 295 eligible individuals were 
randomly selected to be offered Chemonics s rvices beginning in May 2010 (treatment 
group), and 14 productive groups with 300 eligible individuals were randomly selected to be 
ffered Chemonics services beginning in May 2011 (control group).17 In May 2010, 
DIGESTYC finished baseline data collection for the dairy value chain. 
 
 Horticulture chain. Mathematica randomized 31 groups with 647 eligible individuals into 
treatment a d control groups: 15 productive groups with 324 eligible i dividuals were 
randomly selected to be offered Chemonics services beginning in April 2010 (treatment 
group), and 16 productive groups with 323 eligible individuals were randomly selected to be 
offered Chemonics services beginning in March 2011 (control group). 18 In June 2010, 
DIGESTYC finished baseline data collection for the horticulture value chain.    
 
 Handicraft chain. Mathematica randomized 19 municipalities with 674 eligible individuals 
into treatment and control groups: 9 municipalities with 337 eligible individuals were 
randomly selected to be offered Chemonics services beginning in September of 2009 
                                                 
17 Twenty individual producers ere organized into two productive groups for the purpose of randomization. 
As a result, 11 individuals were randomized jointly into control, and 9 individuals were randomized jointly into 
treatment. 
18 The original list of eligible beneficiaries was 945 eligible individuals in 48 groups: 298 eligible individuals 
in 17 groups were classified as exceptions, and therefore not randomized. 
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as improved inputs, spreads among farmers.  Ryan and Gross (1943) grouped farmers into five 
categories: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards.  For an 
innovation to be adopted quickly and reach “critical mass”, it needed to be accepted and 
incorporated by a community’s early adopters.  Typically, early adopters are opinion leaders and 
held in high regard by neighbors and other community members.  They have higher social status, 
educational attainment, and financial liquidity than their peers. They are also more cosmopolitan 
(Rogers, 1962).   
The diffusion of innovations research program resulted in a major paradigm shift in 
agricultural research in the 1940s and the main tenets of the thesis are still accepted today 
(Valente & Rogers, 1995).  Thus, implementers believe that the more quickly and widely 
improved techniques and inputs are adopted, the more quickly and widely these constraints to 
farmers’ productivity and income could be removed.  Key to this strategy is the kind of farmers 
that are targeted and when they are trained.  An implementer of Ghana’s FTT put it thus: 
If you are introducing a new technology that is maybe very new to the farmers, you 
always want to makes sure that you look for those who are the most innovative people, 
the innovators and the early adopters…if they pick it up and the thing works you find that 
it’s much, much easier…to see higher levels of adoption even among the late 
adopters…But if you start with those who are very skeptical and you introduce to them 
the new technologies they might not do it, or not do it well, then it presents a poor picture 
of the new technology (Interviewee 3N, personal communication, August 1, 2016).  
 
In the absence of randomization or random targeting, FTT project implementers, 
interested in maximizing project efficiency targeted participants on seven main criteria: i) 
membership in a farmer based group; ii) education; iii) innovativeness; iv) ability to disseminate 
ideas; v) resources; vi) wealth, and vii) social standing (Phillips, Waddington, & White, 2014).  
These are a mix of binary variables (e.g., membership) and continuous variables (e.g., education, 
wealth).  They are also a mix of “observable” (e.g., resources) and “unobservable” (e.g., 
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innovativeness, social standing) characteristics.  The most popular criteria were membership in 
an organized farmer group or cooperative and basic literacy and numeracy skills.  Practical 
criteria are also important and implementers look to target farmers whose locations are 
accessible, are available to fully participate in training, and are interested in the training and its 
objectives (Phillips et al., 2014).  These are employed to limit the waste of operational resources. 
The same review of farmer training eligibility criteria also summarized how farmer-
training projects targeted participants.  Data from 58 projects showed that 80 percent of projects 
targeted participants through categorical targeting.  Categorical targeting is a method that 
determines eligibility based on whether an individual belongs to a specific category.  This is also 
referred to as group targeting.  The categories employed, such as age, gender, or ethnicity, are 
usually fairly easy to observe, hard to falsely manipulate, and are relevant to the program’s 
objectives (Coady, Grosh, & Hoddinott, 2004).  Typically individual or household assessments 
would determine who ultimately participated in the projects (Phillips et al., 2014).  Field level 
technicians (i.e., field bureaucrats) conduct individual or household assessments to determine if 
potential participants meet eligibility criteria. In farmer training programs, assessment was 
almost always in the form of community- or implementer-based selection of participants, rather 
than a means test (Phillips et al., 2014). 
MCC FTT projects employed similar targeting criteria and mechanisms to other farmer 
training projects. Table 6.6 shows the inclusion criteria used for farmer selection in MCC’s 
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Table 6.6 
Eligibility Criteria for Participation in MCC FTT Projects 
Nicaragua Honduras El Salvador 
Area of land holdings Area of land holdings Access to land 
Access to a water source Access to a water source For livestock, minimum number 
of cattle 
Possession of land title Farm that does not flood and is 
accessible by a paved road 
Desire to participate in project 
activities 
Minimum area of land 
cultivated in past 
Not an existing user of new 
technologies 
Experience or interest in 
producing and selling horticulture 
Minimum age Willing to identify and organize 
neighboring farmers 
Interested in forming alliances 
with other producer groups 
 Commits to implementing 
improved technologies and 
practices 
Interested in marketing and 
selling products with other 
groups 
 Promises to invest the 
necessary time and money for 
success 
Willingness to co-finance farm 
investments 
Source:  Official MCC FTT implementer project inception and interim reports.  
 
MCC FTTs had a mix of binary and continuous variables and observable and unobservable 
characteristics.  The most common criterion was access to a certain area of land holdings.  This 
made immediate sense since without land farmers could not apply and practice new techniques. 
Other criteria included a willingness to collaborate with others and provide a contribution to on-
farm investment. Implementers believed both criteria signaled a commitment to improved 
agricultural productivity and sales. 
While implementers may apply a set of categorical screening criteria to narrow their 
target group they also have good reason to allow their field technicians to exercise discretion and 
deviate from or refine that criteria.  Implementers may choose to do this for two reasons.  First, 
unobservable criteria used for the first step of categorical targeting do not render themselves 
legible easily.  How does one measure “commits to implementing” or “interested in marketing”?  
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Second, even when legible, some of the criteria are based on binary characteristics while others 
are based on continuous characteristics.  While “possession of land title” is a binary 
characteristic, “area of landholdings” is continuous (and even terms like “possession” and “title” 
are complex and open to interpretation). If landholdings are a desirable trait for potential 
program participants, implementers may consider those with more land as more eligible.  Since 
FTT implementers are trying to employ efficiency-based targeting to achieve behavior change 
and innovation diffusion goals, they have an incentive to select participants who are best 
positioned to succeed through training.  These may not be the farmers that were originally 
selected for treatment based solely on observable criteria or around the margins of a cutoff.  
Subjective assessments of both continuous variables and unobservable characteristics may result 
in a different set of farmers appearing as better suited for project goals after “ground truthing” or 
field technicians’ verification of specific farmers’ suitability for project participation.  
 The Political Effects of RCTs: Participant Selection.  A closer look at the Honduras 
FTT will illustrate how an implementer goes about adjusting participant selection without the 
restriction of an RCT.  While an RCT was planned for the Honduras project, lack of early 
involvement of the evaluator, lack of contractual authority to adhere to a randomized design, and 
tepid support from the MCC Resident Country Mission limited social control.  As a result, the 
implementer in Honduras, Fintrac, a 25-year-old Washington, DC based company that “develops 
agricultural solutions to end hunger and poverty”, could deviate from the originally selected 
treatment group.46  The evaluator, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), selected 
treatment and control villages based on geographic information systems data on elevation, soil 
capacity, rainfall, vegetation, distance to nearest major river, and other variables.  NORC 
                                                
46 Further information on Fintrac can be found at: https://www.devex.com/organizations/fintrac-6761 
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matched pairs of villages that looked similar and drew treatment and control samples from each. 
Farmers could then be selected for early and late treatment from the respective villages based on 
observable screening criteria provided by Fintrac (NORC, 2013).  These selection criteria are in 
Table 6.6.  
NORC conducted farmer selection based on criteria provided by Fintrac.47  While NORC 
selected 1,017 farmers in 113 villages for early treatment, Fintrac chose to work with only 28 of 
these farmers across 19 villages (NORC, 2013).  The rejection of so many treatment group 
farmers meant that entire villages selected for treatment dropped out of the study and the 
randomized design collapsed.  The evaluator concluded that basing farmer selection on 
observable Fintrac criteria was “counterproductive”: 
It was clear that the original design concept of stratifying farmers based on the set of 
quantitative criteria provided to us by Fintrac was counterproductive…we concluded that 
we could not replicate Fintrac’s selection process for two reasons: (1) it contains 
elements/criteria that could not be quantified and depended on some element of 
subjective assessment by the Fintrac Field Technician of a farmer’s motivation, ability to 
learn and grow, and willingness to follow program requirements; and (2) the selection 
criteria evolved over time, based on lessons learned during implementation (NORC, 
2013: 16).  
 
Following the rejection of NORC’s treatment group, NORC conducted interviews with 
Fintrac field technicians to discover why their selection of treatment farmers had deviated so far 
from their own.  They discovered that Fintrac field technicians replaced NORC’s originally 
selected farmers with farmers who were either more motivated and/or more aware of the level of 
effort required to succeed in the program.  Some farmers reached out to Fintrac field technicians 
to request participation while the field technicians identified other farmers who had already 
constructed raised beds and other pre-planting steps. To field technicians, these were both signals 
                                                
47 Fintrac did not want to enter communities to select farmers only to turn around and tell farmers that they were 
going to postpone service delivery for 18 months. For similar reasons, this practice was common across several 
MCC FTTs. 
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of program commitment and potential program success (NORC, 2011).  According to an MCC 
agricultural specialist:  
My perspective is that not all farmers indeed turn into commercially oriented farmers.  
Let’s just start from that basic fact.  To assume that any and every farmer will be a good 
candidate and so let’s just randomize, it just doesn’t make sense because, again, not every 
farmer has the capacity to be commercially oriented and there are a lot of other obstacles 
… transforming yourself from being a corn farmer into an irrigated horticulture farmer, 
the costs and the level of knowledge [required], it’s a big step (Interviewee 3L, personal 
communication, July 8, 2016).   
 
According to the field technicians, selecting farmers based on their motivation and 
completion of pre-planting steps raised the quality of participants in the program, reduced drop 
out rates, and allowed field technicians to focus more on technical services rather than 
recruitment of farmers who ultimately may be less committed and more likely to quit (NORC, 
2011).  The field technicians may have also been able to tacitly identify the most capable farmers 
that would thrive in the program.  The lead evaluator for the Nicaragua farmer training RCT, an 
economics professor at The University of California Davis, and several of his colleagues 
attempted to understand what they called “impact heterogeneity” in the Nicaragua FTT project. 
There were “high performing” participants and “low performing” participants among eligible 
and randomly assigned farmers.  They said that this “raises the question of what distinguishes the 
people who benefit a lot from a program from people who didn’t” (Carter, 2016).  They tried to 
answer this question by examining what they called technical efficiency—an estimation of 
famers’ cultivated land area and total farm labor applied as a proxy for unobservable farmer 
capacity—had on farmer participation and income.  
They analyzed the evaluation data and found that variation in farm incomes among 
program participants was largely related to something that’s different between high and low 
performing farmers, but it was not necessarily farmers’ technical efficiency.  Farm incomes did 
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not rise as farmers’ technical efficiency rose.  According to the researchers, “So what this 
suggests is that there are other things going on, it’s not just about technical efficiency, there have 
got to be other factors driving impact heterogeneity…Clearly other unobservables [are] in play” 
(Boucher , Malacarne, & Carter, 2016: 35).  As one MCC evaluation economist who was 
familiar with the exercise put it:  
In Nicaragua they found a little bit of an impact, but the interesting thing that goes to the 
implementer’s point…some people did really well and some people didn’t do well at 
all…But it was not related to anything observable…there’s something going on where 
people are winners and losers in a sense, and in Honduras that’s what they wanted to pick 
[participants] on, right?  In a way they didn’t just want to randomize (Interviewee 3E, 
personal communication, June 24, 2016).  
 
Despite field technicians’ potential to identify the most capable farmers, evaluation 
economists do not want implementers to deviate from the random assignment criteria used 
during implementation or select based on unobservable characteristics because doing so would 
confound program effectiveness and eligibility.  The selection of participants based on field 
technicians’ subjective criteria rather than the randomization process introduces either the field 
technician’s judgment, farmers’ self selection, or the relationship between field technicians and 
farmers as a determinant of project success rather than the training, improved techniques, or 
inputs themselves.  This undermines an RCT’s attempts at internal validity because judgment 
and relationship quality are difficult or impossible to measure and external validity because these 
project characteristics cannot be scaled up or replicated in other places the way standardized 
training, techniques, and inputs can. 
Even while implementers and field technicians appreciated the ability to deviate from 
observable screening criteria, some observable characteristics are known to facilitate the 
adoption and spread of improved practices.  Educational attainment, wealth, and 
cosmopolitanism were all important determinants in the adoption and diffusion of improved 
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inputs.  A review of farmer training programs in developing countries showed that farmers’ years 
of education was a statistically significant determinant of adoption of practices, improved yields, 
and diffusion of lessons learned to neighbors (Phillips et al., 2014).  Implementers of Ghana’s 
FTT echoed this sentiment: “Even among the farmers, it is very clear even here in Ghana and in 
many places that you find that literate farmers, they tend to be higher adopters of technologies. 
It’s easily seen here if you take basic things like adoption of herbicides, some insecticides, new 
varieties [of seed]; you always find literate people going for it first” (Interviewee 3N, personal 
communication, August 1, 2016). In Ghana, these more capable farmers are known as “nucleus 
farmers”.  Nucleus farmers are important “hubs” in farmer and agricultural production networks.  
They are socially well connected, have important agricultural assets, and knowledge of 
agricultural value chains and markets.  By contrast, “out-grower” farmers have relatively fewer 
assets, including smaller land holdings, and limited know-how of value chains and markets.  As a 
result, each out-grower farmer is partnered with a nucleus farmer that provides technical support 
and facilitates market access (Lucas, 2006a). 
Rather than allowing subjective assessments of unobservable characteristics to 
distinguish early project participants from late or non-participants, evaluation economists 
“balance” the early and late treatment groups so that they are indistinguishable based on 
observable characteristics.  In MCC FTT projects, usually over a dozen observable 
characteristics of demographics, resources, and farmer practices were assessed for statistically 
insignificant differences.  This facilitates impact attribution to a stylized project rather than any 
differences between the two groups.  In other words, the first farmer trained should look very 
similar to the last farmer trained on predetermined observable criteria such as age, educational 
levels, and wealth.   
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Contractual authority and MCC Resident Country Mission consent permitted evaluation 
economists to exclude implementers’ and field technicians’ subjective assessments. To build 
support for early and late treatment groups, however, evaluation economists also needed support 
from those closest to participants such as community leaders and local officials that might share 
implementers’ and field technicians’ rationalities.  Evaluators usually staged a participatory 
randomization ceremony (or multiple ceremonies) to build local support for randomization. A 
World Bank economist conducting an RCT in Cameroon described how randomization 
ceremonies—public events where potential project participants were randomly sorted into 
treatment or control groups using material devices such as software programs and ping pong 
balls—appeal to fairness and transparency.  These moral appeals can help justify the “politically 
difficult” task of delaying benefits to the control group and convincing participants’ patrons, 
such as local leaders, that randomization was in everyone’s best interest: 
Our experience in many countries is that public randomization ceremonies are an 
excellent platform to build support for randomization and for the entire impact evaluation 
process. In Cameroon, we organized public randomization ceremonies in three Regions 
to assign health facilities to four study groups in an impact evaluation of performance-
based financing (PBF) in the health sector…This made the randomization process 
completely fair and transparent to all health facilities participating in the study (De 
Walque, 2013).  
 
Once early and late treatment groups were established, the implementers, which were 
contractually bounded to the MCA, had little choice of whom to train and where to train them.  
They had to stay within the confines of the original, codified eligibility criteria and work with 
farmers in the order assigned to them.  Unlike Honduras, the remaining four MCC FTT projects’ 
adhered to the assignment of treatment and control groups and, contrary to the rationality of 
efficiency-based targeting, the two groups looked statistically alike (see Table 6.7).   
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Table 6.7 
Key Characteristics Among Early and Late Treatment Groups: MCC-FTT Projects 
 Armenia Nicaragua El Salvador Ghana 
 T C T C T C T C 
Age (years) 55 55 50 52 45 44 45 45 
Education      
 More than secondary 
school education (%) 






 Education (years)  4.3 4.9 
 “More than basic” 
education (%) 
 9 7 
 At least secondary 
school education (%) 
 11 10 
Wealth     
 Land owned or rented 
(hectares) 
1.8 1.8 25.9 28.8   1.3 1.2 
 Total net annual 
income (US $) 
    1,577 1,700   
Source:  Projects’ respective evaluation final reports.  
Notes: “T” stands for treatment group; “C” stands for control group.  Control group is the “late 
treatment” group.  All results between treatment and control groups are statistically insignificant.  
Honduras was excluded from the table because the integrity of the control group was 
compromised.  
 
The Power of Method: Intervening in Project Execution 
Randomizing participants was only the first step; the control group required maintenance 
over the project’s lifetime.  This meant limiting contamination, or contact, between treatment and 
control group participants, especially early in the project.  Units such as farmers, farmer 
organizations, or farming communities were sampled to maintain spatial and temporal distance.  
This also presented tensions with the implementers’ rationale: implementers wanted to 
encourage contact between “pioneers” and other farmers to boost project outcomes through 
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improved innovation diffusion and train everyone as soon as possible rather than waiting to train 
the control group.  To keep implementers from training control group farmers sooner rather than 
later, the evaluation team had to continuously negotiate with the implementers and persuade 
them to maintain the control group, which was more feasible through an in-country presence.   
Extending the RCT Rails.  Once conflicting rationalities around participant selection 
were resolved in evaluation economists’ favor, the next task was to maintain the control group 
over the life of the project.  There needed to be a treatment group that received the intervention 
and a control group that was denied the intervention (altogether, for a period of time like in FTT 
randomized rollout evaluations, or not encouraged to participate).  These two groups needed to 
be surveyed in two distinct temporal periods: baseline (t1) and endline (t2).  The four 
observations needed for each unit of analysis is known as the difference-in-differences matrix.  
The difference-in-differences estimator, or project impact, is the difference between the 





Before Change After Change Difference 
Treatment 
Group Yt1 Yt2 ΔYt = Yt2 – Yt1 




   
ΔYt – ΔYc 
Source: Author. 
Notes: “Y” stands for year, “t” for treatment, “c” for control, and “Δ” for “change in”. 
 
 
In order for RCTs to succeed, the difference-in-differences matrix needed to be recreated 
in the project implementation landscape.  Project impact estimates need a conducive 
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environment or experimental apparatus in which economic facts can survive.  Just as Louis 
Pasteur’s vaccine would not work across France unless his laboratory conditions at Pouilly le 
Fort were first extended across rural France, valid estimates of development programs or 
projects’ impacts cannot be established unless certain field conditions are first met.  Using the 
metaphor of a railway, Latour (1983) says “you cannot drive a locomotive through a field” 
(Latour, 1983: 155).  He meant that for the trains or scientific facts to work, scientists must first 
“extend the rails” (Petty & Heimer, 2011) or sufficiently recreate their laboratory conditions in 
the outside world so that their facts can survive.48  While evaluation economists did not have a 
laboratory per se, the difference-in-differences matrix is a micro, calculative world whose rails 
had to be extended to the macro, implementation landscape.  
The FTTs sampled units in a way to maximize the temporal and spatial distance between 
the treatment and control groups. This was to observe impact as well as guard against 
“contamination”.  MCC’s evaluators for the Armenia FTT succinctly described contamination 
and how to prevent it.  The evaluators’ description is worth quoting at length: 
Farmers who are in the control group of village clusters would not be offered water 
management training until several years later.  All villages will ultimately be provided 
training, and random assignment is used to determine when they are offered training.  
Randomly assigning entire village clusters in this way, rather than individual farmers or 
villages, guards against contamination of the control group….There are two types of 
contamination.  The first type of contamination is if farmers in control group villages 
nonetheless participate in training.  This could be problematic if control group members 
hear about the training activities and show up to training themselves.  A different kind of 
contamination could occur if farmers who participate in training teach farmers in the 
control about the techniques they learned.  Either of these types of contamination would 
be problematic for the evaluation…Generally, [the implementer] has chosen village 
clusters that are sufficiently far apart geographically to ensure that there is little chance 
that farmers in a control group village cluster would either participate in the training or 
learn about water management techniques through other means….While we cannot 
completely eliminate the possibility of contamination here, it will be important for the 
                                                
48 I thank Margarita Rayzberg for introducing me to the work of Petty and Heimer. 
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planned implementation to strive to avoid such contamination problems (Fortson and 
Rangarajan, 2008: 4-5).  
 
Avoiding contamination limited both the project’s reach and knowledge diffusion 
objectives.  A World Bank economist who conducts randomized evaluations of training 
programs described why implementers are against limiting reach: “There can be a huge 
temptation for the people delivering the program to dip into the control group.  This can either 
[be] because they have been contracted to train or deliver the program to a certain number of 
people, so that every empty seat directly costs them, or just because they see they have space and 
genuinely want to help as many people as possible” (McKenzie, 2015).  For example, when it 
comes to farmers training other farmers (i.e., diffusion), an MCC agricultural development 
specialist said “[t]hat’s a good thing, it’s not a proper evaluation, but that’s a good thing” 
(Interviewee 3J, personal communication, July 6, 2016).  The rationale for limiting 
contamination was in conflict with the rationale of implementing to maximize reach, diffusion, 
and efficiency.  Extending the RCT rails had implications for project implementation and 
therefore met resistance. 
Resistance to RCTs was a topic of discussion at a joint MCC USAID Roundtable on 
Agriculture Impact Evaluations: Learning What Works at MCC headquarters on July 21, 2011.  
MCC and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) brought together 
MCC evaluation economists and staff, MCC’s evaluation contractors, and MCC agriculture 
sector specialists to “[i]dentify challenges, lessons learned and successful strategies for 
implementation of rigorous impact evaluations in the context of agriculture and rural 
development programs” (MCC, 2011: 1). The Roundtable consisted of panels and breakout 
sessions to “foster discussion between agriculture project implementers, impact evaluators, and 
donor agencies” to describe challenges and propose solutions to rigorous evaluation of 
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agriculture and rural development projects (MCC, 2011).  Among the reasons identified for 
resistance were RCTs’ implications for project scope, design, and flexibility.  Regarding project 
scope, participants cited that: “[r]equiring a control group that is comparable to the target 
population can reduce the overall reach and scope of programs” (MCC and USAID, 2011: 3).  
Regarding implications for project design, they stated: “Agricultural development practitioners 
argue for an implementation design that maximizes the reach of the intervention…they may also 
seek opportunities to build on spillover effects.  However, both of these approaches may 
contaminate the control group” (MCC and USAID, 2011: 3). Finally, regarding project 
flexibility, the report stated that “[a]dherence to an impact evaluation methodology may limit 
implementers’ ability to adapt implementation approaches” (MCC and USAID, 2011: 3). 
 According to an MCC agriculture specialist, without an RCT “some things would have 
been done considerably differently” (Interviewee 3J, personal communication, July 6, 2016) (see 
Figure 6.8).  Implementers would have trained everyone sooner on a continual basis rather than 
leaving a gap of at least one year to observe impacts on early treatment groups: “It would have 
been optimal to train all the farmers as fast as you could which we couldn’t because we had to 
stagger the training.  We would have done [the training] on a faster rolling basis” (Interviewee 
3J, personal communication, July 6, 2016).  Second, they would have started training and 
services in an area where they could build on the existing physical, natural, and institutional 
infrastructure left behind by similar projects in the past.  From there they would have gone on to 
train sequentially in nearby locales taking into account accessibility such as road network 
quality. For example, another MCC agricultural specialist said, “[the implementers] went to this 
one town that was technically in the municipality that we were going to do, but the road to get to 
the town is really bad, so one of our criteria is that they really have to have year round access to 
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markets, road wise, and this road, it’s so bad that during the rainy season you cannot access [the 
town]” (Interviewee 3L, personal communication, July 8, 2016).  RCT designs did not take into 
account such conditions. 
 




Notes: Letters represent trainings conducted by implementers.  Lowercase letters represent implementers’ 
approach without a randomized rollout design.  Uppercase letters represent implementers’ requirement with 
a randomized rollout design. 
 
The Political Effects of RCTs: Implementation.  The implications of successfully 
“extending the RCT rails” can be seen in the Ghana FTT where the RCT’s control group was 
maintained throughout the project’s lifetime.  According to the joint MCC USAID Roundtable’s 
participants, the lesson from successful impact evaluations was that “[e]arly 
engagement…fosters deeper understanding of the implementation approach as well as the impact 
evaluation design methodology. Impact evaluations go more smoothly when evaluators involve 
implementers in key aspects of methodology design and continue this engagement throughout 
implementation” (MCC and USAID, 2011: 8).  Critical to this engagement was ongoing 
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communication: “The integrity of the project implementation as well as the impact evaluation 
design will benefit from ongoing communication…All participants should be encouraged to raise 
concerns early and often, so that solutions can be found that best manage tradeoffs between 
implementation flexibility and evaluation validity (MCC and USAID, 2011: 9).  Evaluators and 
evaluation consultants’ presence in the field facilitated communication.  The Roundtable’s report 
stated that “[i]t helps for the impact evaluation team to have representation in the country—not 
only a full-time staff who can respond rapidly to changes in the project, but also team leaders 
who can visit the project sites, understand the implementation approach firsthand, and 
communicate directly with implementers about their challenges and concerns” (MCC and 
USAID, 2011: 9).  In Ghana, like other successfully executed RCTs, engaged implementers and 
ongoing communication were critical to maintaining the control group and reshaping 
implementation. 
 The Ghana FTT delivered approximately 30 hours of agronomic, business, and 
marketing training to farmers. Participants also received a starter pack and the option to access 
credit.  The starter pack was valued at approximately $230 and included fertilizer, one acre’s 
worth of seeds, boots, a facemask, gloves, and some money for land clearing (Adventist 
Development and Relief Association, 2011).  The project was implemented across 30 districts in 
three “zones” of the country: the Northern Zone, Afram Basin (“Afram”), and Southern 
Horticultural Belt.  Each zone had a separate implementer, known as a Regional Implementation 
Consultant.  The project had one evaluator, the University of Ghana’s Institute for Statistical, 
Social, and Economic Research (ISSER), which is located outside of the capital, Accra.  Unlike 
in Honduras, the Ghana FTT control group was maintained during project implementation.   
In Ghana, the random selection was done at the Farmer Based Organization (FBO) rather 
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than individual farmer level.  Farmer based organizations either had close to 50 members or were 
encouraged to join forces with others or split up to reach 50.  Once an FBO was selected, every 
member was eligible for training, technical assistance, and the starter pack.  The program aimed 
to train 60,000 farmers in 1,200 FBOs (the final number of farmers trained was higher at 
66,930).  The FBOs received training in batches to stagger the training over time.  Each batch 
consisted of 600 FBOs and was split into a treatment (early treatment) and control (late 
treatment) group.  The time in between trainings for each respective batch’s treatment and 
control groups was one year.  However, the time in between the treatment group for Batch 1 and 
control group for Batch 2 was two years.  These gaps in training were necessary to observe 
project impact on early treatment groups (see Figure 6.9). 
 
Figure 6.9. Training Rollout in Ghana's FTT 
  
Source: ISSER (n.d.). Approach to Evaluating Impact of the training component of the MiDA Programme. 
Accra: Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research. 
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Farmer Based Organizations were randomized according to stratified cluster sampling.  
Here stratified refers to the stratum, or zonal region, within which randomization occurred. 
Within these strata, FBOs were randomized into either Batch 1 or 2 and then either treatment or 
control.  This was done to minimize the effect of either an FBO’s regional location or 
technological sophistication on project impact estimates.  Here “cluster” refers to sampling by 
FBO (i.e., 50 farmers) rather than by farmer.  This was done to account for positive externalities 
(i.e., spillovers) within the FBO cluster.  By measuring impacts at the FBO level, one captures 
the spillover effect on untrained farmers in the cluster (while all members were eligible for 
training, not all were required to participate).  This is a strategy that J-PAL advocated for in its 
executive education to account for positive externalities through a case study of deworming in 
Kenya (Poverty Action Lab, 2005).  This does not resolve the issue of spillovers across clusters, 
however. 
Once sector specialists and MCA senior officials were in agreement over random 
selection, implementers were bound by their contracts to sequence training in a certain way.  The 
Millennium Development Authority (MiDA), the local MCA office responsible for managing the 
compact, contracted the implementation consultants to manage the FTT and ISSER to conduct 
the evaluation.  Implementation consultants, in turn, contracted technical training service 
providers to deliver technical assistance and training to farmers.  Prior to the FTT’s start, ISSER 
generated farmer lists for training based on training batches and control or treatment status.  
MiDA would then approve “task orders” for the service providers, which the implementation 
consultants would oversee and manage.  Task orders governed the contractual relationship 
between MiDA, implementation consultants, and service providers.  Over 200 task orders were 
issued during the project. When asked why the implementer did not train the control group 
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earlier given its incentives to do so, one implementation consultant manager said, “[b]ecause 
before we can do the training we have to get approval from MiDA” (Interviewee 3N, personal 
communication, August 1, 2016).  The service providers would also have to keep photos and 
written records of farmer attendance and services rendered, which implementation consultants 
would then send to MiDA in Accra for verification.  
But rational-legal contractual authority could be undermined in informal ways, even if 
only partially. One MCC agricultural specialist remarked,  
The biggest challenge…is the implementers don’t want to do [the RCT]. They don’t want 
to have a control group, they don’t want to have any reduction in flexibility in how they 
implement their project.  So if you say, these X communities, you cannot touch them, 
[they say] ‘well, how am I gonna get my results?’  So we have a lot of resistance, and 
we’ve moved towards putting out [Requests for Proposals] that don’t give them an 
option, you have to [have a control group], and even so they chip away at it (Interviewee 
3I, personal communication, June 30, 2016).   
 
Formal contractual authority was insufficient for limiting the erosion of the control group over 
time and also for managing local leaders’ and participants’ resistance.  Local leaders, such as 
district leaders, village chiefs, and executives of rural cooperatives, were also often opposed to a 
control group.  They advocated on behalf of their respective constituents.  When their 
constituents were denied or delayed services, these leaders were not happy and made it known.  
This is in part because potential project participants were unhappy with being in a control group.  
They too had grievances and opposed having services denied or delayed. 
Given this resistance, maintaining the control group required persuasive power in the 
form of “constant negotiation” that was “tedious work” (Interviewee 3E, personal 
communication, June 24, 2016).  This work was tedious because, unlike MCC sector specialists 
and MCC and MCA senior officials, these actors’ interests had not been translated because it was 
more difficult to enroll and mobilize these dispersed local actors into the RCT network.  
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Implementers were not invited to early MCC workshops on impact evaluation, largely because 
they had not yet been contracted.  But even if they had, the question of whether impact could be 
as easily framed as learning rather than accountability remained. Agriculture and rural 
development project implementers have their own conceptions of learning and experimentation 
that are rooted in learning as doing, or praxis.  For evaluation economists project participants 
such as farmers were an afterthought.  While the number of participants, which were in the 
thousands, precluded their participation in research design and planning, the RCT rationale 
nonetheless ignores participants’ agency. The RCT considers participants as vessels into which 
projects are poured and outcome data later retrieved (Breslau, 1998).  The inability to deepen the 
network among participants meant that evaluators had to persuade those involved in project 
implementation such as MCA management and in-country MCC leadership but particularly the 
project implementer.   
An evaluator’s in-country presence made this persuasion all the more feasible and 
effective.  In its evaluation work plan, ISSER said, “Evaluation of the FBO training and 
irrigation components relies on randomization of the entry of FBOs into the program.  In each of 
these cases, measuring the impact of the program will require intensive, frequent, timely and 
close cooperation and exchange of information” (ISSER, 2007: 27).  In other FTTs where the 
control group was maintained, the evaluator was not locally situated.  Close cooperation in this 
case meant as needed conference calls that could be as frequent as every week between MCC, 
MCA, evaluators, and sometimes implementers; trips to the country capital on a quarterly basis 
by evaluation economists and/or MCC evaluation consultants; and occasional site visits to 
training locations.  An MCC evaluation economist spoke of the types of persuasion employed: “I 
think the hardest part of our job is the negotiation and just making sure that people understand 
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and value what you’re doing…we would talk and have these discussions every trip we took 
probably where [the implementer] would want to go into the late groups and we would just tell 
them they couldn’t…It was incredibly tedious work…the number of times we had to have a 
conversation about them not entering the other areas kind of shocked me” (Interviewee 3E, 
personal communication, June 24, 2016).  
In Ghana, this type of interaction was continuous because of the evaluator’s local 
presence. ISSER’s local presence allowed both early engagement and trusted communication. As 
one expert who helped conduct the evaluation said,  “I think that it is the early engagement with 
those on the ground that may have contributed to the low contamination” (Interviewee 3O, 
personal communication, August 2, 2016).  According to someone at MCC involved with the 
evaluation, “I think threats to the control group was really managed by ISSER.  We just had this 
great luxury. It’s very rare that you had a kind of ISSER entity on the ground that had such a 
good relationship with the Ministry of Agriculture and all the other implementers.  There was a 
level of trust there” (Interviewee 3H, personal communication, June 29, 2016).  
 ISSER’s early engagement and local presence successfully maintained the control group 
for the randomized rollout design. As a result, the temporal and spatial sequencing of the training 
was contrary to how some MiDA agricultural specialists, implementation consultants, and local 
leaders and farmers would have liked to see it evolve.  According to one agricultural specialist, 
“Within the MCA we had to make accommodations, so many accommodations for the concerns 
about the contamination…sequencing actually was probably the biggest effect of the evaluation.  
Sequencing of implementation had to go hand in hand with the evaluation and that complicated 
the implementation. It stretched it out” (Interviewee 3J, personal communication, July 6, 2016).  
In addition to the timing of implementation, the randomized rollout also forced implementers to 
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spatially implement training in an inefficient way: “In a geographic way the selection was 
random, it meant that you had to go to different places at different times so you couldn’t plan 
sequencing, if you like, in a straight line” (Interviewee 3O, personal communication, August 2, 
2016).  Both the randomized rollout’s temporal and spatial consequences on Ghana’s FTT led for 
inefficient implementation that also likely raised project costs: “To the extent that the 
randomization meant that you couldn’t geographically plan the sequence of the program, it 
meant that it was a bit more costly for the program” (Interviewee 3O, personal communication, 
August 2, 2016).  
The Ghana FTT was part of an integrated, $200 million agricultural and rural 
development program that included infrastructure development through irrigation and roads and 
value chain development through post-harvest centers and credit. The value chain approach to 
agricultural development is an integrated, systems-based approach.  By conducting a randomized 
rollout evaluation and influencing the implementation of just one piece of this integrated 
approach, there was a risk of affecting the implementation and efficacy of the other approaches 
(Interviewee 3J, personal communication, July 6, 2016).  The randomized rollout evaluation did 
not affect the irrigation or roads projects, but it did affect the credit project.  Credit flowed to 
farmers who had developed business plans, and business plan completion was an outcome of the 
FTT.  One of the evaluators conceded that “[f]or the credit component, which had to use farmers 
that were being trained because of the business development plans etc. that were part of the 
training, [credit] may have followed the randomization” (Interviewee 3O, personal 
communication, August 2, 2016).  
ISSER’s early engagement and close relationship with MiDA and “intensive and 
frequent” communication with implementers ensured little to no contamination of the control 
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group.  There was one exception to this, however.  In the Southern Horticultural Belt, ISSER 
detected some contamination: 
There seem to have been some level of contamination of the control group. This was a 
problem that the farmers in the southern zone particularly raised strongly. There were two 
sources of this contamination. One was from the control farmers attending training 
sessions meant for the treatment group. The other source was engendered by the situation 
where farmers who got the training went around to their colleagues in the control 
group…and taught them what they had learnt (ISSER, 2012: 33).   
 
ISSER estimates that five percent of the late treatment group was trained as part of the early 
group.  While this contamination was neither large nor fatal to the statistical design, it does shed 
light on the limits of social control around RCTs. 
Few evaluation economists or those actors they enrolled and mobilized across the 
network took into account project participants’ agency.  But ignoring participants’ agency was 
not a luxury implementers could afford.  Field technicians working for implementers or 
extension agents working with Ministries of Agriculture that worked with implementers had 
longstanding relationships with farmers from previous projects.  They were also often farmers’ 
neighbors. They bore the brunt of farmers’ grievances, and in turn, voiced these concerns to their 
supervisors. 
Farmers’ interests were based neither in accountability nor learning for development 
impact.  Their interests were material.  Farmers are usually some of the lowest income citizens in 
countries in the Global South.  They wanted training and inputs as soon as possible. As a 
Ghanaian saying goes, “If the rain begins to fall, the earlier you put your bucket to catch the rain, 
the better” (Interviewee 3N, personal communication, August 1, 2016).  Just as one does not 
know when the rain will stop, one cannot predict when project funding will cease: “I mean, 
everybody wants it today because you cannot be sure that tomorrow it will happen. There have 
been instances of programs that have started and somewhere down the line a donor or the 
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government has said ‘I’ve run out of resources’ ” (Interviewee 3O, personal communication, 
August 2, 2016).  A big motivation for farmers to clandestinely attend early trainings was 
provision of the starter pack with seeds and other material inputs, which was valued at over US 
$200. In Ghana, there are substantial regional differences in rural wealth and some of the farmers 
were so food insecure that seeds from starter packs were consumed immediately rather than 
planted (Interviewee 3I, personal communication, June 30, 2016) (seed consumption is a survival 
strategy during periods of food insecurity). 
Contamination was higher in the Southern Horticultural Belt because there were stronger 
network ties and forms of social capital among farmers (Interviewee 3M, personal 
communication, July 27, 2016).  Farmers in the early group would communicate about training 
activities to late treatment FBO members and some would sneak into early treatment trainings. 
Strong social capital and networks enhance the public goods nature of private, individualized 
interventions such as training and technical assistance.  Consequently, they may improve project 
outcomes but undermine a randomized evaluation design. 
The End Life of RCTs: Indeterminacy and Lack of Impact 
On July 20, 2012 MCC held an Agriculture Evaluations Portfolio Peer Review Workshop 
to “critically assess the evaluation results of five MCC-financed agriculture programs…through 
peer review” (MCC, 2012a: 1).  These completed FTT randomized rollouts were dubbed “The 
First Five” for having been MCC’s first completed RCTs.  They were subjected to “peer review” 
by five academic and professional economists such as Yale University economics professor and 
J-PAL affiliate Chris Udry and World Bank economist Markus Goldstein.  The peer reviewers 
submitted their assessments and, together with the evaluations, they were published online.  On 
October 23, 2012 MCC released a report summarizing the conclusions of the evaluations and 
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peer reviews called MCC’s First Impact Evaluations: Farmer Training Activities in Five 
Countries (“Brief”) (MCC, 2012b). 
The findings around the FTT project outcomes were either inconclusive or negative.  
Where RCTs did not hold together for the course of the project, as in the Honduras FTT, results 
were indeterminate.  In these evaluations, the methodology was compromised (i.e., the control 
group was invalidated) and MCC could not trust the estimated impacts.  Where RCTs were 
successfully completed, like in Armenia, Ghana, and Nicaragua, the evaluations were unable to 
detect changes in household income.  As one MCC official said, “So here was our chance, we 
were getting impact evaluations that were gonna be able to show the world how much we had 
raised incomes; none of them were able to.  So then it was like, crap…the whole world that cares 
anything about MCC is watching and we’re gonna have to show that we didn’t achieve what we 
wanted to achieve or we don’t know whether we did because the evaluations don’t tell us that 
(Interviewee 3C, personal communication, May 26, 2016).  Some development economists 
critical of RCTs would lay blame on the method’s rigidity.  Dani Rodrik called RCTs 
“straightjackets” that cannot be adapted once set in motion (Rodrik, 2008).  MCC evaluation 
economists’ decision to focus on income without using a research design that allowed enough 
time to observe changes in household income could be blamed for lack of impact. Save for the 
Nicaragua FTT, there were limited effects on outcomes such as farm incomes and adoption of 
improved techniques as well along the program logic chain. 
Indeterminacy can be troubling to those who have been physically and emotionally 
involved in a project: “The [Ag team] was like ‘oh my god, this is shaking us to our knees’ 
because things that we thought were working are not working or we don’t know whether they’re 
working because we didn’t design the damn thing right or we’ve got a complete mismatch” 
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(Interviewee 3C, personal communication, May 26, 2016).  Lack of perceived impact can be 
downright devastating.  An MCC senior development policy official described the reaction: “I 
mean, we did the peer review conversations for those impact evaluations and the Ag team was in 
the room and [the Sector Director] was in tears because s/he had put blood, sweat, and tears for 
six years designing and overseeing the implementation of the agriculture project in [country] and 
six years later s/he had no [expletive] idea whether it had achieved anything” (Interviewee 3C, 
personal communication, May 26, 2016).  
Ultimately, it is impossible to tell if FTTs achieved their stated aims.  This is because 
RCTs don’t just observe; they intervene.  Evaluations lead to what I call a disposition for a Type 
I error, or failure to reject the null hypothesis that the project had no effect, because when 
successfully implemented RCTs can inhibit project outcomes from materializing.  They 
intervene in various ways while also appearing to capture the resulting lower impacts in a 
supposedly rigorous and credible way.  As a result, RCTs make it appear as if the FTT, or any 
project intervention, was not effective when in fact it was the combination of the project and the 
RCT that contributed to project outcomes.  If an RCT is responsible for participant selection, 
interfering in projects’ operational efficiency, and affecting related components of integrated 
programs, then they cause, rather than neutrally observe at a distance, project outcomes.  One of 
MCC’s evaluators framed the tradeoff RCTs presented as thus: “We had to destroy the program 
in order to evaluate it” (Leonard, 2011).   
The Brief on the First Five FTT evaluations erased any doubt that an RCT was more akin 
to a project than a study.  What was remarkable about this report was how little farmer-training 
projects were discussed.  It instead spent as much time talking about lessons learned around 
RCTs’ implementation (MCC, 2012b).  The conclusions reached attested to the fact that they 
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were not evaluations but interventions.  Like the development projects they aimed to evaluate, 
RCTs too faced implementation challenges that required political work such as enrolling allies 
and stabilizing networks thought to be the reserve of non-scientists to overcome. 
Neither indeterminacy nor lack of impact among randomized evaluations is new. A 
review of eight community level nutrition interventions implemented in the 1970s concluded, “In 
no case could we make an unambiguous, internally valid attribution of change in nutritional 
status to the project’s intervention” (Schön, Drake, & Miller, 1984: 12).  According to the 
authors, indeterminacy is the result of implementation contexts tending to change without regard 
for the experimental design (Schön et al., 1984).  When results are determinate, they tend to 
show no program impact.  This was particularly true of RCTs.  This is why Schon and Rein 
(1995) call such assessments “program killers”.   
The results of the First Five therefore put evaluation economists and their agricultural 
specialist allies in a bind.  With accountability minded managers and external audiences such as 
Congress awaiting the results, how would MCC manage to explain that $180 million dollars 
worth of investments had no impact?  Or more accurately, that approximately $10 million dollars 
spent on randomized evaluations could not conclusively say if any impact was achieved? 49   
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how MCC evaluation economists transformed the academic 
purposes of the RCT for development evaluation and the MCC results agenda.  Senior officials 
welcomed RCTs for their ability to demonstrate the impact of MCC investments to an external 
audience.  The stabilization of RCTs was greatly aided through CGD’s network of economists 
                                                
49 $10 million was sufficient to train approximately 8,000 farmers.  In other words, for the cost of the five RCTs, 
MCC could have funded an additional Nicaragua FTT. 
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and evaluation experts.  Through its working group, the CGD established a hierarchy of evidence 
in project evaluation.  This made it more difficult for performance evaluators to argue the merits 
of their preferred input-output approach to evaluation that lacked a counterfactual.  Other 
opponents, such as sector specialists, had to be dealt with more directly.  Evaluation economists 
did political work to cast RCTs as tools for learning rather than accountability, which appealed to 
some sector specialists’ duty towards achieving best practice in their sector and improved 
outcomes for project participants.  Sector specialists’ and other important stakeholders’ 
opposition was further softened in evaluation workshops.   
Having sector specialists consent to RCTs was essential to overcoming opposition from 
implementers.  In farmer technical assistance and training projects—where most RCTs were 
conducted because of the method’s bias towards evaluating projects delivering private, 
individual goods—implementers wished to target older, better off, and more educated farmers 
first because they were pioneers and would facilitate the diffusion of innovation and 
learning.  Where RCTs prevailed, farmers had to be targeted randomly for early or late 
treatment.  This had the political effect of leading the “average farmer” in both groups to look 
similar.  Randomization also intervened in the implementation process by forcing the 
implementer to maintain the control group. This was an act of control, or power, that changed 
how the implementer sequenced training temporally and spatially.  RCTs’ intervention in project 
participant selection and implementation led to either indeterminate or suppressed project 
impacts.  In other words, the RCT ended up damaging the project in order to evaluate it.  
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Chapter 7: The Power of State Expertise 
Introduction 
This chapter will first summarize the three cases of the dissertation and then provide an 
interpretation of what the empirical findings mean for how economic methods are stabilized in 
the state and the effects they produce.  I use the term stabilized because institutionalized gives a 
false sense of permanency.  Economic methods as governing rationales are contingent, contested, 
and open to future (re)consideration.  The cases show that, if we “open-up” the state, we witness 
conflicts between different groups of state experts and between their rationales.  State economists 
faced alternative rationalities as they attempted to stabilize their governance methods.  The 
dissertation contributes to theories about the power of state expertise by combining empirical 
evidence of how economic experts achieved autonomy and overcame opposition from other 
expert groups from the cases with modern and postmodern theories of power.  An economic 
expert’s actions are motivated as much by political interests as any other actor’s are.  State 
economists have an interest in stabilizing their methods as governing rationales—in other words, 
rationality is politics by other means.  The methods are central to economists’ political work and 
the level of power they require to fulfill their political work is commensurate to the level of 
opposition they face. Governance methods have powers independent of the actors that promoted 
or authorized their use.  As forms of power, methods have political effects that are not simply 
discursive.  These effects include the reshaping of bureaucratic power relations, a shift in 
decision-making processes and actors, and the distribution of global development finance 
resources.  
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Summary of Dissertation Cases 
The first case study examined how the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) employed 
governance indicators to decide which countries to award large development finance grants.  
New institutional economics introduced a new explanatory variable to the neoclassical 
economics toolkit—governance.  Neoclassical macroeconomists at international financial 
institutions in Washington, DC black-boxed the new ideas of institutional economics by equating 
them with proxy indicators of governance derived from private-investment risk-analysis firms.  
By adding these governance indicators as a new explanatory variable for growth to their cross-
country growth regressions, neoclassical economists were able to speak with greater authority 
about a topic normally reserved for other experts.  Neoclassical economists then brought together 
governance indices with research on aid effectiveness to analyze the influence of governance on 
economic growth.  This was a major catalyst for the development-aid strategy of selectivity—
choosing countries based on their performance according to a set of defined quantitative 
indicators. 
Selectivity through governance and other indicators helped the Bush administration 
bridge a widening gap between global- and civil-society demands for increased development 
finance and rising suspicion of development aid among conservative lawmakers.  The use of 
governance indicators in econometric research by World Bank economists played an important 
role in stabilizing selectivity.  Economist Steven Radelet, a US Treasury official and Center for 
Global Development (CGD) Senior Fellow, was a key figure in a network that spanned the 
World Bank, CGD, and federal government and defined many of the parameters of the MCA 
selection system. In particular, his relationship with the creators of the World Bank’s Worldwide 
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Governance Indicators (WGI), Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay, was an important factor in the 
decision by the MCA team to consider the WGI for selectivity. 
Use of the WGI, in addition to other indicators to distribute aid funding, was a novel, 
(neo)liberal internationalist approach to bilateral aid.  This approach was at odds with the 
conflicting rationality of political realists who distributed foreign aid through a geopolitical 
rationale. The economic policy community advocating for the MCA had to overcome the foreign 
policy community’s resistance and did so by developing a strategy of “trust in numbers”.  
Through this strategy its members cast the foreign policy community as political and subjective 
while casting themselves as apolitical and objective.  The economic policy community enrolled 
conservative legislators and White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) officials 
who shared a commitment to the selectivity strategy and curtailed the discretion of the foreign 
policy community.  
Despite the economic policy community’s successful “trial of strength” (Latour, 1988) 
against the foreign policy community, differences over the specific indicators used in the 
selection system remained.  In particular, academic economists in the economic policy 
community were skeptical of the WGI’s aggregation methodology and thus its measurement 
validity as well.  Treasury Undersecretary John Taylor proposed an alternative to the WGI that 
Treasury economists had created, but this index was rejected because it was not “transparent” in 
the way the WGI was.  The CGD had defined transparency as a selection criterion being public 
while research macroeconomists believed transparency was rooted in measurement validity.  
CGD’s criteria, along with the WGI’s broader country coverage, meant that the WGI was more 
suitable for operationalizing the MCA’s global indicator-based competition for funds.  When it 
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came to the WGI’s use in the selection system, policy expediency trumped methodological 
concerns.  
The WGI’s use had an effect on the nature of bias in decision-making as well as the 
distribution of development finance.  Decision-making was shifted away from the Washington, 
DC foreign policy community and towards an assemblage of country risk analysts, survey 
instruments, and statistical models.  In the end, the WGI’s incorporation as a decision-making 
tool for aid allocation did not lead to rationality’s taming of subjectivity but swapped the 
subjectivity of foreign policy experts for the subjectivity of a diverse and distributed network of 
mostly country investment risk analysts. It collapsed incredibly complex country polities into a 
singular metric that ignored important factors for governance such as years since independence 
and institutional path dependencies.  The indicators included another type of bias—income bias.  
Wealthier countries routinely performed better on the WGI than did relatively poorer ones.  
Countries that passed four or more WGI indicators and qualified for MCA assistance were on 
average, wealthier than those that did not.  Because WGI scores barely changed over time, this 
resulted in a set of countries that became a “global underclass” when it came to eligibility for 
global development finance.  
 The second case examined the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC) use of 
growth diagnostics to determine in what kinds of sectors and projects the development agency 
should invest.  In the wake of dissatisfaction with structural adjustment’s prescriptive programs, 
three Harvard economists devised a decision-tree framework that assessed constraints to private 
investment using four data-driven empirical tests based on a Bayesian process of elimination. 
The growth diagnostic was meant to tailor reform programs to country-specific contexts while 
adhering to the principles of neoclassical economics. MCC designed nearly twenty bilateral 
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investment agreements, or compacts, before it began using the growth diagnostic. Early 
compacts were developed in an ad hoc way between MCC senior officials, sector specialists, and 
a partner government’s “core team” comprised of officials from the prime minister’s office and 
various ministries. Country proposals for compact funding were often informed by or directly 
based on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), a vehicle for donor assistance governed 
jointly by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the country government, using 
varying degrees of civil society input. 
 MCC economists were uneasy with this supposed informal approach to compact 
development that produced “Christmas tree” compacts with many disjointed parts from country 
proposals full of pork barrel spending.  Economists also felt that MCC-sector officials were not 
at all objective in their negotiations with the core team and steered projects towards their own 
sectors.  MCC economists pitched growth diagnostics, or constraints analysis, to bring an 
“objective” framework to this “politicized” process.  Senior officials meanwhile looked for a 
solution to what was a laborious compact development effort—they wanted a way to quickly 
winnow proposals into compacts.  
Growth diagnostics are congruent with the Finance Ministry tendency held by the finance 
ministry group (comprised of members of finance ministries, economic policy managers, 
economic analysts, and orthodox academic economists). At MCC, the economists were closely 
aligned with the Finance Ministry tendency.  Growth diagnostics contended with the Civil 
Society tendency held by the civil society group (comprised of a broad range of advocacy and 
NGO groups, members of certain United Nations specialized agencies, social sector ministries, 
and many academic non-economists).  At MCC, the Environmental and Social Assessment team 
(ESA) was closely aligned with the civil society tendency.  The main points of contention 
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between the two groups were over whether and how to address inequality.  The faith of MCC 
economists in competitive markets as a solution to growth made them more tolerant of 
inequality.  They believed that competitive markets and market-led development could resolve 
structural inequalities over the medium to long term. The civil society group believed that 
structural inequalities affecting social institutions also affect markets: markets cannot resolve 
inequalities on their own, and marginalized groups need to be purposefully targeted. National-
level sectoral reform programs tailored to aggregate private investment would not suffice. 
Despite their conflict with civil society rationales, constraints analyses were incorporated 
into compact design with little to no resistance.  This was because constraints analyses received 
senior officials’ blessing and the ESA team’s work was mostly about reducing harm (e.g., 
environmental permitting, proper resettlement) rather than proactively addressing inequality.  
Even if the ESA team took a proactive role, its members were scattered across the agency, which 
made it more difficult to build a network at MCC and with like-minded social ministries in 
partner countries to resist constraints analyses by economists.  MCC’s adoption of constraints 
analysis elevated economists in the compact development process.  Sector specialists were 
demoted and relegated to the role held earlier by economists—data providers. 
 By 2015, MCC constraints analyses informed fourteen compacts.  MCC economists led 
their analysis teams that included anywhere from a handful to a dozen economists, analysts, and 
consultants from Washington, DC, partner country governments, donors and development banks, 
and the Harvard University center where growth diagnostics originated.  This team identified, on 
average, three binding or highest priority constraints to growth.  While MCC economists decried 
the subjective biases of sector specialists, bias had now shifted to the decisions that economists 
made regarding diagnostic analysis such as which constraints to consider and test.  Constraints 
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regarding infrastructure, micro risks to private investment, and human capital were tested most 
often. Data availability and quality were often themselves a constraint on what could be 
reasonably examined. Women, the informal economy, and rural areas were often invisible to the 
constraints analysis team because of data paucity and the existing beliefs of analysts.   
 Constraints analyses had important impacts on MCC’s operations and investments.  The 
constraints analysis substituted for the development finance community’s Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) and, on average, reduced the length, breadth, and depth of participatory 
processes.  PRSP consultations typically gave voice to the rural poor.  Constraints analyses were, 
by contrast, dominated by economists and dismissive of rural concerns.  As intended, they 
concentrated investments in a smaller number of sectors and projects.  Because of their 
neoclassical economic approach, constraints analyses shifted investments from rural to urban 
areas.  Their focus on reform shifted investments from “hard” infrastructure to policy and 
institutional reform.  MCC compacts began to resemble the World Bank’s sectoral structural 
adjustment programs of the past.  Finally, they shifted discretionary authority away from 
presidents and ministers in partner countries to White House and MCC officials in Washington, 
DC.  Energy, rather than Transport or Agriculture and Rural Development, became the dominant 
sector in MCC’s investment portfolio in large part because of the Obama administration’s Power 
Africa program, sometimes in contrast to the priorities expressed by country officials. 
 The third case examined MCC’s use of randomized controlled trials (RCT) to conduct 
impact evaluations of development projects.  MIT’s Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) made RCTs 
popular by the early 2000s after economics professors Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee 
partnered with small non-governmental organizations in India to experiment with education 
projects.  Around the same time, CGD set up an evaluation working group to review how the 
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development community conducted project evaluation.  The working group, of which Duflo was 
a member, established standards of evidence.  Based on these standards, it determined that there 
was a significant “gap” between using counterfactuals to assess impact—of which RCTs 
represented the “gold standard” approach—and evaluations that development agencies were 
conducting.  
 A network formed around RCTs consisting of J-PAL, the CGD evaluation working 
group, and the Bush administration’s interagency group that created the MCA.  A key member of 
this interagency group, Delia Welsh, became part of the network during her tenure at MCC and 
introduced RCTs to MCC’s monitoring and evaluation (M&E) department as a way to 
implement MCC’s results agenda.  With the help of CGD’s establishment of evidence standards, 
MCC evaluation specialists transformed the academic purposes of the RCT for development 
evaluation. RCTs were incorporated into the M&E department despite resistance from 
“traditional” performance evaluators because MCC senior officials found them appealing for 
reasons of accountability.  
 RCTs faced other sites of resistance in addition to the M&E department. Sector 
specialists were reluctant to adopt RCTs because they interfered with project implementation and 
also held them accountable for things outside of their control.  MCC evaluation economists cast 
impact evaluations as serving either senior officials’ goals of accountability or sector specialists’ 
goals of learning depending on which group they were working with.  To win sector specialists 
and other implementation team members over, RCT advocates held workshops where they 
promoted, taught, and preliminarily designed RCT evaluations.  By 2015, MCC had initiated 23 
RCTs, accounting for one out of every six impact evaluations.  RCTs were not, however, 
distributed evenly among MCC’s investments.  MCC impact evaluators sought out projects that 
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were most amenable to RCTs: training programs delivered to individuals.  The structure of the 
RCT makes it nearly impossible to apply them to public goods and networked infrastructure like 
roads and easier to randomize projects with individually delivered benefits such as training to 
poor farmers.  The most common MCC sector with RCTs was Agriculture and Rural 
Development. 
 RCTs were presented as research studies but in reality they were parallel projects that 
unfolded alongside a development intervention throughout implementation.  They randomized 
project participants into treatment and control groups, and these groups needed to be maintained 
over the project’s lifetime.  In farmer training projects, choosing, or targeting participants 
randomly conflicted with purposeful targeting based on the project’s program logic.  This logic 
was geared toward maximizing crop productivity and income, necessitating project participants 
who were most likely to succeed at farming. The targeting criteria of project implementers were 
based on the diffusions of innovations paradigm and included a set of observable (e.g., assets, 
education level) and unobservable (e.g., motivation, skill) factors.  The project implementers’ 
use of unobservable farmer characteristics for project participation was particularly problematic 
for impact evaluation because it confounded implementer judgment with the training itself. To 
attribute impact to the project intervention—a key objective of accountability—MCC impact 
evaluators had to ensure that project participants were selected randomly.  
 RCTs successfully randomized project participants in four of the five farmer training 
projects examined.  In these cases, the evaluation team obtained the consent of agriculture and 
rural development sector specialists, MCC country directors, and country government officials to 
implement an RCT.  Contracts between MCC and project implementers mandated that 
implementers cooperate with impact evaluators’ RCT designs.  When participants were 
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randomized, treatment and control groups closely resembled each other on demographic and 
economic characteristics.  Implementers, however, would have wanted the treatment, or early 
training group, to be better educated and wealthier.   
Randomizing participants was only the first step; the control group required maintenance 
over the project’s lifetime.  This meant limiting contamination, or contact, between treatment and 
control group participants.  Units such as farmers, farmer organizations, or farming communities 
were sampled to maintain spatial and temporal distance.  This also presented tensions with the 
implementers’ rationale: implementers wanted to encourage contact between “pioneers” and 
other farmers to boost project outcomes through improved innovation diffusion and train 
everyone as soon as possible rather than waiting to train the control group.  To keep 
implementers from training control group farmers sooner rather than later, the evaluation team 
had to continuously negotiate with and persuade the implementers.   
 When the control group was successfully maintained, it affected project implementation.  
Implementers altered how they would normally sequence their training temporally and spatially. 
In some cases, costs of implementation rose to accommodate the RCT design.  In integrated 
programs where farmers received financial credit following the completion of training, the RCT 
could also affect when and to whom loans were distributed first.  Even when evaluation teams 
contractually obligated implementers to abide by random selection and successfully persuaded 
them to maintain the control group, instances of contamination, albeit limited, still occurred 
because project participants’ concerns were neither accountability nor learning (from impact 
evaluations). Instead, poor farmers were motivated to acquire resources. 
 The two most common results of the five farmer-training RCTs were indeterminacy or 
lack of impact.  These are indicative of the fate of RCTs at MCC more generally. Where 
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evaluation teams and the implementer could not maintain the control group, the RCT 
evaluation’s findings were judged indeterminate.  Where these efforts were successful, RCTs 
were “successful” and able to document project impact.  Those impacts were lower than they 
might have been without the RCT because it interfered with implementers’ rationales for 
participant selection and implementation sequencing.  The RCT ended up altering the project’s 
original strategy in order to evaluate it. 
The Power of State Expertise  
Let us briefly revisit the issues and questions motivating this study.  A number of 
scholars, particularly social reformers and development critics on the left and right, have failed to 
describe certain forms of state rationality such as neoliberalism or managerialism as political 
accomplishments because they took the power of intellectual rationality as predetermined.  They 
also give disproportionate attention to experts’ discourse and ideas while neglecting their 
methods.  This dissertation posed questions to address these shortcomings.  First, I asked, how 
do certain economic methods, or policy devices, get adopted by state organizations as governing 
rationales?  Second, I asked, how do these methods affect power relations, decision-making, and 
the distribution of resources once stabilized?   
My answer is that the stabilization of economic methods is the result of political work.  
This involved economists exercising various strategies of power to gain autonomy (see also 
Dargent, 2011).  In doing so, experts faced resistance from other expert groups with conflicting 
rationalities. This happened at different “sites” across the cases (see Table 7.1).  The main site of 
conflict lay within state policymaking and administrative bodies such as the National Security 
Council (NSC) and MCC.  The other major site of conflict was the project implementation 
context, which was relevant to the case of RCTs.  In the case of governance indicators, the 
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economic policy community and its neoclassical economic rationality came across opposition 
from the foreign policy community’s geopolitical realists in the NSC interagency working group.  
In the case of growth diagnostics, while the civil society community was concerned about the 
implications of MCC economists’ growth rationale, it was not in a position to present opposition 
to the growth diagnostics of economists when they were first introduced.  In the case of RCTs, 
evaluation economists came across opposition at two sites—in the Compact Transaction Team 
and project implementation environment—from sector specialists and implementers who had 
different rationales for the selection of program participants. 
 
Table 7.1 
Sites of Conflicting Rationalities 
 Sites of 
Conflict 







Diagnostics 0 None 























As a result, economic experts had to do political work—the kind often thought to be the 
exclusive reserve of politicos and similar actors with vested “interests”—to overcome opposition 
to their methods from other state experts with alternative rationalities.   
After becoming stabilized, methods possessed not only the “small-p” political power to 
define, quantify, standardize, surveil and normalize, as many sociologists and governmentality 
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studies scholars have alluded to, but also “big-P” political power to transform organizational 
power relations and determine the distribution of resources.  The remainder of this chapter 
outlines the political work of experts and these small-p and big-P political effects and concludes 
with thoughts on how theories of power might be employed to study state experts.  
Gaining Authority by Achieving Autonomy 
In the documented cases, both state economists and senior officials were occupied with 
autonomy. State economists wanted to stabilize their methods and senior officials sought to boost 
the bureaucratic autonomy of their respective departments to shield them from external public 
and legislative scrutiny (Carpenter, 2001; Huber & Shipan, 2002).  Senior officials welcomed 
any strategy that could improve their department’s legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  In 
response, state economists enrolled senior officials in their entrepreneurial efforts by arranging 
solutions to organizational problems, mediating between the worlds of knowledge production 
and application, and framing themselves as the ideal spokespersons for objectivity.  
Arranging Solutions.  Social scientists studying state expertise who focus on expert 
autonomy generally suggest that knowledge alone is insufficient for expert power; power also 
requires autonomy (Centeno & Silva, 2016).  In all my cases, state economists relied on the 
consent of and autonomy from superiors in order to introduce and stabilize their method.  NSC 
officials allowed economists in the US Treasury (“Treasury economists”) to devise a country 
selection system that included governance indicators.  Officials of MCC Compact Development 
permitted compact development economists (“MCC economists”) to execute growth diagnostics 
for compact design. Department of Accountability officials at MCC agreed to let evaluation 
specialists (“evaluation economists”) implement RCTs as part of MCC’s results agenda.  Unlike 
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existing studies of expert autonomy, methods were central to experts’ ability to achieve 
autonomy.  
In order to gain autonomy, state economists had to enroll their superiors in their efforts to 
stabilize methods for decision-making. Senior officials identify broad policy objectives but rarely 
have the foresight, expertise, or time to identify how their objectives will be realized (Grindle, 
1977; Justesen & Mouritsen, 2011).  These are opportunities for experts to gain autonomy.  
Broad policy objectives such as “aid effectiveness” in the case of governance indicators or 
“results” in the case of RCTs are usually formulated in response to external pressures demanding 
something of senior officials or their organizations.  Except in rare cases, senior officials are 
unable to deliver on these demands without the technical know-how of expert colleagues 
(Grindle, 1977).  Thus, expert bureaucrats are in a position to translate the programmatic ideals 
of policy into administrative and governance practice (Hart, 1992; Huber & Shipan, 2002).  State 
economists translated the interests of these superiors by being what Benveniste (1972) calls 
“arrangers of solutions” to the problems that senior officials faced. 
In each case, some of the important entrepreneurial work that state economists 
accomplished to gain autonomy involved creating a “fit” between the intellectual purpose of a 
development-economic method and the development governance problem to which that method 
could be applied.  Senior NSC officials, for example, consented to a strategy of selectivity but 
were content to leave the details up to the interagency group.  Gary Edson, the Bush 
administration’s Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economic Affairs, knew 
that he wanted a way to select countries based on their policies and institutions but was not fluent 
in the details of specific indicators.  This gave Steven Radelet and his team considerable leeway 
in determining the details of the selection system. Senior officials in MCC’s Compact 
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Development department wanted a way to streamline country proposals and the compact 
development process, but they did not present their own solutions for doing so. The proposal to 
use growth diagnostics came from MCC economist Ben Dennis following his consultation with 
his economist colleagues.  Senior officials in MCC’s Department of Accountability needed to 
respond to external pressures to measure and demonstrate results, but they were somewhat at a 
loss to stipulate what that entailed.  MCC’s evaluation economists partially filled the vacuum 
with a proposal to use RCTs for project evaluations. 
State economists were able to propose solutions because they had knowledge of 
development economics methods appropriate to their field.  Treasury economist Steven Radelet, 
MCC economist Ben Dennis, and evaluation economist Delia Welsh belonged to epistemic 
communities, or knowledge-based networks. In the case of governance indicators, the core nodes 
of this network included the Treasury and the World Bank; in the case of growth diagnostics, the 
Harvard Kennedy School of Government and MCC; and in the case of RCTs, J-PAL, the Center 
for Global Development, and MCC.  State economists like Radelet, Dennis, and Welsh became 
familiar with economic methods like the WGI, Growth Diagnostics, and RCTs in their areas of 
expertise (macroeconomics, development economics, and program evaluation, respectively) 
through contacts with research economists in these intellectual centers.  This is precisely how 
some sociologists have suggested expert methods get introduced into state organizations: 
“[e]conomic expertise is not something that is formulated in the academy and then ‘applied’ 
elsewhere.  It is a network that stretches from the academy through businesses and quasi-
governmental organizations, along a permanent port into the state” (Eyal & Levy, 2013: 232).  
As was the case in economic policymaking in Colombia and Peru (Dargent, 2011), this scientific 
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authority helped to enroll senior officials and boosted the autonomy of experts by presenting a 
solution whose details the politicos could not immediately or easily grasp.  
The combination of state economists’ organizational efforts to stabilize their methods and 
ability to draw on research methods in development economics merits a new category of 
institutional entrepreneur: “methodological entrepreneurs.” When discussing the introduction of 
new policies in an institutional field, institutional theorists call these pioneers “policy 
entrepreneurs” (Mintrom, 1997). Methodological entrepreneurs represent a specific type of 
expert entrepreneur, one who aims to change the way institutions do work based on their 
particular interest in stabilizing methods for governance and decision-making.   
Mediating to Manage Dissension.  Proposing and arranging solutions for senior 
officials’ organizational challenges was only the first step in gaining autonomy.  There were 
competing and compelling alternatives from other credible economic experts for senior officials 
to consider.  State economists managed dissension to their proposals from disciplinary peers by 
mediating between the worlds of knowledge production and its application (Stehr & Grundmann, 
2011).  Mediation involves the use of methods as instruments rather than principles. Those who 
mediate are motivated by “syntheses that work” among important constituencies such as senior 
officials, research economists, and economists “in the wild” and are as expert in the contexts in 
which methods are deployed (such as development finance agencies) as the methods themselves 
(Osborne, 2004). In the case of governance indicators and RCTs, state economists successfully 
mediated between two attitudes towards statistics—“metrological realism,” or a commitment to 
methodological validity, and “proof-in-use,” or a commitment to policy expediency (Desrosieres, 
2001).  Those concerned with methodological validity are committed to reliability in terms of 
accuracy and precision; they adhere to the “moral economy” of science that involves 
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quantification, empiricism, and objectivity (Daston, 1995).  Those concerned with policy 
expediency display little interest in the origins or processes that generate methodological outputs 
(Desrosieres, 2001).   
In the case of governance indicators, the head of the indicator working group, John 
Taylor, was preoccupied with methodological validity.  He warned NSC senior officials about 
using the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) database to rank countries, 
objecting to its data aggregation methods and high standard errors.  Meanwhile, NSC senior 
officials needed a set of governance indicators that could measure and rank as many countries as 
possible.  These officials were more interested in the WGI’s ability to yield a specific point 
estimate for a large number of countries for the purpose of comparison than they were in any 
debate over the validity of the WGI.  Treasury economists mediated between Taylor’s 
commitment to measurement validity and NSC officials’ desire for policy expediency. They 
advocated for the WGI’s adoption because they felt that a commitment to metrological realism 
was unsuited to the selectivity strategy.  Ultimately, dissenters like Taylor had to accept NSC 
officials’ attitude of policy expediency and the use of WGI for governance purposes it was 
neither designed nor necessarily well suited for.   
In the case of RCTs, evaluation economists appreciated the need of senior officials to 
“focus on results” but were also keenly aware of the methodological concerns J-PAL economists 
had about existing evaluation practices. Performance evaluators, however, were skeptical of the 
emphasis that J-PAL economists placed on the establishment of a counterfactual via 
randomization.  They believed that evaluating project outputs against the level and quality of 
organizational inputs could provide an adequate project performance assessment.  MCC senior 
officials had little interest in or concern about these debates.  Their attitude towards evaluation 
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was one of policy expediency—whichever evaluation approach would best portray MCC’s 
commitment to results was most appropriate.  In this case, evaluation economists felt that the 
policy expediency of performance evaluations did not suit MCC’s results agenda. Their 
mediation resulted in the belief among MCC senior officials that randomization would deliver 
attribution of impact to MCC investments.  Senior officials believed that such definitive rigor 
would make MCC a pioneer in the field and boost the agency’s standing as a leader for 
accountability with legislators and peer organizations in the field of global development finance.  
Performance evaluation dissenters ultimately had to accept the methodological standards set by 
J-PAL economists as a core feature of MCC’s evaluation strategy. 
State economists’ participation in think tank–led expert networks was key to managing 
peer dissension.  Their proposed methodological solutions were simultaneously gaining 
establishment as field level standards in global development finance through CGD networks.  As 
Brunsson and Jacobsson (2002) state, “Standards may productively substitute for various other 
forms of authoritative rule…although standards are often promulgated by experts, they may 
come to function as… a way of embedding authority in rules and systems” (Brunsson & 
Jacobsson, 2002: 32).  This external source of legitimate authority made the proposed methods 
“safe” choices for senior officials.   
The Center for Global Development assembled a network of specialists from the US 
government, non-governmental organizations, development research communities, and 
international financial institutions across five workshops in Monterrey, Mexico, and Washington, 
DC to, in part, establish “optimal characteristics of data used for [MCA] eligibility criteria” 
(Birdsall, Levine, et al., 2002).  The think tank also assembled a network of academics, 
evaluation and policy specialists, and state economists into an evaluation working group that 
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established standards of evidence where evaluations employing counterfactuals were superior, 
especially those established through randomization, to those that did not (The Evaluation Gap 
Working Group, 2006).   
State economists’ participation in CGD networks ensured that senior officials would not 
perceive economists’ proposed methodological solutions as idiosyncratic projects tied to 
individual professional or personal interest but rather as projects adhering to emerging field-level 
standards.  The adoption of these methods cum standards by risk-averse senior managers 
bolstered MCC’s legitimacy and standing among legislators, civil society institutions, and other 
development finance organizations.  This improved the chances of senior officials to gain 
bureaucratic autonomy for their respective departments.  State economists’ mediation and 
participation in expert networks drew senior officials down the path of the WGI and RCTs while 
cutting them off from alternatives such as Taylor’s proposed alternative governance index and 
performance evaluations. 
Framing and Shaming.  The final strategy state economists employed to gain autonomy 
was presenting themselves as the ideal spokespersons for objectivity and thus free of personal or 
political bias.  This is an important strategy of power economists employ (Hirschman & Berman, 
2014; Porter, 1996).  State economists cast themselves and their methods as more objective than 
existing alternatives.  This was an act of framing that involved generating tensions around the 
validity of existing decision-making arrangements and matching new projects to the interests, 
values, and problems of potential allies (Garud et al., 2007).  As in other cases of framing in 
organizations, the goal was to convince potential allies such as hierarchical superiors that 
alternatives were valid, appropriate, and indispensable (Rao, 1998).  State economists questioned 
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the legitimacy of existing decision-making processes and attempted to persuade senior officials 
that their more objective approaches were in everyone’s best interest.  
 In all the cases, economists framed existing decision-making as rooted in participants’ 
personal self-interest and those involved as having “selection bias” in their decisions on which 
countries, sectors, and project participants to fund.  Foreign policy officials had their “favorite” 
countries. Country governments and sector officials had their “pet projects”. Implementers and 
local officials “cherry picked” project participants. In each case, these actors were purportedly 
partisan and subjective while the economic approach was rational and objective.   
Existing studies suggest that economists can effectively claim to be spokespersons for 
objectivity because of their quantitative methods (Hirschman & Berman, 2014; Porter, 1996).  
As standards, methods have the character of procedural objectivity and as standardized processes 
are more transparent in ways that support accountability (Fuchs, 1997; Timmermans & Epstein, 
2010). However, a potent and seemingly overlooked source of economists’ claims to objectivity 
is that their discipline is the most nomothetic among the social sciences (Wallerstein, 1996).50  
State economists were able to cast themselves as objective in large part because they presented 
their interests as rooted in universal laws that transcended the self rather than in particular self-
interest or partisan relationships (i.e., politics).  In other words, they argued that they were the 
only experts with aperspectival objectivity (Daston, 1992).  In the cases studied, state economists 
believed that universal laws, sometimes stated in the form of stylized facts—for example, better 
governance leads to greater national growth; eliminating binding constraints leads to increased 
                                                
50 Nomothetic disciplines are systems of knowledge interested in arriving at general laws that govern human 
behavior based on systematically produced quantitative evidence through strictly defined and reproducible methods.  
They also aim to be space and context independent (Wallerstein, 1996). 
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private investment; and randomization produces internally valid impact estimates—hold true in 
all places at all times.  
Like the way Shapin and Shaffer (2011) approached Hobbes’ rationale rooted in natural 
philosophy, which Boyle and the experimentalists blithely dismissed, I employed a “charitable 
interpretation” of the arguments and claims of state experts that Treasury and MCC economists 
rejected.  Such an interpretation is made possible by applying the principle of symmetry that 
neither subscribes to the rationality-politics divide so common in the planning and policy 
literature nor accepts the views of dominant experts regarding what is “rational” (or 
representative of collective social reason), and what is “irrational” (or representative of 
idiosyncratic interests).  As a result, I argue that the characterizations that state economists made 
of other experts and their existing methods were inaccurate.  Upon close empirical observation, 
the practices economists characterized as biased and subjective, either out of deceit or 
unawareness, appeared to be rooted in alternative rationalities.  
In the case of governance indicators, foreign policy decisions were based largely on 
geopolitical calculation.  Foreign policy community members wanted to direct funds to 
important US geopolitical allies such as Pakistan and Egypt.  Most country government 
investment proposals either had strong place-based rationales or reflected the civil society 
community’s concerns for marginalized populations in the periphery. While some countries 
presented laundry list proposals, the majority of countries based their proposals on targeted 
regional or demographic considerations even if the proposals spanned several sectors. 
Implementers selected farmers for success based on observable and unobservable criteria 
combined with theories of how agricultural innovations diffused.  Implementers and field-level 
technicians were motivated by project success, which meant registering farmers that they 
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intuitively believed would excel. Meanwhile, the approaches of orthodox economists were not 
immune from bias; indeed, their methods favored certain interests and groups over others (e.g., 
relatively wealthier countries, urban development, and the average farmer).  
The alternative rationalities in the cases were nevertheless vulnerable to economists’ 
framing and standardized methods because they were more idiographic than nomothetic. 
Idiographic approaches to knowledge focus on the unique qualities of a particular unit (the prefix 
“idio” in ancient Greek refers to the distinct and personal) (Wallerstein, 1996).51  This left those 
employing idiographic rationales vulnerable to criticisms that they were basing decisions on 
idiosyncratic (i.e., subjective) interests.  Regarding governance indicators, while geopolitical 
realism is a social science sub-discipline, geopolitically oriented international realists believed 
that a country’s unique bilateral relationship with the United States and particular geopolitical 
position in the world should inform funding decisions.  With respect to growth diagnostics, 
development strategists holding the civil society tendency believed that a country region’s or 
population’s unique needs or assets should determine country investment strategies.  As regards 
RCTs, field level technicians were free to deviate from observable criteria, such as years of 
education and wealth, that correlate strongly with “early adoption” in diffusion of innovation 
theory and select participants based on unique unobservable characteristics such as individuals’ 
motivation and learning capacity.  As a result, those who held idiographic rationales had a harder 
time arguing that they possessed aperspectival objectivity.   
                                                
51 Idiographic rationales are more deeply invested in case-study approaches that aim to understand an individual unit 
in its entirety than they are in establishing general laws about the behavior of a set of similar units.  Context matters, 
and space and time are among some of its important elements.  Evidence can be qualitative or quantitative but rarely 
precisely reproducible.  History is the paradigmatic idiographic discipline (Wallerstein, 1996). 
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Overcoming Conflicting Rationalities 
After state economists arranged solutions by adapting CGD approved methods to solve 
organizational problems, fended off peers’ alternative proposals, and successfully established 
themselves as spokespersons for objectivity, senior officials and economists became partners in 
method.  Each actor, moreover, achieved some degree of autonomy within this partnership.  
Senior officials could use the methods to boost their department’s legitimacy and by 
consequence bureaucratic autonomy.  Economists could use their autonomy to stabilize their 
methods as governing rationales.  
Scholars studying expert autonomy might be satisfied to stop here.  After all, economists’ 
power could now rest on both their specialized economic knowledge—drawn from their 
education and participation in epistemic communities—and autonomy from hierarchical 
superiors.  Science studies scholars would point out, however, that state economists might still 
face trials of strength because other actors, especially other experts, opposed economists’ 
methodological projects (Callon, 1984, 1986).  In fact, state economists still had to enroll 
additional allies to overcome opposition from other expert such as the foreign policy community 
and project implementers that held alternative rationalities.  Growth diagnostics faced the least 
resistance, while RCTs faced the most. The level of resistance to governance indicators fell 
somewhere in between. Consequently, each group of state economists—evaluation economists, 
Treasury economists, and MCC economists—had to exert a commensurate level of power.   
Trials of Strength in Global Development Finance.  Since expert claims routinely 
“affect, combat, refute, and negate” someone (Turner, 2007), it is not surprising that the claims 
of one expert community would conflict with those of another. Overcoming these conflicting 
rationalities was essential to the transformation of economic methods into governing rationales.  
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The cases here show that when orthodox economists at Treasury and the MCC sought to 
introduce and stabilize their methods, it led to a situation of conflicting rationalities—between 
their rationales and the rationales they sought to displace. When the now famous chemist Robert 
Boyle advanced his program of experimental science using vacuums, he had to contend with 
natural philosophers and their plenist ontologies (Shapin & Schaffer, 2011).  Likewise, in the 
cases in this study, other experts and their associated rationalities had established operating 
norms that were present when economists promoted their rationales as governing principles.  
However, when conflicting rationalities are discussed in the planning and policy literature, it 
usually happens between state and non-state actors or between state formal rationality and non-
state practical rationality (Goulet, 1986; Watson, 2003). Conflicting rationalities within the state 
among groups of bureaucrats or experts are rarely discussed.  
In the case of growth diagnostics, it was sufficient for MCC economists to translate their 
superiors’ interests and gain autonomy to stabilize growth diagnostics as a methodological 
approach to developing and designing compacts (see Table 7.2).  Senior officials were looking 
for a way to streamline and discipline the compact development process and eliminate project 
“dogs” from consideration.  Growth diagnostics were able to do this through a standardized, 
evidence-based process of elimination.  There was no major competing rationality or expert 
network at the time of growth diagnostics’ stabilization.  Enrollment of senior officials was all 
that was necessary for growth diagnostics to become “obligatory passage points” for the 
resolution of development finance decisions (Callon, 1984). 
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Table 7.2 
Growth Diagnostics as Obligatory Passage Points 






design using growth 
diagnostics 
Conduct a growth 
diagnostic once a 
country is eligible 












A “disciplined” and 
legitimate way to 
reject projects that 







cover” for decisions 
Growth diagnostics 
would analyze a 
limited set of 10 
constraints and used a 
standardized process 
to eliminate certain 
constraints from 
consideration 
Notes: Table’s framework adapted from Callon (1984). 
 
However, in the other two cases in which state economists had to withstand trials of 
strength, they had to deploy various strategies of “power to” or power as persuasion rather than 
“power over” or power as coercion to enroll additional actors.  State economists sought to 
transform what Callon (1984) calls bystanders and opponents into allies and make their methods 
obligatory passage points.  
Treasury economists enrolled bystanders who shared economists’ objectives such as 
congressional members and officials of the White House Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) with the moral power of objectivity. While objectivity was important to economists in 
convincing their hierarchical superiors of the merits of their methods in all cases, it was 
particularly salient in the case of governance indicators. State economists’ use of rules-based, 
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third party, quantitative methods and commitment to transparency made them appear impartial, 
selfless, and disciplined.  These are all virtues of objectivity and contributed to a sense of 
economists’ trustworthiness (Daston, 1992).  Convincing others that one is objective can enhance 
a person’s moral standing, which makes it a strategic form of persuasive power (Mehta & 
Winship, 2010).  Once the moral standing that comes from objectivity in life and practice has 
been achieved, one can use the prestige earned as a resource to enroll others (Fuchs, 1997).  
Having powerful congressional members and intellectual actors on their side was central 
to the success of Treasury economists in overcoming the resistance and alternative rationalities 
of the well-established foreign policy community.  The interests of conservative congressional 
members and OMB officials were relatively easily translated, since they had their own reasons 
for wanting quantitative metrics established such as curbing development bureaucrats’ discretion 
by increasing accountability mechanisms for foreign aid spending (see Table 7.3).  Indicators 
enabled this because they provided metrics by which to target countries and monitor their 
progress.  Treasury economists deployed a strategy of “trust in numbers” to enroll congressional 
representatives and their staff members and OMB officials.  Porter (1996) described how 
bureaucratic agencies and their experts defensively adopted quantitative methods to fend off 
unwanted scrutiny and gain bureaucratic autonomy as a form of defense against unwanted 
intrusion.  At certain moments in certain fields the public and its representatives trust agencies’ 
quantitative methods more than officials’ discretionary decision-making (Porter, 1996).  While 
Porter’s argument is very valuable, it nonetheless does not address the use of objectivity by 
experts as a form of offense, which as the case of governance indicators demonstrates, 
economists used against other expert groups such as the foreign policy community.  
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Table 7.3 
Governance Indicators as Obligatory Passage Points 






Build a transparent 
selection system that 
picks countries with the 
“best” policies and 
institutions conducive 









finance; raising aid 





Raise aid levels to 
contribute to broader 
national security and 
growth agendas and 
meet the Monterrey 
Consensus’ goal for 
greater development 
financing 
Treasury economists’ ran 
regression models that 
identified selection 
indicators that were 







foreign aid which 
many believed was 
“failing” 
Increase accountability 
mechanisms for foreign 
aid spending 
Selection indicators 
provided a metric by which 
to monitor countries’ 
progress.  Increases in 
indicator scores, GDP, or 
preferably both would 
provide evidence of 
progress 
Notes: Table’s framework adapted from Callon (1984). 
 
Evaluation economists enrolled opponents such as sector specialists, who resisted 
economists’ objectives and whose interests were more challenging to translate with vehicular 
ideas and identity formation (see Table 7.4).  In the case of RCTs, “impact” was an important 
vehicular idea. Vehicular ideas, similar to “boundary objects” (Star & Griesemer, 1989), emerge 
as ways of problem-solving and their significance can change with context.  They are less ideas 
committed to some grand ideology that compels allegiance or rejection than inclusive, polysemic 
umbrellas under which a range of advocates can shelter, trade and shift their allegiances (Béland 
& Cox, 2016; McLennan, 2004).  Evaluation economists, for example, could cast RCTs as a tool 
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for either accountability or learning. This was important to enrolling sector specialists in the 
enterprise of RCTs.  MCC senior officials came to understand the impact of an MCC project in 
cost-benefit terms, or getting the “biggest bang for the MCC buck,” in the case of a particular 
intervention in another country.  This same motivation, and thus conception of impact, was 
unsatisfactory to MCC sector specialists.  Evaluation economists had to enroll sector specialists 
by casting impact as learning.  Sector specialists were committed to and engaged in “best 
practice”.  It became much more attractive for sector specialists to enroll in the impact evaluation 
efforts of evaluation economists if the impact represented opportunities to learn and improve 
project experiences and outcomes for participants (see Table 7.4).  
Evaluation economists translated the interests of MCC sector specialists through their 
participation in evaluation workshops.  The workshop served a similar purpose to that of the 
scientist’s laboratory (Latour, 1993; Law, 2011).  The tactic of power used in evaluation 
economists’ workshops took the form of generosity rather than a monopoly of knowledge.52  It 
was more important to evaluation economists that as many actors involved in project execution 
as possible understood—and more importantly, believed—in the merits of an RCT.  After all, 
experts become more powerful and influential when they can graft their methods onto what 
others are doing (Rose, 1992).   
Evaluation economists organized and conducted these workshops and invited academic 
economists to present and teach RCT principles.  They shared the merits of RCTs widely and 
enthusiastically with those whose support was needed to successfully implement them.  They 
framed the results of an RCT (i.e., project impact estimates) as educational outputs that served as 
                                                
52 Among those studying professions, monopolization over the supply of an expert’s knowledge is a major source of 
power (Eyal & Pok, 2015).   
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global public goods for development policy and practice at a time when economic research was 
increasingly being endorsed as an input to development alongside capital resources (Stiglitz, 
1999).  When evaluation economists were successful, they were able to cultivate new 
identities—co-experimenters.  As such, sector specialists would engage in the righteous activity 
of generating educational public goods for the benefit of project participants globally rather than 
simply the pedestrian activity of delivering their specific project’s outputs. 
Table 7.4 
Randomized Controlled Trials as Obligatory Passage Points 




impacts of projects via 
randomized trials  
Discover “what 





evidence of project 
impact 
Not applicable 





results agenda to which 
MCC had publicly 
committed 
Fulfilling MCC’s 
mission to “focus on 
results” 
RCTs attributed 
impact to MCC 
investments, which 
was highly desirable 




mistakes and failures 
of the past 
 
Promoting and 












directed by outside 
evaluation experts 
Notes: Table’s framework adapted from Callon (1984). 
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The Resolution of Conflict and Rational-Legal Authority.  Science studies treats 
scientific work as political work because it is met with resistance.  And wherever there is 
resistance, there is power (Foucault, 1978).  These cases demonstrate that without postmodern 
forms of persuasive and productive power the power of experts’ intellectual rationality could not 
be realized; their methods would neither have become obligatory passage points nor governing 
rationales.  Hirschman and Berman (2014) suggest that it is important to understand whether 
economists’ methods achieve the status of obligatory passage points. In all three of these cases, 
they did.  However, their power was taken a step further in the cases of governance indicators 
and RCTs because once the enrollment of senior officials and other allies was successful and the 
methods of economists became obligatory passage points, they were codified in legally binding 
documents.  Methods assumed the force of state rational-legal authority (Weber, 2009).  
Legislation establishing the MCA and MCC mandated that the MCC Board determine a 
candidate country’s eligibility with objective and quantifiable indicators of a country’s 
demonstrated commitment to “just and democratic governance” to the “maximum extent 
possible” (Pub. L. 108–199, 2004).  Compacts’ Monitoring and Evaluation Plans and contracts 
with implementers prescribed impact evaluation strategies and procedures, including 
randomization, which implementers had to follow if they wanted to remain compliant with 
contractual agreements.  
There were no forms of rational-legal authority in the case of growth diagnostics. The 
need for binding language was unnecessary because there was no alternative rationality and 
expert group to overcome.  Meanwhile, in the case of RCTs, rational-legal authority at the state 
organizational level was necessary but insufficient.  Evaluation economists faced not one but two 
major sites of conflict—the state organization and the local implementing environment.  
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Consequently, commensurate forms of persuasive, postmodern forms of power were necessary to 
overcome implementers’ continued opposition to randomized evaluation designs, in addition to 
the contractual agreement for randomization evaluation economists had already successfully 
drafted with sector specialists.  Given the near daily incentives and pressures implementers faced 
to serve members of the control group, evaluation economists had to iteratively negotiate and 
persuade implementers to delay providing services to maintain the RCT’s control group over the 
life of the project. Because implementers were not able to attend workshops, their appreciation of 
RCTs’ merits and cultivation of identities had to be built over the course of multiple interactions.  
Implementers had to be reminded of the learning that was taking place and how everyone 
involved was engaged in the creation of educational public goods.  
The Power of Methods 
Among those looking at experts’ influence, many mainstream scholars in planning, 
policy, and political science have dismissed the influence of experts because it was limited to the 
instruments of planning and policy.  Science studies scholars have taken experts’ methods more 
seriously.  They and others inspired by the field have shown us, through sustained scholarship 
over the past several decades, that methods enact the world around us.  These scholars argue that 
methods should be thought of as interventions (Eyal & Levy, 2013).  As such, they have 
important political effects. Such effects to, for example, make some things visible while 
obscuring others are described as small-p political effects and are both thoroughly documented 
elsewhere (Hirschman & Berman, 2014) and present in the cases studied here.  In asking what 
effects methods have once stabilized, this study also raises the issue of methods’ big-P political 
effects such as those on organizational power relations and the distribution of resources. 
  312 
Bureaucratic Power Relations.  Each successful trial of strength altered the nature of 
bureaucratic power relations.  Through political activity and strategies of power, state economists 
gained not only autonomy but also authority.  Senior officials allowed state economists to 
establish their favored economic method to make decisions on officials’ behalf.  In these cases, 
power was collective rather than zero-sum.  According to Weberian “distributive” theories of 
power, one actor’s power comes at the cost of another actor’s power (Heiskala, 2001). However, 
the social theorist Talcott Parsons conceived of power as a collective force.  Two actors can 
cooperate and enhance their joint power over third parties and nature.  Actors are willing to 
sacrifice some of their own power if the collective power over a third party is large enough 
(Heiskala, 2001; Parsons, 1963).  
In each of the cases presented here, senior officials and economists were willing to 
sacrifice some of their own autonomy and discretion by shifting them to the formal rules and 
procedures of economic methods.  These situations were not so much a power struggle between 
management and economists, like the kind we may see between a sovereign and her subjects or a 
patriarch and his children, as it was a partnership based on method. Nonetheless, economists had 
relatively more to gain from this partnership—autonomy and the ability to withstand trials of 
strength against other expert groups to get their methods stabilized.  As a result, the increased 
bureaucratic authority of state economists put them in charge of important decision-making 
functions.  In turn, those who were dominant in decision-making were often relegated to 
operationalizing economists’ methods. USAID and State Department foreign policy officials 
found themselves helping Treasury economists find appropriate indicators for the country 
selection system that Treasury championed.  Sector specialists and implementers ensured that 
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evaluators’ RCT designs would remain intact throughout implementation.  Senior officials, by 
contrast, already had authority over these other experts. 
Decision Making.  Each of the three methods was deployed for a specific purpose.  
Governance indicators were vital to operationalizing selectivity for US bilateral aid 
effectiveness.  To play this role, governance indicators transformed a country’s political and 
institutional environment into a single number so that it could be compared against others.  
Growth diagnostics were central to efforts that sought to discipline the compact development 
process and narrow down country investment proposals.  To achieve this they provided a 
taxonomy and process to organize a “clinical picture” of what ails a country’s wellbeing (defined 
in terms of GDP) and quantified and classified a limited set of possible “cures.”  RCTs were 
fundamental to MCC becoming a pioneer in “managing for results” in development finance. To 
play this role, RCTs sorted “similar” persons into two spatially and temporally distinct groups, a 
treatment group that participates in a development project and receives its output and a control 
group for whom participation and outputs are denied or delayed.   
Each method also represented its own unique form of power. To understand these forms 
of power, we had to first “get inside” each method by opening its black box (Latour, 1988; 
MacKenzie, 2005).  Opening the black box of orthodox economic methods in the state revealed 
the various people and things such as survey respondents and project participant sample frames 
that state economists assembled to operationalize their methods.  Economists introduced these 
actors and tools into the decision-making process.   
Without the methods of the economists, much of the decision making at MCC resembled 
an “interactionist” form of planning between groups of politicos and experts that held both 
nomothetic and idiographic rationales.  This was planning based on negotiation and “horse 
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trading”.  In its ideal form, such a process would approximate what Charles Lindblom called 
“partisan mutual adjustment” where each actor pursued his or her interests based on information 
about what other actors were doing (Friedmann, 1987).  However, the processes at MCC were 
similar to mutual adjustment processes more generally—they were laced with power relations 
and personal bias even while being informed by alternative rationales (Friedmann, 1987).  These 
power relations and personal biases are part of the reason why economists denounced them.  
Nevertheless, partly supplanting partisan mutual adjustment with economic methods did not 
eliminate bias; it simply changed whose bias impacted decision-making.  
Regarding governance indicators, decision making was shifted away from Washington, 
DC’s foreign policy community and towards an assemblage of country risk analysts, survey 
instruments, World Bank economists, and statistical models. “Some guy sitting in a café,” as one 
NSC official put it, that The Economist Intelligence Unit or similar publication purposively 
sampled to complete a survey would have his (or her) responses aggregated with hundreds of 
others into a single WGI indicator using a complex statistical model. This would determine a 
country’s governance rank. In the growth diagnostics case, diagnostics shifted compact 
development away from in-country government officials and sector experts towards MCC and 
core-team economists (and their consultants), a series of diagnostic tests, and global survey 
firms.  MCC economists chose which constraints to consider, which to test, and the data and 
procedures that would be used to test them.  This shaped the sectors and types of projects that 
could be considered for compact funding.  With respect to RCTs, randomization displaced 
decision-making by sector specialists and project implementers with decisions made by 
evaluation economists (and their consultants), sample frames, and public lotteries.  Evaluation 
economists identified projects amenable to RCTs and their consultants developed sample frames 
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of possible project participants. Randomization procedures (e.g., spreadsheet programs, lotteries) 
then sorted those in the sample frame into treatment and control groups. 
These cases demonstrate that neither power nor bias can be avoided.  Rather, the nature 
of power and bias changes depending on how planning and governance are approached.  
Replacing “interested” actors such as foreign policy officials, ministers of finance, and 
implementers engaged in negotiations and debate with economic methods meant introducing 
different entities and their respective interests into the decision-making process (see Table 7.5). 
These interests are not always explicit nor known to the creators or proponents of economic 
methods (Sinclair, 2008).  For example, in the case of RCTs, the commitment of J-PAL 
economists to experimentation using the RCT made it virtually impossible to conduct 
evaluations of large-scale public goods such as reticulated infrastructure systems because of the 
SUTVA (stable-unit treatment value assumption) principle.  When MCC evaluation economists 
adopted the RCT as an evaluation tool, they implicitly accepted the RCT’s inherent bias against 
networked public goods as part of the decisions about which projects will have a control group.  
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Table 7.5 
Influential Decision-makers Before and After Stabilization of Methods 
Pre-Method Post-Method 
 Governance Indicators 
Senior State Department officials Treasury economists 
Senior USAID officials Country-risk (and other) experts populating survey instruments 
 Governance survey and indicator producers 
 WGI’s creators 
Growth Diagnostics 
“Strong” ministry officials MCC and core-team economists & 
consultants 
MCC senior officials Growth diagnostic creators  
Sector specialists Growth diagnostics consultants 
Members of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Process 
Respondents to competitiveness, enterprise, 
labor, and social surveys 
 MCC senior officials 
RCTs 
MCC sector specialists Evaluation economists 
Project implementers Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption 
Local community leaders and officials Sample frames 
 Lottery systems 
  
The Political Effects of Methods.  Opening the black box also showed us how 
epistemological choices—such as correlating growth with governance or relying 
disproportionately on formal sector data—masked the political interests and values, or biases, of 
economists.  These choices influenced each method’s outputs, such as governance rankings and 
diagnoses of binding constraints to growth.  Understanding methods’ biases is important not only 
because they shape how we see and understand the world but because methods have material 
effects such as influencing the distribution of development finance resources. 
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Scholars have focused on experts’ discourse and its ability to shape identities (Kendall & 
Wickham, 1999).  But economists’ methods also have distinct small-p political and big-P 
material effects (these are not always mutually exclusive).  With respect to small-p political 
effects, governance indicators collapsed the incredible diversity of political and institutional 
environments across dozens of countries into a common metric. This created a ranked hierarchy 
among countries and made comparison of their institutions and polities easy.  This disadvantaged 
Central Asian countries.  They shared a unique institutional and political legacy that was 
different from regions that scored both well and poorly on the WGI.  Furthermore, this scalar 
ranking created a zero-sum relationship and an “arms race” between countries, as one country’s 
improvement in scores became automatically another country’s loss.   
The WGI also mobilized a theory of development (i.e., its political values) through its 
disproportionate reliance on investment risk analysts and indicator producers situated in the 
Global North.  It advanced a lodestar model of state institutions based on emulation of countries 
such as Denmark.  For countries in the Global South this meant fashioning state institutions 
whose raison d’etre is the protection and enforcement of foreign capital’s property rights for 
“market-enhancing” growth. I call this development model the “night watchman state,” and 
heterodox economists have thoroughly documented the bias of governance indicator projects 
such as the WGI (Khan, 2007). 
 Through growth diagnostics economists linked economic theory with a data ecosystem 
that bolstered neoclassical economics and its adherents in the development planning process.  
This created a “regime of perceptibility” (Murphy, 2006) that focused MCC officials’ attention 
on the diagnosis, or binding constraints, rather than a host of other historical, political, 
geographical, or cultural factors that might be responsible for the pathology of low private 
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investment.  It also elevated this specific pathology over all others.  A diagnosis provides 
structure to a disorderly narrative of symptoms and sorts the valid from the invalid (Jutel, 2011).  
Thus, growth diagnostics valorized countries’ levels of private investment, which represents its 
creators’ political values, while disregarding other issues such as high levels of inequality.  They 
determined a pathology’s cause by identifying and naming a disease, such as low social returns, 
based on a set of ten preexisting causes and a systematic process of reading symptoms and ruling 
out those causes.  Like medical diagnoses, growth diagnostics prescribed the possible treatments, 
or investments and reforms in certain sectors to address underlying causes (Jutel, 2011).  These 
processes were all conducted before the consultative process, thereby circumscribing civil 
society participation based on the diagnostic’s results.  
Randomized controlled trials experimented on, and thus subjected to scrutiny, a subset of 
development interventions that involved individualized goods or services such as training 
programs rather than public goods based on reticulated networks.  Evaluation economists 
revealed what forms of knowledge they valued when they sought to actively exclude field-level 
technicians’ intuitive and local knowledge of potential program participants as participation 
criteria. They believed that knowledge of project impact did not come from local praxis but 
quantifiable impact estimates based on observable characteristics and generalizable experimental 
methods. 
 Evaluation economists and their consultants extended their difference-in-difference 
matrix into the implementation landscape that transformed how implementers designed and 
executed these training projects.  This “extension of the RCT rails” changed the temporal and 
spatial order in which implementers would normally deliver goods or services to project 
participants.  This effect stemmed from evaluators having the power to determine who received 
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technical assistance and training first (treatment group) and who had to wait (control group) 
using random number generators and lotteries.  Intervening in the implementation process in this 
way led to inconclusive or dampened project impact estimates and contributed to the sentiment 
that farmer-training projects “don’t work.”  
In addition to the small-p political effects described above, methods in these cases also 
had material effects because they determined the distribution of resources. This is an 
understudied topic among scholars examining experts’ policy devices and the effects of expertise 
more generally.  These big-P political effects were a consequence of economists’ 
epistemological choices that included the assumptions and intermediate decisions of method 
creators and state economists and the data they used in their methods.  Regarding intermediate 
decisions, while Treasury economists did not directly choose countries, they chose the indicators 
that eventually chose the countries.  They were in turn relying on Kaufmann and Kraay’s 
decisions about which survey datasets to include in their indicators.  MCC economists did not 
choose sectors for investment, but they chose which constraints to test, which eventually 
identified sectors for investment.  They built on the decisions of Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco 
about which constraints to include in their growth model.  Evaluation economists chose which 
projects’ participants would be randomly assigned to a control group that eventually delayed 
benefits to a subset of poor farmers in the Agriculture and Rural Development Sector.  They 
were following Duflo and Banerjee and CGD economists’ standards of evaluation evidence.   
The data used in a method is also an important source of bias.  Governance indicators 
rely on data that has a strong positive association with a country’s per capita GDP.  Growth 
diagnostics rely on data that captures the views of larger, formal sector firms located in a 
country’s main cities rather than smaller, informal firms in small towns and rural areas.  
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Economists’ intermediate decisions around how to conduct the methods and which data to use 
introduced systematic and structural, rather than idiosyncratic, biases into “rational” decision-
making processes. 
Together with the official decision-making authority methods possessed once stabilized, 
economists’ epistemological choices had effects beyond those usually studied by other scholars.  
Governance indicators, for example, skewed the distribution of funding to countries that scored 
relatively higher on the WGI and were relatively wealthier in per-capita income terms.  Because 
both perceptions of and actual changes to institutions are slow to change over time, it also meant 
repeatedly directing funds to a narrow group of countries. Growth diagnostics shifted funding to 
projects implemented in cities, particularly a country’s capital city, rather than rural areas and 
away from construction and service delivery to policy and institutional reform.  RCTs directed 
evaluation resources towards training projects in the Agriculture and Rural Development sector.  
They shifted resources in the form of technical assistance and agricultural inputs away from 
“pioneer” or “model” farmers to the “average farmer”.  While in this case RCTs actually 
equalized the distribution of resources, they also have the potential to shift resources away from 
the most needy individuals when they intervene in projects that target the poorest. 
Conclusion 
The findings from these cases lead me to conclude that if experts do not exercise the 
kinds of power often considered as the reserve of politicos and similar actors with vested 
interests, the power of intellectual rationality cannot be realized.  Furthermore, to compete in the 
state, a group of experts’ particular intellectual rationality must contend with other rationalities, 
and, if it is to survive and thrive, overcome them.  This conquest and survival is not something 
foretold—it is hard work.  While state experts are increasingly becoming politicos, they are still 
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largely at the mercy of their hierarchical superiors and face path-dependent organizational norms 
(Centeno & Silva, 2016; Coats, 2001).  To overcome these modern forms of power, they engage 
in institutional entrepreneurship through postmodern forms of “power as strategy” to enroll 
allies.  Enrolling allies allows state experts to gain autonomy, overcome alternative rationalities, 
and establish their methods.  It is often assumed that intellectual rationality exists “out there” as a 
perennial, naturally occurring phenomena just waiting to be applied in virgin organizational 
environments.  This is a myth.  Intellectual rationality must be constructed and nurtured 
(Cabantous et al., 2010).  As a result, expertise is the work of stabilizing methods that can 
overcome conflicting rationalities and knowledge claims.   
The cases have also led me to believe that understanding the power of state expertise 
requires bringing modern and postmodern theories of power together.  Many studies rely either 
on Weberian analyses of authority, hierarchy, and resources or Foucauldian analyses of 
governmentality (e.g., Miller & Rose, 2008; Mills, 2000).  It would be more productive, as some 
other scholars have pointed out, if Weber and Foucault were employed as supplements rather 
than as substitutes (Clegg et al., 2006; Flyvbjerg, 2004; Fraser, 1981).  Moreover, the cases here 
point to the need to combine modern concepts of power such as hierarchy, authority, and 
resources with not only Foucauldian concepts and approaches but also science studies concepts 
of power such as translation, enrollment, and trials of strength (Callon, 1984; Law, 2011). This is 
especially so when investigating state experts and their methods.   
Perhaps unpredictably, the use of these postmodern forms of strategic power led to new 
forms of modern, authoritative power.  Foucauldian and other postmodernists depict experts’ 
methods as powerful but non-coercive (Rose & Miller, 1992). But when both politicos and 
experts transferred their decision-making authority to methods, and those methods became 
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codified in legal agreements after experts successfully prevailed in trials of strength, methods 
adopted the properties of official authority.   
Finally, without looking at expert methods, we cannot understand the full extent of the 
power of intellectual rationality.  Experts are powerful not only because they generate and spread 
ideas and discourse but because they establish methods that do work on their behalf.  After 
becoming stabilized, economists’ methods possessed not only the small-p political power to 
define, quantify, standardize, surveil, and normalize but also more modern forms of big-P 
political power to transform organizational power relations and determine the distribution of 
material resources.  
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Chapter 8: Economic Expertise, Development Governance, and Planning Practice 
Introduction 
For planning research, this dissertation’s findings suggest a need to reconceptualize three 
common assumptions in planning scholarship using three concepts in science studies that have 
proven valuable to understanding state experts and their work.  For development policy, the 
findings suggest how some of the methods studied affect participatory development and have 
implications for inter- and intra-country inequality.  For planning practice, the results suggest 
how the study’s approach to state economists’ methods for governance could inspire reflective 
practice by economists and the allies they have enrolled in their methods.  The study’s findings 
also point to a possible path out of the “postmodern abyss” for practicing planners.  If other 
experts could learn from the experiences of the orthodox economists discussed in this study, they 
might be able to address postmodernist concerns such as a rejection of dualisms and an emphasis 
on plurality and diversity.  The chapter closes with a discussion of the methodological limitations 
of this study, and suggestions for future research.  
Recap of the Study’s Findings 
This dissertation posed questions to address shortcomings in the theories and research 
around the power of experts.  First, I asked, how do state organizations come to adopt certain 
economic methods, or policy devices, as governing rationales?  The cases demonstrate that in 
order to realize their specific entrepreneurial projects, which related to the stabilization of 
economic methods as policy devices for development governance, Treasury and Millennium 
Challenge Corporation (MCC) economic experts had to engage in political work—thought to be 
the reserve of politicos—by using various strategies of power.  State economists overcame 
opposition to their proposed methods by mediating between their epistemic communities and 
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state organizations to achieve autonomy, presenting themselves as spokespersons for objectivity, 
and enrolling allies.  Once the enrollment of senior officials and other allies was complete, state 
economists’ methods became obligatory passage points.   
The second question driving this study was, once adopted, how did these methods affect 
power relations, decision-making, and the distribution of resources? State economists’ 
stabilization of methods put them in charge of important decision-making functions previously 
reserved for actors they had displaced. Their methods changed the decision-makers involved in 
development governance and introduced the ideas and values of a constellation of different 
actors to decision-making through economists’ intermediate decisions and data choices. These 
new actors, values, and decisions introduced new biases and rationales that resulted in political 
effects.  Consequently, Central Asian and other countries’ unique circumstances could not be 
considered for decision-making and the poorest countries routinely failed to qualify for MCA 
funding; the length, breadth, and depth of the participatory planning process suffered and MCC 
projects began to resemble sectoral structural adjustment programs of the past; and projects 
delivering individual private goods were disproportionately selected for evaluation, participants 
thought more likely to succeed in those projects had their project outputs delayed, and the spatial 
and temporal sequencing of project implementation was altered.  
Implications for Planning Research 
This study’s findings have multiple implications for planning research, development 
governance, and planning practice.  Here, the terms planning and planners refer broadly to fields 
dealing with public problems such as urban planning, public administration, development 
management, and public policy. This study suggests reconceptualizing three assumptions in 
planning research with heuristics for the social sciences.  Reconceptualization heuristics are a 
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way of taking a familiar phenomenon and treating it as if it were an example of something quite 
different (Abbott, 2004).  This dissertation’s use of science studies’ concepts such as the 
principle of symmetry, trials of strength, and opening the black box shows the value of 
reconceptualizing how planning scholarship addresses expert rationality, state experts, and expert 
methods, respectively.   
The first common assumption in planning research is that experts’ success or failure rests 
on the strength or weakness of their intellectual rationality.  Too often, planning scholarship has 
made conclusions about expert influence based on the properties of intellectual rationality alone.  
Social reformers in the progressive era made normative assumptions about the value of 
intellectual rationality and its ameliorative effects on representative democracy and patronage 
politics (Finegold, 1995).  This later led to an entire pedagogical and research program on 
rational and comprehensive planning (Altshuler, 1965b).  More recently, empirical investigations 
of planning and practicing planners have cast doubt on the power of intellectual rationality 
(Baum, 1980; Flyvbjerg, 1998).  John Forester is one of the few planning scholars who has 
presented a counterargument against claims of intellectual rationality’s impotence by focusing on 
planners’ communicative and discursive strategies for framing and agenda-setting in the face of 
power (Forester, 1988).  The implicit assumption behind an emphasis on expert discourse is that 
if experts derive power from speaking truth to power, then it is worthwhile to either problematize 
expert speech or reform it to achieve progressive ends.  However, focusing on the 
communicative rationality of experts delimits their sources of power and continues to put the 
“real” power of decision- and policy-making in the hands of non-experts (e.g., Fischer & 
Forester, 1993).  
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The power of experts, particularly through their strategies to gain autonomy and stabilize 
their methods, may be more extensive than originally thought.  When examining state expertise, 
planning scholars should consider applying the principle of symmetry so as to provincialize 
rationality.  Doing so treats rationality as a local accomplishment in particular contexts rather 
than a property that people or organizations do or do not possess (Cabantous et al., 2010).  As a 
local accomplishment, agents such as experts must construct and perform rationality within 
institutions and organizations.  Thus, the principle of symmetry suggests that when experts fail, 
they do not necessarily do so because rationality is a weak form of power but instead because 
they are ineffective politicos.  The organizational theorist Jeffrey Pfeffer (1992) aptly said: 
“Knowledge without power is of remarkably little use. And power without the skill to employ it 
effectively is likely to be wasted” (Pfeffer, 1992: 342).   
Some planning scholars in the 1980s (Baum, 1983b; Benveniste, 1989) began to explore 
this topic, but in recent decades this emphasis has faded, and the “blank space,” or cognitive 
blindness, between planners’ techniques and goals has reemerged (Baum, 1980).  Planning 
research would benefit from scholars returning to experts’ sources and strategies of power as an 
explanation for planning and policy successes and failures.   
The second common assumption in planning research is that conflicting rationalities exist 
between the state and its experts’ intellectual rationality and non-state actors and their practical 
rationality (Corburn, 2007; Goulet, 1986; Scott, 1998; Watson, 2003). This approach is based on 
an instrumentalized view of the state.  Viewed instrumentally, the state has no internal conflicts 
or contradictions and lacks agents interested in or capable of conscious political action (Angotti 
& Marcuse, 2011).  This conception of the state developed, for example, when a group of “neo-
statists” sought to dispel the structural theorists’ view of the state as “society-centric” (i.e., the 
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state as one among many outcomes of structural social forces) with the notion of state autonomy 
(Skocpol, 1985).  In doing so, neostatists also inadvertently ended up casting the state as a 
monolithic entity with a unitary logic (Jessop, 2001).  Weberian theories of bureaucracy that 
separate state and bureaucratic rationality from other forms of rationality, such as the practical 
rationality of politics or local communities, buttressed neo-statist claims.  
In the planning and policy literature, conflicting rationalities within the state among 
groups of bureaucrats or experts are rarely discussed. The science studies concept of trials of 
strength reconceptualizes planning scholarship’s view of conflicting rationalities. This study’s 
findings suggest that the state is not monolithic with a unitary logic; it is an arena of conflicting 
rationalities.  Economic experts faced opposition and had to withstand trials of strength from 
expert groups with alternative rationalities.  If planning scholars applied the concept of trials of 
strength, they would look for instances where experts were opposed to each other and had to 
defend their work.  They would find state environments rife with conflict and competing 
rationalities and would ask why certain groups opposed experts’ proposals.  Treating the state as 
an arena would make characterizations of the neoliberal state as “post-political” appear 
exaggerated.  A particular version of the rational dream, such as neoliberalism, would be viewed 
as a political accomplishment.  The dominance of economic rationality would be seen as 
orthodox economists withstanding trials of strength against other experts and rationalities.  As 
the product of political work, these rationalities would be contingent, contestable, and in need of 
maintenance.  There may not always be a trial of strength present, as was the case with growth 
diagnostics, but there will likely always be an alternative rationality. The issue is how dominant 
experts withstood trials of strength (if any occurred) or failed experts did not. 
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The third common assumption in planning research is that planning methods are 
ostensibly instruments of rationality. Planning scholarship presents planning methods as mostly 
technical instruments of rationality rather than political interventions.  Opening the black box 
reveals their political and moral values.  When planning scholars “get inside” methods, they help 
others to understand their political content (Alonso & Starr, 1989; Dorling & Simpson, 1999; 
Sinclair, 2008).  Opening the black box in this way foreshadows methods’ possible political 
effects when planners use methods to bridge knowledge and action in planning environments.  
Each method is unique and therefore requires planning scholars to apply a tailored approach 
drawn from science studies, sociology, philosophy, history, and critical theory in order to 
uncover its political values and assumptions.   
Implications for Development Governance 
Opening the black box of the three most popular economic methods in global 
development finance reveals various implications for development finance governance. 
Governance indicators, growth diagnostics, and RCTs have become staples of development 
governance at MCC and beyond.  Multilateral development banks and various development 
finance agencies have adopted each of these methods with varying levels of enthusiasm. Growth 
diagnostics and RCTs have implications for participatory development, while governance 
indicators and growth diagnostics have implications for inequality. 
Growth diagnostics and RCTs reduced the breadth and depth of participatory processes in 
development governance.  Prior to growth diagnostics, compacts were based, to differing 
degrees, on countries’ poverty reduction strategy processes, or PRSPs.  PRSPs emerged in the 
late 1990s in the wake of dissatisfaction with structural adjustment lending and policies.  The 
consensus in the development community is that they are important yet imperfect vehicles for 
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participatory planning.  However, one of the core missions of PRSPs was to maximize local 
civil-society participation in development planning.  It included a participatory ideal for which to 
strive.  In some cases, like PRSPs in Honduras, the extent of participation was genuine and 
significant (Dewachter & Molenaers, 2012).  Planning through growth diagnostics moves away 
from this ideal and shifts some of the power over planning back to economic experts and 
development agencies’ headquarters.  This shift is a far cry from the days of structural 
adjustment planning when Washington-based economists’ models doubled as universally valid 
prescriptions and absolute rules (Best, 2014), it nonetheless did forestall what could have been a 
deepening of the PRSP process, at least at MCC.   
While PRSPs are meant to increase participation in the planning and design phase of 
development governance, participatory appraisal and similar constructivist and social-justice 
approaches to development learning emphasize participation in the project evaluation phase.  In 
the 1980s, participation advocates won hard-fought battles to introduce these methods into 
existing policy analytic approaches.  For example, Robert Chambers (Chambers, 1999) 
beseeched development practitioners to “put the last first” or listen to local peoples’ analyses of 
their own problems and ideas for solutions.  Participatory rural appraisals and action research 
linked advocacy planning and cooperative learning (Chambers, 1992).  Evaluation was iterative, 
rather than a one-off exercise, and knowledge was co-produced through a variety of methods.   
By contrast, in a randomized controlled trial knowledge is not co-produced with 
participants.  Knowledge is collected through standardized survey instruments with 
predetermined categories and questions.  The involvement of project participants in evaluation is 
limited to maintaining evaluators’ research design, particularly the evaluation’s control-group 
status.  Participants must cooperate with the efforts of evaluators to minimize contamination and 
  330 
spillover effects.  Project participants were vessels into which interventions were poured and 
outcome data extracted rather than agents who interacted with projects in complex or 
contradictory ways. Their opinions about a project’s services, inputs, or implementation quality 
were not solicited, because evaluators focused on attribution and accountability.  Together, 
growth diagnostics and RCTs represent a reduction in the quantity and quality of participatory 
development planning and appraisal. 
  While growth diagnostics and RCTs affected participation, governance indicators and 
growth diagnostics had implications for development governance in another way: they both 
affected the distribution of development finance.  Governance indicators had implications for 
inter-country inequality.  Selecting countries based on governance indicators shifted 
development finance resources away from countries with the lowest per-capita gross national 
income.  While some of these countries’ incomes were low because of conflict and therefore they 
may not have made ideal candidates for large investment grants, some of them were considered 
simply too poorly governed to merit funding.  Countries such as Comoros, Chad, Laos, 
Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan scored poorly on governance indicators and ranked among the 
poorest nations in the world. Consequently they did not qualify for MCA funding.  Because 
institutions are path-dependent and resistant to change, countries with the lowest incomes failed 
to qualify year after year, while countries such as Cape Verde, Georgia, Ghana, and Morocco 
received funds repeatedly because they routinely passed the qualification criteria, which also 
included performance on human-development and economic-policy indicators.  Over time, this 
has led to a curious conundrum in which MCC runs out of possible countries to fund while the 
focus on governance contributes to a “global underclass” of countries deemed needy but 
undeserving of development funding. 
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Growth diagnostics had implications for intra-country inequality.  This diagnostic relies 
on neoclassical economic theory and formal sector data from enterprise and competitiveness 
surveys that together favored investment in metropolitan areas at the expense of rural areas.  The 
framework of this diagnostic relies on a “root cause” approach toward constraints to private 
investment.  This emphasized national-level policy and institutional reform over place-based 
“hard” investments in infrastructure and services and on making infrastructure services more 
affordable for existing users rather than on increasing access for new users.  Prior to growth 
diagnostics, MCC investments were focused on integrated rural development programs, which 
had their own challenges and problems, and diverse transport investments that included sizeable 
programs for rural road construction.  Compacts developed with diagnostics began to look like 
the World Bank’s sectoral structural-adjustment programs of the past and focused largely on 
institutional reform in country capitals.  
In concert, governance indicators and growth diagnostics have channeled funding into 
national reform programs or urban investments in an increasingly select number of countries.  
Orthodox economists would likely find no fault with such a pattern.  According to their theories 
of convergence, inter- and intra-country inequality will be reduced in the long term as prices 
approach equilibrium.  Poorer countries and rural regions would eventually “catch up.”  
Reductions in regional inequality resemble an inverted U-curve, in which differences initially 
exacerbate but then decrease in later stages of development (Williamson, 1965).  Economists, 
both orthodox and heterodox, and economic geographers have cast doubt on these theories and 
assumptions (Krugman, 1991; Myrdal, 1971; Pritchett, 1997).  Without going into the detail of 
the alternative theories that challenge the neoclassical view, there is good reason to believe that 
cumulative causation—the idea that regional differences and urban and rural inequality are 
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exacerbated over time without state intervention to address inequality—is just as likely as 
convergence (Chakravorty, 2000).  
Economic methods’ effects on the distribution of development finance have 
consequences for economic governance and policy more broadly.  In the wake of the 2008 global 
financial crisis, a debate has emerged over the role of orthodox economists in widening global 
inequality vis-à-vis other actors such as political elites, business leaders, and interests groups 
(Carrick-Hagenbarth & Epstein, 2012).  While it was clear that inequality was on the rise, the 
role that economic expertise played in rising inequality appeared hazy (Galbraith, 2012).  This 
study’s conclusions suggest that orthodox economists play a role in exacerbating inequality. 
When orthodox economists gain autonomy and stabilize methods that relate strongly with 
aggregate measures of gross domestic product or rely upon neoclassical economic theory, their 
expertise aggravates inequality in the distribution of resources at least in the short to medium 
term.  
Implications for Planning Practice 
This study has important implications for planning practice as well.  Opening the black 
box of methods and understanding their political effects can prompt reflective practice. A 
practitioner engages in reflective practice when s/he critically assesses his or her own ways of 
thinking and doing things.  In the case of global development finance, economists and their allies 
can ask themselves if the effects on participation and resource distribution are desirable for the 
targets of development finance.  This would involve acknowledging the assumptions and 
limitations of their methods.  At its best, reflective practice involves a sustained inquiry into the 
causes, meanings, and consequences of one’s actions as part of a public debate (Fischler, 2012). 
Schon and his colleague Chris Argyris developed two models of learning—single loop and 
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double loop.  Single-loop learning is the dominant mode of professional practice and is based on 
efficiency and the improvement of tasks, which are often technical (Argyris & Schon, 1992).  
The practitioner takes in new information and makes the appropriate adjustments to improve 
efficiency.  Underlying norms, values, and frameworks remain unchanged.  In contrast, double-
loop learning redefines the ideas, perspectives, and norms that one brings to the performance of 
tasks (Argyris & Schon, 1992).  Practitioners stuck in single-loop learning try to maximize 
control and minimize risk.  Practitioners open to double-loop learning maximize the validity and 
transparency of information, including the values and objectives of actions (Fischler, 2012).  
They are willing to reveal political values and this sparks reflective practice. 
Surprisingly, planners and other experts are not always aware of the political content and 
effects of their methods (Sinclair, 2008).  State experts may possess enough skill to employ 
methods properly but rarely question the methods’ underlying value-assumptions.  They may 
miss the method’s role in generating broader trends such as shifts in compact funding or biases in 
what programs to evaluate.  Opening the black boxes of methods could reveal political values 
and effects to experts’ allies.  Usually, allies are removed even further from the inner workings 
of methods; they enrolled in the projects of experts because of their own interests or a partial and 
particular understanding of a method’s purpose.  Understanding the full scope of methods’ 
effects might lead allies to reflect as well.  Reflection on the part of both method proponents and 
enrolled allies could lead to reform, if so desired.  This was the case at the Asian Development 
Bank.  The Asian Development Bank’s board of directors changed course when it learned that its 
country selection performance system, weighted heavily towards governance criteria, was 
favoring larger and wealthier countries at the expense of smaller and poorer ones.  Or consider 
the mission statement of the United Kingdom-based Radical Statistics Group: “Radical Statistics 
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is a group of statisticians and others who share a common concern about the political 
assumptions implicit in the process of compiling and using statistics, and an awareness of the 
actual and potential misuse of statistics and its techniques” (Dorling & Simpson, 1999: xxiv).   
Appetite for such reflection may not be as large as some might expect or like.  Experts 
expend political capital to enroll allies and stabilize methods; openly questioning their methods’ 
assumptions and effects could appear too risky.  Nonetheless, it still may be the case that 
recasting methods as political practice with political effects can highlight the individual agentic 
capacity of experts who may be what Ananya Roy calls “double agents” eager to reform their 
practices towards more progressive ends (Roy, 2012).  
This study also offers one modest and admittedly partial route out of the postmodern 
abyss by characterizing the state as a plural arena of competing rationalities.  The postmodern 
abyss represents a suspension between the decaying validity of the modernist project and 
convincing postmodernist critiques that are nevertheless discomforting (Beauregard, 1991).  
Modernism emphasizes the centrality of reason and science to the human ability to act 
effectively via the state in a liberal democracy.  Postmodernism questions the validity of the 
modern state and its experts’ claims to knowledge. Its intellectual foundations include a 
skepticism of conventional beliefs; rejection of universal bases for truth; discomfort with 
universal meanings attached to concepts; rejection of dualisms such as fact and value or 
rationality and irrationality; and belief in pluralism and a diversity of rationales that in the end 
may be irreconcilable (Harper & Stein, 1995).  In response to the modernist project, 
postmodernists have enthusiastically embraced deconstructionism as a strategy of rigorous 
skepticism.  However, the philosopher Hilary Putnam (1992) warned, “the philosophical 
irresponsibility of one decade can become the real-world political tragedy of a few decades later.  
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And deconstruction without reconstruction is irresponsibility” (Putnam, 1992: 132).  Putnam as 
well as Latour (2004) have concluded that critique has “run out of steam” because a rejection of 
reason has left planning impotent and silent in the face of objective conditions of inequality, 
oppression, ignorance, and greed (Beauregard, 1991).   
At the same time, postmodern accounts of knowledge, power, and expertise can become 
handmaidens to a program of “popular epistemology” that gives equal credit to all voices and 
forms of knowledge, including regressive and revanchist approaches that may either be 
indifferent or actively opposed to equality and ecosystem survival (DuPuis & Gareau, 2008; 
Latour, 2004).  In the state, power enters not from the top down, but through the back door by 
means of particular well-funded interest groups.   
Planning theorists have described three broad avenues that planners can follow to make a 
difference: work outside the state to affect planning and policy; withdraw from the state to create 
autonomous centers of governance and production; and operate within the state to make its 
characteristics more humane (Fainstein & Fainstein, 1979).  The last option of working within 
the state is considered unfashionable and neglected in planning practice, often because it is not 
radical enough (Kraushaar, 1988).  However, stabilizing alternative rationalities and methods 
within the state may offer progressive planners one of their best options for change.  The 
examination of how certain experts gained power and how dominant methods came to be 
stabilized and have effects—as in the case of orthodox economists and orthodox economic 
rationality—raises questions about whether different (i.e., progressive) methods could produce 
different consequences.   
Treating the state as an arena of competing rationalities between, for example, orthodox 
economists and other expert groups represents a “middle ground” that bridges the concerns of 
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postmodernists and engages in the kind of responsible reconstruction Putnam recommended.  If 
the state is an arena of conflicting rationalities in which groups of experts deploy strategies to 
enroll others and fend off opposition to become obligatory passage points, then state 
organizations are institutions where plurality and diversity thrive; dualities between rationality 
and irrationality are rejected because power drives rationality; and rationalities are often 
irreconcilable because one group attempts to impose its rationality on organizational processes at 
the expense of others.  This would only partially satisfy postmodernist concerns.  When experts 
withstand trials of strength against other groups embracing other rationalities, they are not being 
antifoundationalist; instead, they are seeking to supplant one foundation of knowledge with 
another.  Nor would these groups reject positivism or empiricism as the basis of knowledge and 
action.  Some of the liberal tenets of modernism, such as the belief that (social) science can serve 
human needs, are maintained (Harper & Stein, 1995). 
Paul Davidoff’s plea for advocacy and pluralism in planning includes elements of this 
responsible reconstruction (Davidoff, 1965).  Advocacy planning rejects master narratives and 
believes in plurality and diversity.  It believes consensus is hard to reach and that the plans of 
different groups may be irreconcilable. What is needed instead is an honest broker to adjudicate 
between different plans.  Peter Marris (1994) and Thomas Angotti (2011) constructively critique 
Davidoff’s strategy by arguing that planners’ approaches need to be more explicitly political and 
entrepreneurial.  Leaving alternate plans to essentially speak for themselves before a jury does 
not suffice.  Advocacy and equity planners and experts need to become “inside agitators” by 
entering the political arena and the state to make a case for their alternative rationalities (Angotti 
& Marcuse, 2011; Eisenstein, 1996; Marris, 1994).  Consider, for example, what happened when 
feminists entered the Australian state in the late 1970s.  These feminist bureaucrats, or 
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“femocrats,” significantly impacted the character of the Australian state, its budgets, and its 
public policies (Eisenstein, 1996).  At the same time, their more radical counterparts in Britain, 
by contrast, rejected any association with the bureaucracy and likewise missed opportunities to 
bend the state towards feminist concerns (Watson, 1991).  These approaches can extend to 
feminist (and other) methods as well (Bartlett, 1990; Nelson, 2001; Seitz & Adato, 2012; 
Roncolato, Reksten, & Grown, 2017).  
If the state is an arena of conflicting rationalities, then feminists and other advocacy 
planners and experts can enter the state and stabilize progressive methods to make the state more 
humane (Sternberg, 1993).  There are structural and institutional limits to the kind of expert 
methods that are possible in particular contexts and political moments (Garud et al., 2007; Innes, 
1990).  Nevertheless, within these limits there are important degrees of freedom and state experts 
can advance alternative rationalities through methods.  Methods, after all, can promote equity 
and justice: “One could even argue that while economics is certainly consistent with legitimizing 
and masking many contemporary forms of domination … this does not necessarily preclude the 
core [of applied economic practice] from playing less problematic roles … a number of 
progressive economists have in fact tried to address major issues of gender domination, global 
inequality, and environmental degradation” (Reay, 2012: 78).  While all forms of knowledge 
may be equally valid in a theoretical sense—and no group’s knowledge should be discounted as 
invalid—in a practical sense, decisions over budgets, regulations, policies, plans, and projects 
will inevitable rely on one set of experts and methods over another (Selinger & Crease, 2006; 
Turner, 2013).  Progressive planners and experts could embrace the political work necessary to 
gain autonomy and withstand trials of strength to stabilize methods that, for example, address the 
commodification of land and labor to rehabilitate human habitation (Sternberg, 1993, 1996).  
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Study Limitations  
There is one main limitation to this study.  The methods studied were observed in a 
relatively unique context.  At the turn of the century, the MCA and MCC were established as a 
new US bilateral development finance program and agency, respectively, to reshape both US 
foreign assistance and global development finance.  As a new agency, MCC faced fewer path 
dependencies and had more leeway to experiment with new approaches.  It was also small.  Its 
relatively compact size—no more than 300 employees globally between 2004 and 2015—made 
it a good candidate for a dissertation case study, but it also limits the representativeness of the 
study’s findings.  Other development finance contexts might produce different conclusions. For 
example, one interviewee remarked that MCC’s use of growth diagnostics has diffused to the 
World Bank where the method faced initial resistance that was overcome.  There was little to no 
resistance to growth diagnostics at MCC.  Growth diagnostics have also spread to the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID), but the focus there has been on constraints to 
more inclusive forms of growth such as wages rather than private investment.  At both the World 
Bank and USAID, growth diagnostics have been employed to inform country development 
strategies but, as of 2016, not to dictate which sectors should be targeted for investment.  While 
the study’s research design and approach controlled for this kind of variation with supplemental 
examples from multilateral development banks, additional cases would help corroborate whether 
MCC’s experience with these methods is representative of the development finance field more 
broadly.  
Suggestions for Future Research  
To address the limitations of this study, future research should focus on adding additional 
cases that vary according to the type of institutional context, method, and expert.  These three 
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categories are not mutually exclusive and can be combined in different ways.  First, scholars 
might investigate the nature of the economists’ experiences with governance indicators, growth 
diagnostics, and RCTs in other organizations.  For example, cases might explore these methods 
in multilateral development banks such as the World Bank or Inter-American Development 
Bank, non-profit organizations, and philanthropies that have been in existence for varying 
periods of time.  Many of the dynamics described in this study have been anecdotally observed 
during the transition to structural adjustment in the World Bank during the 1980s (Pereira, 1995).  
That historical period could also be examined using this study’s framework.  If state economists 
are studied in additional contexts, we can begin to understand if the strategies orthodox 
economists used in this study are specific to the case of the MCA and MCC or more broadly 
applicable.  The literature of science studies describes the processes of translation and enrollment 
broadly and focuses on scientists, engineers, and laboratories.  This study described these 
processes for state economists and in considerable detail.  The question that remains is whether 
these specific strategies have broader applicability in global development finance across 
organizational contexts. 
 It would also be helpful to understand whether these strategies hold among orthodox 
economists in other fields.  Do economists working in public health or social work also become 
spokespersons of objectivity to gain power in their organizations?  Do they draw on field-level 
standards from epistemic communities?  Do they try to convince non-economists to join their 
cause by teaching them their craft?  Or do orthodox economists in other fields use very different 
strategies to achieve autonomy and withstand trials of strength?  It is equally important to 
understand the different methods of orthodox economists.  Many economists draw on sub-
disciplines in economics such as labor or environmental economics that use different methods.  
  340 
A commonly used method not examined in this study is cost-benefit analysis.  Economists also 
rely on models, which some scholars have argued are worth treating as methods when 
investigating their use as policy devices (e.g., Dellepiane-Avellaneda, 2015).   
Finally, further research should focus on strategies by heterodox economists and other 
expert types.  Do sociologists, environmental regulators, policy analysts, city planners and urban 
designers also achieve autonomy and withstand trials of strength?  How do they do it?  Do they 
use similar strategies to orthodox economists or are their strategies different? Are methods 
central to their political work within organizations?  If stabilized, what effects do their methods 
have on their organizations and its outcomes?  Research might focus on experts’ attempts to 
stabilize “progressive” economic methods, like those that aim to highlight social and gender 
inequality, produce alternative measures of welfare, or account for ecosystem wealth.  Studying 
various expert methods in diverse institutional contexts is important for a research program that 
emphasizes state experts’ political work and their methods’ political effects.  
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1D. Anonymous.  Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of State.  June 22, 2015. 
1E. Anonymous.  Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of the Treasury.  June 28, 2015. 
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1G. Anonymous.  Senior Staffer, United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee.   
 July 14, 2015. 
1H. Anonymous.  Director, Department of the Treasury. July 19, 2015. 
1I.  Anonymous.  Private Sector Development Specialist, International Finance Corporation.  
 July 22, 2015. 
1J.  Anonymous.  Director, Department of the Treasury. August 5, 2015.  
1K. Anonymous.  Undersecretary, Department of State.  August 11, 2015. 
1L. Anonymous.  Economist, World Bank Development Economics Research Group.   
 August 12, 2015. 
1M. Anonymous.  Administrator, United States Agency for International Development.    
 August 28, 2015. 
1N. Anonymous.  Director, United States Agency for International Development.  
 September 1, 2015. 
1O. Anonymous.  Undersecretary, Department of the Treasury.  September 2, 2015. 
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Case 2:  Growth Diagnostics 
2A. Anonymous. Lead Economist, Millennium Challenge Account. May 2, 2015. 
 
2B. Anonymous. Deputy Vice President, Compact Operations, MCC. February 11, 2016. 
 
2C. Anonymous. Director, Economic Analysis. February 18, 2016. 
 
2D. Anonymous. Director, Health and Education, MCC. February 19, 2016 
 
2E. Anonymous. Director, Legal and Regulatory Reform, MCC. February 24, 2016.  
 
2F. Anonymous. Director, Economic Analysis, MCC. February 23, 2016. 
 
2G. Anonymous. Senior Director, Compact Operations, MCC. February 26, 2016. 
 
2H.Anonymous. Senior Director, Environment and Social Protection, MCC. March 2, 2016. 
 
2I. Anonymous. Lead Economist, MCC. March 4, 2016. 
 
2J. Anonymous. Vice President, MCC. March 15, 2016. 
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2P. Anonymous. Deputy Vice President, Compact Operations, MCC. March 29, 2016. 
 
2Q. Anonymous. Managing Director, Agriculture. March 29, 2016.  
 
2R. Anonymous. Director, Compact Development, MCC. March 30, 2016. 
 
2S. Anonymous. Director, Infrastructure, MCC. April 4, 2016. 
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Case 3:  Randomized Controlled Trials 
3A. Anonymous.  Senior Director, Monitoring and Evaluation, MCC. February 17, 2016. 
3B. Anonymous.  Managing Director, Department of Accountability, MCC.  April 27, 2016. 
3C. Anonymous.  Associate Director, Policy and International Relations, MCC. May 26,  2016. 
3D. Anonymous. Senior Agricultural Specialist, MCC. June 22, 2016. 
3E. Anonymous. Director, Monitoring and Evaluation, MCC.  June 24, 2016. 
3F. Anonymous. Director, Economic Analysis, MCC. June 27, 2016. 
3G. Anonymous. Associate Director, Monitoring and Evaluation, MCC. June 29, 2016. 
3H. Anonymous. Program Officer, Monitoring and Evaluation, MCC. June 29, 2016. 
3I. Anonymous. Senior Director, Agriculture and Land, MCC.  June 30, 2016. 
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3K. Anonymous. Director, Economic Analysis, MCC. July 7, 2016. 
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Appendix B: Tables and Figures for Governance Indicators Chapter 
Table B-1 
Differences in Income Between Low-income Countries Based on MCA Qualification Criteria 
Performance, 2004–2012  
 
Source: Performance data is from the Millennium Challenge Corporation.  Income data is from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators. 
Notes: Income data at the time of selection was lagged by two years, i.e. selection for fiscal year 2008 used 2006 
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Table B-2 
Differences in Income Between Lower Middle-income Countries Based on MCA Qualification 
Criteria Performance, 2006–2012  
 
Source: Performance data is from the Millennium Challenge Corporation.  Income data is from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators.  
Notes: Income data at the time of selection was lagged by two years, i.e. selection for fiscal year 2008 used 2006 
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Appendix C: Tables and Figures for Growth Diagnostics Chapter 
Table C-1 
Distribution of Categorized Data Sources in MCC Constraints Analyses 
Data Source N Percent of Total 
World Bank World Development Indicators 202 13.6 
Central or National Bank  125 8.4 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys 113 7.6 
International Monetary Fund 92 6.2 
World Bank Doing Business Survey 86 5.8 
National Statistics Office 75 5.0 
Other World Bank 73 4.9 
Other National Ministry 70 4.7 
World Economic Forum 57 3.8 
National Ministry of Finance or Economy 47 3.2 
Other United Nations 41 2.8 
Investment Climate Survey Diagnostic 41 2.8 
Economist Intelligence Unit 38 2.6 
Regional Multilateral Development Bank  35 2.4 
National Infrastructure Ministry 35 2.4 
Unspecified     33 2.2 
National Labor Survey 30 2.0 
UN Center for Trade and Development 30 2.0 
National Economic Social Survey  28 1.9 
Other International Organization 25 1.7 
US Based University or Think Tank 25 1.7 
Individual Scholars 22 1.5 
National Regulatory Agency 20 1.3 
United States Government  20 1.3 
Other National Survey 19 1.3 
UN Food and Agriculture Organization 19 1.3 
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 15 1.0 
UN World Health Organization 14 0.9 
US Based Consultancy 14 0.9 
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Other International Survey 13 0.9 
Other     12 0.8 
National Utility or Port Authority  10 0.7 
Domestic University or Think Tank  8 0.5 
Total* 1,487 100.0 
* The number of data sources is higher than analyses because some analyses use more than one data 
 source. 
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Table C-2 
Distribution of Categorized Data Sources in MCC Constraints Analyses for High Cost of 
Finance Constraints 
 
Data Source Constraint 
 
Bad International 
Finance (%)  
(N=41) 
Low Domestic 
Savings (%)  
(N=87) 
Poor 
Intermediation (%)  
(N=122) 
IMF and National Central 
Banks  22 52 42 
Worldwide Development 
Indicators 22 25 9 
World & Regional 
Development Banks 10 6 2 
Competitiveness Surveys 0 1 14 
UN or Other International 
Organization 12 0 1 
Economist Intelligence 
Unit  7 9 5 
National Ministry or 
Regulator  7 0 10 
National Survey 7 5 8 
US Government, Think 
Tank, or Consultancy 7 1 2 
International Survey 0 0 1 
Other 2 0 0 
Unspecified 2 1 6 
Total 100 100 100 
 Source: MCC Constraints Analyses’ Final Reports. 
Notes: IMF (International Monetary Fund), WDI (World Bank World Development Indicators), WGI 
(World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators), WB (World Bank), EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit), 
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Table C-3 
Distribution of Categorized Data Sources in MCC Constraints Analyses for Market Failure 
Constraints 
 
Data Source Constraint 
 
Information Externalities  (%) 
(N=96) 
Coordination Externalities (%)  
(N=11) 
Competitiveness Surveys 27 0 
National Survey 6 36 
UN or Other International 
Organization 27 18 
Other World & Regional 
Development Bank 7 18 
US Government, Think 
Tank, or Consultancy 3 18 
National Ministry or 
Regulator  10 9 
Individual Scholars 8 0 
Economist Intelligence 
Unit 1 0 
Worldwide Development 
Indicators 4 0 
IMF and National Central 
Banks  2 0 
International Survey 2 0 
Unspecified 1 0 
Total 100 100 
 Source: MCC Constraints Analyses’ Final Reports. 
Notes: IMF (International Monetary Fund), WDI (World Bank World Development Indicators), WGI 
(World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators), WB (World Bank), EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit), 
USG (United States Government). Source: MCC Constraints Analyses’ Final Reports. 
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Table C-4 
Distribution of Categorized Data Sources in MCC Constraints Analyses for Government Failure 
Constraints 
 
Data Source Constraint 
 
Micro Risks (%)  
(N=222) 
Macro Risks (%)  
(N=145) 
Competitiveness Surveys  47 3 
IMF and National Central Banks  4 41 
National Ministry or Regulator  11 12 
Economist Intelligence Unit 0 10 
Worldwide Development 
Indicators 6 9 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators 7 0 
Other World and Regional 
Development Banks 3 8 
National Survey 3 6 
Individual Scholars 3 0 
UN or Other International 
Organization 5 3 
International Survey 3 0 
US Government, Think Tank, or 
Consultancy 4 1 
Unspecified 3 2 
Other 0 2 
Domestic Think Tank or 
Consultancy  1 1 
Total 100 100 
 Source: MCC Constraints Analyses’ Final Reports. 
Notes: IMF (International Monetary Fund), WDI (World Bank World Development Indicators), WGI 
(World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators), WB (World Bank), EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit), 
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Table C-5 







Source: MCC Constraints Analyses’ Final Reports. 
Notes: IMF (International Monetary Fund), WDI (World Bank World Development Indicators), WGI 
(World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators), WB (World Bank), EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit), 
USG (United States Government). 
 
  








Competitiveness Surveys 1 20 28 
IMF and National 
Central Banks  1 1 1 
National Ministry or 
Regulator  19 7 21 
National Survey 4 31 4 
Individual Scholars 0 4 0 
International Survey 2 1 0 
Other 5 0 1 
Other World & Regional 
Development Banks 12 3 13 
Domestic Think Tank or 
Consultancy  0 1 1 
UN or Other 
International 
Organization 13 13 9 
Unspecified 2 1 2 
US Government, Think 
Tank, or Consultancy 18 3 4 
Worldwide Development 
Indicators 23 15 16 
Total 100 100 100 
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Table C-6 
Summary Statistics on Analysis Types Found in MCC Constraints Analyses 
 
 Snapshot Time Series Total 
 
N % N % N % 
Descriptive 190 14.0 429 31.7 619 45.7 
Benchmarked 397 29.3 239 17.7 636 47.0 
Correlation 60 4.4 21 1.6 81 6.0 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 7 0.5 4 0.3 11 0.8 
Map 7 0.5 0 0.0 7 0.5 
Total 661 48.8 693 51.2 1,354 100.0 
Source: MCC Constraints Analyses’ Final Reports. 
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Appendix D: Tables and Figures for Randomized Controlled Trials Chapter 
Table D-1 











































PSD Education & Individual Mentoring RRO Complete 




















Indonesia Community Nutrition HECS 
Community based health 
grants RA Ongoing 















Mongolia Peri-Urban Land Leasing Land  Individual land titles RA Ongoing 
Mongolia Vocational Education HECS 
Individual training and 
access to new equipment RA Ongoing 
Morocco Enterprise Support Grants PSD 
Business development 
grants RA Complete 
Morocco Fruit Tree Rehabilitation ARD 
Education & Individual 
Mentoring RA Complete 






























Energy Household connection subsidy RA Ongoing 
 Source: MCC Impact Evaluation Database. 
Notes: Only RCTs where a control group was identified are included in the list.  Randomized designs 
include RRO (Randomized Roll-out), RA (Random assignment), and RPL (Randomized pipeline).  Sector 
acronyms stand for Agricultural and Rural Development (ARD), Private Sector Development (PSD), 
Health, Education, and Community Services (HECS), and Water and Sanitation (W&S). 
 
